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ABSTRACT  
Entrepreneurship is an interdisciplinary process regarded to have the potential to create wide 
ranging socio-economic impact, however the fuller understanding of entrepreneurs operating 
within emerging markets or developing economies remains somewhat ambiguous.  As such, 
this study examined entrepreneurship through the interdependence of the individual and 
context, examining the unique notion of co-evolution and reflexivity to and from 
entrepreneurial action and institutional elements within a specific context.  Creating a more 
comprehensive understanding of the duality of the entrepreneur and operational context 
within an emerging market, this study addressed three main objectives, investigating: the 
individual internal characteristics, or drivers, of the entrepreneur; the influences from 
external dynamics and institutions, or determinants, on entrepreneurial outlook and action; 
and finally, if and how entrepreneurial action can be reflexive to and from existing 
institutions as both co-evolve within operational structures. 
 
The conceptual framework developed for this research was informed by Structuration 
Theory, which interprets entrepreneurship as a co-evolving construction of structure, agent 
and social system, providing a theoretical outline for the empirical analysis of 
entrepreneurship as a reflexive interdependent duality.  Research used the coffee sectors of 
Ethiopia and Rwanda to structure the investigation of entrepreneurs given the similarly linear 
formations of each marketplace.  Use of the respective coffee markets provided a framework 
for detailed analysis of entrepreneurship occurring across a range of entrepreneurial 
classifications and different business models across the coffee industries, comprising 
Smallholder Producers, Processors and Exporters.  This comparative analysis further 
examined the entrepreneurial phenomenon within opposing economic systems of market 
liberalization and political embrace, using participatory qualitative and quantitative methods 
to collect and analyse data, and interpret results. 
 
Empirical analysis between the internal construct of Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs 
revealed inherent differences as well as varying strengths and weaknesses of the tested 
drivers across the different business types.  Comparative analyses of operational contexts 
found multiple elements to influence entrepreneurship and revealed situations of 
entrepreneurial constriction and entrepreneurial dynamism.  Examination of entrepreneurship 
as an interdependent whole demonstrated the reflexive nature of entrepreneurial action on 
systems and structures, revealing both positive and negative outcomes of reflexivity and 
additionality.   
 
This thesis identified, demonstrated and explored entrepreneurship as a multifaceted, 
composition of the interdependence of the entrepreneur and operational context; with 
entrepreneurship found to have the potential for introducing change, only if embraced 
through the appropriate systems.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1. Study Introduction 
Entrepreneurship is a critical element to economic development and industry advancement, 
and can provide pathways for improved livelihood and economic growth across sectors 
(Casson, 2003; Rocha, 2004; Brixiova and Asaminew, 2010; Hall et al., 2012).  However, 
determining factors, which may predispose entrepreneurial outlook and influence action of 
entrepreneurs within emerging markets remains ambiguous and has received relatively less 
attention within areas of the entrepreneurship discourse (Thai and Turkina, 2013).  A 
complex, interdisciplinary and even convoluted area of study; entrepreneurship can manifest 
through a multitude of factors, depictions and understandings across a myriad of 
backgrounds, cultures, business models and operating environments (Baumol, 1993; Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane et al., 2003).  Individual entrepreneurs are coloured through 
a prism of vibrant characteristics and differing environments, which conjoin through the 
discovery and exploitation of opportunity pursuit (Shane, 2003).  Indeed, internal 
characteristics can propel attention and opportunity pursuit (Chell, 2008) and likewise, 
external contexts can be highly influential through the environment presenting the 
opportunity and corresponding risk (Gregoire et al., 2010; Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  In 
turn, entrepreneurial action can also leave its mark upon a wider system (Sarason et al., 
2006).   
 
While the entrepreneurial face may vary across location, business model or operational 
composition, it is believed core similarities and needs exist across all realms.  However, 
understanding how these internal characteristics and contexts influence entrepreneurship 
within an emerging market requires additional study as empirical evidence defining the 
characteristics and contextual influences remain limited (Williams and Nadin, 2010; Boso et 
al., 2013); it is the generation of this evidence that drives this specific study.  
 
1.1.1 Research Gaps Defined   
Traditionally, entrepreneurship study has focused on either the opportunity or the individual, 
but rarely both and much of the current analysis and discourse centred on entrepreneurship 
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has focused this analysis on either the individual or the opportunity within a western or 
developed economy context (Rogerson, 2001; Thai and Turkina, 2013).  Given the wide 
range and interdisciplinary nature of the contributing fields to the study of entrepreneurship, 
it has proven difficult for scholars to pinpoint a distinct definition or define a unified 
approach for analysis and as such, entrepreneurship remains one of the least-understood 
fields (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003; Jennings et al., 2013; Mazzucato, 
2015).  This has created a gap in current research in terms of how to approach the analysis of 
entrepreneurs operating within emerging markets as well as how to understand, analyse and 
interpret the resulting outcomes from entrepreneurial outlook and action.  Given the lack in 
current entrepreneurship research, specifically addressing action within an emerging market 
context, entrepreneurially orientated activities and actors are still not well understood within 
the developing economy context (Boso et al., 2013).   
 
Traditionally, work has investigated either the actor or the opportunity existing within a 
developed economy, and while investigation within the developing country context is 
growing, there currently exists much opportunity and need for additional exploration 
(Jennings et al., 2013).  It is assumed a variety of entrepreneurial activities are on going 
within emerging economies, however empirical evidence demonstrating the internal make-up 
and wider operational landscape of current entrepreneurs in these contexts is scarce 
(Williams and Nadin, 2010).   
 
Within a theoretical realm, more recent thought has sought to investigate entrepreneurship 
either as a dualism or duality within differing approaches and philosophical concepts.  
Related investigation into entrepreneurship as a duality using Structuration Theory has 
recently only taken place on a theoretical level and has yet to be empirically tested (Sarason 
et al., 2006).  As such, it is this notion of entrepreneurship as an interdependent duality that 
this research looked to test through empirical analysis of the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial 
action within the context of emerging markets, specifically analysed in the context of the 
coffee markets of Ethiopia and Rwanda (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Sarason et al., 
2006).  
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1.1.2 Research Rationale  
Undertaking this journey of understanding entrepreneurship and more specifically, 
entrepreneurship within an emerging market context, began with the following questions, 
which evolved to form the rational for this study.  Do all entrepreneurs have similar 
characteristics, which predispose entrepreneurial action?   Can entrepreneurs succeed in 
opportunity pursuit in spite of external structures or hurdles?  And do these external barriers 
influence an entrepreneur’s opportunity pursuit or dictate entrepreneurial action?   
 
While some individuals may have all the markers considered necessary of an entrepreneur, 
the influence of the operational context presents an interesting quandary into how operational 
contexts have the potential to enable or even prohibit entrepreneurial action and advancement 
(Mazzucato, 2015).  Within a developing economy context, with varying degrees to the rule 
of law, political perspectives, regulatory environments, strength of market structures and 
fluidity to the formalization and professionalization across sectors, the analysis of 
entrepreneurship is an especially critical investigation for understanding wider growth and 
developmental potentials (Acs et al., 2008; Chell, 2008). 
   
As such, understanding entrepreneurship as only an outcome of individual genius is only part 
of the story and instead should be considered as an intertwined phenomenon of individual 
and context.  Building from this rationale, research has looked to identify, investigate and 
understand the individual characteristics and operational contexts needed to shape and 
support entrepreneurial action, as well as how entrepreneurial action is reflexive to structures, 
which may go on to influence a wider system within emerging markets.  In doing so, this 
research relied on Structuration Theory to inform a theoretical basis for interpreting and 
understanding entrepreneurship as an interdependent duality of the individual entrepreneur 
and operational context (Sarason et al., 2006).  Ensuing research was constructed to first 
analyse the internal characteristics, or drivers, of entrepreneurs in order to determine 
differences or similarities of the internal construct between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs.  Second, research investigated the external parameters, or determinants, within 
a specific operational context influencing the entrepreneur’s outlook, perception and 
opportunity pursuit.  With the improved understanding of the individual and operational 
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context realized, research progressed to assess the entrepreneur and context as a whole, and 
investigated how entrepreneurship can be reflexive to wider systems and economies within 
emerging market contexts; questioning if a symbiotic ecosystem can be built through the 
interrelated actions of entrepreneurs, State agendas and national need. 
 
Through research and corresponding analytical investigation, this study provided additional 
evidence into the individual construct of an entrepreneur as well as to the influences on 
entrepreneurship from differing factors within operating environments, reinforcing areas of 
current discourse, but also providing new information on entrepreneurs within the developing 
economy context.  This research also presented evidence to gaps in research areas concerning 
actors traditionally more difficult to classify and analyse within developing economies, 
particularly operators within informal sectors, such as the rural smallholder producer or 
micro and small-scale business owners operating outside of major urban areas or traditional 
enterprise zones.  
 
1.1.3 Study Area 
In order to understand the individual entrepreneur and operational context in action within an 
emerging market context, this study conducted a comparative analysis of entrepreneurs 
across the market chains of the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda.  While this research 
remains an investigation and analysis of entrepreneurship, it used the coffee sectors as a 
means to house the overall research framework due to the relatively linear formation of the 
two marketplaces.  Investigation across the coffee chains provided additional ability to 
investigate a wider range of entrepreneurial faces given the different businesses, starting 
points and operational structures of smallholder rural producers, private owners of processing 
centres and founders of formalized exporting businesses.  Comparative analyses were made 
between actors across the chains in order to further investigate the potential influences of 
individual constructs to differing business models, understand how environments of 
operation can shape entrepreneurs across a range of business models, as well as to investigate 
how entrepreneurial action can influence different operating environments. 
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Presented in greater detail in Chapter 4, these markets have evolved out of similar histories 
and continue to operate under similar, yet unique structures today, providing an ideal 
platform for comparison of not only individual entrepreneurs, but also of wider operational 
landscapes effecting entrepreneurship within each country and how each may co-evolve.  
Following the political and economic evolutions of both countries since the 1990s, each 
country has diverged down differing paths of market openness, distinct embrace of 
entrepreneurship, and engendered growth of the private sector (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; 
Boudreaux, 2007; 2010; Petit, 2007).  Given the interdependence and importance of an 
operating environment and related influences to entrepreneurial action, a strong investigation 
and understanding of the specific contexts researched was found necessary in order to not 
only enable appropriate absorption of respondents, but also to appropriately analyse action 
through comparative analysis. 
 
The comparative analysis of these two countries was used to more fully investigate and 
present entrepreneurs operating across a range of business segments and different operational 
contexts to enable comparison of not only respondents, but of market structures, financial 
mechanisms and political embrace. 
 
1.2 Study Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
Multiple theoretical approaches have been developed in order to describe and unpack the 
entrepreneurial web of individual and context; however, this specific research looked to 
determine the entrepreneur and context in tandem.  Using Structuration Theory to inform 
understanding of entrepreneurship as the interdependence of the individual and context, this 
study has developed its own conceptual framework, coined as the Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship Nexus, which comprises both the individual entrepreneur and environment 
housing specific opportunity.  The nexus further allows for a framework in which to analyse 
how entrepreneurship can co-evolve as entrepreneurs in turn influence a system of operation.  
While a multitude of possibilities exist for both the theoretical and empirical investigation of 
entrepreneurship, as will be described in greater detail in Sections 2.2 and 3.2.1, this research 
understands the ‘individual’ as an internal construct, investigating internal, inherent 
characteristics, which may predispose an individual towards entrepreneurial action.  
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Likewise, ‘operational context’ refers to the combination of determinants reflecting the 
systemic nature and/ or institutions naturally occurring within an economy or market 
dynamic, which an entrepreneur must navigate.   
 
The research aim is to improve understanding of the individual characteristics and 
operational contexts of actors within a developing economy context, specifically analysing 
entrepreneurship within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets.  In doing so, this 
research first deconstructs the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus into the individual 
construct and operational context for independent analysis, in order to finally analyse 
influences of the reflexive entrepreneur within the co-evolving nexus in its entirety.  As such, 
this study aims to address the following three research areas:  
 
1. What internal characteristics, or drivers, of the individual construct separate an 
entrepreneur from non-entrepreneur? 
2. What external dynamics of the operational context, or determinants, shape an 
entrepreneur’s approach, outlook and opportunity pursuit? 
3. How drivers and determinants can be fused to reveal influences from entrepreneurial 
reflexivity and additionality on wider structures within a co-evolving, interdependent, 
entrepreneurial ecosystem? 
 
Guided by the above aims, research relies on the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus as a 
conceptual framework for ensuing analysis.  Corresponding research objectives and 
questions are presented below.  
 
Research Objective 1  
To identify specific drivers (individual, internal construct) of entrepreneurs within an 
emerging economy 
- What are the specific characteristics of entrepreneurs along the coffee chain? 
- What additional attributes may separate entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs?  
- Are there differences and/or similarities of drivers tested between entrepreneur 
classifications or differing segments along the coffee chain and between countries? 
 
Research Objective 2  
To identify specific determinants (operational context of opportunity) which influence 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy 
- What are the historical and socio-cultural influences to entrepreneurship? 
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- What are the current political environments influencing entrepreneurship? 
- What are the market structures of the coffee chain that influence entrepreneurship? 
- What are the available local resources influencing entrepreneurship? 
 
Research Objective 3  
To identify evidence of the potential for entrepreneurial reflexivity and additionality to 
operating environments and wider economies 
- What perceptions, behaviours and actions are results of the reflexive entrepreneur? 
- How does influence from operational contexts and related entrepreneurial action 
influence a wider economy? 
- Can entrepreneurs be architects of change? How?  
 
The analysis and corresponding outcomes of the above research objectives are presented and 
dissected in tandem, with results building from each analysis in order to be used in support of 
the ensuing investigation of the next objective.   
 
1.3 Thesis Outline  
Given the research aim and specific approach, distinct emphasis has been placed on more 
fully understanding the individual entrepreneur and distinctive influences of operational 
contexts and market systems of entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Rwanda.  As such, the thesis is 
constructed in order to first lay the groundwork of related theory, research methodology and 
contextual histories, in order to then present results from the investigation and analysis of 
each research objective.  The following chapters are outlined as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 – Discussion of classical to current entrepreneurship theory, related policy 
implications and current discourse on entrepreneurship within developing economies, 
particularly within sub-Saharan Africa.  Theoretical backgrounds to the interdisciplinary 
approach taken for research design and analysis are also discussed.  
 
 Chapter 3 – Presentation of the research approach and design, inclusive of a review of 
the specific, targeted research areas and methods employed in respondent sourcing, data 
collection and analysis.  The Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus is introduced and its 
framing for this research is further described.  
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 Chapter 4 – Explanation of the structure of the global coffee market as well as the 
complex political, economic, cultural and social histories of Ethiopia and Rwanda and 
related coffee markets believed to effect entrepreneurial settings, behaviour and actions.  
 
 Chapter 5 – Identification of the socio-demographic elements as well as internal 
characteristics, or drivers, in order to further understand the individual construct of the 
entrepreneur as well as non-entrepreneur.  The Entrepreneurial Range and corresponding 
business segments used for entrepreneur classification and further analysis is introduced 
with ensuing comparison and analysis of drivers made between respondents classified 
along the Entrepreneurial Range.  
 
 Chapter 6 – Identification of the contextual operating environments and determinants 
that influence entrepreneurs and corresponding action.  Investigation includes the 
analysis into influences from histories and socio-cultural impacts, current political 
environments, existing market structures and local resource availability.  
 
 Chapter 7 – Interpretation into the potential influences from entrepreneurial reflexivity 
onto the wider systems and economies researched.  Outcomes of research investigations 
enable a completed construction of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem and related reflexive 
influences and ensuing additionality realized throughout the sector and broader economy; 
presenting an argument as to how, if enabled, entrepreneurs can be architects of social 
and institutional change. 
 
 Chapter 8 – Conclusion of this thesis presents research findings, exhibits research 
contributions, discusses policy recommendations and directs possibilities for further 
research through the introduction of a macro-level framework and corresponding set of 
micro-level parameters for use in future research and analysis on entrepreneurship: the 
Entrepreneurship Blueprint and its corresponding Entrepreneurship Matrix.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review.  An Entrepreneurial Recipe  
2.1 Introduction  
The study of entrepreneurship is an interdisciplinary process encompassing the variable 
nature of differing contexts, venturing activities, support mechanisms, inherent cultures, 
growth variations as well as individual characteristics and psychologies (Lee and Peterson, 
2000).  In assessing entrepreneurship, distinct collections of research foci emerge, including 
but far from limited to: entrepreneurial management, networks and institutions, new business 
creation, as well as more recent research on the societal impacts of entrepreneurship 
(Jennings et al., 2013).  Given the wide range of contributing fields to the study of 
entrepreneurship, it has proven difficult for scholars to pinpoint a distinct definition or 
unified approach for analysis.  However the inherent fluidity of investigating 
entrepreneurship also affords one the ability to move in, across, and throughout subject areas 
in building baselines of knowledge and identifying gaps to current research and theoretical 
thought; creating an entrepreneurial adventure in its own right!  Despite the lack of one, 
unified definition, entrepreneurship scholarship still centres around the process of the 
discovery, evaluation, pursuit and exploitation of opportunity and the individual’s potential 
and ability to maximize the exploited opportunity in a new or unique way within a distinct 
marketplace (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Casson, 2003).  As such, entrepreneurs are 
transporters of new ideas, innovations and change, and can be highly impactful to local 
systems of operation.      
 
Entrepreneurs are active in any society and as such, form an important part of a society’s 
economic make-up (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005).  A variety of entrepreneurial activities 
are occurring within emerging economies, however empirical evidence demonstrating the 
internal make-up and wider operational landscape of current entrepreneurs in these contexts 
is scare (Williams and Nadin, 2010).  Entrepreneurship is critical to the development of an 
economic ecosystem (Baumol, 1993; Isenberg, 2010; Acs et al., 2014) regardless of whether 
it occurs within formalized economic structures or informal marketplaces (Thai and Turkina, 
2013).  Despite this, entrepreneurially orientated activities and actors are currently still not all 
that well understood within the developing economy context (Boso et al., 2013).   
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This research is based largely from entrepreneurship theory stemming from an economics 
discourse, however given the larger confines of the research’s conceptual framework of what 
is has coined as the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, this work also relied on 
contribution from the sociology and psychology perspectives.  Informed by Structuration 
Theory, this study understands entrepreneurship as a co-evolving construct1 of the individual 
and opportunity within a specific structure or operational context, however this work does 
not fully nor exclusively apply the structuration model in its investigation and analysis of 
entrepreneurship.  As such, this research approach and ensuing analysis understands 
entrepreneurship through the dynamic process of an agent engaging to, and responding with, 
a specific context, understanding the entrepreneur and structure as co-evolving, 
interdependent mechanisms (Sarason et al., 2006).  
 
In order to understand this nexus beyond its theoretical scope, research deconstructed the 
nexus of it conceptual framework to first analyse the enterprising individual, to then 
understand influences from the specific operational context of opportunity pursuit, and 
finally to understand the nexus in its entirety in looking at how entrepreneurs can influence 
their environment.  
 
In preparation for the remaining thesis, this chapter looks to provide a solid grounding for 
analysing entrepreneurship through the confines of this research framework and approach.  
As such, this chapter largely follows the layout of this research approach and remaining 
analysis is constructed as follows: 
 
1. Presentation of the theoretical study of entrepreneurship evolution and related policy.  
2. Investigation into the development basis for the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus. 
3. Identification of elements of the individual construct, or internal drivers. 
4. Identification of elements within an operational context, or external determinants, that 
may influence entrepreneurial action. 
5. Discussion on current discourse on entrepreneurship in developing economies, 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
                                                        
1 Shane and Venkataraman (2000) first presented the individual- opportunity nexus.  Sarason et al., (2006) first 
used Structuration Theory to extrapolate the theoretical application of the individual- opportunity nexus further. 
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2.2 Entrepreneurship Theory and Major Contributions 
Theoretical viewpoints of entrepreneurship have continued to evolve and deepen with the 
emergence of new economic growth strategies and the continued advancement of thought 
concerning economic development, particularly within the developing economy context 
(Rogerson, 2001; Thai and Turkina, 2013).   While entrepreneurs are key to sustained, 
successful economic growth at a national level, given its inherent interdisciplinary nature, 
research has yet to establish universal criteria or guidelines in which to define and classify 
the entrepreneur or process of the entrepreneurial venture (Boso et al., 2013; Carsud et al., 
2014).  As such, the understanding of specifics of entrepreneurial action and the uniqueness 
of the individual entrepreneur particularly within emerging economies or informal sectors 
remains an evolving understanding.  Classical entrepreneurship theory leaned heavily on the 
interdisciplinary domains of sociology, psychology and economics and while this research 
relied to a greater degree on an economic perspective, it benefited from all three.  This 
section looks to first review classical and current thought on entrepreneurship, leading to 
current policy agendas within the developing economy and emerging market context 
believed to impact entrepreneurship, as much of the study and discussion to date has focused 
on the formal business with a ‘western’ or ‘developed’ economy.  Empirical information, 
concerning entrepreneurship in emerging or developing economies is considerably more 
limited, with much focus at a macro level, as opposed to the micro or individual venture level 
(Carsud et al., 2014).  This research intends to look at entrepreneurship at the macro, meso 
and micro levels.  
 
2.2.1 Theory and Major Contributors 
In its most basic form, entrepreneurship focuses on the discovery and exploitation of 
profitable opportunities.  Opportunities are defined here as a “natural consequence of 
economic volatility.  And at any given time some opportunities will be recognized and 
exploited (by certain individuals), and others will be overlooked” (Casson, 2010, p. 44).  As 
such, research has typically approached the entrepreneurial phenomenon by either looking 
exclusively at the individual as the ‘agent’ instituting change or pursuing opportunity, or by 
looking exclusively at external forces in which opportunities are embedded (Shane, 2003).  
Given these distinct research approaches, traditional study has focused on entrepreneurs as 
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‘fillers of market gaps’ or through opportunity pursuit via new firm creation; typically within 
‘western’ or ‘developed’ markets (Sarason et al., 2006).  This study looked to benefit from 
the more recent approaches understanding and analysing entrepreneurship through the 
interdependence of the individual and operational context, as will be discussed throughout 
this chapter.     
 
Despite multiple definitions and approaches of study, in order to ensure transparency in the 
knowledge gained and used from current discourse as well as to add credence to this specific 
research perspective, a distinct and pragmatic definition of the entrepreneur was developed 
specifically for this research to further enable and support research activities.  As such, 
within this research, an entrepreneur is defined as:  
An individual aimed at profit maximization through opportunity recognition and its 
pursuit, which has resulted in unique, tangible action towards opportunity 
recognized.  
In this definition, profit is understood not only in monetary terms, but also through non-
monetary means.  Non-monetary means can be as varied as secured benefits, such as supply 
and/ or sourcing routes, additional payments earned in-kind such as technical agriculture or 
business trainings or even expanded marketing opportunities.  Business success rates or exact 
profitability could not be obtained or verified within this research and as such were not used 
as a specific measurement for entrepreneurial classification, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in Section 5.2.3.  This definition does not expressly account for potential power 
dynamics related to gender and/ or certain ethnicities, which in some contexts may restrict 
certain individuals from believing in their own opportunity pursuit or ability to take tangible 
action towards an opportunity recognized; this is recognized as a limitation of this study.  
Section 3.3.3, presents the additional guidelines used in determining respondents as 
entrepreneurs.  Table 2.1 below, presents a systematic review of entrepreneurship thought 
and corresponding defining elements to entrepreneurship as identified through this literature 
review.    
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Table 2.1 Systematic Review of Entrepreneurship  
Author(s) Contribution to Entrepreneurship Study Defining Elements of Entrepreneurs/ Entrepreneurship  
Cantillion  
(1775) 
First introduction of the term 'entrepreneur' as an organized study of 
phenomenon 
Entrepreneur is an agent who contracts business arrangements with 
known risk of uncertainty 
Schumpeter (1921; 
1934) 
Introduction of ideas of Creative Destruction, New Combinations.  
Risk is borne by financier, not entrepreneur 
Risk taking is a characteristic of capital investment / investor  
Entrepreneur capitalizes on market disequilibrium through new 
combinations or creative destruction of existing processes 
Kirzner  
(1979) 
Entrepreneurial discovery occurs through the ‘push - pull' effect of 
opportunity alertness and pull of profit 
Entrepreneur is the decision maker who arises out of an alertness to 
an opportunity 
Casson  
(1982; 2003) 
Entrepreneurial opportunity is through new goods, services, materials 
and processes that are introduced and sold at a greater value.  
Individual specializes in the judgment of unique allocation of scarce 
resources.  
Entrepreneurship occurs through the individual valuation of 
opportunity and resources; opportunity discovery is a subjective 
process.  Entrepreneurs are ‘judgmental decision makers’, 
individuals who create and are responsible in conceiving and 
implementing new business plans aimed at wealth creation 
Baumol  
(1993) 
Individual Approach - entrepreneur is an individual who interprets 
opportunity to create new businesses.   
Firm-Organizing Approach - entrepreneur is a high-level 
management group that creates, or operates new processes into 
business ventures. 
Entrepreneurship occurs via continual innovation to ensure new 
opportunity discovery for profit maximization 
Society’s rules and norms create incentives and influence firms to 
entrepreneurial activity.  At times institutional factors incentivize 
rent-seeking entrepreneurship activity as opposed to socially 
productive activity 
Palich and Bagby 
(1995) 
Entrepreneurial Individual vs. Entrepreneurial Firm 
Entrepreneurs perceive less risk than managers.  Entrepreneurs view 
business opportunity more positively, view risk elements as potential 
opportunity 
 
Venkataraman 
(1997) 
Opportunity discovery process is subjective and not all individuals 
recognize and react to same opportunity in same way 
Entrepreneurship is intrinsically linked to individual opportunity 
valuation  
Stewart et al. 
(1999) 
Entrepreneurs are driven to succeed, have a higher propensity for risk 
–taking, than small business owners or corporate managers 
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(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Shane and 
Venkataraman 
(2000) 
Perceived lack of conceptual framework for entrepreneurship study: 
development, presentation of the Individual - Opportunity Nexus 
Field of entrepreneurship study is the scholarly examination of how, 
by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods 
and services are discovered, evaluated and exploited. 
Baum et al. 
(2001) 
Understanding of different skills and/ or traits have different direct 
and indirect affects on venture performance  
 
Shane  
(2003; 2012) 
Opportunity perception is a key element within entrepreneurial 
process.  Opportunity perception uses awareness of socio-
demographics, socio-cultural environments and new knowledge 
development  
The entrepreneurial process occurs via individual pursuit of specific 
opportunity following consideration of optimal pricing and/or 
expected returns 
Rocha 
(2004) 
Entrepreneurship is positively associated with economic development 
and changes to social structures following entrepreneurial activity.  
Clusters may have impact on entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is the creation of new organizations.  
Technological innovation and human capital are included as 
endogenous variables to entrepreneurial behavior.  
Acs et al. 
(2008; 2014) 
Importance of entrepreneurship to economic development.  
Importance and impact differs given development stage of an 
economy: factor-driven, efficiency-driven or innovation-driven stage 
Interdependencies of entrepreneurship within institutional context 
influences economic development and institutions.  Type of 
entrepreneurship depends on country, stage of economic 
development and business arena. 
Brixiova  
(2010) 
Entrepreneurship is a key driver of economic growth, but opportunity 
entrepreneurs and necessity entrepreneurs effect economic growth 
differently 
Opportunity Entrepreneur - found in high-income countries.  
Entrepreneurs enter market out of perceived opportunities for 
maximum return; entrepreneurial efforts have significant, positive 
effect on economic development.   
Necessity Entrepreneur- from lower-income countries, individuals 
enter market out of necessity for survival, typically micro-
enterprises; entrepreneurial efforts have limited to no impact on 
economic development 
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Earliest mentions of entrepreneurship theory are traced back to Cantillion’s 1775 
understanding of self-employed individuals able to adjust to risk with uncertain returns 
(Palich and Bagby, 1995).  Early modern contributions to research on entrepreneurship are 
traced to Knight (1921) and Schumpeter (1934), with important, later influences from 
Baumol, Casson, Kirzner, Shane, and Venkataraman.   Both Knight and Schumpeter each 
understood entrepreneurship within an interdisciplinary context and shared ideas on 
entrepreneurial risk bearing, forming the basis for today’s understanding and platform for 
further study (Shane, 2003; Ricketts, 2006). 
 
Debate focused on the description and function of the entrepreneur is traced to Schumpeter.  
Schumpeter’s early work (1934) focused on the innovating entrepreneur, however his later 
work (1947, 1949) focused primarily on the emergence of the firm as the prim innovating 
driver of growth.  The Schumpeterian perspective depicts entrepreneurship as the factors of 
an individual able to capitalize on ‘new combinations’ through innovation or ‘creative 
destruction’ within a competitive, economic system (Ricketts, 2006).  An entrepreneur 
benefits from the inherent disequilibrium of an economy by introducing change to an 
economic system, challenging established, set operational constructs and business 
incumbents (Schumpeter, 1934; Acs et al., 2014).  Focused on the role of the entrepreneur as 
the ‘personification of innovation’ (Hagedoorn, 1996) Schumpeter understood economies to 
operate in a constant state of disequilibrium, and as such, the State is constantly creating 
opportunity for entrepreneurs to recognize and ‘fill’ gaps left by the market through 
innovation and new combinations (Schumpeter, 1934).  Within this setting, the entrepreneur 
will benefit from changes in political structures, technology, socio-economic trends, and 
regulatory environments to combine resources into more beneficial and valuable forms 
(Shane, 2003).  As such, the entrepreneur becomes the driver of innovation for products and 
processes that force change (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).    
 
Schumpeter’s work further understood entrepreneurship in regards to human capital in which 
the “function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by 
exploiting an invention” which requires “aptitudes that are present in only a small fraction of 
the population” (Baumol, 1993, p.198).  Schumpeterian opportunities tend to be more 
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innovative and break from current knowledge or existing organizational systems and as such, 
also tend to carry more risk (Shane, 2003).  Schumpeter’s second major contribution is the 
consideration that as a capitalistic society develops, entrepreneurship becomes automated and 
larger firms become the beacon for innovation, usurping smaller entrepreneurs due to an 
inherent increased efficiency (Ricketts, 2006).  
 
Kirzner describes the entrepreneurial element in human decision making to be “active and 
creative rather than automatic and mechanical” (1979, p.35).  He defines the ‘pure 
entrepreneur’ as the “decision maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to 
(recognize) unnoticed opportunities” (1973, p.39).   Kirzner saw entrepreneurship as 
requiring ‘differential access’ to information, and as such, it is the interpretation and decision 
making of new information that enables opportunity capitalization (Shane, 2003, p. 20).  In 
connection with appropriate market knowledge, the entrepreneur is thus more able to 
recognize the potential to maximize opportunity.  More specifically, the ‘entrepreneurial 
discovery’ results from a push (alertness) and pull (profit) effect (Arentz et al., 2013).  
Kirzner (1997) believes that speculation in regards to profit seeking is the driving force 
behind production and entrepreneurial action. Through a Kirznerian perspective, 
opportunities are less innovative and instead become alterations to existing systems, 
knowledge or organizational forms, tending to carry less risk (Shane, 2003).  Thus, 
entrepreneurship becomes a mechanism through which inefficiencies in an economy are 
discovered and mitigated (Kirzner, 1973; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Rocha, 2004).    
 
Within the entrepreneurship related literature, two main ‘types’ of entrepreneurs are typically 
discussed and analysed: the development of new business through firm creation via the firm-
organizing approach or the specific individual’s interpretation of opportunity in order to 
create new business opportunity via the individual approach, initially identified by Baumol 
(Baumol, 1993; Lee and Peterson, 2000).  Building from Baumol’s entrepreneur as the 
individual innovator, the “transformation of innovation and ideas are made into an 
economically viable entity,” however this is not dependent on the actual creation of a new 
firm (Baumol, 1993, p. 198).   Instead, Baumol considers the innovating entrepreneur as the 
prime instrument of growth, defining the ‘innovating entrepreneur’ through two specific 
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influences: specific individual attributes and the institutional, social or economic 
arrangements that affected the “quantity of entrepreneurial effort” (1993, p.201).  While this 
research places greater emphasis on the individual, this discussion would be remiss not to 
briefly discuss the firm-organizing entrepreneur.   
 
The firm-organizing entrepreneur can be an individual or high-level management grouping 
that creates, organizes and operates new processes or businesses into new ventures (Baumol, 
1993) and the analysis of firm creation is the most commonly used measure for determining 
entrepreneurship growth (Castanhar et al., 2008).  The firm approach, typically enacted in 
developed economy contexts, has made more progress in the research frontier and stresses 
upon the overall process of entrepreneurship focusing on ‘top-management’ as decision 
makers of new ideas and ventures, accounting for these ‘entities’ as the entrepreneur (Lee 
and Peterson, 2000).  Large amounts of the current discourse focus on the successful creation 
of the firm or a new organization as the ‘entrepreneurial entity,’ specifically within 
developed or more formalized economies.  For purposes of this specific research, less 
emphasis was placed on entrepreneurs as firm creators, and greater emphasis placed on the 
individual entrepreneur as the pursuer of opportunity.  
 
Uncovering the motivating factors of an individual are also key to understanding decisions of 
the specific individual pursuing the opportunity.  The varying resource combinations as well 
as grade of creativity involved not only varies across individuals but also varies between 
opportunity depending on resources available and how an individual perceives those 
resources (Shane et al., 2003).  Thus, this creative combination, resource availability and 
corresponding limits, can cap levels of growth or innovation in certain situations and will be 
further analysed through the confines of this specific research.   
 
While competition spurs growth, knowledge spillover is another key element for innovative 
opportunity perception (Rocha, 2004).  As such, entrepreneurs must continually be 
innovating in order to continually discover new opportunities for profit maximization as 
typically, once something is discovered, others will follow or imitate the discovery, creating 
the potential for reduced profits overtime for the ‘original entrepreneur’ (Baumol, 1993).  
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Thus, if an entrepreneur wishes to continue or increase their profit share, they must innovate 
and adapt accordingly through continual opportunity pursuit.  Through new combinations 
designed for increased profit, governments typically see entrepreneurs as a key generator of 
new employment, creating additional economic benefits and increased revenue streams 
(Palich and Bagby, 1995; Kantis and Federico, 2012).  Entrepreneurial efficiency can also 
greatly benefit an economy through the innovation of not only growth and or the 
establishment of new businesses, but entrepreneurial potential is gained through 
understanding and presenting solutions to market needs, inefficiencies or existing market 
failures (Ricketts, 2006). 
 
Finally, entrepreneurship cannot exist with out opportunity.  Casson explains that 
entrepreneurial opportunities are situations in which new goods and services, materials, and 
processes can be introduced and sold at greater value (Casson, 1982; 2003).  Opportunity is 
intrinsically linked with the individual’s valuation of opportunity or resources.  Thus, 
determining opportunity is a subjective process and as such, not all individuals recognize and 
react to a distinct opportunity in exactly the same way (Venkataraman, 1997).  
 
2.2.2 Entrepreneurial Opportunity Perception  
The understanding of an entrepreneur’s ability to perceive opportunity is key to not only the 
understanding of perception, but also the ability to recognize tangible potential and 
corresponding opportunity pursuits of the entrepreneur (Shane, 2003).  Understanding 
opportunity perception was also critical to enabling ensuing research to adequately and 
accurately appreciate the entrepreneurial perception, discovery process, and related analysis 
from this study.  
 
The entrepreneurial process is one in which “individuals become aware of business 
(ownership) as an option or viable alternative, develop ideas for businesses, learn the 
processes of becoming an entrepreneur and undertake the initiation and development of a 
business” (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005, p. 42).  It is widely agreed this process takes 
place through individuals pursing opportunities (Shane et al., 2003).  However, what causes 
an individual to recognize and pursue one opportunity over another?   Opportunity perception 
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and discovery requires one’s awareness of “demographic, industry, and socio-cultural 
changes of new knowledge development and of the existence of system incongruities” 
(Rindova and Fombrun, 2001, p. 236).  Kirzner’s work plays a key role in understanding 
entrepreneurial opportunity recognition via alertness in that prior knowledge and experience 
are linked with opportunity discovery (Arentz et al., 2013).  Prior knowledge, or knowledge 
stock is defined as “the sum of all knowledge that an individual may possess (consciously or 
not) at a given moment in time” (Arentz et al., 2013, p. 466).     Using Kirzner’s ‘push—pull’ 
understanding of entrepreneurship, an individual’s existing knowledge allows experience and 
unique understanding of combinations to discover opportunity and its exploitation in unique 
ways.  This existing knowledge stock can also predispose an individual towards perceiving 
and discovering opportunities within a specific market context related to existing, specific 
market and contextual knowledge and understood as either entrepreneurial orientation or 
market orientation (Arentz et al., 2013).  Entrepreneurial Orientation refers to the 
opportunity seeking orientation, or ability to explore new market opportunities.  Market 
Orientation refers to the ability to generate, disseminate and respond to market intelligence 
(Boso et al., 2013).     
 
While entrepreneurship encompasses levels of growth aspiration, it varies with the specific 
individual and as such all individuals cannot be considered to wish to attain the same, high 
levels of growth or profits.   Different growth intentions can result from different valuations 
of opportunity or differences in choice (Douglas, 2013).  From a theoretical economics 
perspective, individuals make choices in regards to opportunity pursuit based on projected 
outcomes, typically in consideration of optimal price and or expected returns (Shane, 2003).   
 
Given the varying perspectives, an entrepreneur is one that is able to recognize opportunity 
and in collaboration with the unique, operational or environmental context is able to 
maximize or exploit an opportunity.  An example of the entrepreneurial process and related 
opportunity perception is presented below in Figure 2.1, depicting the stages of the 
opportunity, discovery and pursuit for an entrepreneur. 
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Figure 2.1. Shane’s Model of the Entrepreneurial Process 
 
(Shane, 2003, p. 11) 
 
Even within the entrepreneurial process, information is not guaranteed.  As such, when 
information is unknown, the entrepreneur is left to calculate and determine risk levels and 
expected returns based on their own judgement of a certain set of parameters or unique 
opportunity (Casson, 1982; Shane, 2003). Investigating entrepreneurship from an individual 
approach also accounts for entrepreneurial perception of the environment or contextual 
analysis.  Thus, individuals use specific internal characteristics to make entrepreneurial 
decisions or take action in response to certain environmental circumstances that can support 
or diminish success (Lee and Peterson, 2000).   
 
Through the investigation of the literature’s landscape, what does become clear is that 
individual opportunity recognition, pursuit and exploitation must be paired with the 
appropriate resources and context to enable an entrepreneurially orientated individual to 
maximize an opportunity.  Additionally, for entrepreneurial action to take place, intrinsic, 
internal abilities enabling an individual to see an opportunity as well as the external resources 
enabling an individual to exploit an opportunity must also be present, as both influence 
actions taken (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
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2.2.3 Entrepreneurship within a Policy Landscape 
Great potential exists for continued and sustained economic growth if governments can 
harness the power of entrepreneurship in order to support a transformation of economies.  
However opportunity as well as direct and indirect benefits can also be lost as a government 
presides over a political or economic climate non conducive, or even restrictive to the 
entrepreneurial process.  Boso et al., (2013) argue that within developing economies, high 
levels of both entrepreneurial and market orientation maximizes performance, however 
greater risk can be involved due to underdeveloped structures, regulation and infrastructure.  
Environments with an absence or limited scope of institutions can result in a limited ability to 
access capital, creating a significant barrier to market entry for entrepreneurs (Casson, 2003).  
Given the context of a more underdeveloped sector, network ties and contextual knowledge 
are perceived to be more important than in developed economies (Webb et al., 2009; Boso et 
al., 2013).   
 
As will be seen, entrepreneurial action can be influenced from many areas of government 
policy through regulation or specific legislation governing supply logistics, trade, labour 
markets, social aspects and even development orientated agendas (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 
2005).   In addition, many factors inherent in a society impact policy: cultural or societal 
attitudes, population size, government involvement, labour structures and even the level of 
entrepreneurial action at a current time (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005).  According to 
Kantis and Federico (2012) the most common applications or implements for supporting and 
growing entrepreneurship within a developing economy are access to seed capital, business 
incubation centres and technical assistance.  However the use, and of course, effectiveness of 
these are dependent upon specific country and administrative contexts.   
 
Government design of entrepreneurship strategy (if existing) and related policy objectives 
include four major areas.  Specific policy areas for government support or direct involvement 
include Extension, New Firm Creation, Niche and Holistic Entrepreneurship policy 
(Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005).  These targeted approaches reveal goals of specific 
governments, but also the current state of economic systems and development within a 
specific country.  Specific policy typologies are listed below:   
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- Extension Policy refers to governments without explicit entrepreneurship dominated 
policy structures.  Support is provided to add-on measures to existing strategies or 
services already in place.   Primary focuses of governments involved with extension 
type policy are those attempting to address market failures.  
 
- New Firm Creation Policy is geared towards supporting (and in some cases 
simplifying) the start-up processes for businesses and reducing regulatory barriers. 
 
- Niche Policy is dedicated to specific segments of a population to improve upon 
elements such as “social inclusion, gender equity, labour market integration, or 
wealth creation” and/ or to improve opportunity within typically under represented 
segments of a society.   
 
- Holistic Policy attempts to do it all though a cognisant approach of fostering 
entrepreneurship within an economy.  Integrating elements from the previous three 
types of policies, holistic policy aims to address a variety of failures while providing 
support mechanisms in which to simultaneously grow an overall economy to become 
more entrepreneurial (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005).   
 
Admittedly, strategy looking to support and further develop entrepreneurship must stem from 
multiple disciplines often with overlapping agendas.   Recent trends have emerged in regards 
to enabling institutions to fulfil not only policy mandates, but to act where policy cannot.  
These institutions are most likely a part of civil society2  and are more able to provide 
entrepreneurs with direct assistance, where as government structures should work to develop 
the umbrella to encapsulate overall program design (Kantis and Federico, 2012).    
 
Typically, entrepreneurship policy is designed specifically to focus on individuals, 
supporting the start-up process of individuals from awareness to post start-up.  However the 
actual occurrence and effectiveness, while difficult to quantify, is questioned (Lundstrom and 
Stevenson, 2005).  Growth strategies also benefit from the use of ‘soft’ measures such as 
education or training, mentorship and promotion as opposed to ‘hard’ regulatory or legal 
frameworks.  Benefits from entrepreneurship can also be reaped from the incorporation of 
unique partnerships from diverse industries or across sectors (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 
                                                        
2 Civil Society can be made up of universities, business incubators, foundations, chambers of commerce, non-
profits, educational development programs, etc  (Kantis and Federica, 2012, p. 57). 
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2005).   However, simply decentralising policy does not necessarily guarantee impact, and 
should be reinforced through appropriate market incentives (Kantis and Federico, 2012).   
 
Creating or maintaining growth in an economy dominated by small enterprises requires either 
the expansion of current businesses or the net creation of new enterprises, which is largely 
influenced at a macro-economy level (Mead and Liedholm, 1998; Rogerson, 2001).  While 
micro and small enterprises have similar levels of market entrance during times of growth as 
well as stagnation, large enterprise entrance and continued operation is most often connected 
to, and driven by, market demands.  As such, larger enterprises are more reliant upon, as well 
as influenced by, overall economic performance policy and enterprise support strategies.  As 
opposed to micro and small enterprises, medium to large enterprises make greater 
contributions to economic growth and can often disproportionately account for the amount of 
economic growth within an economy.  As such, Rogerson argues that focus should be 
weighted towards the economic transitioning to medium and large-scale enterprise (2001, 
p.121), although, this may be a case of ‘easier said than done’ for many economies.    
 
Within many regulatory environments, major barriers exist for business registration and new 
business creation including: “taxation, labour law, business trade, land ownership, town 
planning schemes and access to credit” (Beyene, 2002, p.137).  Poor infrastructure and 
communication networks as well as a lack of technology transfer also inhibit enterprise 
growth.  Understanding the specific, contextual connection and overlaps between 
entrepreneurship, local institutions, governance structures and economic development 
provides critical insight and further understanding as to the relationship of how policy and 
entrepreneurship can impact across these spectrums (Acs et al., 2008).  
 
2.2.3.1 Entrepreneurship within Developing Economies 
While agriculture still forms the base of most economies, within the agricultural sector, most 
enterprises (smallholder producers) would be characterized at the micro level (particularly 
within this study context most smallholder producers operate on just ½ hectare or less) and 
much entrepreneurial activity could be categorized as survivalist.  Given the agricultural 
industry’s importance, specifically within developing countries and its dominance by micro, 
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small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), promotion and support of domestic, regional and 
potentially international trade can be seen as key opportunity for growth, corresponding 
employment and income generation (Reginer, 2009).  However, small enterprises must build 
capacity in production and marketing to be able to adequately meet increased, external 
demand through strategic support from national governments, international non-
governmental buyers as well as foreign investors (Reginer, 2009).  External demand offers 
opportunity that can be maximized by entrepreneurs willing to take the risk.   
 
Improving the environment to foster entrepreneurship, specifically within the agricultural 
sector can result in overall economic growth.  However for more encompassing pro-poor 
growth strategies to be successful, smallholder producers must be targeted and involved with 
increasing levels of commercial integration into larger markets (domestic, regional as well as 
international).  Policies aimed at stimulating productivity and growth within the agricultural 
sector in large part also supports the development and nourishment of entrepreneurs: access 
to national and regional markets, opportunity for export, development of, and increases in, 
human capital and land size (Jayne et al., 2010, p. 1392).  The growth of smallholder 
producers’ gradual integration into the larger global market will enable entrepreneurship, and 
also encourage specialization and differentiation (Djurdeldt, 2012) if an appropriate 
supporting environment is present.  Increasing focus on access to inputs as well as improving 
market structures and regulation, at a macro-level at least, has supported economies for 
smallholders to increase production and allowed new entrants into the sector.   
 
Specifically within developing countries, micro, small and medium enterprises are significant 
creators of employment and income generation.  However, the majority of micro and small 
enterprises typically have a single employee 3 , or, occasionally additional unpaid family 
members, which are often not counted as ‘employees’ (Mead and Liedholm, 1998).    
 
2.2.3.2 Entrepreneurship within sub-Saharan Africa 
Following the recent global financial crisis (2008), it has become even more apparent for 
developing economies to focus on other areas for growth and revenue generation away from 
                                                        
3 Micro to Small Enterprise defined as 1-50 employees (Mead and Liedholm, 1998).  
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FDI or donor assistance and are looking at the transformative potentials of domestic 
entrepreneurship and MSMEs as positive drivers of change and growth within a country 
(Brixova and Asiminew, 2010); private sector actors are considered a key element of this 
change.   
 
Many economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are considered to be at the ‘factor-driven 
stage’ of development, as opposed to efficiency driven4 or innovation driven5 economies.  
Factor-driven economies are characterized by early stages of economic growth, with a large 
agricultural base and the overall economy largely dependent upon natural resource 
extraction, lower cost efficiencies from commodities or value added products (Acs et al., 
2008; Harrington and Kelley, 2012).  Acs et al., (2008) also add that at the factor driven 
stage, an economy is not creating knowledge specifically for the sake of innovation.  Overall 
there is the perception of many available business opportunities across SSA despite the stage 
of economic development within a specific country.  However the types of business activity 
to be engaged in differs from what is typically found in more developed economies 
(Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  As such, businesses and business ventures tend to be lower-
margin, ‘me-too’ businesses and are highly vulnerable to clusters or shocks (Valliere and 
Peterson, 2009).  In addition, new business-oriented activity is largely driven by necessity 
(survival) rather than opportunity (return) motives.  Societal perceptions about 
entrepreneurship and potential for success have been found to greatly influence an 
individual’s decisions with high levels of positive perspectives resulting in larger proportions 
of individuals venturing into entrepreneurial activities (Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  
 
Within many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture still forms the base of most 
economies, with the majority of labour involved in some capacity within the agricultural 
sector.  However, this view of the ‘agricultural entrepreneur’ has shifted and evolved, now 
varying widely across different country contexts and specific policy environments, and the 
ability of entrepreneurs to contribute to economies is tied to specific environment and related 
                                                        
4 Development of industrial sector, higher productivity via economies of scale with the addition of more 
developed financial institutions (Herrington and Kelley, 2012) 
5 Economies experience the ‘shift’ to an expanded services sector, economy responds to the needs of a more 
affluent population.  Also increased focus on R&D and knowledge-intensive business (Herrington and Kelley, 
2012). 
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growth strategies (Djurfeldt, 2012).  As linkages with larger or urban markets develop and 
are increasingly influenced by international markets and prices, it is perceived that 
overcoming or easing access barriers can be accomplished through diversification of tradable 
crops, goods or services (Dorward et al., 2003).  
 
2.2.3.3 Challenges and Successes for Smallholder Producers 
For the majority of economies in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture maintains a fundamental 
role in consumption, employment generation and economic growth.  Harnessing opportunity 
within this sector has the potential to result in significant strides for development of an 
economy.  Successful entry and supply of local markets for producers and indeed 
entrepreneurs, is highly influenced by local conditions or environments such as “climate, 
population density, human capital endowments, infrastructure and communication” (Dorward 
et al., 2003, p. 76). 
 
Difficulties faced by smallholder producers have compounded recently through the continued 
growth and globalization of markets and international supply chains, which in turn, has also 
impacted entrepreneurial action.  International pressure on price, market entry barriers, land 
availability and lack of ownership rights or access to financing also can create additional 
difficulties.  Environments lacking entrepreneurs in rural areas can be traced to difficulties 
for improved market institutions which create a type of ‘penalizing environment’ resulting in 
low productivity and a lack of entrepreneurial activity or entrepreneurial dynamism 
(Djurdeldt, 2012).  In addition, an inability of governments to properly regulate local markets 
has resulted in weak regional and national markets (Jayne et al., 2010).   
 
Creating and fostering linkages between knowledge, market gaps and economic development 
is critical to improving an agricultural sector with exportable commodities and achieving 
poverty reduction (Juma, 2011).  Stimulating productivity requires increased public 
investment, a friendly policy environment to private sector involvement (Jayne et al., 2010) 
as well as market access, access to working capital and credit facilities, and human capital.    
Djurfeldt (2012) found successful strategies of smallholder entrepreneurs to be related, in 
that a) raising land productivity, achieved through inputs and technology, b) attaining food 
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security, in that once consumption demands were met a household was able to sell remaining 
harvest, and c) diversification of income, including non-farm income but also diversification 
within the farm (p.222).   
 
Specific characteristics enabling success within the smallholder agricultural perspective (as 
an entrepreneur or not) include landholding size, relationship with head of family, human 
capital endowment, gender of head of household and relationship with community leader 
(Jayne et al., 2010).  Improvements to a producer’s technical knowledge and use of 
productivity improving inputs can also further support innovation attempts.  These 
characteristics should be viewed in combination with the individual determinants that enable 
an individual to recognize opportunity and take entrepreneurial action and will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 
Further understanding the importance of MSMEs, productive entrepreneurs and the benefits 
government policies can have is critical in unpacking the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and development.  While not an exhaustive list, critical elements include: 
institutions, credit (access to/ constraints), business environment, infrastructure (bottlenecks) 
and skills or the lack of critical skills (Brixiova, 2010, p. 441).  As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Section 2.5 and Chapters 6 and 7, specific policies and investment strategies 
can directly impact levels of growth and productive entrepreneurship.  
 
2.2.3.4 Private Sector Impacts on ‘Development’  
Discussion in Section 2.2.3 has focused on policy requirements around generating and 
supporting entrepreneurship within a developing economy as well as the need for and 
effectiveness of entrepreneurship within an emerging market context, specifically within the 
agriculture sectors of sub-Saharan Africa.  Local business expansion and the engagement of a 
functional private sector has also been found to play an increasingly active role in 
‘development’ agendas, particularly within poor and/ or underdeveloped communities and 
countries.  Incentivized private sector actors can be powerful agents of change within these 
contexts through directing investment, job creation, skills training and increasing inclusivity 
of often excluded groups (women, minorities) within a developing country (Dolan and Roll, 
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2013; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014).  Often referred to as the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ or the 
‘bottom billion’, further openness to these markets, has enabled and increased access for 
international businesses to interact with the poorest and generally most difficult (and 
expensive) groups to reach, increasing market access potential via strategically developed 
products, services, wealth creation schemes or localized goods manufacture.  Over the last 
two to three decades, businesses, especially social-orientated ones, have become increasingly 
vested, acting as an effective tool for development practitioners and donor agencies alike 
through initiatives focused on public-private-partnerships and market-orientated solutions 
(Dolan, 2011; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014).   
 
Additionally, increasing impacts and potential of national-level private sector actors and 
entrepreneurs are recognized for ability to generate employment, attract skilled labour, 
increase capital attraction and actively participate in the formalization and development of 
local markets (Dolan and Roll, 2013; Dolan and Rajak, 2016).  Given this potential, 
increased attention has turned towards further developing and building the potential of local 
entrepreneurship.  However, to harness positive potential from private sector actors and 
entrepreneurs, constraints of market access and capital attraction need to be addressed 
through the ‘democratisation’ of local markets. Achieving this, local entrepreneurs can 
become both a catalyst and beneficiary for the “new economy of development” (Dolan, 2011; 
Dolan and Rajak, 2016, p. 515).  Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, within these 
specific research contexts, the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets, donor agencies, as 
well as international coffee import corporations have been found to be an active player within 
this wider development agenda via directed skills training (business acumen, quality), 
infrastructure development, capital injection and market development.   While these 
investments are recognized as a means of strengthening business propositions, it also can be 
seen as a case study in how private sector actors can use business as a mechanism for 
development.  This thesis has not taken a direct critique of ‘development,’ its theory, various 
approaches or current agendas.  However, as will be seen throughout the remaining 
discussion, entrepreneurship and an enabled private sector can have great potential to make 
positive change.   
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2.3 Analysing the Entrepreneurship Nexus 
Given the interdisciplinary aspects of entrepreneurship and its multiple perspectives for 
analysis, securing an overarching unified conceptualization has remained elusive and one of 
the greatest challenges to this field of research (Lee and Peterson, 2000; Shane, 2003).  While 
traditional approaches towards entrepreneurship investigations have centred on either the 
individual, or the context of an opportunity, as two separate research areas, more recent 
discussions have focused on the distinct ‘overlap’ of the two elements.  This section presents 
the theoretical background to the development of the conceptual framework used for this 
research.  Discussion will focus first on the entrepreneurship nexus and then present the 
theoretical backgrounds for the ensuing analysis of the individual construct and external 
operational context.  
 
2.3.1 Evolution to the Individual – Opportunity Nexus 
Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) approach to understanding entrepreneurship was through 
the nexus of the individual and opportunity, which created the prospect for revised academic 
study on this overlap of two distinct areas.  This reflects the understanding of the individual 
characteristics of an entrepreneur and the related operating environment where opportunity 
maximization occurs (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003).  Within this 
perspective, entrepreneurship becomes “the nexus of two phenomena: (the) presence of 
lucrative opportunities and the presence of enterprising individuals” (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218).  A major contribution to the area of study, this individual – 
opportunity nexus provided an intellectual paradigm for the understanding of 
entrepreneurship (Shane, 2012).  Figure 2.2 presented below, is this author’s 
conceptualization of Shane and Venkataraman’s individual – opportunity nexus.   
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Figure 2.2. Author’s Conceptualization of Shane and Venkataraman’s Individual – 
Opportunity Nexus 
 
(Source: Author Construct)  
 
Shane and Venkataraman used their individual – opportunity nexus as a base in which to 
understand the entrepreneurial process of discovery and exploitation of opportunity as well as 
the individual enterprising strategy (Shane, 2003).  Key to understanding this nexus is the 
perception that entrepreneurship is the overlap of two distinct and otherwise independent 
constructs.  In this understanding, the separate constructs are distinct unto themselves and 
only overlap when the right individual discovers the right opportunity (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003). 
 
The theoretical approach to entrepreneurship through this framework has formed the premise 
that the individual and opportunity are two separate entities, operating independently from 
one another, enabling the notion of a more generalized universality to findings.  However 
more recent thought has built from Shane and Venkataraman’s nexus using Structuration 
Theory, understanding the individual and opportunity as interdependent elements and thus 
highly contextualizing analysis and outcome.   
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2.3.2 Structuration Theory 
First introduced by the sociologist Anthony Giddens, (1984) in establishing the groundwork 
for social constructivism, Structuration Theory encapsulates the human individual as a 
purposive agent, responding to and with reason to activities; influencing, as well as being 
influenced by, available contexts or social structures (Giddens, 1984; Chell, 2008).  Giddens’ 
theory encompasses as well as distinguishes the agent, structure and social system.  Defining 
the agent as ‘purposeful, knowledgeable, reflexive and active,’ the structure is defined as the 
rules and resources recursively occurring (rules are often also understood as norms and social 
conventions), and the social system is defined as duality of both structure and agent with each 
unable to exist without the other (Rose, 1998; Sarason et al., 2006; Dutta et al., 2016). 
 
A meta-theory, Structuration Theory presents a wider-world view of social and system 
integration, in which actors are ‘co-present’ to a wider social formation they are a part of 
(Kilminster, 1991).   ‘Structures’, within this theoretical approach are not conceived as a 
barrier to action, but instead as an essential involvement to the action’s production and 
comprise the environments, societies and nation states in which entrepreneurs or businesses 
are located (Cassell, 1993; Chell, 2008).  Structuration Theory presents the “conditions 
governing the continuity or transformation of structures, and therefore the reproductive 
systems” of an agent responding to a specific opportunity (Cassell, 1993, p. 118).  As such, 
structures are understood to comprise unique environments as societies, nation states, 
institutions, rules and available resources where an agent is based (Giddens, 1984; Chell, 
2008).   
 
In regards to entrepreneurship study, Structuration Theory depicts the interplay of the 
entrepreneur within a social and economic system and as such, both evolve due to the 
influence of the other (Sarason et al., 2006). From this theoretical perspective, 
entrepreneurship can be characterized as a continual, ‘co-evolving’ process between the 
entrepreneur and the system housing a specific opportunity, in which the entrepreneur creates 
as well as discovers that entrepreneurial path and discovery influences the wider context.  
Specifically for Giddens (1984) the human agent is one looking to the possibility of ‘doing 
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otherwise’ in order to make a difference (Kilminster, 1991, p. 79), but action is limited to 
power differences and relative to resource mobilization capacity.  
 
Structuration Theory investigates the relationship between agency and structure, perceiving 
the agent as an interdependent, reflexive element within a larger system, not a separate entity 
that operates independently from an environment or social system (Sarason et al., 2006; 
Chell, 2008).  In viewing the entrepreneur and opportunity within a distinct operational 
context, it reflects the entrepreneur as a “reflexive agent engaging in purposeful action” 
(Giddens, 1984; Sarason et al., 2006, p. 287).  Thus, this theoretical application recognizes 
the socio-economic structure as dynamic, but also subject to change, thus “dynamically 
creating opportunities based on subjective interpretations” (Chell, 2008, p. 76).  As such, 
Structuration Theory has become increasingly recognized as a way to approach the 
theoretical aspects of entrepreneurship and is used in understanding entrepreneurs at the 
macro (national, regional level) and micro (individual, team level), but also meso (industry, 
institutional level) in order to analyse surrounding contextual institutions (Chell, 2008).  
 
While this study has not uniformly applied Structuration Theory as a model in its analysis of 
entrepreneurship, the theoretical conceptualization of its framework was informed by it.  In 
doing so, perception of the entrepreneurship nexus provided an additional, but also more 
expansive perspective in how entrepreneurs can both interpret and influence their 
environment, viewing the entrepreneur as a reflexive agent to and within an interdependent 
operational context  (Sarason et al., 2006).  While Shane and Venkataraman’s individual – 
opportunity nexus is one in which entrepreneurship is an overlap of the two independent 
constructs, entrepreneurship through Structuration Theory presents the constructs as an 
interdependent duality6, unable to be separated in which the individual entrepreneur not only 
is benefited by distinct opportunities within an environment, but in turn benefits specific 
environments of operation, resulting in a co-evolving construction.  Figure 2.3 depicts the 
author’s conceptualization of the co-evolving entrepreneurship construct, informed by 
                                                        
6 Shane and Venkataraman (2000) understood the entrepreneurship overlap as a dualism.  Whereas 
entrepreneurship through Structuration Theory understands it as a duality, comprised of linked, as opposed to 
separate, parts (Sarason et al., 2006). 
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Structuration Theory.  This conceptualization was also developed as the conceptual 
framework used in this research: the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus.  
 
Figure 2.3.  The Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
While entrepreneurship has long been understood through a more traditional sense through 
the discovery and filling of market gaps, i.e. the Kirznerian perspective, entrepreneurship 
from a Structuration Theory perspective sees both social and economic systems as dynamic 
but also influenced by entrepreneurial action (Sarason et al., 2006).  Recent emerging 
research has further aided in the understanding of how individuals operate within specific 
systems and how they can be influenced by wider institutional arrangements (Jennings et al., 
2013).  In Giddens’ Structuration Theory, context is referred to a ‘social structure’ and the 
structural properties of these distinct systems consist of rules and/ or resources in use by 
human agent interaction.  As such, the rules and resources inform the agent and are 
reaffirmed by the agent’s action (Giddens, 1984; Sarason et al., 2006; Mole and Mole, 2012).  
However, this research deviates from Giddens’ use of structure in its analysis of the 
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‘operational context,’ instead choosing to analyse the more formalized, tangible institutional 
structures existing within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets.  
 
To be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5, systems, as presented in this research, can 
influence resources such as finance availability, social capital, legitimacy, reputation, and 
experience of a given community or more specifically what a given network or community is 
willing or able to provide (Chell, 2008).  These institutions can vary widely due to levels of 
enforcement and direct interaction, but largely include state involvement, legal structures, 
market formations and development of support mechanisms for entrepreneurs (Lee and 
Peterson, 2000; Jennings et al., 2013).  Successful or unsuccessful entrepreneurship, in turn, 
impacts these systems and related operational outlooks.   
 
Social ties improve upon an individual’s chances to successfully exploit an opportunity, as 
they may also be more likely to benefit from additional information or improved access to 
resources (Shane, 2003).   Societal perceptions about entrepreneurship and potential for 
success have also been found to greatly influence an individual’s actions (Herrington and 
Kelley, 2012).  As such, an entrepreneur may be propelled or constrained by specific 
opportunities or structures identified through the venturing process within a specific context 
and specific opportunities or structures may be created or constricted through the results of 
entrepreneurial actions making entrepreneurship relative to both the individual and context of 
operation (Sarason et al., 2006).   
 
As discussed, it was critical to view entrepreneurship through the appropriate lens and 
context to fully appreciate and understand influence, action and decision making of 
entrepreneurs within targeted research areas.  As entrepreneurship is viewed as an integral 
part of an environment and not a separate entity that operates independently from a social 
system, entrepreneurship processes are rooted in the corresponding country’s context and 
institutional frameworks (Acs et al., 2014).  Recalling the co-evolution of the entrepreneur 
within and to a social and economic system, entrepreneurship can be characterized as a 
continual process between the entrepreneur and the operational landscape in which the 
entrepreneur discovers and creates opportunities while still being influenced by the wider 
operational landscape (Sarason et al., 2006).    
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2.3.2.1 Critique of Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
Analysis of structure, in this research specifically referred to as the ‘operational context,’ and 
agent, provides a deductive framework in which to study these two aspects: the agent and 
structure without necessarily prioritising either the individual or the operational context, as 
well as examining how entrepreneurship can go on to shape institutions and wider economies 
(Mole and Mole, 2010).  However, it is this same notion of equitable, interdependence of 
agent and structure (individual and operational context) that has drawn the most criticism of 
this approach.  Particular critique, namely from Archer (1990, 1995), Rose (1998) and 
Layder (2006) discuss the conflation of the agent and structure as a limiting factor in analysis 
due to an inability of separation between the individual and specific social system.  
Additionally, the notion of interdependence of the agent’s reflexive action on a specific 
system does not allow for the further analysis of impact on the structure or the agent (Kort 
and Gharbi, 2013).  While Giddens acknowledges some structures can ‘exist’ external to an 
agent (allocated resources i.e. raw materials, land), through his development of Structuration 
Theory, these two entities cannot exist without the other (Giddens, 1984; Kort and Gharbi, 
2013, p. 94).   
 
Giddens also states that rules are independent from structure as they exists in the agent’s 
conceptualization of structure, however this presents a disconnect in the rational (realist 
perspective) understanding that preordained rules are implemented by an existing social 
system or order (Rose, 1998; Kort and Gharbi, 2013).  This contrasts with the realist view of 
how elements within a society and its members interact (Rose, 1998).  The realist perspective 
allows the structure and agent to exist as distinct elements and interact over different lengths 
of time.  As such, this separation allows for a detached and correspondingly distinct 
analytical review (Archer, 1995; Rose, 1998).  Additionally, within Archer’s realist 
perspective, structures are properties of existing resources, both human and material, 
however these are continually needing to be improved, which fosters the notion for 
continuing ‘metamorphosis,’ and further explains a recursive nature of society (as perceived 
through a realist perspective) (Mole and Mole, 2012).  In contrast, Giddens sees structure as 
subjective to the rules and resources perceived and created by the agent and as such, places 
greater emphasis on the interdependence of the agent, as opposed to the independent 
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structure (Mole and Mole, 2012).  Additional disciplinary approaches to entrepreneurship are 
Equilibrium, Imperfect and Radical Innovation Theories (Economics) and Social 
Constructionism Theory (Sociology) (Chell, 2008).  Recognized as alternative possibilities 
for analysing entrepreneurship, these theories were not specifically detailed due to 
applicability as well as time and space available within the overall thesis.  
 
2.3.2.2 Examples of Applications of Structuration Theory 
One reason this study chose to rely on Structuration Theory as a way of informing its 
approach to entrepreneurship was the lack of the theory’s actual implementation or empirical 
research in regards to entrepreneurship, it has only been discussed through theoretical 
assessments.  This was, perhaps naively, viewed as a distinct opportunity to make a specific 
contribution to the wider research around the subject.  However in hindsight, the lack of 
previous implementation or existence of wider empirical research using the theory could also 
have been interpreted as an incompatibility or difficulty in being able to fully apply the 
theoretical framework successfully.  To date, no other studies have been found directly 
applying Structuration Theory as an empirical model analysing entrepreneurship.  As such, 
within this space of lacking contextualized examples, this research was left to interpret 
applicability of elements of the theory.   
 
While alternative research applying Structuration Theory to entrepreneurship has not been 
found, the theory has been used to study the fields of Organization, Information and 
Management Systems, Strategic Management as well as specific elements of Business 
Theory (Rose, 1998; Mole and Mole, 2012; Dutta et al., 2016).  Within these disciplines, 
Structuration Theory has been lauded for its ability to reflect how individuals and businesses 
intersect within a wider organizational structure as well as how the recursive duality of 
structure and agency evaluates progress towards strategic change (Dutta et al., 2016).  
However, a critical, recognizable difference between these studies and this specific research 
is the application of ‘structure’.  The above named studies understood structure in a more 
similar perception to Giddens’ original theory, with structure interpreted as rules and social 
norms existing across a specified time and space, developed by and continually influencing 
the agent (Rose, 1998; Dutta et al., 2016).  Alternatively, this study deviates from Giddens’ 
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interpretation of structure, choosing instead to perceive ‘structure’ as the more tangible 
elements within localized institutional systems of an ‘operational context’.  This deviation 
and specific approach was implemented, as it was believed to be more applicable in regards 
to empirical research and analysis within the overall research design.   
 
2.3.3 Trait Psychology 
Economists have developed theories around entrepreneurship, which have inferred 
personality and behaviour characteristics of an entrepreneur and this identification of the 
individual entrepreneur has typically involved the exploration of the individual through 
distinct human attributes (Shane, 2003; Chell, 2008).  However, as this study looks at both 
the individual construct and operational context, trait theory was used to identify, understand 
and analyse the individual, internal entrepreneurial construct. 
 
While the individual construct is just one part of the entrepreneurial story, this research uses 
elements of Trait Psychology to further investigate and measure elements of the internal 
make-up or construct of the individual entrepreneur.  In taking a ‘trait view’ of an 
individual’s personality, specific aspects of character of the individual can be identified and 
used to determine increased likelihood of entrepreneurial action (Chell, 2008).   Through 
analysis of the individual, entrepreneurship can be attributed, in part, to the “internal 
psychological traits of entrepreneurs” through characteristics such as risk propensity, self-
efficacy or innovativeness (Lee and Peterson, 2000, p. 402).  Individuals have differing 
aspects of personality and or motives, which are a core element of self (Shane, 2003). As 
such, personality traits are considered to remain largely unchanged over stretches of time or 
through various influences.  Cognitive characteristics are however considered to change and 
evolve over time and can be largely situationally dependent (Chell, 2008).  
 
From a psychology perspective, trait theory is a personal construction of “a dynamic inner 
process” and is reflected through consistencies in outlook, behaviour and personality aspects 
(Chell, 2008, p. 105).   Through individual pursuit of opportunity exploitation, specific 
psychological characteristics can increase (or decrease) the likelihood of exploitation (Shane, 
2003).  However, it is important to recognize that the endowment of a psychological trait 
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does not automatically enable an individual to be an entrepreneur or to take entrepreneurial 
action (Shane, 2003). While personality traits are an inherent part of every individual, 
specific traits, enduring characteristics or identifiable attributes of an individual can be found 
to be more typical in entrepreneurs than others (Chell, 2008) and will be discussed in greater 
detail in Section 2.4.  
 
However, understanding the individual through only personality traits has largely proven 
unsuccessful in fully determining a wider range of entrepreneurship as an individual may be 
understood to have all their characteristics predisposing towards an entrepreneurial nature, 
but may not exist in a context to enable or support the entrepreneurial venturing process 
(Shane, 2003).  Individuals engage in entrepreneurial behaviour at particular times and in 
response to particular events or opportunities and as such the nature of entrepreneurship can 
be considered ‘episodic’ (Shane, 2003).  Entrepreneurship is not a continually occurring 
phenomenon and as will continue to be discussed, understanding only the individual is just 
part of the story. 
 
2.3.4 Global Value Chain Analysis 
Global Value Chain Analysis 7  (GVCA) can account for historical, cultural and current 
contexts inclusive of public sector actors, governments, service providers, certification 
schemes and even pricing structures within the international market (Gibbon, 2001; Daviron 
and Ponte, 2005; Bolwig et al., 2010).  In regard to these specific research confines, the use 
of GVCA improved understanding and analysis of the determinants to entrepreneurship as 
well as further supported the understanding and potential impact of entrepreneurial entry into 
international trade arenas and ensuing opportunities offered (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  
While GVCA was regarded as a useful tool, within this research it severed merely as a 
guideline to support investigation and analysis and was not used as a strict method of 
interpretation or result examination.  As such, a brief discussion below presents how areas of 
GVCA supported this research.   
 
                                                        
7 GVCA also known as Value Chain Analysis pre-1994 (Bolwig et al., 2010) 
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Given the nature of the coffee production and supply chains that house this research, the use 
of GVCA supported ability in understanding entrepreneurs within a larger marketplace as 
well as within the embedded network of activities and ensuing impacts of value distribution 
(Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Bolwig, 2010).  Employment of the GVCA method allowed for 
analysis of “structures, actors and dynamics of value chains, including examining the 
typologies and locations of chain actions and the linkages between them” (Bolwig et al., 
2010, p. 174).  It further enabled the understanding of factors impacting income distribution 
within and between actors through the capture of distinct roles and/ or skillsets of differing 
chain segments (Kaplinsky, 2000; Gibbon, 2001).  
 
Using GVCA in analysing entrepreneurs within respective coffee sectors supported the 
detailed understanding of each market and enabled opportunity to trace entrepreneurs’ 
movement up and within the chains as well as allow for deeper understanding of the 
transformative impacts across the chain (Bolwig et al., 2010).  Considering the buyer-driven 
market of the coffee sector and influence by the wider global market, research also accounted 
for the governance or external influences outside the distinct coffee sectors of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda.  Specific market structure analyses will be found throughout this research, but 
primarily within Chapter 6.  
 
2.4 Individual Construct, Internal Drivers 
The theoretical basis for the conceptual framework for this research was presented in Section 
2.3 and will be discussed further in Section 3.2.  However, from a practical research 
application perspective, understanding the entrepreneurship nexus through tangible, 
empirical evidence required the initial deconstruction for the individual and operational 
context to be understood separately, prior to understanding the reflexive entrepreneurial 
influence on systems of operation.  This section presents the approach supported through 
related literature of understanding the individual entrepreneur.  Deconstruction of the Co-
Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus looked to first understand the individual construct of the 
entrepreneur, which provided opportunity to assess the entrepreneurial make-up through the 
extraction and later analysis of individual characteristics, or drivers.  Throughout the current 
entrepreneurship related literature, several distinctive traits emerged which have helped to 
shape the understanding of the innate, predisposed characteristics of an entrepreneur.   
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Assessing why entrepreneurs may select certain choices can also be contributed to 
entrepreneurial ability, specific labour skills (specialization), attitude toward risk and access 
to capital (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979).  Additional ingredients of successful entrepreneurs 
may also include: new ideas and innovation strategies, human capital and (access to) 
financial resources (Goetz and Freshwater 2001).  For ease and clarity in presentation, human 
capital and gender are presented within the discussion on Drivers, Section 2.4, however are 
not counted here as inherent characteristics to the internal construct of the entrepreneur.  
Likewise, financial resources are presented within the discussion on Determinants in Section 
2.5.    
 
In reviewing the individual entrepreneur, this research looked to the specific, individual 
attributes and predisposed characteristics (drivers) believed to be key elements to the 
predisposition of an individual to be more entrepreneurially inclined or to take 
entrepreneurial action (Lee and Peterson, 2000).  Within the confines of this research, 
‘individual’ is understood as the individual construct and this research investigates the 
‘internal make-up’ of the person using a trait-view to better understand individual elements 
separating entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. 
 
2.4.1 Ingredients of the Entrepreneur 
While major theoretical contributions to entrepreneurship have been outlined, defining the 
specific innate characteristics enabling an individual to recognize and maximize opportunity 
(or not) continues to be investigated.   This analysis of the internal, individual construct 
differs from the more traditional research that has focused on the individual through 
historical experience, (specifically family linkages, business start-up results or personal 
histories) access to capital and education (Fairlie and Holleran, 2012).   
 
New, emerging literature is beginning to analyse the specific personality or psychological 
traits believed to have influence over an individual’s entrepreneurial likelihood.  As such, a 
multitude of individual characteristics, constructs and traits emerge as ‘entrepreneurial 
drivers’ from a range of perspectives and fields of study.  These include: ambition, analytical 
ability (cognitive skillset), awareness, creativity, desire for independence, education, 
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entrepreneurial orientation, extraversion, foresight, innovativeness (including technical, 
product, service, system), intuition, locus of control, opportunity recognition, persistence, 
personal experience, self-efficacy, social ability, social competence, social networks, 
resilience, risk tolerance and vicarious learning (Casson, 2003; 2010; Shane, 2003; Chell, 
2008).  Many characteristics, as well as influences, can be considered within the individual 
construct which contributes to the makeup and actions of an entrepreneur, however current 
research only has a limited grasp on the level and depth of these factors and corresponding 
internal processes enabling or predisposing entrepreneurial behaviour (Zhao et al., 2005).   
 
As it was not feasible within this study to test every driver listed in the paragraph above, 
those selected for analysis were derived due to the importance in enabling entrepreneurship 
determination, but also for tangibility within the specific research environments.  This 
tangibility also improved researcher ability for absorption of respondent responses and 
actions.  The specific drivers were finalized following initial testing and investigation during 
the Rwanda Research Pilot and will be discussed in full in Chapter 5.  Within this study, the 
specific drivers targeted in evaluating entrepreneurship within an emerging market context 
are resilience, self-efficacy, innovativeness, risk tolerance, and opportunity recognition 
and entrepreneurial orientation (OR+EO).  Wider situational frameworks may also 
influence these drivers and the socio-economic or cultural constructs believed to have 
influence on entrepreneurs and will be addressed within Chapter 6.  Each driver is discussed 
in turn below.   
 
2.4.1.1 Resilience 
Resilience, as defined by Tedeschi and Callhoun (2004) refers to an “ability to go on with 
life, or to continue living a purposeful life, after hardship or adversity” (as cited in Bullough 
et al., 2014, p. 478).   It has also been defined as a “dynamic process encompassing positive 
adaptation within the context of significant adversity (Bullough and Renko, 2013, p. 345). 
The development or innate construct of an ability to positively rebound from and adapt to 
adverse situations can reduce the occurrence of negative ‘chain-reactions’ and amplify 
effective coping and adaptation measures (Sinclair and Wallston, 2004).   Optimism, higher 
levels of education, the ability to articulate goals and interests, or the ability to garner wide 
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ranging social support have been found to be specific characteristics enabling individuals to 
be more inclined towards resilient action (Sinclair and Wallston, 2004).   
 
Resilience, specifically framed within entrepreneurship research, has received limited 
attention and is largely associated with difficult environments (war and/ or conflict zones) or 
other extreme or adverse situations (Sinclair and Wallston, 2004).  Bullough et al., (2014) 
argue that entrepreneurial intentions can be developed if individuals are resilient in adverse 
situations and have high belief in their own ability (self-efficacy); resilience has been 
strongly linked to self-efficacy.  It has been shown that higher levels of both resiliency and 
self-efficacy, especially within adverse or dangerous conditions can better enable ability to 
mange difficult situations or stress in dealing with improved coping skills in order to 
continue activity, following an adverse event (Bullough and Renko, 2013; Bullough et al., 
2014). Similar to self-efficacy, developing a level of resilience can also be influenced by 
external factors and environments (Bullough and Renko, 2013).  
 
2.4.1.2 Self – Efficacy 
Self-efficacy can be viewed as a motivational aspect of a construct, which is continuously 
influenced through preferences, actions, choices and experience, which an entrepreneur 
continues to build (Zhao et al., 2005).  Considered to be a distinct entrepreneurial trait, but 
can be either motivating or de-motivating, self-efficacy is generally defined as the “belief in 
one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given 
attainments” (Bullough and Renko, 2013; Bandura, 1997 as cited in Bullough et al., 2014, p. 
479).   Self-Efficacy was originally understood as a central part of the social learning and 
social cognitive theories but began to be integrated into entrepreneurship research in the 
1990s (Bullough and Renko, 2013).   
 
Research has shown that individuals with greater degrees of self-efficacy are more likely to 
look for and exploit opportunities in comparison to individuals with low self-efficacy (Shane, 
2003).  While self-efficacy is considered to be a motivational construct, which relates to risk 
and specific entrepreneurial intentions (Zhao et al., 2005) it is also believed to have a direct 
impact on entrepreneurial feasibility and ability (Bullough et al., 2014).  Multiple studies 
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have shown it to be highly linked with resilience and overall performance indicators are 
believed to influence motivation and self-confidence (Chen et al., 1998).  Most frequently 
defined as one’s perceptions about their own abilities to preform specific tasks, individuals 
with a higher self-belief about their own ability to achieve a specific task are considered 
more likely to have higher performance outcomes than individuals with low self-efficacy or 
self-belief (Chen et al., 1998; Shane et al., 2003).   
 
An individual’s degree of self-efficacy can also be influenced and determined by 
performance and/ or accomplishments (Chen et al., 1998).  Thus, a high self-efficacy 
individual may take criticism or failure in a more positive light and be more willing to ‘try 
again’ as compared to a low self-efficacy individual (Shane et al., 2003).  The decision to 
take entrepreneurial action, will no doubt be influenced by an individual calculation of an 
opportunity, however an individual’s level of self-efficacy is a deciding factor as to whether 
an individual believes they can or cannot exploit and benefit from that opportunity (Chen et 
al., 1998; Shane et al., 2003).  As such, entrepreneurs have been found to be much more 
likely to maintain a positive outlook during adversity and/ or setbacks and are more likely to 
pursue new opportunity again following adversity (Bullough and Renko, 2013; Bullough et 
al., 2014).   
 
2.4.1.3 Innovativeness 
At its foundation, all innovation can be perceived as new or improvements to ideas in unique 
or original combinations, significantly impacting socio-economic change as drivers of 
growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Janssen, 2000; Hall et al., 2012).  Innovation, or the capacity to 
engage in the development of new processes, products, services, ideas or systems, does not 
necessarily require entry into new markets (Hult et al., 2004; Okpara, 2007).   While 
innovation begins with creative ideas, creativity on its own however, is not sufficient to bring 
about innovation or innovative change (Okpara, 2007).  
 
Earlier research focused on individual innovativeness as only a characteristic, however more 
recent research views it as an outcome of a characteristic from idea improvements in 
collaboration within a wider structure (Baumol, 1993; Scott and Bruce, 1998).  As such, an 
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entrepreneur is focused on gathering and combining ideas or opportunities in unique and or 
original ways based on their available surroundings, systems or structures.  Additionally, 
innovativeness can be revealed in multiple forms such as new processes that improve 
efficiencies, new or improved products or services, or finally management resulting in 
improved organizational structures, business models or operations (Okpara, 2007).   
 
2.4.1.4 Risk Tolerance 
Perhaps one of the most important elements of entrepreneurship is an individual’s attitude 
towards, and ability to manage risk, and risk tolerance is the most analysed trait of 
entrepreneurship (Fairlie and Holleran, 2012).  Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), stated risk 
aversion as a key-determining factor to the individual that ‘becomes’ an entrepreneur.  
Entrepreneurs bear technical risk (product functionality), market risk (pace and scale of 
customer adoption, competing business ventures) and competitive risk (length of time they 
will remain competitive in a given market) (Shane, 2003). Risk-taking propensity within the 
entrepreneurship perspective is defined as an individual’s “willingness to take moderate risks 
in the pursuit of a given opportunity” (Shane et al., 2003, p. 265).   As such, an individual’s 
propensity to take risks is the outcome of ‘judgemental decision-making’, which is associated 
with the behaviour of entrepreneurs (Chell, 2008).  Research has shown that entrepreneurs 
are less risk adverse and more likely to see opportunity as opposed to risk, or are more 
willing to bear risk in given scenarios than non-entrepreneurs (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000; Shane, 2003; Douglas, 2013).  
 
Palich and Bagby (1995) show that while it is widely believed that risk is an innate 
determinate of entrepreneurs, risk propensity may also be heavily impacted by willingness to 
take risks given the specific opportunity or business related activity.  As such, this research 
found perceptions to be different when considering opportunity, in which entrepreneurs may 
be more ready to handle riskier endeavours than non-entrepreneurs (Palich and Bagby, 1995).  
However, it must be realized entrepreneurs take recognized and calculated risk, as opposed to 
individuals actively pursing risk-filled activities precisely because they are ‘risky’.  
Calculated risk-taking is a specific, strategic behaviour of entrepreneurs and variations or 
differences within individual risk propensity can result in different outcomes (Josien, 2012).  
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Specific relationship or socio-cultural constructs surrounding failure are also considered as 
part of an individual’s risk tolerance.   
 
2.4.1.5 Opportunity Recognition + Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO) 
Opportunity Recognition is largely influenced by subjective interpretations and perceptions 
of objective realities such as new information or market dynamics (Gregoire et al., 2010) and 
the literature understands opportunity recognition to be a cognitive attribute understood on an 
individual level (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  Webb et al., (2013) describe two key 
factors inherent in an entrepreneur: alertness to an opportunity and the cognitive ability for 
opportunity recognition.  Alertness enables an entrepreneur to recognize opportunity, perhaps 
before or in a different way than others.   Opportunity recognition occurs when knowledge 
bases are bridged, enabling the entrepreneur to recognize opportunity and fill a market gap 
(Webb et al., 2013).  In line with Schumpeter’s earlier description of new combination, 
entrepreneurs are the ones able to put new opportunities together with appropriate resources 
(Croitoru, 2012).  An individual may also be more comfortable or confident in pursuing an 
opportunity due to their social position within a community (Shane, 2003).   
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation refers to an individual’s interest and desire to explore new 
opportunities; generally resulting in the individual operating with higher degrees of 
innovativeness, but also higher degrees of risk tolerance (Boso et al., 2013).  An individual’s 
specific orientation towards entrepreneurship can be characterized by a myriad of 
dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness and risk taking but all 
contribute to an individual’s ability to be ‘orientated’ to recognize an opportunity (Huang and 
Wang, 2011).  Entrepreneurial orientation includes the ongoing process of exploratory 
learning, opportunity seeking and the exploration of new markets for future advantage (Boso 
et al., 2013).   
 
Individual action based on entrepreneurial orientation carries high potential for uncertainty 
and risk, however this can be mitigated with an individual’s market-orientation, which 
includes specific market understanding, intelligence and connections within, and of certain 
markets operations (Boso et al., 2013).   Market orientation correlates highly to market 
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intelligence and adaptiveness, which can potentially offset risk taking as well as indicate a 
higher degree of self-efficacy (Boso et al., 2013; Douglas, 2013).    
 
2.4.1.6 Selected Driver Review  
While each of the drivers described above, can not alone be considered as an indicator of 
entrepreneurship, the combination of these elements along with the individual’s operational 
business landscape were used to further investigate the individual entrepreneurial construct to 
understand entrepreneurship within a given environment.  These selected drivers, analysed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5, assessed differences between entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs as well as determined the entrepreneurial strength or weakness of specific 
drivers for respondents, across business models and for comparison between countries.   
 
While human capital and gender are not specifically tested as ‘drivers’ in this research, both 
elements are acknowledged as important in understanding the individual entrepreneur 
operating within the given contexts of this research.  While a specifically gendered approach 
has not been taken within this research, it is recognized as a dynamic within these contexts of 
opportunity, with some entrepreneurs having to account for.  
 
2.4.1.7 Human Capital & Gender 
Human capital can be acquired in many ways and from multiple venues such as education, 
trainings, or past experiences.  Increased knowledge (or a specialized knowledge stock) can 
better enable an individual to register or sift through new information and apply it to decision 
making, creating ‘knowledge’ in four distinct ways: “accumulation, organizational proximity, 
social proximity and recombination-transformation” (Vaghely and Julien, 2008, p.76).  Shane 
(2003) discussed that an individual is more likely to exploit an opportunity depending on 
levels of education due to the increased knowledge stock and skillset as well as potential 
technical information gained through education.   The degree of education has been strongly 
linked to the level and success an individual obtains (Shane, 2003).   However, in lieu of 
education, an individual can also benefit from previous experiences or from the observation 
of others (Shane, 2003).  Admittedly, this research has targeted entrepreneurs within 
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developing economies where high attainment of quality schooling is not an automatic 
guarantee. 
 
Shane and Venkataraman, offer two main properties as key for successful entrepreneurship in 
relation to human capital:  1) possession of prior knowledge, required to identify the 
opportunity and 2) cognitive properties, necessary to value the opportunity (2000, p.222).    
Information corridors reflect the prior knowledge stock of an individual within a specific 
situation.  This also points to the required specialization of an individual to have the 
necessary, specific knowledge that enables recognition and identification of an opportunity.  
However, despite the individual’s stock of prior knowledge an individual may still fail to 
recognize an opportunity.  Without the ability or the appropriate development of cognitive 
properties an individual may be unable to achieve this relationship (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).    
 
How an individual is able to gather and use relevant information can also be traced to their 
‘absorptive capacity’.  The specific absorptive capacity enables information to be 
transformed into knowledge that supports opportunity recognition, innovation and decision-
making (Rocha, 2004).   Knowledge can also be garnered through proximity and clusters, 
which support information sharing and training, both through formal and informal 
mechanisms.  Within the context of an informal sector of a developing economy, it is 
considered that knowledge will have a greater level of influence from proximity and cluster 
dynamics (Rocha, 2004).  Opportunity is a combination of market information and 
innovation, however the entrepreneur that has the cognitive ability to pair this with 
knowledge will be more able to maximize an opportunity (Vaghely and Julien, 2008).  
Knowledge gains and information flows from clusters, is especially evident within the coffee 
sector.  
 
Gender is not specifically highlighted and this research has not taken a gendered view of 
entrepreneurship, however aspects of gender are recognized to have potential in influencing 
entrepreneurship through existing gendered power dynamics, social norms and the related 
impact on accessibility as well as perception of opportunity pursuit within the specific 
contexts analysed.  Previous studies have shown men to have a higher prevalence towards 
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entrepreneurship, see: Brush, 1992; Haber, Lamas, & Lichtenstein, 1987, but this has more to 
do with opportunity availability and specifics of gender dynamics than a person’s gender 
(Zhang et al., 2009).  And an individual’s gender is not in itself a determinant of 
entrepreneurial nature.  Zhang et al., (2009), found that when analysing personality and 
genetics of entrepreneurs from similar backgrounds it did not significantly influence a 
tendency to become entrepreneurs, however men and women do face different environments 
and stages of an entrepreneurial process that can determine levels of market accessibility and 
entrepreneurial success.  As Rijkers and Costa (2012) explain, differing cultures, religious or 
socio-economic contexts often influence which individuals or members of the community or 
household are able to explore additional or new opportunities for increased income 
generation.   Specifically within developing country contexts, women’s (and to a similar 
extent children’s) employment is often counted as unearned income (Zhang et al., 2009).   
 
The specific social norms and related dynamics around gender within a specific context can 
be highly impactful in regards to opportunity accessibility and the varying institutional 
structures which can influence a woman’s ability to perceive and pursue tangible action 
towards new opportunity.  Gender differences in access to and use of specific services, 
namely finance, education and land tenure have been found to have direct, negative 
repercussions for female entrepreneurs as well as an economy more widely (Aterido et al., 
2013; Brixiova and Kangoye, 2016).  The existence of these ‘barriers’ have been found to 
result in gendered performance gaps, underperformance of female entrepreneurs and a higher 
prevalence for women to exit a market place than men, particularly for actors in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Brixiova and Kangoye, 2016).  Dynamics within households should also be 
considered when assessing gendered market accessibility and corresponding resources.  The 
majority of household heads in sub-Saharan Africa are male and many female-managed rural 
agricultural plots remain, in some respects, controlled by the male-head of household.  
Additionally, female-headed households are overwhelmingly characterised by situations 
where the husband has passed away, works in an alternative location involved in migrant 
labour, or is involved with polygamous relationships (Ali et al., 2016).  These situations can 
further exacerbate gendered endowment and access gaps (Ali et al., 2016; Brixiova and 
Kangoye, 2016).   
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This study focused on individuals as entrepreneurs, and as such targeted respondents that had 
already taken tangible action towards opportunity pursuit and in doing so, had found ways 
around specific barriers.  Within the specific contexts of the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee 
markets, men were found to be much more prevalent entrepreneurial actors, which fits with 
the specific dynamics and construction of the socio-cultural norms of each country as well as 
the existing market structures.  
 
2.5 Operational Contexts, External Determinants 
As has been discussed, in addition to the individual construct, the opportunity landscape or 
external operational context can also influence an entrepreneur’s action and process of 
opportunity pursuit (Baumol, 1993; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane et al., 2003). 
With an understanding to the background of the internal, individual construct, attention now 
turns to understanding the operational contexts entrepreneurs must navigate in pursuit of 
opportunity.  Not all entrepreneurs will recognize value and maximize an opportunity at the 
same time or in the same way, and different individuals will weigh the value of an 
opportunity differently given perceived elements of a specific operational structure  (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000).  Paring analysis of the individual with the entrepreneur’s external 
environment provides a broader understanding of an operational context enabling the breadth 
and depth of specific actions (Lee and Peterson, 2000).  Entrepreneurial intentions can be 
influenced by a multitude of factors including motivation and individual capacity, but also 
the current competitive environment, resource availability, political system, market 
involvement and regulatory environment (Gregoire et al., 2010; Herrington and Kelley, 
2012).  The following section looks to define and present broader themes of the operational 
context believed to have the potential to influence entrepreneurial actions.  The nuanced 
elements of determinants found to have influence on entrepreneurship through this research 
will be discussed and analysed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
 
2.5.1 Operating Environments for Entrepreneurs  
The ‘environment’ in which an individual operates is a complex mix of socio-economic 
factors inclusive of interlinked, yet distinctive political, legal, regulatory, economic, market 
and socio-cultural systems (Chell, 2008).  However, entrepreneurial pathways and dynamics 
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can differ significantly depending on the varying institutional contexts and specific levels of 
market professionalization and/ or wider economic development (Acs et al., 2008).  
Additional complexity can be added to these systems via existing physical, technological and 
even religious environments (Chell, 2008).  While research to date has focused mainly on the 
individual or firm analysis of entrepreneurship, it has largely overlooked “system-level 
constraints and outcomes” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Acs et al., 2014, p. 478).  
Despite the seeming potential for an opportunity to be lucrative, without the existence of the 
necessary resources or supporting structure, an entrepreneur cannot maximize an opportunity 
‘discovered’ (Sarason et al., 2006).  Likewise, the existence or ability to access these specific 
resources may dictate the degree to which an individual may take entrepreneurial action 
(Shane et al., 2003).  This can be specifically seen within emerging markets where 
regulatory, financial and legal systems may be lacking.  Successful environments for 
entrepreneurship are heavily determined by quality of governance, access to capital, 
institutions (political and social) as well as the perception of entrepreneurs within societies 
(Acs et al., 2008).      
 
Emerging economies, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, are increasingly experiencing large 
scale institutional transformation with a focus on further stimulating and enabling economic 
growth through market-based policies (Boso et al., 2013).  Increasing privatization and 
corresponding ‘entrepreneurial transformation’ of state enterprises can also be a significant 
part of entrepreneurial activity (Zahara et al., 2000, as cited in Valliere and Peterson, 2009 p. 
464).  While this presents widespread opportunities, it can also be seen as a means of 
excluding private sector participation.   
 
2.5.2 Identified Determinants  
Within the entrepreneurial environment, interdependencies between the entrepreneur and 
wider development potential is impacted by factors such as governance effectiveness, access 
to capital or additional resources as well as social perception of entrepreneurs (Acs et al., 
2008).  Given this research focus, the external determinants of entrepreneurship within the 
wider operational systems are understood to be the political environments, market 
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structures, available resources and historical, socio-cultural settings and are briefly 
described in turn below.   
 
These specific determinants are highlighted in the current literature as acknowledged factors 
to entrepreneurship and economic effectiveness (see: Casson, 2003; Shane, 2003; Acs et al., 
2008; Chell, 2008; Brixiova and Asaminew, 2010; Boso et al., 2013).  However, the 
determinants selected for this specific research are used as overarching themes to house 
further investigation into each and were chosen due to sensibility in appreciating multiple 
and differing aspects of the operational context believed to have an influence on 
entrepreneurship.  Further investigation and analysis in order to understand where and how 
these specific elements support and promote entrepreneurship as well as which may dissuade 
and constrict entrepreneurship will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
2.5.2.1 Political Environment  
Political environment includes the current political system, including its political and 
economic stability, legal restrictions or ease and efficiency (cost) of doing business and 
ability for business establishment.  In order for entrepreneurship to be cultivated within an 
economy, the political system should be transparent, enable “individual rights, democratic 
rules and checks and balances of a government” (Lee and Peterson, 2000, p 408.)  Political 
freedoms, power decentralization, strong rule of law and property rights are also believed to 
increase levels of opportunity exploitation (Shane, 2003).  As presented earlier in this 
literature review, government policy can approach entrepreneurship support under four 
distinctive policy approaches: Extension, New Firm Creation, Niche and Holistic 
Entrepreneurship.  Within this research, the two types of approaches were found to be 
implemented within the political systems analysed: Extension Policy and New Firm Creation 
Policy.  As will be discussed in Section 6.3, each government takes a different approach to, 
and acceptance of, entrepreneurship, however neither has yet to actively implement policies 
specifically targeting and supporting entrepreneurship.  
 
2.5.2.2 Market Structure 
Market structures include the industry structures, regulatory climates, barriers to entry, 
population dynamics (social, cultural, political norms), market size and opportunity and 
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political involvement within a given market structure.   Market incentives can increase 
opportunities for entrepreneurial action and this can also be supported through government 
regulations aimed at making an economy more efficient (Lee and Peterson, 2000).  However, 
market structures can also restrict and inhibit entrepreneurial action and movement 
throughout a market system.  It is critical to recognise that entrepreneurs operate and grow 
differently in differing stages of an economy’s development.  Thai and Turkina (2013) argue 
that a more formalized and open economy enables entrepreneurship to flourish due to more 
formalized, widely accepted, understood and legally executable structures of systems geared 
towards developing a human capital base, as opposed to a less formalized, closed economy. 
 
2.5.2.3 Resource Availability  
Resource availability refers to the ability to access adequate means of capital and finance, 
existing infrastructure, available technology and opportunity for education and/ or training, 
(business or technical) (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Shane et al., 2003).  Finance 
(accessibility, availability and cost) was found to be problematic for many entrepreneurs 
within developing country contexts due to lack of access, high cost and impeding 
bureaucracy from banks and inability to provide sufficient collateral (lack of assets).  This is 
especially problematic for entrepreneurs within the early stages of business development or 
operators within informal sectors hindered by typical banking challenges.  Additionally, 
entrepreneurs are often unable to obtain financing if needs are larger than typical micro-
credit providers due to the smaller size of business and lack of related collateral endowments, 
or are unable to afford and use such large financing provided from national lenders.  From a 
financial lender’s perspective, micro-loan recipients do not have the structure and capital to 
be able to take larger loans and often lenders do not find medium sized loans financially 
viable or an attractive service to provide (Herrington and Kelley, 2012).    
 
Lee and Peterson (2000) found that the most favourable external environments for an 
entrepreneur are those that provided market incentives (financial returns), but also provided 
access to appropriate capital availability in order to pursue opportunity as wished.  A 
country’s investment climate and related institutions are critical in encouraging and actually 
enabling entrepreneurial activity and development as well as overall economic development, 
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or its lack thereof (Valliere and Peterson, 2009).  In developing economies, entrepreneurs 
may be more dependent on donor-oriented financing mechanisms or international financial 
institutions, but not local financial providers.  While this may legitimize some business 
aspirations, a corresponding risk of bureaucracy and political interference also exists 
(Valliere and Peterson, 2009).   
 
2.5.2.4 Historical and Socio-Cultural Setting 
The historical, socio-cultural setting refers to the specific desirability for entrepreneurship or 
business success related role models for new entrepreneurs as well as cultural beliefs 
associated with opportunity exploitation (success, failure, ‘traditional’ employment models) 
within a society (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Shane et al., 2003).  Research shows that 
entrepreneurs operating within an informal economy or less regulated sector are highly 
driven by a ‘socially-supportive culture’.  This socially supportive or accepting culture for 
entrepreneurship, along with the presence of entrepreneurial role models is also believed to 
support opportunity exploitation (Shane, 2003).  A socially supportive culture creates 
acceptance or animosity of success, approving or disapproving of the individual risk taker, 
responding to failure or expectations of success among a wider community.  The socially 
supportive culture is less important within more developed economies due to higher levels of 
regulation and formalized processes (Thai and Turkina, 2013).  
 
Conflict, while not discussed as a specific determinant, it is recognized to have devastating 
impacts to entrepreneurs, the wider development of entrepreneurship as well as a wider 
economy and its institutions  (Bruck et al., 2012).  While conflict results in obvious damage 
to a country and economy, it also results in reduced or destroyed market size, limited 
profitable opportunities, increased uncertainty, technological stagnation and higher 
transaction costs for entrepreneurs.  It also impacts the quality of the “entrepreneurial pool” 
from lost investment opportunity and/ or access as well as lost educational opportunity 
(Bruck et al., 2012, p. 11).  During times of conflict, an entrepreneurial brain-drain of sorts 
can also adversely impact an economy’s ability to recover and rebuild, and this is especially 
harmful for less developed economies.  Entrepreneurs, as with smallholder producers or 
poorer segments of a population, tend to be disproportionately affected by conflict (Bruck et 
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al., 2012).  Given the recent violent histories of both Ethiopia and Rwanda, influence from 
conflict on entrepreneurship was also appreciated within the wider discussion.  
 
2.6 Potential Impacts and Influences from Entrepreneurship 
Building from entrepreneurship theory and understanding the interdependence of 
entrepreneurship as discussed above, this section looks to understand the potential for 
entrepreneurship (both positive and negative) and create an understanding for ways in which 
entrepreneurial activity can in turn impact structures and wider operating environments.  
Entrepreneurship is considered as an important mechanism to economic development not 
only through employment and new innovations, but also through the resulting welfare effects 
(Acs et al., 2008).  The results of the reflexive entrepreneur and structure identified through 
this research are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.   
 
2.6.1 Potential Impacts and Benefits of Entrepreneurship  
As has been discussed, entrepreneurs are critical for economic growth and integral to the 
process of economic development.  Long considered as a significant factor in socio-
economic development, entrepreneurs emerging from these marketplaces decorate a long 
spectrum of varying contributions critical to roles of poverty alleviation and national 
economic development (Lee and Peterson, 2000).  Most significantly, entrepreneurs 
contribute through employment creation, growth enhancement and corresponding poverty 
alleviation (Rogerson, 2001).  Determining the driving factors to the actions and decisions of 
entrepreneurs in coordination with the contextual operating environment sheds light on ways 
in which to foster business opportunity, expansion, innovation and growth, crucial for 
continued development and economic growth within a wider economy.  Unpacking these 
elements provides context and grounded evidence to a successful atmosphere for 
entrepreneurs investigated within these research contexts.  
 
Entrepreneurship is generally thought to have a positive impact on economic growth due to 
potential for the creation of new economic activity, typically resulting in new organizations 
or pursuits of innovation (Rocha, 2004).  However, looking at potential for additional 
benefits or business opportunities created through entrepreneurial activities, focus should 
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also be on the entrepreneurial process, with the intention to understand the determinants of 
the payoffs or expected returns for an entrepreneurial activity.  As such, an appropriate 
reward structure (payment scheme, tax incentive, ease of market access, access to capital) 
should be built in to, or form part of, an active economy (Rocha, 2004).  The development of 
beneficial structures to entrepreneurship can create additional pathways for continued 
entrepreneurial reflection as to related effectiveness on implemented reward structures.  The 
transformative potential of entrepreneurship is a key element to economic development and 
can provide pathways for improved livelihood and economic growth across sectors (Casson, 
2003; Rocha, 2004; Brixiova and Asaminew, 2010; Hall et al., 2012).  Direct and indirect 
benefits are however, also reliant upon the type of entrepreneur and whether or not an 
entrepreneur consciously uses the positive potential of entrepreneurship for a wider benefit.   
 
2.6.2 Types of Entrepreneurs 
Josien’s (2012) work focused on the differing levels of entrepreneurs: micro and macro and 
their related designation towards risk.  While a macro-entrepreneur looks to create something 
entirely new and has a high level of risk-taking propensity, a micro-entrepreneur sees 
business ventures as a primary source of income and is generally thought to have a lower risk 
taking propensity (Josien, 2012, p.23).  This is seen in this research through the range of 
entrepreneurs as smallholder producers to owners of a large formal business, such as an 
exporter.  
 
Apart from micro and macro, specifically looking at the types of entrepreneurs and 
conducive environments for success within developing economies, Brixiova (2010) has 
determined that two types of entrepreneurship emerge: opportunity and necessity.  
Understanding the characteristics and tendencies of the opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneur lends credence to the ability for improved understanding of respondents.  As 
such, opportunity entrepreneurship occurs in higher-income economies, typically 
characterized by more highly educated entrepreneurs that make specific decisions and 
choices based on opportunity returns.  Opportunity entrepreneurship is the voluntary nature 
of opportunity pursuit, exhibiting an individual’s perception and cognizant action to achieve 
benefits of opportunity (Acs et al., 2008).  Conversely, necessity entrepreneurship also 
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referred to as ‘survivalist’ or ‘enforced’ entrepreneurship, occurs in lower income economies 
where, typically less educated entrepreneurs operate out of the necessity to generate needed 
additional income. Multiple studies have shown opportunity entrepreneurship to have 
significant positive impacts on economic development whereas necessity entrepreneurship is 
believed to have almost zero impact (Brixiova, 2010; Acs et al., 2008).  However, given the 
specific context framing interpretation, income gains by necessity entrepreneurship may have 
a higher relative impact at a household level, despite impacts at a national level, which may 
remain unseen.  Successful entrepreneurship can be characterized by survival rather than 
highly productive activities.  
 
Rogerson (2001) states that a majority of new start-ups in developing economies or those 
operating within informal sectors are the result of enforced or necessity entrepreneurship, 
actions taken for survival rather than opportunity recognition and exploitation  (p.117).  
Usually operating within the ‘informal’ sector, these businesses often enter and exit the 
market as needed, with exit strategies not necessarily related to business failure (Rogerson, 
2001; Mead and Liedholm, 1998).   Mead and Liedholm (1998) point out that these 
survivalist (necessity) enterprises are key to direct poverty alleviation of an individual or 
household as they enable “large number’s of very poor people to become less poor” (p.70).  
However this group typically is the most difficult to serve financially and without the much-
needed access to working capital, growth and expansion is largely capped (Mead and 
Liedholm, 1998).  With at least 1/3 of new labour entering employment within the MSME 
sector, these micro enterprises, while important to income generation, are primarily 
established as ‘survivalist’ mechanisms characterized as necessity entrepreneurship.  This 
type of entrepreneurship typically results in lower returns with different growth paths and 
corresponding economic impact than larger enterprises (Mead and Liedholm, 1998).   
 
While opportunity focused entrepreneurship has been shown to have positive impacts on an 
economy and economic development, necessity entrepreneurship has almost no impact (Acs 
et al., 2008; Brixiova, 2010).  Typically, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have higher rates of 
necessity entrepreneurs due to higher rates of un and under employment (Herrington and 
Kelley, 2012).  However, dependent upon the specific environment and situation, necessity 
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entrepreneurship may result in a higher relative impact for a specific household.   This also 
impacts development of local private sectors and markets.  Within factor-driven economies, 
high discontinuance and exit rates are typical for entrepreneurial activity (Herrington and 
Kelley, 2012).  Reasons for this are varied and highly contextual, however, with high levels 
of necessity entrepreneurship, it is possible that individuals target an opportunity out of 
necessity and once reaped the benefit, (income gains to support a specific need) choose to 
move on.  It is also highly possible that operating within different sectors (again country 
specific) may result in easier exit options due to lack of regulation.  As will be presented, this 
research looked to understand the entrepreneurial faces across a range of business types, aims 
and sizes.  
 
Despite limited literature available, imitation entrepreneurship, while seemingly 
oxymoronic, is also considered.  Building on from Rocha’s (2004) research on cluster 
dynamics, imitation entrepreneurship is understood as the evolution of multiple business 
models following a specific, or type of business model initially established.  This could be 
seen as a general phenomenon of the coffee sector within producing countries.  Within these 
structures, entrepreneurs have learned or observed basic operating structures, imitating a 
basic model, yet having changed structures, procedures or elements in order to compete 
within a unique setting.  While the 'imitation' of a specific business model may not be 
entrepreneurial, the entrepreneurial aspects are in the unique placement and operational 
aspects of the new business to enable and maintain competitiveness and profitability.  
Imitation entrepreneurship can be seen within many cluster dynamics as discussed in Rocha 
(2004) and was also observed within this study. 
 
Finally, entrepreneurs and the businesses operated have the potential to be architects of social 
change.  Social entrepreneurship refers to business operations with a conscious social aspect 
implemented through innovation and entrepreneurship, and as such, the social component is 
rooted in business principles or operational strategies to create social value.  While profits 
remain a key factor for decisions, the business based platform also looks to maximize 
efficiencies and profit, however the decision on how to use profit and where to invest are 
from a conscious decision of creating social impact, integrated as part of a wider business 
model  (Novkovic, 2008). 
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2.6.3 Measuring Entrepreneurship  
Given the myriad of varying perspectives and constructs of perceiving and understanding 
entrepreneurship, it remains a difficult element to define and appropriately quantify 
completely and as such, its corresponding benefits (or adverse outcomes) remain a difficult 
concept to ‘measure’ (Shane, 2003; Jennings et al., 2013).  The majority of quantification 
strategies for assessing entrepreneurship have typically focused on impact to or outcomes of 
national economic growth, business start-up or firm-level analyses, population dynamics, 
historical studies, length of business operation, labour market data, business output or the 
specific individual entrepreneur, or the entrepreneurial perception or attitudes (Casson et al., 
2006; Acs et al., 2014).  However, these methods have typically been implemented in studies 
looking at entrepreneurs within developed economies.  The majority of entrepreneurship 
assessments conducted within a developing country or emerging market context however 
have largely focused on industry impact, business scale, formalization and market entry 
strategies (Brixiova, 2010; Boso et al., 2013; Jennings et al., 2013).  It is also recognized that 
the potential lack of data within some countries may also play a role in limiting empirical 
studies.  
 
As entrepreneurship is relative and highly dependent upon actors and environments, 
empirical studies reviewed through this related literature investigation supported the 
development of individual mechanisms for selecting and/ or measuring entrepreneurs within 
a specific study.  Given the relatively limited number or availability of potential 
measurement approaches, this research relied on developing its own interdisciplinary design 
and approach for measuring and assessing entrepreneurship within an emerging market.  The 
guidelines and baseline measurements used for this specific study can be found in Section 
3.3.3. 
 
One mechanism that does establish measurement parameters is the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor8 (GEM), which provides data on global entrepreneurial activity, largely focusing on 
individual motivations and small-scale business ventures as opposed to large firm operations.  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is one of the only known mechanisms for attempting 
                                                        
8 Established 1997 by Babson College and London Business School. www.gemconsortium.org  
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to measure entrepreneurship within a developing economy context.  However GEM’s 
classifications for entrepreneurship stages within developing economies look at the evolution 
of an entrepreneur in accordance with the length of time of a specific business life within 
informal economies (Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  GEM’s measurements approach 
businesses operating in major urban centres however it does not investigate the differing 
types of business models or operational sectors.  It also makes no attempt at understanding 
the individual entrepreneur or the overlapping differences between differing business 
environments.  As such, its measurement guidelines were not used within this study.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has taken a focused, systematic approach to the review of classical and current 
literature surrounding entrepreneurship in the attempt to build a solid foundation for the 
ensuing investigation into research themes, objectives and specific questions.  The discussion 
built from an economics basis of entrepreneurship theory and was further informed by 
Structuration Theory in understanding and developing this research’s specific approach for 
analysing entrepreneurship within the coffee markets of Ethiopia and Rwanda.  The use of 
psychology’s trait view approach, created a foundation for the understanding and analysis of 
the internal, individual construct of the entrepreneur.  Additional examination discussed 
entrepreneurship within differing contexts, specifically within developing economies in sub-
Saharan Africa and the related policy requirements providing additional insight into the 
potential determinant influences from varying elements of the operational context on 
entrepreneurship.  Use of this interdisciplinary approach enabled this research to use and 
build from its conceptual framework: the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, which 
framed the investigation of the reflexive entrepreneur within a distinct operational context in 
order to further analyse if and how entrepreneurs can benefit from as well as influence wider 
structures through entrepreneurial activity.   
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Chapter 3 – Methodology.  A Researcher’s Toolbox 
3.1 Introduction  
Analysing entrepreneurs within this specific research design enabled a distinct research 
approach and process to aid in the understanding, interpretation and analysis of the individual 
construct of an entrepreneur as well as investigation of the specific interaction within and 
influence from unique market environments of operation; in this case, the coffee sectors of 
Ethiopia and Rwanda.  This chapter will present the research approach, design and specific 
methods used throughout the data collection and analysis process.  
 
3.2 Research Approach 
The aim of this research was to understand specific influences from internal characteristics, 
or drivers, and elements of external operational contexts, or determinants, of entrepreneurs 
and the corresponding influence this may have on systems of operation.  This study used the 
coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda as the structure in which to ground opportunity 
perception and individual action within two distinct marketplaces, providing an ideal 
situation for analysis and further comparative study.  While entrepreneurship can be viewed 
from a multitude of differing academic perspectives and disciplines, this research built 
theoretically from an economic perspective, but also used theory and approaches from the 
sociology and psychology domains.  As discussed in the literature review, academic 
scholarship has yet to agree to a single definition, set of distinctive assumptions or theories 
used in identifying entrepreneurship (Shane, 2012).  Without a distinctive set of principles, 
the multitude of perspectives and indeed multiple options for defining and even analysing the 
individual entrepreneur or entrepreneurial action must be clarified.  The following discussion 
looks to present the specific framework this particular research used in design and approach 
in order to identify, interpret and analyse entrepreneurs and environments of operation.  
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Perspective 
As presented in Section 2.2, traditionally, entrepreneurship study has researched either the 
distinct individual or the distinct opportunity.  This more traditional approach of analysing 
entrepreneurship is one in which the entrepreneur is commonly perceived as a filler of market 
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gaps; with the individual entrepreneur and specific opportunity conceived (and studied) as 
two separate and distinct constructs (Shane, 2003; Sarason et al., 2006). However, as 
discussed, more recent investigation has looked at the outcome from the combinations of 
these two constructs.  This ‘combination’ was first presented in Shane and Venkataraman’s 
(2000) framework of understanding entrepreneurship as the individual—opportunity nexus, 
initially presented in Figure 2.2 of Section 2.3.1.  This nexus perceives entrepreneurship as 
the overlap of two distinct constructs: the individual (entrepreneur) and the opportunity 
(context).  Shane and Venkataraman’s understanding of entrepreneurship is one of the 
individual entrepreneur and opportunity as a dualism, or separate and distinct elements 
independent of each other that come together to ‘overlap’ when the right individual discovers 
the right opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Sarason et al., 2006; Shane, 2012).  
 
Discussed in Section 2.3.2, Structuration Theory views the entrepreneur and opportunity 
within a distinct operational context; one that reflects the entrepreneur as a “reflexive agent 
engaging in purposeful action” (Giddens, 1984; Sarason et al., 2006, p. 287).  Thus the 
‘entrepreneurship nexus’ is not viewed as an overlap of two separate domains, but as a co-
evolving construction of the individual and opportunity within a specific operational context; 
believing both as interdependent forces that cannot be understood separately.  As such, an 
entrepreneurial minded individual may be propelled or constrained by specific opportunities 
or structures identified through the venturing process within a specific context.  Likewise, 
specific opportunities or wider structures may be created or constricted through the results of 
entrepreneurial actions (Sarason et al., 2006).   
 
Structuration Theory informs this understanding of the individual entrepreneur as 
interdependent within specific operational contexts.  Thus, the co-evolution of the 
entrepreneur and system, or operational context is perceived to be continually influencing 
entrepreneurial behaviour, and in turn, entrepreneurial behaviour and choices are constantly 
influencing their operational context.  The author’s developed conceptual framework and 
conceptualized Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus is again depicted in Figure 3.1, below.  
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Figure 3.1.  The Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
This research approach and analysis understands entrepreneurship in accordance to the 
theory of structuration, as the dynamic process of an agent engaging to, and responding with, 
a specific operational context; understanding the entrepreneur and context as co-evolving, 
interdependent mechanisms within a social system (Sarason et al., 2006).  Using elements of 
the theoretical application of Structuration Theory, embodied through the Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship Nexus, this study looked to investigate the unique interdependence of the 
entrepreneur and operational context as mutually dependent elements within a wider market 
structure through the investigation of grounded, empirical evidence.  Building from this 
approach, this study developed an operational framework to study the theory in action, 
through the discovery of evidence to the inputs and outcomes of the co-evolving dynamics.  
As such, research looked to investigate these elements in turn, through understanding:  
 
1. The nature of an individual entrepreneur,  
2. External factors which influence entrepreneurship, and  
3. How entrepreneurs in turn influence their social and operational systems.  
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3.2.2 Operational Application 
In order to understand this co-evolving nexus in action, the individual and context must first 
be understood separately to then be able to understand the more complete nexus in its 
entirety.  As this research approach views entrepreneurship as part of a larger system and not 
as a separate entity operating independently from distinct contexts, research looked to take 
this theoretical approach further by investigating the grounded application of both internal 
(individual construct) and external (operational context) inputs, as well as the output of 
tangible evidence of entrepreneurial action and corresponding reflexivity.    
 
Therefore, this research investigation and analysis deconstructs 9  the individual and 
operational context, to then test influences of the co-evolving nature of the nexus.  As such, 
this research has the following three objectives:  
 
1. What internal characteristics, or drivers, of the individual construct separate an 
entrepreneur from non-entrepreneur 
2. What external dynamics of the operational context, or determinants, shape an 
entrepreneur’s approach, outlook and opportunity pursuit 
3. How drivers and determinants can be fused to reveal influences from entrepreneurial 
reflexivity and additionality on wider structures within a co-evolving, interdependent, 
entrepreneurial ecosystem 
 
In this research, individual construct is understood as internal, inherent characteristics, which 
can predispose an individual towards entrepreneurial action.  These characteristics are 
referred to as drivers, and several will be tested through this investigation of the individual 
entrepreneurial internal construct. Operational context refers to the systemic nature of 
institutions naturally occurring within an economy or market dynamic, which an entrepreneur 
must navigate and work within.  The identified institutions, norms and influences within the 
operational context (political, economic, market and socio-cultural) are referred to as 
determinants within this research.  The phrase entrepreneurial action has been coined to 
conceive the tangible, actual outcomes that can be identified and analysed through this 
research process from the individual entrepreneur operating within, and influenced by, a 
                                                        
9Deconstruction of the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus may appear counterintuitive, however this 
approach, as part of the overall research design, is felt necessary in order to truly account for both, key elements 
within the greater whole.   Previous entrepreneurship studies have typically looked at only one element, either 
the individual or opportunity and thus, have not fully accounted for a larger picture. 
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distinct operational context, and these outcomes are used to investigate reflexive influences 
back to the social system.  
 
Critical to the specific absorptive capacity used in analysing evidence of entrepreneurship 
through tangible, unique action is an understanding and appreciation that entrepreneurship 
and indeed entrepreneurial actions are relative and contextual and as such, must be 
understood within the specific context of operation.  While building from a theoretical 
interpretation of entrepreneurship, this research took a pragmatic view in research approach 
and design, in the attempt to create and use new knowledge as a tool for action (Bryman, 
2012).  As such, this research placed greater emphasis on, and interest in, the practical 
application and corresponding implementation of entrepreneurial activity within the unique 
research contexts and less emphasis on the implications for wider theoretical discussion.  
Given this approach, research positionality is constructivism as the perceptions and actions 
being tested are the results of the active construction by respondents in reaction to their 
surroundings; in this case, the entrepreneur (Bryman, 2012).  Research also uses subjective 
epistemology to investigate and analyse entrepreneurship through asking questions of what, 
why and how (Sarason et al., 2006)   
 
3.3 Research Design 
From this research approach, developing the research design and related questions relied 
heavily on an inherent flexibility as information was continually learned, theories tested and 
research conducted through the initial literature review, pilot research phase and final field 
research for data collection.  As entrepreneurship is largely relative and given the scope of 
this research, flexibility enabling an intellectual mobility to explore backgrounds, operational 
contexts, and individual characteristics was believed to have greatly benefited this researcher 
and process in order to be better equipped to more aptly appreciate respondent interactions as 
well as to maintain integrity of information received.   
 
Admittedly, research questions also built from the researcher’s interest, knowledge and 
experience of working with and investing in entrepreneurs and private sector actors in 
emerging markets.  Professional experience includes Managing Director of several 
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businesses and social enterprise ventures across West Africa 10  involved in agri-business 
product purchase and service provision, the local production distribution and sale of 
improved household technologies, and a regional finance and investment portfolio.  
Responsibilities were inclusive of the development and expansion of product portfolios and 
corresponding distribution channels, implementation of credit provision services, market 
development strategies and financing schemes.  Much of this work focused on the active 
sourcing, classification and capacity building of entrepreneurs through the development of 
vested investments and partnerships with national-level business partners, clients and 
consumers.   
 
This previous experience contributed to the research lens and factored into the specific 
research approach.  While existing positionality was obviously informed through knowledge 
gained from past experience, part of the personal appeal and challenge of undertaking this 
study was to move past reliance on previously used ideas, strategies and habits in order to 
delve deeper into the theoretical discourse and participatory strategies, and use new methods 
and approaches to achieve research targets.  Conscious efforts were made to rely upon 
information gained from theoretical discourse prior to embarking on field research and 
respondent analysis, and to ensure formulated research positions were made from direct 
evidence through this research endeavour.  During data collection, attempts were made to 
avoid preconceptions or information misrepresentation through keeping an open mind, not 
asking leading questions and by becoming as educated as possible on the respective 
marketplaces, related industry growth, economic history, and specific backgrounds to the 
varying research areas.  A cognizant effort was also made in not comparing entrepreneurial 
action, findings or observations to past experiences in order to avoid bias or preconceived 
ideas surrounding specific entrepreneurial action as well as what a successful entrepreneur or 
non-entrepreneur might be in these specific settings.  
 
Given the ethnographic approach of this study, past experience was however found to be 
beneficial to research design, logistical management, community entry strategies, generating 
                                                        
10 Business headquarters were located in The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria.  Sourcing routes and wider 
investment portfolios also covered Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal (including Casamance), Sierra Leone 
and Togo. 
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access to interviewees, relationship building with respondents and understanding of 
respondent information.  Ensuring appropriate absorption, interpretation and analysis of 
respondent responses was made through in depth due diligence on histories, business models, 
outlooks, future plans and growth strategies, based on evidence obtained through field 
research.  While efforts were made to not allow this researcher’s positionality to interfere 
with the epistemological framework, it did help in the structure and management of data 
collection.  Despite efforts, it is recognized that past experience or perspectives may have 
still influenced decisions, perceptions and outcomes. 
 
While the specific methods used will be further discussed in Section 3.4, this research 
benefited from the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate individual, 
internal characteristics as well as wider operational contexts in determining business models, 
current operational strategies, growth plans, valuation perceptions, innovative actions, 
product sourcing, financing schemes, risk management, and tangible opportunity pursuit as 
well as personal histories and experiences of respondents across the coffee chains of both 
Ethiopia and Rwanda.  The data collection phase took over nine months, in addition to a six-
week research pilot.  The specific actions and outcomes from this research are depicted 
below in Figure 3.2, presenting the timeline to research design and ensuing data collection 
and analysis.   
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Figure 3.2. Research Design and Implementation Timeline 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
As presented in Figure 3.2, the research design has been achieved through a detailed, 
strategic process and will be further explained below.  
 
3.3.1 Location Selection 
While this study is a comparative piece, research was initially attracted to Rwanda due to the 
country’s work, and relative success, in reengineering its economy through building a strong 
national focus of creating and promoting an entrepreneurial environment focused on 
nurturing the growth of local enterprise and private sector development (Crisafulli and 
Redmond, 2012).  Interest was peaked by the Rwandan Government’s initial involvement in 
re-establishing a functioning economy following the war in 1994, as well as its distinct 
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choice and maintained commitment in extracting its direct involvement as a functional 
private sector re-emerged.  Admittedly, the Rwandan Government’s interest in entrepreneurs 
stems largely from the need for employment generation and economic revenue creation.  
However over the past 20 years, the country, its policies, legal structures, markets, and 
regulatory environments have worked to facilitate a more conducive environment for 
entrepreneurs, especially within its highly valuable coffee sector.  A more conclusive 
discussion of Rwanda’s political, economic and coffee sector history is found in Section 4.4. 
 
In comparison, while much of Ethiopia’s economy reopened following the collapse of the 
Derg Regime in 1991, and indeed the country has achieved high growth rates, success is 
often limited to and achieved by ‘select entrepreneurs’ in distinct sectors (Lefort, 2013).  
Given the active participation of the Ethiopian State in the economy and the ensuing uneven 
competitive environment between state-enterprises and the unaffiliated private sector, the 
country is experiencing constricted entrepreneurial mobility and a severe lack of 
entrepreneurial dynamism.  While coffee remains the key export and foreign exchange 
earner, the market was found to be hindered by direct Government involvement, reduced 
resource availability and accessibility and a political perception of distrust in private sector 
actor’s ability to achieve sate-led agendas; damaging long-term potential for not only 
entrepreneurial opportunity pursuit, but also the coffee sector itself.  Discussion of Ethiopia’s 
political, economic and coffee sector history is found in Section 4.3. 
 
The divergent paths of each county in terms of market liberalization, private sector re-
introduction as well as entrepreneurial promotion and embrace, provide an ideal opportunity 
for comparative research, investigating not only individual constructs, but also the influences 
differing contexts have on entrepreneurial ability as well as the ensuing influences 
entrepreneurs have on their contexts.   Within each country, specific research sites were 
chosen in the attempt to facilitate ease in finding respondents in order to achieve an adequate 
sample size and data collection.  As a result, main coffee production zones were targeted for 
each country.  Section 3.3.2 examines research areas for each county, presenting first a 
macro-level view of research area within the country, followed by a micro-level view of the 
plotted, distinct locations visited, as identified on maps used during research.   
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3.3.2 Research Areas 
Ethiopia 
Coffee production zones stretch across most of the southern, western and eastern areas of 
Ethiopia and fieldwork undertaken for this research occurred in the south within the Southern 
Nations Nationalities and People’s Region11 (SNNPR).  Respondent data collection, outside 
of the capital, specifically for Smallholder Producers and Processors focused on the 
Yirgacheffee and Sidama coffee zones.   Additionally, respondents in Exporting, private 
Commercial Farming, and some Processors had business headquarters in the Capital, Addis 
Ababa and were interviewed there.  Figure 3.3, shows the location of respondent research 
areas within Ethiopia.  Area demarcated in red depicts the specific research sites within the 
southern coffee zones of Yirgacheffee and Sidama.  Area demarcated in green represents 
area for Commercial Farms where all private commercial farmland is designated, however 
direct travel was not made to the Western Ethiopia12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 Due to Ethiopia’s policy of ethnic-federalism, research chose to stay within one Federalist Zone to reduce 
external influences that may adversely effect comparison, support easier assimilation of respondents and similar 
language spoken: Amharic.  While SNNPR has some of the best natural coffee producing areas, SNNPR is 
surrounded by the Oromia Region; a federalist zone known for its strong dislike and at times violent uprising 
against the National Government.  For these reasons it was believed to be beneficial to strategically stay within 
the SNNPR for respondent sourcing in order to maintain a more uniform understanding of respondent history. 
12 Travel was restricted due to time and distance required, but also due to travel restrictions enacted by the 
Ethiopian Government due to the National Elections held in May 2015. 
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Figure 3.3. Ethiopia Fieldwork Research Areas 
 
(Ezilon Maps, 2015; Author additions)  
 
While Figure 3.3 shows the areas of respondents interviewed through this research within 
Ethiopia, Figure 3.4 below, depicts the specific research sites visited during the data 
collection phase as plotted during interviews with respondents.  In Figure 3.4, green dots 
depict the location of Smallholder Producer farm locations.  Red dots depict the sites of 
processing stations of Processors interviewed.  While travel was unable to be made to 
specific commercial farms, locations were plotted for Commercial Farmers interviewed in 
Addis and are shown on the map as a green dot with a “C”. Data collection was conducted 
in the southern, coffee producing zones of Yirgacheffee and Sidama.  The northern tip of 
research sites was an approximate 500km south of Addis Ababa and the southern tip of 
research sites was an additional 100km south. Research was conducted at farm or processing 
site, or as near as possible, through driving and at times, hiking to interviewees.   
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Figure 3.4.  Map of Specific Field Work Sites in Ethiopia 
 
(Source: ITMB Publishing Ltd., 2011; Author additions.  Research sites were plotted in real time following interview.)   
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Rwanda 
In Rwanda, coffee is produced across large swaths of the country and as can be seen in 
Figure 3.5 below, with darker areas reflect higher concentrations of coffee production.  Key 
areas for coffee production used in this research were the western and southern regions due 
to the high intensity of coffee production.  Rwanda is not segregated by ethnicity and 
Kinyarwanda is spoken throughout the country; as such, larger areas of the country were 
toured in the attempt at enabling adequate respondent sourcing.  Areas demarcated in red 
show the location of data collection areas within Rwanda.  Similar to Ethiopia, Exporters as 
well as some Processors, were located in the capital, Kigali and were interviewed there.  
 
Figure 3.5. Rwanda Fieldwork Research Areas 
 
 (NAEB, 2012; Author additions) 
 
 
!
  73 
Figure 3.6 below, shows the specific research sites for locations of farms and processing 
stations, visited during the data collection phase as plotted during interviews with 
respondents.  Again, green dots depict the location of Smallholder Producers interviewed.  
Red dots depict the locations of Processing Stations.  The majority of decaffeinated 13 
producers were located in the southern tip of the country and are marked by a “/” through a 
green dot.  Southern research sites were an estimated 150 to 200km south of Kigali, with the 
southwest research locations an estimated 250km to 350km from Kigali.  Northwest research 
sites were an estimated 150 km to 200 km northwest of Kigali.  Research was conducted at 
farm or processing site, or as near as possible, through driving and at times, hiking to 
interviewees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 To be discussed further in Section 3.3.3, the term ‘decaffeinated producer’ is current phraseology used in 
Rwanda referring to smallholder producers that no longer produce coffee because of a conscious decision to 
have uprooted their coffee trees.  
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Figure 3.6.  Map of Specific Fieldwork Sites in Rwanda  
 
(Source: ITMB Publishing Ltd., 2013; Author additions.  Research sites were plotted in real time following interview.)   
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3.3.3 Entrepreneur Classification  
As discussed, entrepreneurship is relative to actors and contexts within a specific operational 
context and actions must be appreciated accordingly.  As will be initially presented in 
Sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, the coffee industries of both Ethiopia and Rwanda are built from 
the same three elements: Production, Processing and Export, and respondents were 
designated according to specific business segment involvement.  Within these three elements, 
additional classifications were made to more fully reflect the varying range of respondents 
and related business types encountered through this research in order to enable testing and 
analysis of individual entrepreneurs operating across the varying types of business models 
within the coffee chains.  A more complete explanation of all business segments used is 
found in Section 5.2.2.   Additionally, through the research process, it was discovered that 
respondents, irrespective of business segment, could not be simply classified as Non-
Entrepreneur or Entrepreneur and as such, an Entrepreneurial Range was developed in order 
to appropriately classify respondents across a range of Non-Entrepreneur, Potential 
Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur.   The Entrepreneurial Range will be explained and 
investigated in greater detail in Section 5.2.3, however, Figure 3.7 presents the outcome of 
entrepreneur classifications for each business segment from this research.   
 
Figure 3.7. Entrepreneurial Range and Business Segments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
The design strategy of multiple business segments represented across the Entrepreneurial 
Range was used to strengthen ability to enable not only the individual to be understood, but 
an opportunity in which research could understand and compare individuals (Entrepreneurs 
and Non-Entrepreneurs) within specific, and between different, business segments in order to 
determine similarities or differences in individual constructs.  While business segments were 
Entrepreneurial Range Segment 
Unclassified Decaffeinated Producer (Rwanda only) 
Non-Entrepreneur Smallholder Producer, Non-Entrepreneur 
Potential Entrepreneur Smallholder Producer, Potential Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur 
Smallholder Producer, Entrepreneur 
Commercial Farmer (Ethiopia only) 
Processor 
Exporter 
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defined from the organic diversification of varying business activities across the coffee chain, 
the actual classification of respondents as entrepreneurs (or not) was not as clear-cut, or 
easily defined.  The term ‘decaffeinated producer’ is current phraseology used in Rwanda 
referring to smallholder producers that no longer produce coffee due to the conscious 
decision to have uprooted their coffee trees; a very literal decaffeination of the farm.  This 
term is not to be confused with the product: ‘decaffeinated coffee’, which is typically 
prepared by the international importing agent or roaster, post product export; it is not a 
processing technique currently preformed in either Ethiopia or Rwanda.  Decaffeinated 
producers were unable to be categorized along the Entrepreneurial Range introduced in 
Figure 3.7 due to the current business inactivity within the coffee market and as such, 
Decaffeinated respondents remain unclassified within the Entrepreneurial Range.  These 
specific respondents were still included in this study as a means to provide additional 
information to a specific element of Rwanda’s coffee industry.   
 
Given the wide range of possible actors across two different marketplaces and economic 
structures, a distinct, rule based system for classifying respondents could not be and was not 
used.  Instead, building from the literature presented in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, 
parameters were developed based on individual motivations, market interaction and the 
distinct, unique, tangible actions taken in pursuit of opportunity. These parameters provided 
guidelines for interpreting and appreciating respondents and were used to classify 
respondents as Non-Entrepreneur, Potential Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur, seen in Figure 
3.8 below.  
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Figure 3.8. Parameters for Entrepreneurial Classification 
  Non-Entrepreneur Potential Entrepreneur Entrepreneur 
Individual 
Motivation  
 - Limited to no interest in sector or 
product 
 - Interest in sector/ product   - Interest in sector/ product  
 - Unwilling, or believes self to be 
unable to expand business 
 - Believes in sector or product's profit 
making viability 
 - Believes in sector's/ product's profit making viability 
 - Lack of belief or interest in 
profitability for sector/ product/ 
business 
 - Willing or eager to expand business 
 -  Interest in exploring perceived market gaps.  Willing, 
eager to expand business 
 - Little belief in self to achieve 
success within specific sector or 
business 
 - Understands market, sees gaps/ 
potential for new opportunity pursuit 
 - Understands market, sees gaps/ potential for new 
opportunity pursuit 
 - Not personally motivated in pursuit 
of business expansion 
 - Interest in exploring perceived market 
gaps  
 - Has specific goals/ future plans for business.  Currently 
taking action towards achieving plans.  Has developed 
strategy to achieve plans.  
 - Does not see market potential or 
opportunity 
 - Has specific goals, future plans for 
business, but not yet taken steps towards 
achievement  
 - Strong belief in self to succeed, persevere through 
difficult situations  
   - Belief in ability to achieve success 
 - High drive for successful pursuit of opportunity, interest 
in new challenges 
Market       
Interaction 
 - Views product as just one element 
of many for income generation  
 - Limited or no access (at times) to 
additional resources 
 - Views product as key or integral to income generation 
 - Limited to no access, or use for 
additional resources 
 - Limited use of additional resources if 
have access 
 - Takes action on new opportunity seen for market 
expansion 
 - Unwilling, uninterested to take risk 
on new activity 
 - May be investing in current business 
as good business practice and not as an 
expansion technique 
 - Actively investing in current business as well as for 
business growth/ improvement/ expansion into new, unique 
area(s) 
 - Not investing in perceived business 
potential  
 - Sees potential for new opportunity or 
market expansion, may not have yet 
determined specifics  
 - Actively pursue options for additional resources / 
financial access.  Able to overcome barriers to resource 
sourcing / financial access  
 - Not trying to expand business 
 - Not against taking risk, but prefers to 
see other's success prior to attempt 
 - Willingness to take risk in pursuit of new opportunity  
 - Not necessary to witness other's prior success before 
attempting / starting something new 
 - Short-term, season to season 
mentality  
 - Willing to invest in business 
expansion activities  
 - Takes long-term view on business potential (not just 
season to season)  
 - Relies on existing knowledge stock 
to manage business, not actively 
looking to build additional knowledge 
 - Limited in action taken through 
pursuit of perceived opportunity 
  - Willing and able to try new activity, regardless of having 
seen other's attempt 
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(Source: Author Construct) 
 
  
 - Relies on existing knowledge stock to 
manage business, not actively looking to 
build additional knowledge 
  - Actively looking to improve and/ or build upon existing 
knowledge stock to search for new opportunities or unique 
activities to become involved 
  
 
- Active player in market, enforcer for change 
     - Embrace opportunity to try something new 
     - Active pursuit of new opportunity, innovative pursuit of 
opportunity 
Unique, 
Tangible 
Action 
towards 
Opportunity 
Pursuit 
    
 - Established own business.  Expand inherited business 
into current model, inclusive of specific operational 
expansion in pursuit of new opportunity  
    
 - Unique approach to gain, maintain competitive 
advantage/ secure supply 
    
 - Diversify product and business portfolio: certification/ 
unique production/ processing techniques/ marketing 
strategy  
    
 - Implementation of innovative sourcing - supply routes/ 
financing mechanisms (provision and/or attraction)/ quality 
recognition 
    
 - Continuation of business despite price volatility or 
adverse business climates 
    
 - Strong belief and trust in own decision for opportunity 
pursuit, despite risk.  Pursues business/ new venture 
accordingly  
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3.3.4 Respondent Sourcing and Community Entry 
Given the multiple ‘moving parts’ within this research and the need to build from a baseline 
understanding to ensure appropriate respondent absorption, the research process was 
designed in a strategic manner in order to not only gain understanding, but also to develop 
contacts and build relationships.  Research did not partner with local institutions in the 
attempt to avoid potential contamination, however it is recognized that this approach 
potentially added difficulty in actually finding respondents and perhaps, in finding the ‘right’ 
respondents across a range of business types, outlooks and performances.  While primarily 
based in Addis Ababa or Kigali, during data collection phases outside of the capital cities, 
this researcher stayed in research location areas, often for several weeks at a time.  As 
research specifically looked to uncover certain elements about entrepreneurs, purposive 
sampling was used to select key individuals based on distinct factors (Berg, 2004).  While 
some respondents, such as Exporters were more easily identifiable and contactable, others 
such as rural Smallholder Producers required greater efforts to uncover.  Snowball sampling 
was also used to find target respondents based on others’ recommendations or suggestions 
(Berg, 2004).  Usage of the snowball sampling technique did not account for the potential of 
local power dynamics, which facilitated men being more commonly presented as 
respondents.  The ensuing lack of gender parity is recognized as a limitation to this study.  
 
3.3.4.1 Research Pilot (April – May, 2014) 
A pilot research trip was taken to Rwanda during the peak of the coffee harvesting and 
processing season in order to observe the natural phase of work and business process, with 
the goal of facilitating an improved understanding of the operational aspects of the coffee 
production, supply and marketing systems as well as the contextual environment of 
entrepreneurs within the country.  This visit was largely focused on defining some of the 
logistical and operational frameworks that heavily defined the overall research.   While 
contacts of coffee actors or locations of coffee businesses were initially sought from local 
government agencies during the first weeks of the pilot phase, updated, accurate lists were 
not available.  As such, a Rwandan Research Assistant was hired to facilitate community 
entry and provide translation and this researcher hired a car and drove throughout coffee 
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production zones across the country in search of Producers, Processors, Exporters as well as 
other industry actors.   
 
Given the peak coffee season, it was anticipated that the majority of actors across the coffee 
spectrum would be active and easier to find, however, given the frantic nature of the industry 
during this time, lengthy discussions or interviews were not expected, nor received.  Despite 
the hectic season, contacts and potential respondents were able to be found through the pilot 
investigation and while brief, initial meetings explained researcher presence and research 
purpose, and contacts were asked if they would be willing to be a part of the larger data 
collection phase.  Transparency and an effort for effective presentation of intentions was 
made to not only appropriately inform respondents, but to dissuade potential biases14 contacts 
and respondents may have had towards this researcher (Bryman, 2012).  Those agreeing to be 
part of the study provided contact details or methods of how to locate them, for producers 
without mobile phones.  This resulted with not only an initial contact database of possible 
respondents, but also in a feasible logistical layout for the larger research and data collection 
phase.  The pilot also enabled the initial assessment of specific driver applicability, varying 
business models and the wider coffee market from which to develop methods and data 
collection tools.    
 
3.3.4.2 Rwanda Data Collection (September, 2014 – March, 2015) 
Rwanda data collection built from the initial contacts gained in the pilot phase, but occurred 
strategically, after the close of the coffee season15 with the conscious effort of providing 
respondents with opportunity and time to spend during interviews in less pressured 
environments.   The logistical framework identified through the pilot aided in ordering area 
entry and additional respondent sourcing.  Entering areas where research was conducted 
occurred either through invitation from sourced contacts or in new areas of entry, abiding by 
appropriate protocols, gaining community entry approval from local municipality offices 
prior to data collection, where possible.  Targeted, as well as snowball sampling was used for 
smallholder producers through personal recommendations from other respondents.  
                                                        
14 Many respondents assumed I was an investor or buyer, which at times appeared to change attitudes if a clear 
research purpose or intention was not understood.  
15 Rwanda’s coffee harvest and processing season typically stretches from March to June. 
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Additionally, in order to get a wider range of respondents as well as the need to find 
respondents across a range of entrepreneurial-ness, respondent requests were made for 
interviews with smallholder producers with a large number of trees as well as those with a 
small number of trees16.  In this way it was believed to be able to better source producers 
along different scales of business size and management with the hopes of finding a wider 
range of respondents17. Admittedly this may have pre-disposed some respondents, however it 
was found that recommended respondents tended to be ‘model farmers’ or more senior 
community members within an area, thus making it difficult to obtain producers with varying 
degrees of business success, perspective and interest in coffee.    
 
Processors and Exporters, largely based Kigali in the off-season were also found through 
targeted sampling, with some being traced following this researcher’s purchase of their 
coffee from local supermarket shelves in Kigali.  Key informant interviews with government 
officials, industry leaders, lobbyists, technical specialists, NGOs, financial investors and 
expat owned exporting businesses were largely held in Kigali.   
 
Methods and data collection tools underwent heavy testing and piloting prior to use in data 
collection.  Through these testing phases, methods of delivery and explanation were 
improved, tools were advanced and ambiguous or confusing questions addressed. This ‘pre-
data collection, tool-testing period’ also provided opportunity for the training of Rwandan 
Research Assistants18, accommodating additional issues discovered or perceived in method 
delivery; aiding in overall method, tool, and approach improvement.  
 
3.3.4.3 Ethiopia Data Collection (March – June, 2015) 
Given the comparative nature of this study, attempts for ensured continuity and similarity 
were made through data collection tools and explanations, as well as through community 
                                                        
16 Asking for specific land size proved difficult as specific measurements were largely unknown by respondents 
17 Not all respondents reporting to have a large number of trees were considered to be entrepreneurs and not all 
respondents with a small number of trees were considered as non-entrepreneurs.   
18 Research Assistants were hired through a partnership with a Rwandan higher education initiative, Kepler 
University, which is affiliated with the US universities, providing qualified students the opportunity to earn an 
Associates or Bachelors degree accredited through a US university.  Partnership between this researcher and 
Kepler University allowed selected students to receive paid work experience as well as work placement credit 
towards their degree.  All Research Assistants were students pursuing degrees in Business.    
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entry and respondent sourcing strategies.  While a pilot research trip was not possible for 
Ethiopia due to time constraints and timing of the coffee season, similar strategies were used 
in regards to contact sourcing, method testing and data collection.  The coffee season19 is 
typically earlier in Ethiopia than Rwanda and research timing occurred at the end of the 
season with the similar aim of working with respondents in less pressured environments.   
Contacts were initially sourced for Export and Processing businesses through the Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (ECX), with the majority of these businesses based in Addis Ababa.  
Discussions with Export and Processing businesses led to linkages with business partners and 
sourcing agents in targeted research areas who were able to provide introductions with, and 
contacts to, local area producers.   
 
Again, targeted and snowball sampling 
techniques were used in finding 
respondents.  Similar to Rwanda, in order to 
find a range of Smallholder Producers in 
regards to different business sizes, 
approaches and perceptions, respondent 
requests were made for interviews with 
producers with large numbers of trees as 
well as those with a small number of trees20. 
Methods and tools were also tested prior to 
data collection to ensure appropriate 
translation, Ethiopian Research Assistant 
training, and tool delivery to respondents.  
Picture 3.1, shows this researcher being taught 
how to sort processed coffee beans and discovering she is not very good; much to the 
amusement of another woman sorter! 
 
                                                        
19 Ethiopia’s coffee harvest and processing season for red cherry is typically from January to April. 
20 Again, respondents with relatively large number of trees were not automatically classified as an entrepreneur 
and vice versa.   
Picture 3.1. Learning to Sort Coffee at an 
Ethiopian Processing Station 
(Source: Author) 
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The data collection phase for Ethiopia occurred during the build-up to and aftermath of 
National Elections (May 25, 2015).  Respondents were recognizably hesitant in speaking 
with, or being perceived as providing information to ‘outsiders’.  Admittedly, this made 
finding respondents willing to participate much more difficult and as such, a smaller sample 
size was gathered.  It is also recognized that the greater degree of difficulty in community 
entry and ability to find respondents willing to participate may have limited the depth of 
information received in some cases.  
 
3.3.5 Ethical Assurances  
Reciprocal and equitable ethical management of this research approach and process was 
made in the effort to not only limit negative impact, but also provide a means for a net 
positive contribution.  Every effort was made to ensure ethical integrity and responsibility in 
the attempt to ensure an impartial and comfortable environment for information sharing and 
knowledge transfer.  All respondent participants were guaranteed anonymity for information 
provided and advised of rights to cease participation at any time or retract information 
already provided.  Trust relationships were observed to be especially important in both 
research settings and as such, community entry and respondent relationship building took a 
priority in the data collection phase.  Throughout, efforts were made to put respondents, 
research assistants and the overall research aims, in the best possible positions for success.  
 
3.4 Tools, Data Collection and Analysis 
This research took an ethno-methodological approach in that it was primarily based around 
field research and more specifically, the understanding of individuals within their own, 
specific environment (Silverman, 2011).   Additionally, methods used were specifically 
designed to extract information from individuals interviewed with the understanding and 
analysis of specific results viewed from within a certain context (Berg, 2004).  All tools used 
were translated into either Amharic or Kinyarwanda for Ethiopia and Rwanda respectively, 
and were translated by research assistants hired for the data collection process.  Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used and are described in turn below.  All methods 
and data collection tools used during this research received prior clearance by the University 
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before implementation.  Additionally, all photographs taken of respondents, businesses or 
farm areas were taken with respondent and/ or owner permission.  
 
3.4.1 Research Tools  
Qualitative research was used to unearth various business structures, specific business 
evolutions, individual experiences, knowledge, innovative actions taken, personal or business 
histories as well as specific policies, actions or resources that have been particularly 
instrumental in enabling or prohibiting entrepreneurial success. Methods used to collect this 
information were document analysis, observation, semi-structured interviews, case studies, 
key informant interviews and market chain analysis.  During the ‘pre-data collection, tool-
testing period’, it was discovered that respondents became visibly anxious when asked if 
conversations could be recorded and responses were observed to be much less detailed.  
Given this experience, a recording device was not used during data collection. 
 
Document Analysis relied on the review of reports, sector analyses, market assessments and 
policy documents from public sector actors, private investors, technical experts as well as 
government agencies.  A systematic, evidence focused, literature review process was used to 
ensure the robust identification, review and synthesizing of theories, thoughts and evidence 
in support of this research and process (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2013).  Establishing 
fundamental baselines for political and economic histories as well as current political 
environments, initially presented in Chapter 4, enabled appreciation of how operational 
contexts have and continue to influence action as well as in how to interpret action and 
opportunity pursuit.  Additionally, provided that the entrepreneur and operational context are 
interdependent and believed to co-evolve, a deep understanding of histories, political and 
economic influences as well as socio-cultural perceptions were considered critical to more 
fully understand the entrepreneur and corresponding action within a system.  While research 
was on going, document analysis provided much of the theoretical understanding of 
entrepreneurship and backgrounds to the respective coffee industries within each country.  It 
was also used in some cases to check or provide context to information obtained from 
respondents.  
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Observation was an on-going process, inclusive of indirect observation of the distinct 
marketplaces and actors as well as direct observations with respondents in a participatory 
process.  Direct observation not only improved understanding of systems and procedures but 
also allowed for observation of entrepreneurs within their distinct operational contexts 
(Silverman, 2011).  Additionally, Visual Mapping Techniques were used and found to be 
especially beneficial during community entry.  Visual mapping was used as a means of an 
additional, unobtrusive, informal data gathering process to provide an improved 
understanding of specific areas.  Visual assessments included: 
 
 Physical infrastructure within and leading to a community (road quality, electricity 
access) 
 Transportation vehicles available (bicycles, motorbikes, cars) 
 Dwellings (type/ quality of housing and/ or roofing, construction materials used) 
 Number of shops, bars, local banks/ credit offices, street vendors, prevalence of livestock 
 Presence of markets held 
 
Techniques also considered personal attributes of individual respondents and other 
individuals within a community such as:  
 Clothing 
 Shoes (purchased or hand-made, lack of shoes)  
 Number of children in school uniforms (or not) 
 
While these observations are obviously not a concrete guide, it did provide additional, 
relative background information and was used to enable better absorption and understanding 
of information provided.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews were used with respondents analysed in this research in order to 
guide conversations on, but not limited to, business models, market perspectives, market 
understanding or interpretation of opportunity, future outlooks, influences to business, 
individual histories, current political realities and business actions.  Examples of the semi-
structured interview questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.   
 
Key Informant Interviews were conducted with other sector actors operating within 
government agencies, NGOs, lobbyists, financiers, local transporters and market buyers.  
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Key informant interviews were used as a means of gaining and building background 
knowledge, clarifying information gathered and discussing result outcomes and initial 
findings.  Attempts were made to schedule key informant interviews prior to field data 
collection.  However in some cases, additional interviews were scheduled following the 
completion of field data collection in the attempt to clarify questions raised and ensure 
adequate and appropriate knowledge or information was gained.  Based on specific positions, 
some key informants were able to provide strategic contacts into targeted research areas or to 
potential respondents.  Examples of the key informant interview questions can be found in 
Appendix C.  Table 3.1 below provides further detail into the number of key informants 
found for specific groups in Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
 
Table 3.1. Breakdown of Key Informants Interviewed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Case Studies were used mainly with entrepreneurs that had demonstrated a unique business 
model or operational scheme or were involved in multiple business phases of the coffee 
chain.  Case studies were used to provide additional clarifications and highlight some of the 
most interesting individuals found through this research.  Focus Groups were found difficult 
to achieve and occurred only three times in Rwanda with Smallholder Producers.  Ethiopian 
respondents refused to be seen meeting as a group and thus none occurred in Ethiopia.  
Multiple case study synopses are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Market Chain Assessments were used for each country and marketplace.  These were used to 
determine product flow, support mechanisms, actor overlap, influences external to the chain, 
direct and indirect government involvement and sources and destinations of financial 
movements.  This study used the Global Value Chain Analysis (GVCA) technique in support 
Key Informant Type  Ethiopia Rwanda 
Government or Coffee Department Official 4 3 
ECX Official (Ethiopia Only) 2  
CEPAR Official (Rwanda Only)  3 
NGO / Research Group 6 4 
Non-National, Private Sector Actor in Coffee Sector 2 3 
International Institution 1  
Coffee Cooperative Leader 2 1 
   
Total  17 14 
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of assessments of market structures, embedded networks and potential impacts for value 
distribution.  GVCA also was used to support analysis and interpretation of influences from 
operational structures, chain dynamics, factors impacting income generation and product 
flow as well as income distribution within and between actors (Kaplinsky, 2000; Gibbon, 
2001; Bolwig et al., 2010).  Through the use of GVCA in analysing entrepreneurs within the 
respective coffee sectors, market structures were captured, presenting greater understanding 
to the skeletal construction of the respective entrepreneurial ecosystems.  Within this 
research, analysis specific market chains were developed to capture direct and indirect 
government influences, financial flows (or lack thereof) external influences and final product 
flow capacity.  Various depictions of the market chains developed through this research can 
be found in Sections 4.3.3.1, 4.4.3.1 and 6.4.1.1, 6.4.1.2.   
 
Participatory Budgeting was used in the attempt to define actual profitability of coffee 
businesses.  In Rwanda, budgeting occurred with Smallholder Producers and one Processor. 
In Ethiopia, only one participatory budgeting session took place with Smallholder Producers.  
Formal businesses of Commercial Farmers, Processors and Exporters were reluctant to 
discuss private, proprietary information.  Due to the small sample size of respondents 
participating in this method, results cannot be generalized and are not included within wider 
analysis.  However, outcomes from participatory budgeting sessions and the related costing 
models can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Quantitative research relied on a Structured Questionnaire to determine degrees of specific 
individual characteristics: resilience, self-efficacy, innovativeness, risk tolerance, and 
opportunity recognition and entrepreneurial orientation (OR+EO).  This questionnaire was 
structured using a Likert Scale to measure strength or depth of specific traits, or drivers, in 
Entrepreneurs, Potential Entrepreneurs as well as Non-Entrepreneurs.  Likert scales are the 
most commonly used method found for testing individual traits (Chen et al., 1998; Zhao et 
al., 2005; Bullough et al., 2013) and the likert scale method was used specifically to 
understand the dimensions, or depth of individual characteristics of respondents (Bernard, 
2000).  Ranking and scoring exercises were also used within the questionnaire, in order to 
test respondent preference to specific financial packages.  Likert scale questionnaires were 
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translated into Amharic and Kinyarwanda.   Examples of the Structured Questionnaire and 
Likert Scale used can be found in Appendix D.    
 
A sample size of 20 to 30 respondents was targeted for each business segment across the 
Entrepreneurial Range, identified previously in Figure 3.7, per country.  63% of Rwandan 
privately owned processing businesses and over 85% of Rwandan owned export businesses 
were interviewed for this research.  With more than 400,000 smallholder producers involved 
in Rwanda’s coffee production nationwide, the 126 Smallholder Producers interviewed for 
this research remain a marginally representative sample.   
 
It was very difficult to obtain accurate information regarding businesses currently operating 
in Ethiopia’s coffee sector, and different reports and government agencies provided large 
variances in business registrations and current stages of operation (licensing fees paid).  
However, it is estimated that over 70% of Commercial Farmers and at least 50% of privately 
owned processing businesses located within the southern coffee zones of Yirgacheffee and 
Sidama were interviewed for this research.  To be discussed in Section 4.3.3, only 300 EXC 
Export Licences are available in Ethiopia, however an undisclosed number of non-licenced 
ECX Exporters continue to operate.  Exporters typically source nationally and thus, cannot 
be limited to a single production zone.  This research interviewed both licensed and non-
licenced Exporters and while it is estimated that at least 15% of all Exporters were 
interviewed, an exact percentage for the business segment is unable to be calculated.  
Smallholder Producers number more than four million people in Ethiopia, and similar to 
Rwanda, the 95 Smallholder Producers able to be interviewed for this research remain 
marginally representative.  
 
Table 3.2 below, details outcomes of data collection, presenting the number of respondents 
for each research tool used.  All respondents partaking in the Likert Scale Questionnaire also 
took part in a Semi-Structured Interview.  Sample size, per business segment is presented for 
these methods for clarity as they formed the main data collection for quantitative analysis.  A 
more detailed breakdown for the specific business segments and Entrepreneurial Range is 
detailed in Section 5.3.  Method and tool testing periods, prior to actual data collection are 
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not included in this final count.  As can be seen, Ethiopia had an overall lower sample size 
than Rwanda in nearly all categories.  While a greater degree of difficulty in actual 
respondent sourcing was experienced in Ethiopia, it is also considered as an outcome to the 
restrictive market and adverse political structure, as well as the closeness of National 
Elections to data collection occurrence.   
 
Table 3.2. Details of Data Collection, Number of Respondents per Tool  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author Research Data) 
 
In maintaining respondent anonymity, coding of respondents was used according to the 
following system identified in Table 3.3 below, depicting business segment, country, 
interview number within specific business segment and year of interview.  Countries were 
designated as ‘E’ for Ethiopia and ‘R’ for Rwanda.  An example code for the first 
Smallholder Producer respondent in Rwanda interviewed in 2014 would be: (P_R_1, 2014).  
Key Informant interviews used a similar strategy, coding key informants by country of 
operation, interview number and year of interview, such as (E_1, 2015) for the first key 
informant interviewed in Ethiopia.  Data gathered from discussion and interviews are 
referenced accordingly throughout this thesis through direct quotes or case studies.  Data and 
information from respondents not presented as a direct quote has still been referenced, in 
regards to this structure, throughout the text. 
 
 
 
Research Tool, (N) Ethiopia Rwanda 
Semi-Structured Interview 95 126 
Questionnaire (Liker Scale) 95 126 
Decaffeinated Producer (Rwanda only) - 14 
Smallholder Producer, Non-Entrepreneur 4 31 
Smallholder Producer, Potential Entrepreneur 17 15 
Smallholder Producer, Entrepreneur 6 23 
Commercial Farmer (Ethiopia only) 22 - 
Processor 26 20 
Exporter 20 23 
Key Informant Interview 17 14 
In-Depth Case Study 5 15 
Focus Group  0 3 
Participatory Budgeting (Smallholder Producers) 1 3 
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Table 3.3. Coding Classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author) 
 
3.4.2 Research Analysis 
Multiple research tools were used as a means of extracting information through different 
mediums, but also to triangulate data obtained to clarify information, identify outliers as well 
as validate results.  Narrative Analysis was used in analysing the qualitative research in order 
to objectively extract trends or themes discovered (Bernard, 2000).  Continual review of 
secondary data was also reviewed to aid and support understanding or clarification of 
information received during data collection.  All data was entered into researcher developed 
excel databases and cleaned prior the running of any analysis.  Specific Market Chain 
Analyses were developed and are presented in this thesis to depict results from each country’s 
coffee market and corresponding influences from external actors or direct government 
involvement. 
 
Quantitative analysis used Descriptive Statistics and Statistical Analysis Testing to determine 
specific scores for respondent results from likert scale tests.  Respondent results within each 
entrepreneurial classification and business segment were aggregated in order to determine 
group scores for statistical comparison of varying groups across coffee chains and between 
countries.  Binary Logistic Regression Models were also used to better understand and 
compare specific quantitative data gathered and determine its probability of influencing 
entrepreneurship within each country.  Results from these efforts will primarily be found in 
Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.   
 
3.4.3 Issues 
Issues and challenges were obviously encountered through this research process, and upon 
reflection of design and processes completed, areas for improvement have been recognized.  
These are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
Business Segment  Coding Classification 
Smallholder Producer P 
Commercial Farmer CF 
Processor Pc 
Exporter Ex 
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Entrepreneur Classifications  
Perhaps the most crucial element of this entire research process and final outcome is the 
classification of respondents along the Entrepreneurial Range.  Admittedly, the classification 
relied on this researcher’s understanding and interpretation of the literature, background, 
contextual information within related contexts and absorption of responses.   Through the 
research process and data collection phase, attempts for appropriate and robust due diligence 
in regards to classifications were made against best reliable information received.  However 
it is recognized that some individuals may have over or under-reported activities, and while 
using multiple methods tried to circumvent misinformation and validate evidence, it is 
recognized and possible that some respondents may have been misclassified.   
 
An additional, obvious issue remains the actual classification of respondents.  As will be 
show in Chapter 5, Smallholder Producer respondents were able to be classified as Non-
Entrepreneurs, Potential Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs due to the varying range of 
responses and unique, tangible action taken.  However, other business segments (Commercial 
Farmers, Processors and Exporters) were only able to be classified as Entrepreneurs.  While 
all classifications used the same parameters articulated in Figure 3.8, respondents in these 
business segments (Commercial Farmers, Processors and Exporters) were all classified as 
Entrepreneurs due to the fact that they had started new business or had built inherited 
businesses into new, unique phases, or had expanded operational models and business areas.     
 
Given the recent history and ‘restart’ of both countries’ coffee sectors, the majority of these 
current businesses were start-ups.  Where businesses were inherited, current owners had 
shown evidence as to how they had uniquely changed business approach and model to stay 
competitive or remain in business.  It is also recognized that tangible, entrepreneurial action 
was easier to perceive due to evidence of business start-up, unique product diversification or 
divergence into new business areas.  However, it is acknowledged that this can raise 
questions to classification and ensuing analysis.  Efforts were also made to find owners of 
failed businesses (or ‘failed entrepreneurs’) and while several were sourced and contacted, 
none were willing to participate in this research, removing potential for an additional 
baseline.  
  92 
In-Country Challenges 
As mentioned above, Ethiopia was found to be surprisingly difficult in achieving respondent 
willingness to participate and provide information.  This was found at each stage of 
production, processing and export as well as with government officials.  While these 
challenges did result in a smaller overall sample size and may have resulted in limited 
information gathering, it is also perceived as evidence to the enabling environment of 
entrepreneurial mobility (or lack thereof) and restrictive political climate and market 
structure and will be discussed in greater detail in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.  
 
Rwanda, while easier in sourcing willing research participants, it was discovered that the 
local language, Kinyarwanda, does not have an equal translation for ‘risk’.  In Kinyarwanda, 
the closest translation is one of ‘challenge’ or ‘problem’, which in relation to discussions 
about business was not acceptable.  As such, distinct phraseology was used to describe risk in 
relation to business in the attempt to get the same idea across in a fluid and continuous 
manner.  Risk was described as: the exposure of loss or difficulty from a chance taken in 
regards to business activity. 
 
Given Rwanda’s recent history of the 1994 genocide and the direct impact it had throughout 
many targeted research areas21, certain questions were avoided.  Specific dynamics with 
group meetings and power dynamics also had to be considered and accounted for.  Rwanda’s 
history of the 1994 war and genocide remains a strong, palpable, and to some degrees, living 
component very much engrained throughout society today.  However, this research was not 
interested in the personal histories of tragedy and horror and instead chose to strategically 
focus on more recent business perspectives and achievements.  As such, specific direct 
personal histories were never asked about or sought after.  Questions posed focused on 
specific business histories, how knowledge gains occurred and involvement within the wider 
community.  Through these settings, some respondents volunteered information about 
personal experiences from the war and the country’s history of conflict; others did not.  
 
                                                        
21 Traditionally Tutsi owned large land areas inclusive of and in some cases were heavily focused on large-scale 
coffee production.  Given the high Tutsi prevalence, many of these coffee areas where research was held 
experienced some of the worst massacres of the 1994 genocide.   
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Differences in Theoretical Perspectives 
Finally, different perspectives and perceptions of structure and agency, as first presented by 
Giddens (1984) can be found within the wider discourse to this theoretical approach of 
analysing entrepreneurship and can admittedly result in different options and abilities in 
interpreting entrepreneurship.  Additionally, different theoretical perspectives have also been 
highlighted for building upon Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) presentation of the 
individual-opportunity nexus, other than Structuration Theory.  Most suggestions have been 
made for using a more critical, realist perspective, such as Archer’s (1995) proposal in 
analysing entrepreneurship through a realist lens in order to account for specific conditions 
that may be allowing entrepreneurship to occur, looking at neither structure nor agent (Mole 
and Mole, 2010).  While the realist perspective is acknowledged as a feasible approach, this 
research wanted to prioritize the agent as well as the structure as a direct means of 
understanding entrepreneurship, and as such, was informed primarily by Structuration 
Theory. 
 
Gender and Ethnicity 
In its most basic form, entrepreneurship can only occur through an individual having the 
ability to perceive potential opportunity pursuit and the access for its tangible pursuit.  
However, within the specific contexts analysed, women often have unequal access to 
property and assets, and within certain socio-cultural settings may be restricted from leading 
or undertaking specific business orientated activity.  This inaccessibility and related power 
related dynamics obviously could have implications for results and wider outcomes on 
entrepreneurship within these contexts.  
   
Similarly, within the specific contexts researched, certain ethnic groups, both men and 
women, are believed to also have challenges related to the inaccessibility of specific 
opportunity pursuits or have unequal rights to property, assets or financial services; this is 
recognized to also have implications to assessing entrepreneurship within these specific 
contexts.  Likewise, it would have been unethical to specifically investigate the differences in 
entrepreneurship or opportunity accessibility by ethnic grouping. 
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This study chose to not take a gendered assessment of respondents and entrepreneurs 
operating within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee sectors.  However, given the focus of the 
study: to improve understanding of the internal construct of individuals able to take 
entrepreneurial action as well as how those entrepreneurs interacted within their wider 
operational context, this study did not implement an ethnic or gendered sampling 
stratification.  Not specifically analysing as such is recognized as a limitation in this study.  
However, it should also be recognized that research investigating the impacts on 
entrepreneurship from the specific elements precluding women from market access is a 
different aim than this specific study and is one that is recommended for future research. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This research understands entrepreneurship as a co-evolving, interdependent, reflexive nexus 
of an individual and an operational context in which the context continues to influence 
entrepreneurial action and entrepreneurial action is believed to in turn, influence the 
contextual system.  This chapter has looked to present the strategic approach and design for 
this research, in preparation for the remainder of the thesis.   
 
Given this research approach, distinct emphasis has been placed in fully understanding 
individual entrepreneurs as well as the distinct operational contexts and market systems used 
for data collection and research analysis.  In achieving this aim, the ensuing research results 
from this thesis are structured as follows: 
 
 Understanding and presenting the structure of the global coffee market as well as the 
complex political, economic and social histories and coffee markets of Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, Chapter 4.   
 
 Identifying internal characteristics, or drivers, and socio-demographic elements, in further 
understanding the individual construct of the entrepreneur, Chapter 5. 
 
 Identifying the contextual operating environments, or determinants, that shape an 
entrepreneur’s approach, outlook and opportunity pursuit, Chapter 6.  
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 And finally, interpreting how the internal drivers and external determinants can be fused 
to reveal influences from entrepreneurial reflexivity and additionality on wider structures 
within a co-evolving, interdependent, entrepreneurial ecosystem, specifically within the 
Ethiopian and Rwanda coffee markets, Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 4 – Coffee and Country: A Presentation of the Global 
Coffee Industry, Ethiopia and Rwanda  
4.1 Introduction  
Given this research purview, in order to fully define and appreciate entrepreneurial efforts 
and action, a solid foundation needed to be built through the firm grasp of not only 
operational contexts of Ethiopia and Rwanda, but also of the global coffee market and its 
international trade.  It is important to note that as this analysis of entrepreneurship is highly 
contextualized.  As such, results are primarily applicable to the distinct entrepreneurial actors 
and structures within the operational contexts of the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets.  
As discussed in Section 2.5, the specifics of a unique operational context are critical 
components to the entrepreneurial outlook and action, and as such this chapter provides 
descriptive data to the historical overviews as well as to the economic and market evolutions 
for the global coffee market, Ethiopia, and Rwanda.  Information presented here is in 
preparation for the more detailed comparative analysis of the defined determinants in Chapter 
6, Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5.  Additional analysis of how entrepreneurs have gone on to 
influence wider systems will be analysed in Chapter 7, Sections 7.3 and 7.4.  This chapter is 
considered a part of the overall results found through this thesis, as in depth research was 
required for the understanding of the global coffee market and each respective country prior 
to the investigation into entrepreneurs; the following discussion is the by-product of that 
research.  
 
For the specific countries used in this research, socio-economic and political histories, which 
have shaped current landscapes, are believed to have broad and wide-ranging impacts on 
national actors and entrepreneurs alike.  This chapter is not meant as an exhaustive history, 
nor critique, however a sampling of the complex histories and tangled politics provides tools 
to appreciate analysis and results.  While this research is not primarily focused on coffee, it 
did use the industry as a framework in which to structure research questions, house analysis 
and appreciate outcomes.  As such, the following chapter presents market structures, 
institutional dynamics and related histories to provide readers tools in which to do the same.   
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The selected coffee markets of Ethiopia and Rwanda present ideal opportunities from which 
to study entrepreneurship.  While coffee production volumes, histories within international 
markets and consumer recognition can be considered polar opposites; both countries have re-
emerged from similar historical and economic platforms over the past two decades.  Needing 
to revitalize nearly lost private sectors, each has taken distinctly different paths from which 
to maximize domestic industries and economies.  Following the evolutions of both sectors 
since the 1990s, each country has diverged down differing paths of market openness and 
focus with Rwanda slowly establishing a liberalized coffee market focused on specialization, 
and Ethiopia managing a stifled, non-liberalized sector geared towards commercialization.   
 
These respective positions offer unique launching pads in which to investigate, test and 
analyse entrepreneurs operating in liberalized and non-liberalized markets.  As such, this 
chapter presents:  
 
1. An overview of the global coffee industry as an explanation to the different 
international market forces, pricing influences and technical aspects. 
2. A review of the political and economic histories and market evolutions of Ethiopia.  
3. A review of the political and economic histories and market evolutions of Rwanda. 
4. A brief comparison between Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets. 
 
4.2 Coffee, a Global Perspective 
In the post World War II era, coffee has become the world’s second largest, legally traded 
commodity, with more than 2.25 billion cups consumed daily (Schubler, 2009).  An 
important source of income for 70 countries, it is produced on more than 10 million hectares 
and involves millions of people across the globe (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; International 
Trade Centre (ITC); TechnoServe, 2013a). Throughout its long history, coffee has 
transformed global trade, influenced fashion, incited religious and political conflicts and 
provided the stimulant for revolutions.   
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While there is not a specific year known for coffee’s initial discovery, its global trade is 
traced to sixth century Abyssinia22 (modern day Ethiopia) (Sereke-Brhan, 2010). Today’s 
current market is comprised of Arabica and Robusta varieties (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).   
Robusta comprises 30-40% of global production and is known for greater resistance to pests 
and diseases, typically growing at lower altitudes (zero to 800 meters).  However Robusta is 
also recognized for lower quality and less dynamic taste profiles.  The remaining 60-70% is 
Arabica, growing best at higher, cooler altitudes, producing a superior quality bean, but is 
also more susceptible to pests and diseases (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; ITC, 2011).   Growing 
at high altitudes, in typically more difficult growing conditions, Arabicas are able to develop 
more intense and diverse flavours due to strains of the specific growing conditions (higher 
altitudes, limited rainfall and specific soils), where as Robusta trees typically do not have 
these demands and thus, tend to produce a duller or more diluted flavour profile.  Arabica is 
the dominant coffee variety produced in both Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
 
4.2.1 Market Structure 
Coffee was one of the first commodities to be highly regulated at the international level and 
for most of the 20th century was traded via a regulated global market that played a significant 
role in the setting of global production quotas and prices (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Schubler, 
2009). International Coffee Agreements (ICAs) regulated international production, allocating 
quotas to producing countries, and governed modern global trade for consuming countries 
from 1962-1989 (Backman, 2009; Schubler, 2009).  While the ICAs had some effect on 
stabilizing prices, the agreements failed to establish a true mechanism to set equitable, 
stabilized prices across the industry and global prices continue to be highly volatile today 
(Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Backman, 2009).  Liberalizing the global industry in 1989 saw a 
boom from the un-regulated supply and resulting sharp drop in prices in the early 1990s, 
which all significantly impacted producing country government’s market power.  This led to 
widespread, yet varying degrees of national market liberalization and political reaction across 
much of the coffee-producing world (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  
                                                        
22 According to legend, a goat herder in Ethiopia’s highlands, first discovered coffee when he observed his goats 
becoming very energetic and lively after eating the leaves and berries of a specific plant.  Showing his 
discovery to a local priest who developed methods for brewing and sharing his newly discovered drink with his 
congregation to keep people awake for longer hours of prayer and devotion (Sereke-Brhan, 2010).    
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While the majority of coffee consumption occurs in developed countries, 90% of its 
production takes place within developing countries and remains dominated by smallholder 
producers, largely at a subsistence level (Ponte, 2002; ITC, 2011).  Consequently, the global 
industry is gripped by the ‘coffee paradox’, with booming markets and profitable new trends 
in consuming countries23, but with price volatility, climate vulnerability, difficult market 
access and limited negotiating power for producing countries (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  
The structure of the current global coffee market, with concentrated dominance in a handful 
of international traders, roasters and importers has resulted in increasingly difficult 
negotiations and reduced opportunity for local export agents (Ponte, 2002).  Additional 
oversupply and the increased marketing strategies of large scale importers and roasters to 
blend specific coffee profiles across unified brands was also found to depress prices through 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Ponte, 2002; ICO, 2015).  Despite these challenges, important 
opportunities have emerged for producing regions as consumer demand and consumption 
patterns have changed with the growing interest of ‘conscious consumers’ in regards to 
higher quality, unique products, traceable coffee origins with speciality coffees becoming 
one of the fastest growing industries (Ponte, 2002; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; ITC, 2011); 
providing ideal opportunity for entrepreneurial pursuit and expansion. 
 
4.2.2 Coffee Production, Processing and Supply 
The coffee chain is formed through a somewhat linear sequence typically passing through 
five different stages: producer, processor, exporter, roaster (importer), and retailer 
(marketer), before finally reaching the consumer (Schubler, 2009).  All coffee is produced, 
harvested and processed in county of origin, with the final product resulting in the green 
bean, ready for export. Coffee beans are exported green to preserve freshness and taste 
profiles with the vast majority roasted upon receipt by specialized roasters who choose to 
either blend24 different origins and profiles together or to keep as a unique origin; depending 
on specific taste profiles and preferences for a targeted clientele (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  
As importing companies have expanded capabilities for roasting and marketing, initially 
                                                        
23 It is estimated that Importers and Roasters make over 85% of the final retail price, with producers taking less 
than 7% of final retail price (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). 
24 Blending presents an easier product for retailers to maintain year on year despite difficulties in securing the 
same supply profiles.  
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separate industries have become amalgamated within larger company portfolios.  Through 
this structure, the coffee industry has become dominated by the top five trading groups, 
which as of 2005, control a combined 69% of global market share (Daviron and Ponte, 
2005).    
 
80% of the coffee cherry is waste25 and an estimated seven kilos of red coffee cherries are 
required for one kilo of green coffee beans (National Agricultural Export Board (NAEB), 
2015a).  Grading is a constant process, preformed throughout the chain’s process.  Coffee 
consumed in country of origin is roasted locally, however roasting remains a specialized 
industry that needs to be further developed in many producing countries (R_5, 2014).  Within 
producing countries, traditional roles for men and women throughout the coffee chains 
continue to be largely applied.  Rural, smallholder producer household production is 
dominated by men, however through this study, some women (mainly widows) were found 
to be responsible for their own farm production.  Within the processing chain, men preform 
traditional, more labour intensive responsibilities, while women are responsible for quality 
control and grading processes.  Business ownership, as will be seen throughout later research, 
remains dominated by men, however women are increasingly owning and operating their 
own formal businesses.  As will be shown, some of the most dynamic entrepreneurs found in 
this study are women.  Figure 4.1 below, depicts the distinct segments of the coffee chain and 
related activities from the producer to end consumer.  The specific segments used for 
analysis within this study are Production, Processing and Export.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 ‘Waste’ from the cherry can be used as compost.  Research found some entrepreneurs to make own compost 
for personal use or sale to area producers.  Alternatively, Processors produced compost on site for distribution 
to producers as incentive or bonus payment.  
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Figure 4.1. Coffee Production and Supply Chain for Global Markets 
 
(Source: Daviron and Ponte, 2005, p.54-55; Author Construct) 
 
4.2.2.1 Production – Coffee Cherry  
The majority of global coffee production is preformed at the 
smallholder producer level.  As seen in Picture 4.1, coffee cherries 
are a red fruit from coffee trees with a typical productive lifespan 
from three to 40 years26.  As an income generator, it is a long-term 
investment and must be a carefully planned decision as coffee trees 
will not reach full productivity and quality potential until after year 
three (Backman, 2009). Inherent coffee quality is largely impacted 
by production zones, given the specific and unique climates, soils 
and specific varietals; maximizing this quality is most impacted at 
farm level (TechnoServe, 2013b).   
 
                                                        
26 After 40 years a tree will continue to produce but productivity and quality are noticeably reduced 
 
(Source: Author) 
Picture 4.1. Coffee Cherry 
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Harvesting is preformed by hand, either by the careful selection of individual cherries based 
on ripeness, or through the ‘stripping’ method in which a producer drags a hand down the 
branch of the tree taking all cherries off at once.  Stripping, the most common harvesting 
method in Ethiopia, results in some cherries harvested at sub-optimal times and also damages 
any upcoming buds or leaves on the branch.  Cherries harvested over or under peak ripeness 
result in a poorer quality, often bitter tasting coffee with an end result of lower quality and 
price (Murekezi and Loveridge, 2009).  Coffee cherries are highly perishable and 
transportation time can also influence quality as well as impact a farmer’s decision and 
ability to either supply to processing centres or process by hand, on-farm (Mujawamariya, et 
al., 2013).  
 
4.2.2.2 Processing – Cherry to Parchment  
Processing can be done either on farm site 
or at coffee processing centres.  Two 
primary processing methods exist: Fully 
washed and Semi-washed (commonly 
also known as Sun-Dried).  Quality 
attributes are not added through the 
processing phase, but value of the coffee 
is maintained, or lost post harvest and 
during the processing stage (Daviron and 
Ponte, 2005; MTI, 2008).  In regions of 
abundant water availability, fully washed 
processing is the premier technique to 
produce a higher quality coffee, with fully 
washed beans garnering a higher price due to higher end-quality profiles (MTI, 2008; 
TechnoServe, 2013b).  Picture 4.2 shows a Rwandan coffee washing station using the fully 
washed method with processed parchment drying in the sun.  
 
The Fully washed or wet method, uses significant amounts of water and due to the complex 
and mechanized process, can only be preformed at a washing station as opposed to farm site 
Picture 4.2. Drying Beds at a Coffee Washing 
Station in Rwanda 
(Source: Author) 
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(ITC, 2011).  The fully washed process includes the mechanized pulping of ripe cherries, 
fermentation of the pulped cherries, soaking and washing to remove mucilage27 and finally 
drying, peeling and polishing.  The resulting Parchment28 is then left to dry in the sun over a 
period of two to four weeks29 depending on area weather conditions (Daviron and Ponte, 
2005; ITC, 2011).  Grading is a constant process, much of it done by hand.  As can be seen in 
Picture 4.3 below, dried parchment, post-processing is sorted and graded by hand30 at a 
washing station in Rwanda. While fully washed beans are typically considered of higher 
quality and command higher prices, it is a much more laborious as well as cost intensive 
process as compared to the sun-dried method (Backman, 2009).  
 
The Sun-Dried method is generally 
considered to result in an inferior product, 
typically achieving lower prices.  However 
this method also requires less time, involves 
less risk and relatively less investment.  Sun-
Dried coffees are typically processed on farm 
site31 by hand.  Harvested cherries are simply 
left to dry by the sun and then striped of the 
external dried cherry shell either by hand or 
with manual ‘pulpers’.  In general, sun-dried 
coffee tends to be comprised of the lower 
quality grades and is typically produced at 
household level by producers unable to access processing centres or markets. Sun-dried 
coffee, while illegal in Rwanda, continues to have a market and is produced by producers far 
from local markets who can store for traders to purchase and sell in neighbouring countries, 
                                                        
27 A sticky, sugary coating beneath the pulp adhering to the bean 
28 The ‘skin’ purposely left on the bean after processing.  Parchment is left on the green bean as long as possible 
to preserve freshness, as the taste profile continues to develop as the bean is processed.  Parchment is finally 
removed prior to export, resulting in the green bean.   
29 Incomplete drying attracts mold and damages flavor profiles 
30 In both countries, grading was reported to always and only be done by women, as women are considered to 
be much more patient than men; able to effectively grade coffee beans for 12+ hours per day.  
31 Washing Stations can and will also produce sun-dried coffee if seasonal prices are particularly low and 
anticipated returns will not cover cost of fully washing techniques. 
Picture 4.3. Hand Grading of Parchment 
(Source: Author) 
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mainly Uganda.  Approximately 70% of Ethiopia’s coffee is sun-dried, however the country 
has developed a distinct market for unique sun-dried coffees, trading to the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe and Russia.    
 
4.2.2.3 Export – Parchment to Green Bean and International Sale 
Exporters are national business entities or 
multi-national companies which facilitate 
the purchase of parchment and green 
beans post processing for sale and supply 
to international importers.  The majority 
of producing countries had state-managed 
industries at some part of their coffee 
history, especially in during Africa’s 
colonial era and as such, privately owned 
exporting businesses are a relatively new 
phenomenon of the chain.  Exporting 
businesses will also grade again pre-
export; typically by hand in Rwanda and 
through a mechanized process in Ethiopia. Picture 4.4, shows sorted and packaged green 
beans ready for export at a warehouse in Ethiopia.  Demand preferences vary widely for 
differing consumption origins and sourcing is often highly linked through historical 
connections (Ponte, 2002).   
 
4.2.2.4 Import, Roasting and Marketing  
Typically, coffee is purchased from producing and exporting countries by international trade 
houses or dealers.  Over the past quarter century, the coffee industry has consolidated and is 
dominated by a handful of retail giants and this remains one of the significant problems of 
the overall market structure.   International traders or importers will supply to roasting houses 
that combine, blend and roast according to specific demand from retail clients (ITC, 2011).  
While different, distinct companies can be solely responsible for either the import, roasting 
or final marketing and packaging, a greater number of companies are merging and adding 
Picture 4.4. An Export Warehouse in Ethiopia 
(Source: Author) 
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internal capabilities to control greater proportions of market share and command higher 
margins (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  This led to a focus on product consistency and 
homogeneity in “price, packaging and flavour” using more uniformed blends, reducing cost, 
but also quality (Ponte, 2002, p. 1110; Daviron and Ponte, 2005).  However, with the 
emergence of speciality coffee, smaller, more specialized importers and roasters are carving 
out a unique market share through targeting or specializing in specific types, tastes or origins 
and capitalizing on rising conscious consumption trends.  These firms typically place orders 
directly at point of origin with processors or exporters (Ponte, 2002; ITC, 2011).  
 
4.2.3 Understanding Quality and Pricing  
Specific and unique taste profiles and related degrees of quality are largely created by 
differing microclimates, climactic factors, altitude, rainfall and soil compositions with 
distinct taste characteristics coming from different growth origins.  It is important to note that 
no one definition of ‘best quality’ exists as differing characteristics and taste preferences vary 
from each microclimate as well as each consumer palate.  Technically, each farm produces 
its own, unique product based on specific variables in care as well as changing soil dynamics 
and climate, however these become largely indiscernible once mixed within larger batches at 
processing centres (TechnoServe, 2013a).  Determining taste profiles is an objective process, 
however matching quality and preference for specific consumer groups is a subjective 
process largely occurring through roasters, marketers and retail agents (ITC, 2011).  
Marketability and branding (i.e. region, certification, unique origin) also heavily impact 
quality preferences (Ponte, 2002).    
 
While no ‘universal’ grading system exists, minimum standards for export and to a certain 
extent marketing, include altitude and/ or region, botanical variety, preparation (wet or dry 
process), bean size32, bean shape, bean colour, bean density, number of defects per bean, 
number of defective beans per batch, roast appearance and cup quality (flavour, 
characteristics, cleanliness of brewed coffee) (ITC, 2011, p. 5).  General international 
standards and quality segmentations do exist for determining the quality of coffee beans but 
exact specifics are often left to consumer country import regulations and producing country 
                                                        
 32 A single tree will produce multiple different shapes and sizes of beans (R_3, 2014). 
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export designations.  For example, Ethiopia has 229 export classifications across ten 
exportable grades; Rwanda has just two export classifications across four grades (R_3, 2014; 
E_3, 2015).  For the purposes of this study the following quality designations will be used as 
described in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1. Coffee Quality Parameters 
(Source data: ITC, 2011, p. 39, 190, 191; TechnoServe, 2013a) 
 
Premiums for specialty coffees can be considerable, although prices for producers remain 
low; they are typically still more lucrative than mainstream, commercial grades.  In today’s 
market, mainstream (Commercial to Low Grade) coffee accounts for 85-90% of world 
consumption from exports (ITC, 2011).  Specialty or exemplary, high quality coffee beans 
account for an estimated 10-15% of the word market (ITC, 2011).  
 
4.2.3.1 Global Pricing  
 Traded on global commodity markets, coffee is at risk to worldwide price fluctuations33 in 
which the producer, processor and export entities have little to no power in influencing 
specific prices or trends.  Factors influencing global supply and prices are market 
                                                        
33 Arabica coffee is traded on the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (NY-C), which covers most of 
the physical trade.  The NY-C guides prices for commercial grade coffee the world over with higher-grade 
coffees pegged off commercial grade prices.  Futures and speculative markets also impact price (Ponte, 2002; 
TechnoServe, 2013b).   
Quality Type  Quality Specs 
Specialty-Grade 
Quality 
High intrinsic value, limited availability, sourced from specialized regions or unique 
origins.  Fully washed or some of best/ most unique sun-dried coffees, Arabica 
varieties.  As true niche coffees, products are certified with highest and most rare 
quality designations.  Sold through exclusive retail outlets, specialized coffee bars and 
upmarket delicatessens.  Ethiopia’s specialty sun-dried coffees of Harrar and 
Yirgacheffee are also included. 
High-Grade Quality 
Beans are fully washed with very minimal defects to bean batches, close to visually 
perfect.  Typically high-quality coffees used in blends to improve overall taste for 
lower grade, end products.  High quality/ niche Robustas also classify.   
Commercial-Grade 
Quality  
The majority of coffee consumed.  Can range from good tastes and cupping profile, but 
are not visually perfect.  Descent taste, but not impressive, no distinctive character 
notes.  Includes lower quality certified beans as well as lower quality, fully-washed and 
high-quality semi-washed beans.  Quality grade consists of lower quality Arabicas, but 
mostly Robusta.  Commercial coffee will often be blended with higher grades to 
improve overall batch. 
Low-Grade  
Quality 
Anything unable to be sold as Commercial-Grade.  Typically produced via sun-dried 
method and sold in domestic markets for domestic consumption or black-market, cross 
boarder trade.  Much of this grade is also used for the production of instant coffees. 
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speculation, futures contracts, extreme weather events34 in producing countries, as well as 
changes in consumer preference or demand (TechnoServe, 2013b).  Consumption levels in 
‘traditional markets’ of Europe and North America for mainstream coffees have stayed 
relatively static, while consumption in Brazil, India, Eastern Europe, parts of the Middle East 
and China are growing at annual rates of 10-20% (TechnoServe, 2013b). However, market 
fragmentation of speciality consumption is growing steadily across all markets, specifically 
North American and European markets as consumers are trending away from commercial 
grade and towards higher quality, distinct taste profiles (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; 
TechnoServe, 2013b).   
 
4.3 Ethiopia at a Glance 
The Ethiopian economy presents an interesting dichotomy with the appearance of its market-
orientated economic promotion strategy.  However, the country remains managed through a 
state-led economy dictated by internal control and private sector mistrust (Lefort, 2014).  The 
strong party-led interventionist strategy, while achieving high economic growth rates, is 
powered by only a handful of prioritized industries (construction, manufacturing and select 
export products) (Lefort, 2014). In addition, the continued suffocation of a non party-
affiliated, private sector, and the absence of genuine competitive environments, disruptive 
regulations and top down oversight have resulted in a lack of entrepreneurial dynamism 
(World Bank, 2014a).   
 
The second most populated country in Africa; Ethiopia’s population of 90+ million 
encompasses more than 60 different ethnic groups (Lyons, 2011).  Experiencing some of the 
most impressive growth rates in the world, projections are estimated at 9.5, 10.5 and 8.5% 
growth for 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively (Holodny, 2015). Yet despite being one of the 
fastest growing, non-oil dependent economies, the country is still widely associated with 
chronic food shortages and continues to be depicted by a rain fed agriculture-based economy 
                                                        
34 For example: drought in Brazil and coffee rust disease throughout much of South America in 2013 and 2014 
led to some of the largest movements in coffee prices over the last two decades with many countries believing 
2015 to be a year for especially high prices, however this has not proven to be the case (E_5, 2015). 
Additionally, Brazil’s forced pre-sale of its coffee stocks in order to improve the country’s liquidity in the build 
up to the 2014 World Cup, was also believed to be a boom to prices for the 2014 and 2015 seasons.  Instead 
many importers horded stock and drove down prices (R_4, 2014). 
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(Lefort, 2013; Tridos Facet, 2013).   The opening of the Ethiopian economy and seeming 
embrace of the private sector following the regime change in 1991, has since seen divergent 
paths in regards to market orientation, presentation, and domestic, state-led action.  While the 
country has worked diligently to maintain an outward appearance of stability, current 
leadership continues to have an intense intolerance for dissent with extreme limits on press 
freedoms, free speech and harsh suppression of opposition parties, as well as active 
involvement within economic spheres (Lyons, 2011). 
 
Within the Ethiopian context, questions must be asked as to the willingness of the 
Government to support a private sector and correspondingly to what degree entrepreneurs are 
actually enabled to pursue opportunity.   This section looks to lay groundwork for the 
ensuing investigation as to the potential influence these historical as well as current political, 
economic and market structures have on entrepreneurship within Ethiopia and the wider 
implications for growth. 
 
4.3.1 Political and Economic Histories 
Ethiopia, one of the earliest civilizations and political societies has been moulded by a 
relatively recent history of conflict and leadership styles of control and oppression; shaping 
its militarized, controlled existence throughout modern history (Geda, 2008; International 
Crisis Group (ICG), 2009; Lyons, 2011).   This institutional legacy and single party political 
dominance continues to shape internal politics and power balances today and has further 
served to dilute private sector equity and ability. 
 
The conflicts, power struggles, ideological transitions and resulting strong state-control and 
intervention, have resulted in barriers to economic growth as well as peaceful 
democratization expansion.  While this study is not a historical review, Ethiopia’s economic 
performance is believed to be strongly correlated with the political regimes and ideologies in 
power (Geda, 2008).  As such, it is necessary to appreciate the country’s formative 
background and understanding of its modern political development.  Clarifying the political-
socio-cultural environment sheds additional light onto the whys and hows of entrepreneurial 
choices and action in the country.  
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4.3.1.1 Early Powers 
Ethiopia’s expansive land area has historically encompassed a wide range of differing 
cultures, religions and ethnic groups.  Tracing this history to the 1800s, important networks 
of extensive trade routs played key roles in not only the pacification of rivalries but 
connected the country through the trade of profitable commodities: initially salt and slaves, 
later by ivory and gold, and eventually coffee (Zewde, 2001).  This time period also saw the 
development of social transformation towards a united monarchical system, which took, 
controlled, and maintained power through militarization and force.  
 
The Tigrean, Yohannes IV became Emperor in 1872 and viewed unification through a “policy 
of controlled regionalism” attempting to create a military and political balance (Zewde, 2001, 
p. 44).  While these efforts were strongly rebuffed by local populations, Yohannes’ efforts to 
institute a ruling polity of controlled regionalism can be seen as the initial groundwork in 
laying the modern day policy of ethnic-federalism.  While Yohannes was killed while trying 
to subdue an appointed Vassal, who later became Emperor in 1889, it is important to note the 
Tigrean nobility and wider Tigrean populace bitterly harboured the loss of not only 
Yohannes, but also the lost opportunity to replace him and maintain power through Tigrean 
lineage (Zewde, 2001; Bekele, 2015).  This bitter resentment of lost power and ruling 
prospect has been kept alive in subsequent generations of Tigreans and as will be seen, not 
only played an important role at the end of the twentieth century, but also continues to 
dominate political aspects within Ethiopia’s ruling party and wider business environment 
today (Bekele, 2015).  Following Yohannes, Emperor Menelik II, known for his great 
diplomatic skill, keen administrative organization and military strategy35 is recognized as 
ensuring Ethiopia’s sovereignty during the ‘colonial’ period, beginning the country’s 
transformation towards modernity (Zewde, 2001; Bekele, 2015). 
 
4.3.1.2 Imperial Regime  
Perhaps the country’s most revered, despised and divisive ruler, Emperor Haile Selassie, 
acquired a country still operating from a traditional ethos of differing cultural and historical 
identities (Bekele, 2015).   A distant cousin of Menlik II’s, Haile Selassie, motivated by a 
                                                        
35 Perhaps Ethiopia’s most famous conflict, Menelik II led the Ethiopians in the Battle of Adwa in 1896, which 
ceased the threat of Italian colonization attempts (Bekele, 2015). 
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political vision of subjugation and nobility, kept tradition with the past 150+ years of power 
transitions, seizing power through force (Zewde, 2001; Clapham, 2015).  The Imperial 
Regime saw state-power reach levels unseen before in Ethiopian history with The Emperor 
proving highly adept at solidifying and wielding absolute power through elaborate security 
networks, 36 centralized provincial administration, military occupation and financial control 
(Zewede, 2001).   
 
The Imperial Regime was led by a state pursued, market-based economy of landed-
aristocracy and peasants (Geda, 2008).  While the country developed an expansive private 
sector fuelled by large external investment37, 70% of the country’s investment flowed from 
foreign capitalists with the remaining from Ethiopian elites and state-businesses (Lyons, 
2011; Prunier, 2015). Industry was concentrated in major urban areas with half of all 
industrial sites in the capital (Zewde, 2001).  Large-scale agricultural development projects 
and reforms resulted in immense benefits for large-scale landowners, linked to the regime 
and further enabled this aristocracy to take advantage of trade and industry opportunities 
(Zewde, 2001; Clapham, 2015).  With increasing disparity created between impoverished 
masses and selected elites (Clapham, 2015), the country remained a largely rural agro-
economy with 90% of the export value from agricultural commodities, 60% of which was 
coffee (Zewde, 2001).  While improvement to education was a high priority, national 
investment in the sector failed to meet ever-increasing enrolments, resulting in reduced per 
pupil expenditures.  This educational environment paired with a sagging economy and a 40-
50% (mainly urban) unemployment rate, resulted in poorly educated, largely unemployed 
masses; resulting in a large population ripe for radicalization and militarization (Prunier, 
2015). 
 
4.3.1.3 The Derg Military Junta 
As the country continued its economic and political implosion, the Derg Military Junta seized 
power through a coup, surprising both the Emperor and Populist Student Movement.  The 
                                                        
36 This public security division formed the basis for today’s Federal Police.  Initially developed to suppress 
political dissent and opposition within the Capital, its mandate has not changed much over the past 75 years, 
however networks have spread nationwide (Zewde, 2001). 
37 Large foreign investment was due in large part to the infatuation with the Emperor by the international 
community (Lyons, 2011).   
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new regime worked quickly to subdue protest movements, outlawing strikes, instituting 
curfews as well as the widespread elimination of top officials (Prunier, 2015).   The Derg 
instituted an economic system based on socialist principles of centralized planning, a 
nationalized private sector, nationalized land distribution and of course, a strong national 
military force38 (Geda, 2008; Brixova and Asaminew, 2010; Lyons, 2011; Prunier, 2015).  
Continued fighting between populist movements which had grown out of the earlier student 
movement, resulted in the new Government’s period of Red Terror, which took advantage of 
the large network of intelligence gathering.  While the period initially started with arrests, it 
escalated to torture and targeted killings but soon led to large, indiscriminate massacres;39 
permanently altering the population’s assessment of, and relationship with, politics and 
governance (Prunier, 2015).   
 
Radical land reforms were implemented and market forces were strongly, consciously 
supressed with the “nationalization of land, private property, financial institutions and 
manufacturing firms” (Geda, 2008, p. 8; ICG, 2009). Consolidated power through new, 
nationalized institutions40 as well as the socialization of production and distribution systems 
resulted in significant reductions in economic growth and productivity with the private sector 
all but eliminated (Ambaye et al., 2014).  The ‘socialist utopia’ intended by the Derg, never 
came close to fulfilling its own propaganda and the nationalization of sectors, suppression of 
markets, economic shocks and lost economic output crippled the country and its institutions 
(Geda, 2008).  Impacts are still felt today through unresolved ambiguous land policies, 
relationships with private sector actors and entrepreneurs (Prunier, 2015).  
 
4.3.1.4 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
Multiple opposition forces maintained entrenched in, much of it violent, opposition 
throughout the Derg Regime.  The most effective and successful of these groups was the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), forged through intense struggles with nearly all 
                                                        
38  This not only nearly eliminated the private sector but also ceased opportunity and willingness for 
entrepreneurial action. 
39 Red Terror culminated in the late 1970s to early 80s in which hundreds of thousands of people were tortured 
and /or killed due to political associations or beliefs, as much as Government paranoia (ICG, 2009; Lyons, 
2011).  
40 Including ‘peasant associations’, marketing boards, cooperatives, etc.  
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other northern41 opposition movements (Tadesse, 2015).  Out of necessity and through its 
multiple trials, the TPLF developed a superior military, administrative organization and 
political agenda.  Following its long history of perceived Tigrean exclusion, the TPLF firmly 
believed that successful struggle against the Derg (or any opposing force) could only come 
from a primarily ethic-based movement.  Much of this mind-set remains in effect today 
through the country’s entrenched ethno-federalist policies and largely Tigrean leadership 
throughout senior levels of Government (Tadesse, 2015).  
 
Under an ethno-nationalist umbrella, the TPLF-led opposition, joined together to form the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)42 orchestrating and ensuring 
the Derg’s collapse in 1991 (Geda, 2008; ICG, 2009; Lyons, 2011; Tedasse, 2015).  The 
violent takeover and TPLF-led EPRDF Transitional Government, led by Meles Zenawi, 
inherited a country nearing collapse, with little remaining public funds, an ill-equipped civil 
service and non-existent private sector.  It quickly reverted Ethiopia from a failed socialist 
idea to a market based economy, instituting structural adjustment strategies, opening the 
country to trade and privatization of selected State assets (Geda, 2008; Tedasse, 2015).  
However, leaders forged from the student populist movement in the 1960s and 70s, 
implemented strong party-led State agendas, assuming much control of the market economy 
through state-led enterprises.  The end of the 1990s saw reform mechanisms begin to take 
hold and while private investment was encouraged in agriculture and manufacturing, 
Government Enterprises remained in control of financial services, transport, energy and 
telecommunications, among many others (Tadesse, 2015).  
 
4.3.1.5 Ethiopia Today 
Ethiopia remains hindered by a ‘redistribution system,’ which has focused power and 
resources towards the interests of a single region and political group; with policies designed 
to reinforce and provide unequalled support and distribution of opportunity and benefits43  
                                                        
41 It is believed that outside of the Capital, the Red Terror campaign had the largest impact and aggression 
against the Tigrean Region (Tedasse, 2015). 
42 EPRDF was formed by the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and political power continues to be 
dominated by the Tigrean people.   
43 60% of Government-privatized investments have been ‘awarded’ to MIDROC Ethiopia, owned by Ethiopian-
Saudi businessman Al Amoudi.  Known to have strong ties to the regime, Al Amoudi is the country’s sole gold 
exporter (Lefort, 2013) and ranked by Forbes (2012) as the world’s 63rd richest person.  
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(Geda, 2008).  Crystalized through the TPLF leadership and current State leadership 
structure, Tigrean nationalist sentiment and need for control grew out of the region’s 
perceived political, socio-economic neglect through the 20th century, 44 and has resulted in 
power and business concentrated in the hands of elite officials and ‘selected entrepreneurs’, 
which comes at the expense of the remaining oppressed and exploited population (E_1, 2015; 
Vaughan, 2015).    
 
The EPRDF remains an ideologically driven party, suspicious of those considered 
detrimental to its agenda and the “ethno-regionally structured state” (Tadesse, 2015, p. 273).  
Tracing back to TPLF’s initial ethos of the need for ethnic-based mobilization and 
governance, the current redistributive system has been further engrained through an 
administrative system guided by ethnic-federalism (Geda, 2008; Lyons, 2011). Control of the 
ethno-federalist system is based on a hierarchical platform that extends from the upper most 
levels of government down to village level, highly restricting and greatly increasing risk for 
an individual looking to invest outside of specific administrative zones or ‘ethno-areas’, or to 
challenge instituted systems (Geda, 2008; Lyons, 2011).  While ethnic-federalism was aimed 
at increasing peace and democracy (although this can be highly questioned), it has carved 
deep barriers across areas of the country creating internal strife, with several regions 
reporting to feel more of a colonized system than a part of a national identity (Fiesha, 2006; 
ICG, 2009; Lyons, 2011).  
 
While Ethiopian State-interests continue to dominate the economy and marginalize the 
private sector, the EPRDF-led State views development as a state-driven process and one that 
requires a centralized control for economic liberalization, decentralization and 
democratization (Vaughan, 2015, p. 285).  Additionally, current ideology of the State 
remains one of ‘development capitalism,’ which rejects markets as the best tool for which to 
improve productivity, efficiency and development, with the State working to ensure the 
autonomy of a developed economy, largely excluding a purely private sector (Vaughan, 
2015, E_1, 2015).    This ideology considers the government as the necessary disciplinarian 
                                                        
44 The nationalist sentiment and obsession with control, has grown out of the region’s perceived socio-economic 
neglect throughout the 20th century as well as resentment at the southward shift of power stemming back to the 
death of Yohannes IV in 1889 (E_5, 2015; Vaughan, 2015) 
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of the market, and private sector forces are seen as a threat to policy-making and target 
achievement (Vaughan, 2015, p. 306).  As such, the economy, financial bodies and the 
privatization of state assets remain, essentially, state-led.  Little evidence exists to the actual 
reduction in state-owned companies since the EPRDF came to power, with party affiliated 
conglomerates constituting a significant proportion of the country’s private sector, with 
hundreds of state-owned enterprises across the economy (Access Capital Research, 2011; 
Vaughan, 2015).   
 
In a country still viewing external interference as a threat, a gradual acceptance of 
globalization has been gained, however it has not been automatically welcomed or easily 
adopted (Prunier, 2015).  The late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, ruled Ethiopia for more 
than 20 years and overtime had consolidated power and control in his grip alone.  His 
unexpected and untimely death in 2012 left the country devoid of the ruling strongman it had 
come to accept as part of its political reality and today’s post-Zenawi era remains influenced 
and overshadowed by the late Prime Minister45.  While competing factions have vied for 
internal power, the party continues to use and benefit from the strong, state-led vice of 
control Zenawi built, and none so far have dared to confront his country’s current economic 
contradiction.  Successful elections, held in May 2015, saw Zenawi’s Deputy Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn formally assume power as the EPRDF Government won every 
parliamentary seat, (BBC, 2015) however it remains to be seen if Desalegn will be able to 
exert himself as Ethiopia’s next strongman. 
 
4.3.2 Relationships with the Private Sector and Entrepreneurs  
Ethiopia has a long history with entrepreneurship extending back to prominent trade routes 
from the medieval and mercantile eras, however more sophisticated demands exist for the 
country’s entrepreneurs today (United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2012).  
Despite opening towards liberalized economic markets, the highest levels of government 
remain highly sceptical and distrustful of a private sector as the correct entity in which to 
                                                        
45 The late Prime Minister’s picture continues to hang in many homes, as well as in all businesses and 
government offices. New Prime Minister Desalegn has purposefully not replaced the picture, as tradition 
typically dictates, and the party has the feel of continuing to be ruled by Zenawi’s presence and continued 
legacy from the grave. 
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spearhead economic growth. This current economy has revealed a state-led public sector 
bourgeois, which dictates opportunity, growth plans and investment.  Displaying a mind-set, 
which embraces the public sector as the superior entity to a market-led private sector to meet 
targets, stimulate growth and ‘develop’ the country (Lefort, 2013).  While through this state-
led development opportunity has been created, the majority of entities accepting these 
benefits remain connected to the party.  As such, ‘new entrepreneurs’ have been created by 
EPRDF offerings of lucrative opportunities, sometimes in exchange for warmer receptions of 
Government policy (this was rumoured to be especially widespread following the internal 
party turmoil and uprisings after the election results in 2005).  It is these ‘new entrepreneurs’ 
that are driving the majority of the growth through the prioritized sectors and this action has 
worked to solidify strong (and rich) bases of support, neutralizing some forces of opposition 
(Lefort, 2013).    
 
Since the regime change in the 1991, the Government has worked to increasingly open its 
markets and promote its own directed economic development agenda (Tridos Facet, 2013).  
However, over and under-regulation and the lack of competitive environments has led to an 
anaemic private sector stemming from lacking competitive environments and intense 
involvement from the State.  The Government retains control and oversight through various 
laws, regulations and attitudes, keeping private businesses on a short leash (Tridos Facet, 
2013).  Ethiopia also suffers from under investment and low productivity and despite efforts 
and investments to incentivize growth and expansion, the economy has seen little widespread 
improvements, with success being traced to distinct sectors, (construction, manufacturing and 
export valuables: coffee, leather, flowers, oilseed) as opposed to the overall economy 
(Brixova and Asaminew, 2010; Ambaye et al., 2014).   However, even within these 
‘prioritized sectors’ the playing field is not level, and priority is weighted towards specific 
elements.  
 
Additionally, poor infrastructure, weak markets, limited extension services, a severe lack of 
research and development, the volatility of global market prices as well as increasing costs of 
food imports and necessary commodities, continue to squeeze actors across the economy 
(Gebreselassie and Ludi, 2008). Undoubtedly, the economic and political landscape of 
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Ethiopia can be a harrowing experience for entrepreneurs and local business, and the 
Government still retains much involvement in the non-liberalized coffee industry.   
 
4.3.3 Ethiopia and Coffee  
Critical to the country’s continued development and sustained economic growth, coffee 
remains the leading export and main foreign exchange earner, accounting for over 30% of the 
country’s total export with 2014 revenues equating more than $750 million (out of an 
estimated $2.5 Billon) 46  (Lefort, 2013; World Bank, 2014a; International Coffee 
Organization (ICO), 2015).  
 
Recognized as coffee’s birthplace, Ethiopia has long dominated the coffee conversation, with 
the product playing a significant part in the country’s political, economic and socio-cultural 
identity.  This long history and diversity make it an important source of genetic origins and 
Ethiopia enjoys the distinction of producing some of the most unique and diverse range of 
Arabica coffees in the world47 (Backman, 2009; Megerssa et al., 2012).  However, despite 
Ethiopia’s long coffee history and its internationally recognized brand, the sector struggles to 
maximize its natural endowments and remains largely locked in a low-input, low-output 
cycle characterized through traditional production, harvesting and processing practices 
(Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Petit, 2007).  
 
Ethiopia is one of only two producing countries in the world that has a strong coffee drinking 
culture and an estimated 50% of all coffee produced is consumed locally (Tefera and Tefera, 
2013).  2014 production figures are estimated at close to 400,000 tonnes, with export 
volumes recorded at 190,876 tonnes (ICO, 2014).  A crop of significant cultural, political and 
economic importance, the sector involves approximately ¼ of the population48, is the leading 
export for the country and remains its most significant foreign exchange earner 
                                                        
46 As with the majority of statistics generated by the Ethiopian Government, these figures should be questioned.  
Interviews with large-scale export businesses indicated a highly skeptical reaction to recent export and revenue 
figures reported for the coffee sector.   
47 24 formal varieties of Arabica and an estimated 6,000 indigenous strains have been discovered so far, 
providing not only unique, distinctive taste profiles, but also the genetic diversity of varieties thought to have 
resistance to disease and climate variability impacts (Chemonics, 2010; Sereke-Brhan, 2010).   
48 An estimated 4.2 million smallholder producers are directly reliant on coffee through their own cultivation 
and harvesting, with an additional 15 to 20 million estimated to be involved across the industry via 
transportation, processing, trading, financing and marketing (Herhaus et al., 2014a).   
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(Gebreselassie and Ludi, 2008; Schubler, 2009; World Bank, 2014a).  Coffee can be found 
growing in just about every region of the country from the semi-savannah climate (altitude of 
550 meters), to the wet forest zones in the west (altitude 600 – 1,500meters) and the high 
plateaus in the south (altitude of 2,200 meters) (Schubler, 2009).  The country’s varying 
microclimates with adequate rainfall, appropriate altitudes, temperature and soils make ideal 
environments for not only producing coffee, but for producing naturally very high quality, 
premium coffee and the sector has grown rapidly since the regime change in early 1990s 
(Backman, 2009).  Graph 4.1 below presents the expected production and published export 
volumes49.  
 
Graph 4.1. Ethiopia Coffee Production and Export 
 
(Source data: Ethiopia Ministry of Trade (MoT), 2015).  
 
The resurgence of the sector came following the removal of the Derg Regime,50 which saw 
widespread nationalization of coffee plantations as well as processing stations. The majority 
of farmers having land confiscated and nationalized under the Derg have to date, been unable 
to reclaim land lost in the 1970s and 80s (Lefort, 2013).  It is believed the Government has 
now privatized approximately 23,000 hectares of state-owned coffee plantations51. Since the 
mid 1990s, the government has also privatized some state-owned processing stations as well 
                                                        
49 Production figures are estimates, as data from direct household consumption at producer level is not known. 
Additionally, figures for production were only provided from 2005 to 2015, as such production figures for 1991 
to 2004 have been estimated at double the export volumes as typically 50% of production is consumed 
domestically.  
50 During the Derg, farms not considered large enough (most smallholder farmers) were forced to be part of 
state-managed, rural cooperatives (Dempsey, 2006).   
51 The 23,000+ha are rumored to have been sold to MIDROC Ethiopia.  This company has purchased 60% of 
Ethiopia’s privatization efforts (Lefort, 2013). 
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as parcel out land for new commercial plantations, with an estimated 30,000 hectares 
currently registered as private commercial farms (Herhaus et al., 2014b).   
 
Historically, Ethiopia’s coffee was bought and sold within the country by merchants and 
exported abroad by traders linked to current power regimes.  Actors along the production and 
processing chains have historically been hindered by low prices and hampered by adverse 
government intervention (State Marketing Boards), low prices determined and set by the 
State Marketing Boards and high transaction costs.  Since 1950, nine different institutions 
have been responsible for the country’s most valuable product.  One of the most complicated 
coffee markets in the world, it features significantly in political and economic agendas (Petit, 
2007).  The current coffee industry is managed on equal platforms by the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Trade, with product sale, market oversight, control mechanisms and structure 
established and enforced through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX), with no one 
institution in a position of overarching control; final decisions are taken by the Office of the 
Prime Minister.  As will be shown in greater detail in Chapter 6, the non-liberalized market 
and strong Government involvement has severely limited entrepreneurial mobility. 
 
4.3.3.1 Coffee Sector Actors 
The Ethiopia Coffee chain is comprised of a myriad of actors and influences.  Figure 4.2 
below shows the supply chain flow from Producers to Processors and finally Exporters, and 
the related influences from external sources, non-governmental forces and the potential for 
financial flow (or lack thereof) among actors throughout the chain.  Regulatory and direct 
government oversight will be depicted and examined in detail in Chapter 6.  Research 
segments: Producers, Processors and Exporters are designated in red.  These specific 
research segments were chosen, as they are the main elements of the coffee chains in each 
country and are also highly representative of emerging entrepreneurial involvement 
providing ideal opportunity for analysis and comparison.  As seen in Figure 4.2, product 
flows from Smallholder Producers to the ECX Primary Markets and is purchased by 
Processors.  Once the raw product is processed, all coffees are tested at ECX warehouses 
before being sold at the ECX Auction.  Exporters must purchase from the auction for onward 
sale to international importers.  International buyers are prohibited from buying coffee at 
auction and cannot buy from an unlicensed ECX Exporter.   
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Figure 4.2. Ethiopia Coffee Chain and Sector Influences  
 
(Source: Author Construct)  
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Smallholder Producers 
The majority of Ethiopia’s coffee production is done through small scale, rural producers 
typically earning less than 60% of export prices (Backman, 2009; Minten et al., 2015).   The 
majority of Ethiopian producers still rely on traditional cultivation and harvesting practices 
with little or no use of inputs.  This has drawn external criticism due to Ethiopia’s very low 
productivity rates as well as large volumes of un-certifiable52, organic coffees (Schubler, 
2009).  Producers typically process sun-dried coffee on-farm site for home consumption and 
sale to domestic markets.  Small volumes of freshly harvested coffee cherries are sold 
directly to ECX Primary Markets or area traders who will sell on to ECX Primary Markets.  
Selling directly to processing centres is prohibited and thus, all product is pushed to either 
Cooperatives or ECX Primary Markets. While some cherries are sold at time of harvest to 
ECX Primary Markets as a means of accessing immediate cash, many Smallholder Producers 
store sun-dried coffee at home as a type of savings mechanism due to a lack of formal 
financing or savings schemes available.  
 
Cooperatives 
Cooperatives are organized under national Cooperative Unions, which are responsible for the 
international marketing and sale of member product.  However, only 20% of all Smallholder 
Producers in Ethiopia are members of a cooperative and less than 15% of all coffee is 
received and processed through local cooperatives (E_7, 2015).   Additionally, in order for a 
smallholder to supply, active (due-paying) membership is required.   Coffee sold through 
Cooperatives and finally exported by Cooperative Unions can be traced and is thus able to 
receive certification, which should in theory flow back to the producer; however respondents 
reported that this to not always be the case.  As will be seen in Section 5.3.3, distrust was 
found to be rife between smallholder producers and cooperatives. Coffee sold by a 
Cooperative Union is not sold on the ECX Marketplace, but directly through marketing and 
negotiations with international buyers (Chemonics, 2010).  Cooperatives are not included as 
an entrepreneurial element within this study.  
 
 
                                                        
52 Given the current market structure and regulation of the ECX, coffee origins cannot be traced and thus are not 
eligible for certification schemes.  
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Commercial Farmers 
Commercial Farms are privately held coffee plantations of at least 50 hectares, although most 
farms expand several hundred.  Private Commercial Farms are generally, separately managed 
business entities in which entrepreneurs have purchased previous state-owned plantations or 
bid to purchase new land sites as a vested business interest.  Commercial Farms currently 
account for 5% of the country’s total production.   While coffee from Commercial Farms 
must still be tested for quality at ECX Warehouses, coffee can be traced back to the 
plantation site and thus, are able to receive certification.  Coffee sold by a private 
Commercial Farm is not sold on the ECX Marketplace, but exported directly via marketing 
and negotiations with international buyers (Herhaus et al., 2014a).  Commercial Farms also 
operate their own processing stations on farm site and due to traceability are able to certify 
their coffees or sell as distinct micro-lots or single origins. 
 
Processors – Coffee Processing Stations 
Processing occurs in privately held processing stations, on cooperatives, or within 
Commercial Farms.  Given the country’s wide range of growing regions, both processing 
techniques of fully-washed or sun-dried are common and marketed.  While the numbers of 
centres are expected to have increased, updated numbers were unable to be obtained during 
this research.  As of 2010, a total of 1,125 processing stations existed across the country53; of 
those 786 were counted as privately owned facilities (Chemonics, 2010).  Only privately held 
washing stations were investigated as part of this research.  
 
Traders  
Given the wide disparity of production areas, many producers are not close enough to 
Cooperatives or ECX Primary Markets.   As such, Traders have entered into the system as a 
means of providing transportation and/or supply services for freshly harvested cherries and at 
times, sun-dried coffee. Purchasing at garden gate, Traders supply to a designated ECX 
Primary Market (Chemonics, 2010).  As a control mechanism, all traders must be legally 
registered due payers with the ECX and with the local municipalities; as of 2010 there were 
                                                        
53 Numbers do not account for processing stations within Commercial Farms 
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1,068 ECX registered traders (Chemonics, 2010).  Traders are not included as entrepreneurs 
within the study. 
 
Exporters 
All Exporters must be registered, approved and licenced with the ECX in order to purchase 
coffee directly at the ECX Auction and export.  However ECX Export licences are limited 
and only 300 are currently allowed.  Actors unable to get these licences are otherwise forced 
to purchase product from ECX registered Brokers who can buy at auction, but cannot export.  
Additional ‘local control’ is maintained through the premise that only Ethiopian Nationals 
are allowed to register as traders or exporting businesses with international companies 
forbidden to invest in local suppliers or to partake directly at the ECX auctions (Schubler, 
2009).  As such, Ethiopia’s coffee sector receives more local control than any other coffee 
exporting country54, but is also excluded from potential financing mechanisms available from 
international buyers (Schubler, 2009; Chemonics, 2010).  
 
4.4 Rwanda at a Glance 
Over the past two decades, Rwanda has worked to reengineer its economy through building a 
strong national focus of promoting a dynamic private sector, creating an entrepreneurial 
environment focused on nurturing the return and growth of local enterprise.  Through the 
country’s recent history and current efforts, it becomes apparent there is a strong will towards 
achieving progress and an iron fist desire to be recognized for current economic 
achievements and budding potential, rather than marked by past bloodshed.  Rebuilding the 
all but eliminated private sector, concentration has centred on creating opportunity through 
education, reconciliation, socio-economic development and entrepreneurship as a means of 
developing economic self-reliance and wealth creation through private sector development 
(Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).  While Rwanda remains dominated by small-scale 
agriculture, the mixture of this national focus, agricultural prevalence and rising opportunity 
sets the stage for the emergence of a new ‘entrepreneurial class’ focused on high value, 
exportable commodities.   
                                                        
54 Additional licencing is also required for the local roasting of any coffees for domestic sale (Tefera and Tefera, 
2013). 
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Making great strides in re-starting its economy, admittedly from a low starting point in 1994, 
impressive annual GDP growth has been realized averaging 6% between 1995 and 2000, and 
between 7-8% from 2003 until 2011 (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).  Rwanda was recently 
projected as the 12th fastest growing economy in the world with anticipated GDP growth 
rates at 7, 7 and 7.5% for 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively (Holodny, 2015).  However, the 
majority of this growth has been concentrated, often presenting uneven growth paths and 
increasing levels of income disparity in the country (Ansoms and Rostangno, 2010; World 
Bank, 2014c).  High growth rates are masking inequalities especially within the rural poor, 
which could undercut efforts to continue economic development (UNDP, 2007, as cited in 
Cooke, 2011).   
 
The most densely populated country on the continent, Rwanda has a population of more than 
12 million people on just over 26,000 square kilometres (Cooke, 2011; World Fact Book, 
2014).  Despite development and recognizable progress, land continues to be a scarce 
commodity and over half of farming households cultivate on less than one hectare of land 
(Boudreaux, 2010).  Energy and electricity shortages as well as poor infrastructure are 
significant problems in many areas and increasing prices for key commodities continue to 
handicap growth potential; donor assistance still comprises 50% of the Government’s budget 
(Cooke, 2011).  
 
4.4.1 Political and Economic Histories 
Rwanda’s multi-layered history has produced a unique socio-cultural, economic and political 
landscape which today’s entrepreneurs must navigate.   Earliest records indicate a Tutsi 
Kingdom ruled over much of what is recognized as current day Rwanda since the 16th 
century, with a largely homogenous culture.  The Kingdom included three ethnic groups: 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa; with intermarriages common, a single shared language and many 
shared cultural and religious beliefs.  Rulers during this era are recognized to have run 
‘tightly controlled administrations’ which enabled categorization and added administrative 
control through distinct clan ‘rankings’55 (Prunier, 1997, p. 16; Crisafulli and Redmond, 
2012).  This early control is understood to have evolved as a necessity given the area’s 
                                                        
55 18 clans exist within the Hutu/ Tutsi ethnic groups 
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traditionally high population density.  Through the centralized forms of political governance, 
top-down control was established in order to manage inherently small land availability with 
high population densities, resulting in high degrees of value-laden, social interaction 
(Prunier, 1997).   These tight administrative structures also separated into hierarchical 
arrangements where Tutsi were the ruling, administrating and intellegencia class, and Hutu 
the labouring class (Prunier, 1997).  Ethnic tensions and class divisions began to escalate in 
the mid nineteenth century in which power, wealth and assets (namely cattle and land) were 
consolidated by Tutsi elites, with Hutu and poor Tutsi excluded or designated into a forced 
labour system56 (Cooke, 2011).   
 
Rwanda, part of the East African Territory was first colonized by the Germans in the late 
1800s but was seeded to Belgium following World War I. Divisions between Tutsi and Hutu 
were further extrapolated by colonial rule, in which Tutsi (thought by the Belgians to be 
superior) were elevated to management levels of administrative power with Hutu largely 
excluded57 (Cooke, 2011).  As early as 1933, the Belgians instituted identification cards 
designating tribal origin, which served to further heighten the status of Tutsi to near 
aristocratic levels, furthering race, class and social divisions (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).  
By the end of the colonial presence in 1959, Tutsi individuals had assumed 98% of available 
administrative authority as well as the majority of economic, academic and formal 
employment opportunities (Prunier, 1997). The administrative design of the Kingdom and 
later, through the Colonial and Government structures established a history of a societal norm 
of control and obedience that saw grave consequences in 1994 and one that continues to play 
a significant role today. 
 
4.4.1.1 Ethnic Clashes and Post-Colonial Transition 
While Rwanda’s genocide and ensuing conflict resolution may dominate the current 
discourse for this small country, this specific study chose not to take a necessarily in-depth 
look at the 1994 genocide.  However, an overview and understanding of related causes and 
outcomes supports a clearer view of the country today, as well as the impact historical, social 
                                                        
56 All Hutus were mandated for the forced labour system; mandatory labour did not apply to Tutsi  
57 Hutus were also excluded from higher education opportunities 
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and cultural institutions have on entrepreneurs.  Through an examination of recent history, it 
is important to note that the ethnic differences and ensuing violence can not be attributed 
directly to incited tribal hatreds, the outcome of colonial manipulation, or influences from 
external actors58 (Cooke, 2011) but was perhaps, a tragically perfect storm of all three. 
 
The most recognizable conflict of Rwanda’s history, the 1994 genocide was not an 
independent act, but predicated by numerous violent clashes charged by economic and 
political injustice, which used ethnicity as a tool to demonize opposition for the advancement 
of political agendas.  The first of many violent uprisings is traced to differences between the 
ruling Tutsi minority and the majority Hutu population which came to a head with the 1959 
Hutu Revolution; flourishing in the power vacuum left by the dwindling Belgian Colonial 
presence.  Violent clashes continued against Tutsi as well as against the general population 
for the next several decades (highlighted in periodical massacres in 1959, ‘63, ‘67, ‘73 and 
‘88) resulting in tens of thousands of Tutsi killed and several hundred thousand refugees 
fleeing to neighbouring countries: Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Prunier, 1997; Cooke 2011).   These first groups of Tutsi refugees were the 
founders of the Tutsi exile military organization, which began primarily in Uganda following 
the 1959 violence.  Much of this initial movement of refugees would later form the Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and its commanders were sourced from these Rwandans living as 
refugees – current Rwandan President Paul Kagame being one (Prunier, 1997).   
 
Throughout the ensuing decades, Tutsi remained excluded from power, but were generally 
not harassed as long as they did not interfere with politics (Prunier, 1997; Cooke, 2011).   As 
such, Tutsi remaining in Rwanda stayed far from politics, choosing instead to become 
involved in business, making up much of the private sector (Prunier, 1997).  
 
4.4.1.2 Coffee in Politics 
Earnings from coffee exports were deeply politicised and ingrained revenue streams in the 
colonial and post-independence eras.  By the 1980s, Government and political elites relied 
heavily upon successful export commodities: coffee, tea and tin, in addition to foreign aid, 
                                                        
58 For further information on the impacts of key actions or lack thereof from the French Government and 
Catholic Church, see:  Gérard Prunier: The Rwanda Crisis; History of Genocide (1997).   
  126 
for personal enrichment as well as to fund State operating budgets (Boudreaux, 2007; 2010).   
However, increasing economic difficulties began in the late 1980s with the liberalization of 
the international coffee market in 1989 and the resulting 50% drop in value for commercial 
coffee.  Significantly impacting Rwanda’s foreign exchange earnings, the ensuing fiscal 
crisis was further compounded by drought and heightened food insecurity59 (Prunier, 1997; 
Cooke, 2011).  Rapid reductions in coffee revenue also meant reductions in graft for political 
elites and lead to further infighting and competition for reduced resources (Prunier, 1997).  
While coffee is not considered as a direct contributor to the ensuing genocide, it did add to 
the political and socio-economic environment and instability, which, following the drop in 
commodity prices, resulted in, attempted political survival through repression and further 
ethnic demonization60 (Boudreaux, 2007).  
 
4.4.1.3 1994 Genocide 
The atrocities of Rwanda’s war and ensuing genocide of 1994 are well documented and have 
had lasting impact on the country’s social, cultural and economic evolutions, and continue to 
form a considerable element of today’s national construct. A handful of extremist politicians 
used the deteriorating economic situation of 1993 and early 1994 to feed a personal agenda 
for the accession of a Hutu State (Prunier, 1997).  The final spark igniting the war in 1994 
came when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 661 and the ensuing 
genocide killed 800,000 to one million people in a three and a half month span.  It is 
unknown if the assassination of the President was planned or coincidence, however his 
removal enabled the doors to open for extremists' control to institute the ‘final solution’ 
(Prunier, 1997).  What is known is that the genocide was a planned62, systematic attempt at 
                                                        
59 This further strengthened opposition movements, highlighted by the Rwanda Patriotic Front  (RPF), which 
began to lay groundwork for civil war. 
60 Tactics have been paralleled with Nazi Germany propaganda.  Later turning to a choice of ‘kill or be killed’ 
propaganda and mentality (Prunier, 1997). 
61 Debate remains as to the responsibility of who shot down Habyarimana: opposing RPF forces, extremist Hutu 
Militia, or members of the Presidential Guard.  RPF Forces were cleared of any association with the 
assassination following a ruling from a French Judge in January 2012 (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).  It is 
considered highly likely that members of Habyarimana’s inner circle and perhaps family members (his wife’s  
family coming from a traditionally more important class of Hutu) orchestrated the assassination, as he was 
viewed to no longer be effective and/or useful (Prunier, 1997).  
62 Organizers of the genocide also took measures to arm the general populace.  Evidence shows that the 
Chillington Company, the country’s largest producer of the panga (cutlass or machete – a common agricultural 
tool), sold more in February 1994 than all of 1993 (Prunier, 1997, p. 243)  
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ridding the country from all Tutsi as well as moderate or sympathetic Hutu.  Within hours of 
the President’s assassination, many high-ranking Tutsi and Hutu opposition officials, 
members of the judiciary, academics and journalists were murdered in Kigali in coordination 
with lists prepared well in advance of the plane crash (Prunier, 1997; Cooke, 2011).   
 
Targeted demonization, brutal oppression and the later killing sprees63 were facilitated by the 
extensive, systemic individual identity documentation of class, ethnicity and political 
affiliation for every Rwandan citizen; an engrained, highly detailed system dating back to the 
Belgians in the early 1900s (Prunier, 1997; Fussell, 2001; Cooke, 2011).  While the top-level 
organizers numbered only a handful, they relied upon a strictly organized administrative 
control system throughout the country to achieve their goals for widespread massacre with an 
estimated 80,000 to 100,000 people actively taking part in the killing (Prunier, 1997, p. 261).   
 
4.4.1.4 Rebuilding Rwanda Post - 1994 
The war technically ended when RPF forces, led by current President, RPF Major-General 
Paul Kagame, took control of Kigali in July 1994 (Cooke, 2011).   However, despite the 
acknowledged cease-fire, revenge killings were common, with many perpetrated by 
uncontrollable RPF soldiers (Prunier, 1997).  Individuals who had survived the genocide 
were often charged in carrying out the killings or sympathizing with those who did, causing 
additional violence and mistrust within communities for years following the war, further 
tearing at the remaining threads holding the country together (Prunier, 1997).  
 
With much of the fighting over, many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees64 in 
neighbouring countries tried to return to their own homes, assume rights to land of family 
members or even take the houses and land of those who would never return.  Many of the 
returnees were those who had lived in neighbouring countries (namely Burundi and Uganda) 
for many years and returned after the genocide not only with money, but also without the 
incredible trauma of those who had stayed.  These returnees (largely Tutsi refugees) were 
                                                        
63 Mandatory ID cards made it simple and easy to know the ethnic group of individuals in addition to the 
common practice of wearing hats, badges, or symbols of political parties supported.  Thus, in every 
neighborhood, ethnicity and political affiliation were commonly known (Prunier, 1997, p. 231). 
64 It is estimated that up to 2.1 million people fled Rwanda with a further 1.3 to 1.8 million people internally 
displaced (Prunier, 1997, p. 312).  
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some of the first to aid in the re-start of the economy and remain key actors within the private 
sector today (Prunier, 1997; R_1, 2014).   
 
4.4.1.5 Rwanda Today 
Through the Transitional Government and later ‘democratic elections’, the RPF, with the 
ascension65 of Paul Kagame, has maintained a stronghold on power and continues to stifle 
any emergence of opposition. With the RPF and President Kagame firmly in power, dramatic 
change is not projected to be likely as long as economic progress, security and stability 
continue.  
 
Action by the Government to suppress independent investigations66 as well as refusal to 
acknowledge wrongdoing of its own actions in the war continues to be a source of strong 
resentment for many Rwandans today and is a cause for concern for future economic, 
political and social stability following an incomplete justice in the reconciliation process and 
deep vulnerabilities reportedly remain through mistrust between differing ethnic groups 
(Ansoms and Rostagno, 2010; Cooke, 2011).  While national identification through ethnicity 
labelled identification cards has been outlawed since 1997, perception remains that a Tutsi 
Government is again in power at the expense of Hutu (Fussell, 2001; Cooke, 2011).  
 
Today, the country and its society remain marked by deep-rooted tensions and unresolved 
resentments (Cooke, 2011).  While the supposed stability and economic progress has drawn 
great attention, it is also considered by many to present a front for an authoritarian, restrictive 
Government and an economy marked by growing income disparity (Cooke, 2011).  
Questions remain as to whether President Kagame will step down following the 
constitutionally limited second term in 2017, and whether or not the country will face an 
ensuing power vacuum if he does.  However at the time of writing, Rwandans had recently 
                                                        
65 In 2000, the President, Prime Minister and National Assembly Speaker resigned on allegations of corruption 
or divisionism with the former President being sentenced to 15 years in prison; Kagame, formally the Minister 
of Defence, elevated to the Presidency in March 2000 (Cooke, 2011).   
66 Independent studies report of continued widespread human rights abuses as the RPF forces hunted remaining 
génocidaires into neighbouring DRC (Cooke, 2011), however no official investigations or prosecution for war 
crimes have ever been brought against members of the Rwandan Government or other prominent RPF 
members.   UNHCR believes RPF forces killed another 30,000 people after the war, many of which, in 
retrospect, were considered innocent of involvement in the genocide (Cooke, 2011).   
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voted in a constitutional amendment67 (a 98% voter approval) allowing Kagame to run for a 
third, seven-year term, following with two additional five-year terms; ensuring the possibility 
for Kagame to serve as President through 2034, at least (P.A., 2015).  With strictly limited 
tolerance for political dissent and the lack of a functional opposition, it is expected for 
Kagame to again be ‘democratically’ elected and serve at least a third presidential term; 
Rwanda’s Presidential Elections remain scheduled for late 2017.   
 
4.4.2 Building a Dynamic Private Sector 
With a lost generation, destroyed infrastructure, no governance system and a shattered social 
fabric, the self-described failed state of 1994, has since worked, and is succeeding to a large 
extent, to incubate and foster a renewed, dynamic private sector which aims to be 
characterized by the successes of local entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 2012; Crisafulli and 
Redmond, 2012).  Following the war, Rwanda took a strong, Government-led, interventionist 
strategy to restart the economy, promoting three key local industries: coffee, tea and tourism, 
due to the potential to employ large segments of the population, but also garner much needed 
foreign exchange (Isenberg, 2010).  As such, the country has embarked on an ambitious and 
comprehensive reform campaign aimed at stimulating private sector growth and 
entrepreneurship by improving its business climate, regulatory environments and investment 
attractiveness (Traore et al., 2013).  As will be seen in Chapter 6, the Rwandan Government 
has worked hard to institute policies aimed at maximizing growth, while also harnessing 
local-level potential for micro and small-scale entrepreneurship.  
 
The 2014 Doing Business Report named Rwanda the second best ‘improver’ globally and top 
in sub-Saharan Africa for its improved business climates and ease of doing business (World 
Bank, 2013b).   Rwanda improved its global ‘ease of doing business’ ranking from 150th in 
2008 to 46th in 2015 (World Bank, 2013a; 2014d).  In 2013, Rwanda’s economic global 
competitiveness was ranked 66th (out of 148 countries) and Rwanda ranks far above the sub-
Saharan average for ease of doing business (World Bank 2013a).  Specifically for the 
improvements to its regulatory environments, reduced time for business registration and 
start-up, and improvement in obtaining the necessary permits according to specific business 
                                                        
67 Elections held December 18, 2015 
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type.  Rwanda ranks high in terms of ease of obtaining credit, mainly due to the fact that 
collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to facilitate credit access and the level of 
credit information shared by lending institutions (World Bank, 2014d).  However, while 
access to credit has improved, financial inclusion for poor, especially rural populations 
remains far behind actors in major urban areas (Murenzi, 2013).  Additionally, hurdles 
remain for smaller actors or new entrants, largely resulting in some businesses choosing to 
remain or move into the informal sector.  Incentives to support small business formalization 
have yet to see the widespread outcomes intended (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012).  Further 
detailed analysis of policy and regulation agendas in coordination with impact on 
entrepreneurship will take place throughout Chapter 6.  
 
4.4.3 Rwanda and Coffee  
Coffee has traditionally been one of Rwanda’s most important production staples, foreign 
exchange earners and remains a major cash crop for more than 400,000 producing 
households across 35,000 hectares (Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), 2008; NAEB, 
2012).   While coffee accounts for more than 45% of the country’s export earnings, Rwandan 
coffee makes up less than 1% of the global trade (Ministry of Agricultural and Animal 
Resources (MINAGRI), 2014; ICO, 2015).  
 
Coffee is not an indigenous crop to Rwanda and was introduced by German missionaries in 
the early 1900s, with widespread cultivation further enforced by Belgian colonial 
authorities68 in the 1930s (Bourdeaux, 2007; Selvarajah, 2012).  Despite frustration from 
farmers, Rwanda’s post-independence Governments continued the colonial requirement of 
coffee production; despite the fact that many wished to cultivate more profitable crops.   
From Independence through to the mid 1990s, the State purchased all coffee designated for 
export through state-owned monopsony companies (MTI, 2008; Boudreaux, 2007).  
Following Rwanda’s coffee sector liberalization in 1995, the sector has since seen a 
relatively fast transformation, rebounding with higher prices for producers as well as the 
                                                        
68 The Colonial Government began the supply of seedlings and inputs but also introduced price restrictions, 
quality guidelines, and special licenses for firms to purchase coffee, imposing export taxes on sales and income 
taxes on farmers.  Tutsi chiefs were responsible for collection of taxes for colonial government (Boudreaux, 
2010).  
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emergence of new, private sector actors (national and international69) and privately owned 
exporting entities (Boudreaux, 2010). Liberalization of the sector involved removing a 
variety of trade barriers across the chain, encouraging vertical integration and incentivizing 
new investment across the spectrum which has facilitated entrepreneurship throughout the 
industry (Mutandwa et al., 2009; Boudreaux, 2010).  
 
Recognizing the only way for Rwanda to be competitive on the international market was 
through a high quality product, concerted efforts to improve the country’s quality stock 
resulted in local market incentives as well as technical improvements at farm level (R_2, 
2014).  As such, the Government instituted a plan to radically increase the amount of quality 
coffee produced and exported.  Making semi-washed or sun-dried coffee illegal in 2011, 
focus is now on the production and processing of fully washed cherries.  Currently, 41% of 
all coffee produced is fully washed and of speciality grade (MINAGRI, 2014; NAEB, 
2015b).  However, tremendous value addition remains to be seized throughout the sector 
given Rwanda’s ideal growing conditions and unique, marketable characteristics.  
 
Graph 4.2, depicts the country’s total annual export volumes70 not differentiated by speciality 
or commercial grade. While production has been relatively static, it is believed that the 
proportion of speciality grade is increasing and makes up for the reduced quantity volumes 
through higher revenue quality.  Total volume of green bean exported from the 2014 Season 
was 15,417 tonnes (ICO, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
69 The major state-owned export company was sold to a US businessman who is part of the President’s 
Economic Advisory Council in 2009 for $2.3 million (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012). 
70 Seasonal year counted from September to March 
  132 
Graph 4.2. Rwanda‘s Coffee Export  
 
(Source data: ICO, 2015) 
 
Graph 4.3 below, presents the evolution of the sector in regards to the development of Fully 
Washed Coffee (FWC) as a proportion against total exports.  Rwanda continues to support, 
as well as force, the increased production of FWC.  In parallel promotion with increased 
marketability of Rwanda’s high quality beans, attracted buyers are willing to pay price 
premiums (MTI, 2008).   Given the increase in private sector led investment and the ever 
increasing fully-washed cherry volumes, broad efforts are being undertaken to increase 
awareness at the producer level as well as incentivize producers to improve quality of 
production in order to maximize price opportunity and improve operations and processing 
throughout the rest of the chain (MTI, 2008; MINAGRI, 2014).   
 
Graph 4.3. Rwanda’s Evolution towards Fully Washed Coffee  
 
(Source data: NAEB, 2015a; ICO, 2015) 
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4.4.3.1 Coffee Policy Development  
Over more than a decade long process, the Rwandan Government, in partnership with its 
private sector and international donors, has reshaped the industry through the development 
and implementation of regulatory frameworks for production, increasing the number and 
capacity of processing stations.  Additional market support linkages were found between 
domestic production, processing and export, and foreign purchasers, facilitating demand by 
increasing private sector involvement with improved ability to cater to quality and marketing 
(Boudreaux, 2010).  Rwanda’s National Coffee Strategy was first developed in 2002 and 
specifically focused on the development of the ‘speciality coffee product’ through upgrading 
production quality at the farm level.  The National Coffee Strategy (2009-2012)71 looks to 
build upon the groundwork laid through the initial strategy as well as improve upon key 
lessons learned during the period (MTI, 2008, R_3, 2014).   
 
The National Agricultural Export Board is responsible for policy development and 
implementation for export crops and has placed emphasis on professionalizing the coffee 
sector through increasing volumes of fully-washed coffee, improving competitiveness and 
promoting Rwanda’s coffee (Selvarajah, 2012).  However, poor farming practices continue to 
hinder results with low as well as variable quality for farmers, adversely impacting not only 
the farmers’ revenue, but also profitability for processing stations and exporters due to 
limited volumes of quality coffee cherries supplied.  
 
Focused improvements within the speciality coffee sector have seen some success in recent 
years, however poor input distribution, increased soil acidity and inappropriate or inadequate 
use of fertilizers has resulted in Rwanda currently underachieving compared to the targets set 
(MTI, 2011).   Inefficient processing capacity, poor business planning at the point of 
processing and high transportation costs continue to plague processing stations (MTI, 2008; 
Boudreaux, 2010; MINAGRI, 2014).  While this is an inherent bottleneck for the chain, 
potential for improvement also offers opportunity for entrepreneurs. 
 
 
                                                        
71 A National Coffee Strategy post 2012 had yet to be released at time of writing 
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4.4.3.2 Coffee Chain Actors 
The Rwanda coffee chain is comprised of a myriad of actors and influences.  Figure 4.3 
below, shows the supply chain flow from Producers to Processors and finally Exporters.  
Related influences from external, non-governmental forces as well as potential for financial 
flows among actors throughout the chain are common, if not encouraged.  The enabled 
vertical integration of actors across the chain has resulted in greater financial flow, business 
overlap, influence and incentive structures among and between actors, often filling gaps left 
by the Public Sector.  This diagram does not show market regulations, which is examined in 
detail in Chapter 6.  The specific business segments selected for this research are identified in 
red: Producers, Processors and Exporters due to scalability across the chain, but also chosen 
because they form the main elements of the coffee chain, allowing for further study through 
comparison with Ethiopia.  
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Figure 4.3. Rwanda Coffee Chain and Sector Influences  
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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Smallholder Producers 
Similar to Ethiopia, small-scale producers dominate the Rwandan coffee sector.  While 
relatively large farms exist72, unlike Ethiopia, large-scale private commercial farms are not 
classified differently than smallholder producers. Producers typically have three market 
options: 
a. Sell high quality cherries to cooperatives or private processing stations 
b. Sell lower quality cherries to local traders  
c. Illegally produce semi-washed coffee on farm and sell directly to local markets 
(Murekezi and Loveridge, 2009; Mujawamariya et al., 2013).   
 
Given the multiple options for supply, producer decision-making habits often go beyond 
comparison of price and/ or a cost-benefit analysis.  Importance of transaction costs as well 
as relationships in terms of trust and loyalty can weigh heavily on supply decisions 
(Mujawamariya et al., 2013).  In addition, smallholder producers have high degrees of 
difficulty accessing formal financing (MTI, 2008; R_1, 2014).  As the sector has become 
more competitive, it was observed that entrepreneurial processors and exporters have begun 
to introduce payment tiers related to quality grades as incentives to producers.  Improvements 
to grading and corresponding pricing systems have resulted in significant improvement in 
prices with premium coffee cherries more than doubling since 2003 (MTI, 2008).  
 
Traders  
Traders can offer additional sales outlets for producers as well as competition to local 
cooperatives or washing stations.  Considered as middlemen or opportunists, traders can 
absorb large volumes of lower grades, selling on to local or regional markets (Mujawamariya 
et al., 2013).  A producer may decide to ‘side-sell’ to local traders for multiple reasons: better 
price for lower quality cherry, opportunity for credit, trust, shorter distances to market, 
payment in cash at an agreed spot-price or even personal relationships (Mujawamariya et al., 
2013).  Traders, while potentially entrepreneurial, are not used for research purposes within 
this specific study.  
 
 
 
                                                        
72 Largest farm reported in Rwanda was 25 hectares 
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Cooperatives 
Coffee Cooperatives started to emerge in Rwanda from the mid 1980s with the aim of 
improving producer livelihoods through the opportunity to benefit from economies of scale, 
pooled resources, and improved access to market information and customers, as well as a 
reconciliation mechanism for rural communities, post 1994 (Mujawamariya et al., 2013; 
TechnoServe, 2013b).  However, it is estimated that only 20% of Rwandese coffee producers 
are members (Elder et al., 2012; Mujawamariya, et al., 2013).  Despite the potential benefits, 
cooperative businesses can fail to become profitable due to insufficient planning, poor 
business decisions or improper management (TechnoServe, 2013b).  Despite intensive efforts 
in capacity building by NGOs, many cooperatives remain “fragile, unorganized and 
dysfunctional” and the mishandling of finance from national banks has plagued the sector in 
attracting new or increased investment (Boudreaux, 2010, p. 6).  Cooperatives are not 
considered an entrepreneurial entity and are thus not used as a research segment within this 
specific study.  
 
Processors – Coffee Processing Stations 
Since 2002, Rwanda has significantly improved its national processing capacity.  Strategic 
and directed investment, largely from the renewed private sector, significantly increased the 
number of processing stations throughout the country from just two in 2002 to 229 stations 
(both cooperative and privately owned) in 2014 (MTI, 2008; NAEB, 2014).  However, 
during this research, only 38 privately owned processing stations were operational in the 
2013/14 Season.  The increase in number of processing stations resulted in reduced 
transportation costs for many producers and increased the amount of fully washed coffee able 
to be processed.  However financial challenges felt by some stations can be traced to high 
operational costs (namely transportation and labour), micro-smallholders with limited 
(inefficient) supply volumes as well as poor management and inefficient financial structures 
and practices (MTI, 2008; Selvarajah, 2012).   
 
While additional volumes are needed to ensure profitability, improvements can be done at the 
processing level such as improving selection techniques for low to high-grade cherries (MTI, 
2008).  Access to adequate water is also key to the capacity of Rwandan processing stations 
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in order to adequately process high-volumes of fully washed coffee (ITC, 2011).  Low 
volumes of high-grade cherries and poor cash flows have at times incentivized washing 
stations to process commercial grade coffee for lower margin, but with quicker turn-around 
sales when prices are low or additional volumes are needed (MTI, 2008).   
 
Exporters 
Prior to the sector’s liberalization in 1995, the State exported all coffee and as such, the 
development of local, private coffee export businesses are a relatively recent phenomenon.  
Export of green beans prior to 2000 consisted solely of commercial grade (MTI, 2008).  To a 
large degree, specific bean types and qualities of Rwandan export businesses are paired 
largely with the corresponding import contract demands, however more lucrative opportunity 
exists in exporting higher, speciality grades.  In many respects the Government, in 
collaboration with new private Exporters, played a key role in enticing buyers to experience 
Rwanda’s coffee with the private sector solidifying these relationships through product 
development (MTI, 2008).   
 
4.5 Comparison of Ethiopian and Rwandan Coffee Markets 
Comparisons between political environments, market structures, resource availability and 
historical socio-cultural influences will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  
However, a brief comparison of industry size and revenue generation is made here to 
demonstrate the differences between each industry.   
 
As discussed, starting in the 1990s, both countries and coffee sectors underwent transitions 
from tightly controlled, state-led monopolies to varying degrees of liberalization and re-
introduction of private sectors.  As will be shown in the following chapters, while 
entrepreneurs operating in each country have similarities, structural differences and market 
forces also play a large roll in the extent of entrepreneurial willingness, opportunity pursuit 
and dynamism.  In comparing industry scale and size, obvious differences exist upon a first 
glance at the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda in terms of historical significance, 
international brand recognition and production capacity potential.  While both countries have 
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similar levels of per hectare productivity73, as seen in Graph 4.4 below, Ethiopia’s export 
dwarfs that of Rwanda’s, with Ethiopia typically exporting near ten times more than Rwanda 
(NAEB, 2013).  
 
Graph 4.4. Coffee Export Comparisons (Eth = Ethiopia, Rw = Rwanda) 
 
 (Source data: NAEB, 2015a; MoT, 2015; ICO, 2015) 
 
As will be seen throughout this discussion, coffee represents a significant revenue earner and 
comprises nearly half of foreign exchange for both countries. Graph 4.5 below, demonstrates 
again the large differences between the two economies and respective sectors in regards to 
national coffee export revenues.  Export revenue for Rwanda could only be sourced through 
the 2011 season.  For comparison, Ethiopia’s coffee revenue in 2011, equalled over $841 
million, with Rwanda’s coffee revenue are just $75 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
73 Ethiopia’s productivity is estimated at 0.7kgs red cherry / tree (FAO, 2014; E_5, 2015).  Rwanda’s 
productivity is estimated at 1.35kgs red cherry / tree (NAEB, 2013; R_5, 2014).   
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Graph 4.5. Coffee Revenue Comparisons 
  
(Source data: NAEB, 2015a; MoT, 2015; ICO, 2015) 
 
Price differences are of particular interest as Ethiopia typically commands higher prices than 
Rwanda.  As discussed in Section 4.2, quality is objective but also subjective in regards to 
marketing and consumer demand for a respective country.  As such, added value through 
marketability and consumer recognition is an important aspect of final price determination 
and the ensuing effects through the production, processing and export chain.  Given the long 
history of Ethiopia’s coffee and distinct familiarity with consumers, it is able to demand 
higher prices as compared to relatively unknown Rwanda; despite the fact Rwanda is 
considered, in many cases, to have a generally superior quality to Ethiopia.  This is reflected 
back to the producer level and while price to producer is admittedly influenced by market 
structure and national policies, comparison of garden gate prices earned provides evidence of 
price differentiation and volatility on the international market.  Graph 4.6 below, presents 
average cherry prices paid to smallholder producers, as reported by governments, calculated 
against exporter prices.  Prices are not differentiated by grade74. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
74 Coffee is traded internationally in US cents / lb. 
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Graph 4.6. Averaged Cherry Price to Producers 
 
 (Source data: ICO, 2015; MoT, 2015; NAEB, 2015a) 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Ethiopia and Rwanda have taken different tracts in support and embrace of entrepreneurship 
as well as in pursuit of viability for respective coffee industries.  Ethiopia continues to pursue 
a strategy of state-led market involvement, emphasising quantity over quality with an ever-
entrenched position of commoditization over specialization.  Rwanda, through its liberalized 
coffee market has used entrepreneurs as employment creators and service providers, focusing 
on specialization in its coffee sector as a means to compete within international markets.  
Given the approach to this research and the weight the operational context has within the 
overall conceptual framework and ensuing analysis, a strong understanding of markets as 
well as historical, political, economic and socio-cultural environments was considered crucial 
prior to receiving the remaining research presentation and analysis.  Building from the 
contextual backgrounds delivered within this chapter, research will unfold in the following 
chapters to further detail specifics concerning the entrepreneurial actors of the respective 
coffee markets within wider research results and analyses.   
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Chapter 5 – Defining Drivers.  Identifying the Individual 
Constructs that Separate the Entrepreneur from Non-
Entrepreneur.  
5.1 Introduction  
The Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus used in this research approach provided a 
conceptual framework for understanding the interdependent and reflexive nature of the 
individual entrepreneur within a specific operational context.  In order to fully understand the 
individual within the entrepreneurship nexus, this chapter deconstructed the nexus in order to 
analyse the construct of the entrepreneur.  While the individual can be analysed through a 
multitude of means, this chapter understands ‘individual’ as an internal construct, involving a 
collection of drivers, which may predispose an individual to be more (or less) 
entrepreneurially orientated (Chell, 2008). 
 
Within this chapter, analysis looks to understand the chosen drivers (internal, predisposed 
characteristics within each individual) of respondents in relation to specific business 
segments and along the Entrepreneurial Range of the coffee chains of Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
Understanding who and what the entrepreneur is in regards to internal characteristics requires 
understanding of not only the specific drivers, but also of the socio-demographic elements 
surrounding entrepreneurs tested through this research.  This chapter presents, discusses and 
analyses findings of the more intimate make-up of the individual found to be an entrepreneur 
within the confines of this specific research paradigm.   
 
Within the literature, several distinct characteristics are recognized as elements to the 
entrepreneurial makeup and are considered to influence outlook and behaviour; these are 
presented in Section 5.2.1 below.  Throughout this chapter, differences between 
Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs were found, however the nuanced differences of 
specific driver strengths and weaknesses of actors across business segments of the coffee 
chain remain critical to deciphering the individual entrepreneur and related potential for 
opportunity pursuit.  This chapter combined analysis using both quantitative and qualitative 
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methods, but distinctly relied on quantitative analysis when deciphering similarities and/ or 
differences between business segments of the coffee chain and across the Entrepreneurial 
Range of respondents.  As such, the chapter is built in three parts:  
 
1. Explanation to the reasoning behind why and how specific drivers were chosen and 
how respondents were classified. 
2. Presentation of socio-demographic elements discovered and analysed according to 
varying business segments and the Entrepreneurial Range.  
3. Investigation using statistical analysis to decipher the similarity or difference between 
business segments and entrepreneur classification, per country.  Determining the 
strength of specific drivers, identified by Driver Index Scores, allowed initial analysis 
of each specific driver to be tested across the Entrepreneurial Range, prior to the 
following analysis of Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs within and between 
countries.   
 
Specific market dynamics, cultural environments, resource allocation and regulatory 
constrictions are also believed to influence individual behaviours, actions and choices but 
will be addressed in the following chapter. 
 
5.2 Classifying Entrepreneurs and Understanding Specific Drivers – How 
Were Respondents Classified? 
Analysing the individual entrepreneur required a distinct vetting process for selection and 
appropriate classification of respondents in order to test drivers against respondents to 
measure potential differences in an individual construct of actors within different business 
models or degrees of entrepreneurship. The process of understanding how to absorb and 
provide appropriate classification of entrepreneurs and business occurred in three steps:  
 
1. Determination of specific drivers in which to test the individual, entrepreneurial 
construct, identified in Section 2.4.1 and discussed in 5.2.1. 
2. Determination of business segments in the coffee chain, discussed in Section 5.2.2. 
3. Determination of the Entrepreneurial Range and corresponding appropriate 
classification of respondents, discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
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5.2.1 The Individual Construct, Drivers of the Entrepreneur 
A multitude of elements can be used to understand and determine individual 
entrepreneurialness, including many internal and external stimuli (Casson, 2003; Boso et al., 
2013).  As every potential stimulus obviously could not be tested, a handful of drivers, or 
characteristics understood to be inherent to an individual entrepreneur were used for this 
study.  Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity 
Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO) are some of the most universally 
referred to characteristics when discussing the inherent toolset of an entrepreneur.   As 
discussed through the initial review of related literature in Section 2.4.1, potential drivers 
were initially tested for feasibility and viability for this research during the Research Pilot 
conducted in Rwanda (April-May, 2014).  These final drivers were selected due to 
importance to entrepreneurship determination, but also for contextual tangibility within the 
specific contexts of research environments, used to better understand responses and actions.   
 
While many individuals could be perceived as being entrepreneurial, a respondent had to 
have demonstrated specific, tangible action in pursuit of an opportunity, in order to be 
recognized as an entrepreneur.  This could be as varied as expanding unique or new business 
operations, purchase of additional farmland, diversified product portfolios, production of 
specific, unique products, innovative sourcing models, unique financing mechanisms, or the 
establishment of business start-ups.   
 
Table 5.1 is an outcome from the evidence of entrepreneurial action in relation to the specific 
drivers questioned and tested in this research in order to contextualize the universality of the 
selected drivers; as understood via Structuration Theory.  These tangible outcomes, also 
provided a framework for grading responses used in classifying individuals by determining 
entrepreneurialness, which has also built from the initial parameters used in guiding 
entrepreneurial classification first introduced in Section 3.3.3. 
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Table 5.1. Driver Tangibility  
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
5.2.2 Coffee Chain Segments 
The coffee chains of both Ethiopia and Rwanda are built from the same three elements: 
Production, Processing and Export.  Within these elements, specific business segments 
Drivers Evidence of Entrepreneur Driver Related Action  
Resilience 
Continuity of market presence despite:  
- High price volatility and unpredictability 
- Negative histories of political involvement, state-owned sectors 
- Inability to access formal financing options 
Return to business despite displacement and/ or conflict  
Self – Efficacy 
- Strong belief in self to be able to continue to be successful in business despite: 
- Volatility of global coffee market, 
- Dramatic, unpredictable seasonal price variation,  
- Mistrust in government, 
- Lack of government market regulations or support mechanisms 
Very strong belief in current business strategy and direction  
Strong sense of self 
Feeling of control over own business, life 
Strong belief in self, more willing to trust own judgement, try/ attempt unique and/ or 
innovative strategies.  
Innovativeness 
Implementation of new, experimental practices such as: 
- Different production, harvesting, processing techniques or practices   
- Financing options  
- Supply / sourcing strategies 
- Quality recognition and pursuit 
- Diversification of product base 
- Implementation of different business models 
- Social innovation: different ways of interacting and incentivizing suppliers via 
monetary and non-monetary benefits 
Risk Tolerance 
Implementation of risk mitigating strategies to overcome/ adapt to: 
- Lack of long-term guarantee for purchase orders 
- High price volatility and unpredictability  
- High likelihood of seasonal losses with low prices 
- Climate variability/ risks (changes in rainfall, rainy season onset, deforestation) 
- Unstable market conditions, inherent lack of market power 
- Limited land availability/ access 
- Limited/ restricted access to formal financing mechanisms 
Opportunity 
Recognition 
Ability to perceive potential market gaps through: 
- Recognition of new, unique opportunity through establishment/ evolution of sector and 
related markets 
- Use of existing knowledge stock to expand, diversify, change business strategy to 
maintain/ improve business standing from increased competition 
- Understanding emergence of domestic/ regional / international markets and new 
product development 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
Actively being pulled towards recognised market gap due to:  
- High levels of market intelligence and high drive for pursuing success, via trying new 
activities, growing business and taking risks 
- Tendency to look for ways to pursue opportunity through unique, innovative means to 
maintain / improve business outlook 
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have been further unpacked to reveal the range of respondent types uncovered through data 
collection, presenting the full coffee chain analysed for this research.  These business 
segments were extrapolated from the main elements of the coffee chain: production, 
processing and export, and defined from the organic diversification within existing coffee 
structures.  Understanding these structures and related business models followed an in depth 
review of secondary sources, a pilot research trip to Rwanda and the actual data collection 
and field research.  In doing so, this enabled a more complete understanding and opportunity 
for analysis of the differing actors involved.  The business segments described below, are 
accepted terms and business classifications of the coffee sectors in both countries.  While 
segments of the coffee production and supply chains were initially discussed in Sections 
4.3.3.1 and 4.4.3.1, the information below presents an overview of the specific business 
segments used for analysis and the reasoning as to why and how respondents were classified.  
Additionally, entrepreneur classifications are listed after each business segment, for further 
clarification.  The Entrepreneurial Range is again presented in Figure 5.1 and further 
discussed below in Section 5.2.2.  Statements from respondents classified in each segment 
are presented in italics to provide a more grounded understanding of respondents.  
 
Coffee Business Segment, Entrepreneur Classification:  
- Decaffeinated Producer, Unclassified (Rwanda only):  As initially discussed in 
Section 3.3.3, “Decaffeinated Producer” is the current phraseology used to describe 
smallholder producers in Rwanda who had previously produced coffee but had recently 
taken the conscious decision to uproot coffee trees (within the last ten years).  The term 
does not describe a different type of coffee production or processing technique and 
should not be confused with the product of decaffeinated coffee.  Decaffeinating fields 
is an illegal practice in Rwanda and highly discouraged by the Rwandan Government 
and local authorities.  A variety of reasons were given by respondents for the drastic 
measure, such as inability to manage the crop due to household loses or death of family 
members, dislike of the difficulty to secure profits year on year, high resource cost of 
production (money, time, effort), unstable/ unpredictable market prices, or mistrust of 
Rwanda’s coffee market. Decaffeinated Producers are unclassified in the 
Entrepreneurial Range, as they no longer operate within the coffee sector.  
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Additionally, while these actors made the distinct choice to focus on alternative income 
generators, related entrepreneurialness in regards to those endeavours was not assessed 
within this study.  Two Decaffeinated Producer respondents explained: 
My husband took care of coffee, it was one of the ways we were able to earn 
money, but after he died it was too much for me to manage and the washing 
station is very far.  I paid a penalty to the municipality for stopping. (P_R_2, 
2014)75  
 
I inherited coffee on my farm from my father.  I used to sell to Burundi, but 
with security now it is not possible to take across border. I do not trust the 
prices and when I was growing it, it was my lowest earner.  I now focus on 
other crops and can now predict my income. (P_R_3, 2014) 
 
- Smallholder Producer, Non-Entrepreneur: Respondents currently producing coffee, 
but not actively pursuing opportunities to expand or maximize business holdings.  
These producers, largely at a subsistence level, continue to harvest and sell coffee 
seasonally as it exists merely as part of a wider production basket and used as a cash 
crop.  Limited effort or resources are spent on this product and the lack of activity was 
reported to be due to the lack of interest in coffee as a viable business commodity, 
limited involvement or understanding of the market, disbelief in viability for income 
generation, lack of capacity or interest for investment in expansion or improvement to 
quality.  Respondents also lacked ability or interest in developing creative ways to 
overcome barriers or to improve current business standing.  These respondents were 
found to be highly vulnerable to shocks and it should be recognized that they perhaps 
did not consider themselves to be in a position to take risk due to current economic 
circumstances, given the highly volatile and unpredictability of the coffee market.  
Respondents classified as Non-Entrepreneurs were observed to be highly risk adverse 
and were visibly poorer than other actors across the chain, with the majority reporting to 
have relatively small production areas and land size.  A Non-Entrepreneur explained, 
We have 200 trees, it pays for my children’s school, but I cannot use that 
money to expand because I may not get it back and I cannot risk my children’s 
school fees.  Also, we have small land and do not have animals, so I cannot 
                                                        
75 Interview coding is based on business segment, country and interview number within the segment and year of 
interview: (Segment_Country_Interview #, Year of Interview)  For example the first Rwandan producer 
interviewed in 2014 would be coded as (P_R_1, 2014). 
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use manure for fertilizer. We just harvest and sell what we have.  (P_R_16, 
2014) 
 
- Smallholder Producer, Potential Entrepreneur: Respondents who demonstrated an 
understanding of the market and how to maximize opportunities, however failed to 
demonstrate tangible steps in actual pursuit of opportunity.  These respondents were 
comprised of both subsistence level producers and those slightly above a subsistence 
level.  Many respondents reported to have specific goals or future plans, or were 
perceived to be market orientated and often demonstrated an understanding of the 
market, but again, failed to present tangible steps in pursuit of market opportunity.  The 
lack of tangible steps towards opportunity pursuit is understood as a high-risk aversion, 
an inability to overcome barriers, or access means considered necessary to succeed with 
specific strategies for opportunity pursuit or business expansion.  ‘Restrictions’ to this 
achievement was reported as the result of lack of access to financing, distance from 
markets, inherent market structure, and prohibitive regulations dictating individual, 
operational potential76.  A Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur explained,  
Coffee can make a lot of money, I would like to expand my trees, but I cannot 
get finance.  When the coffee prices are low and I make losses I use money 
from other areas to cover and so I have not been able to buy more seedlings.  
Also the Government now makes us sell only to certain traders and I don’t 
think they give a fair price.  But that is coffee; you just have to accept it. 
(P_E_6, 2015) 
 
- Smallholder Producer, Entrepreneur: Respondents demonstrated clear, in depth 
understandings of the market as well as how to maximize opportunities. Respondents 
exhibited not only the capacity to take steps in overcoming barriers in pursuit of 
opportunity but reported to have used or developed unique means by which to pursue 
and achieve results.  In addition to market and opportunity understanding, respondents 
demonstrated actual, often unique, tangible steps in pursuit of business opportunity such 
as acquisition of additional land, financial accessibility and product diversification 
                                                        
76 As will be shown, it was difficult to find and classify rural smallholder producers in Ethiopia.  While many of 
these respondents had strong understanding of the marketplace and saw market opportunities, due to the 
limitations or inherent ceilings, were unable to pursue or take the tangible steps.  As such the majority of 
Ethiopian Smallholders are classified as Potential Entrepreneurs.  
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(product supply, quality standards, certifications).  Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, 
while still rural producers, were visibly wealthier than other Smallholder Producers 
interviewed.  Some respondents reported to have relatively larger land sizes, with others 
reporting plantations of relatively small land size, yet all were able to work through 
barriers to take risk and implement unique, tangible action in pursuit of opportunity 
valued.  Two Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs explained,   
I have invested purposely in my coffee and bought additional land for more 
trees.  I worked hard to expand when I make a profit.  The problem is others 
(producers) are afraid to reinvest their earnings.  From my coffee profits, I 
bought a motorbike and now use it as a moto-taxi in the village and make 
money off that as well.  (P_E_24, 2015) 
 
Coffee is very hard work, but you can make money.  There is no more land left 
in this area, but I rent land from some other farmers so I can grow additional 
coffee.  It is a risk if prices are low, but I usually do not make losses.  I have 
hired extra workers so I can manage all my plantations in different areas and 
produce good quality and make better prices for the good quality. (P_R_62, 
2014) 
 
- Commercial Farmer, Entrepreneur (Ethiopia only77.): Respondents who own and 
operate formalized businesses purposely established for large-scale, commercial coffee 
production and export.  Private, Commercial Farms are formally registered businesses 
and produce approximately 5% of Ethiopia’s production with plantations of at least 50 
hectares; often significantly larger 78 .  The Commercial Farms are inclusive of 
production, harvesting, processing and the eventual export of the specific coffee 
produced on farm site.  Businesses require large upfront capital investment to facilitate 
land acquisition79, plantation infrastructure and on site processing facilities.  Business 
applications are made directly to the Ethiopian Government and were reported to be 
approved anywhere within three months to six years, with all land allocated in the 
Western Region of Ethiopia.   Most Commercial Farmers are first generation owners, 
                                                        
77 Rwanda does not have farms of this size, due to land availability and regulation.  No Rwandan respondents 
were found to have farms greater than 25 ha.  
78 The largest, privately held Commercial Farm in Ethiopia is 25,000 hectares.  It used to be a state-owned 
plantation, but was purchased by MIDROC Ethiopia in 2013.  
79 Despite Ethiopia’s land rights regulations, Commercial Farmer owners purchase land directly from the 
Ethiopian Government and are granted land ownership rights 
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having established plantations after 1991, of which only 14% reported to have inherited 
farms.  Very few reported to have introduced an out-grower scheme with surrounding 
smallholders, instead sourcing solely from own plantations.  Commercial Farms are 
allowed to export directly and are not mandated to sell on the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange.  A Commercial Farmer explained,  
My grandfather and father were always involved in coffee on small plots and 
my father also worked as a coffee trader.  I decided to invest in a large 
plantation because you can also export yourself and that is where the money 
is.   We exported 576 tonnes (green) in 2014.  (CF_E_1, 2015) 
 
- Processor, Entrepreneur: Respondents who own and operate privately held, 
formalized businesses established to process coffee from its post harvest cherry into 
parchment and later green bean ready for sale to Exporters for final export.  Rwandan 
businesses involved in the study are all first generation start-ups. 42% of Ethiopian 
Processing businesses are first generation.  Rwandan Processors can enter into the 
processing business at anytime and some entrepreneurs have ‘added’ this particular 
business phase to an existing portfolio, for example pairing production and processing 
or processing and export, to increase margins as well as market share. Ethiopian 
Processing businesses include both wet and dry methods.  However, Ethiopian 
Processors are prohibited80 from being involved in any other segment of the chain and 
are also prohibited from investing in other segments such as investing directly with 
smallholder producers.  A Rwandan Processor explained,  
I was in University for two years and decided to drop out to start my own 
business.  I have one washing station and buy from 5,000 farmers.  I have 
invested to purchase another station that the bank seized through someone’s 
foreclosure; it should operate next year.  I also plan to export my own coffee, 
but you need to be able to fill your own container (19.2 tonnes) and I don’t 
have enough volume, yet. (Pc_R_4, 2014) 
 
 
                                                        
80 Ethiopian Government fear of monopolies created via vertical integration prohibits the same business entity 
from operating across multiple facets of the chain.     
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- Exporter, Entrepreneur: Respondents who own and operate formalized businesses 
established to market and sell green beans to importers on the international market.  
Rwandan Exporters involved in the study are all first generation business start-ups with 
58% of Ethiopians as first generation start-ups.  Rwandan coffee is sold directly from 
Exporters to international importers with Government oversight only to approve quality 
standards as agreed in purchase contracts.  Ethiopian Exporters must buy and sell 
product ‘blind’ via the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Auction.  Importers of 
Ethiopian coffees purchase from these Exporters, however foreign investment to 
exporters, or any other segment of the chain, is prohibited.  Rwandan and Ethiopian 
Exporters explained, 
I am a trained medical doctor, however after the war, in my area there were 
many orphans and widows to take care of and I could not manage on a 
doctor’s salary so I invested in a washing station.  I employ the widows and 
orphans in my businesses so they have their own income and can also get 
some business training.  I now have three washing stations and an export 
business; I export certified, speciality grade coffee to the American market.  
(Ex_R_10, 2014) 
 
Our family has been in coffee business for 60 years, although mainly within 
the domestic markets.  I started the export business in 2005.  About 65% of 
our business is coffee; the rest is other commodities and imported goods.  
Import businesses are very profitable here and coffee profits enable me to buy 
goods abroad for import. (Ex_E_18, 2015) 
 
5.2.3 The Entrepreneurial Range 
From a macro-perspective, actors within the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda could be 
perceived to operate in highly similar fashions and with similar models.  The coffee chains 
could be referred to as part of an industry culture of imitation due to similar functionalities, 
generalized business models, production techniques, and to some extent, the use or lack of 
technology (Ex_R_2, 2014).  While from this macro-perspective much may appear to be 
similar, nuanced individual behaviours, business techniques and practices within specific 
market structures and varying control mechanisms are found to be different and unique, 
allowing for a deeper, more in depth appreciation of entrepreneurs and how each may operate 
within different market structures.  For individuals operating within the same market 
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structure and political realm, operational requirements still differ due to the unique needs, 
environmental endowments and available infrastructures.  Building from the coffee business 
segments described above in Section 5.2.1, a range of entrepreneurial classifications was 
established in order to classify respondents based on entrepreneurialness or perceived levels 
of entrepreneurship. 
 
As presented in the literature review, one overarching definition for entrepreneurship does 
not exist.  However, in an effort to ensure transparency, this research defined the 
entrepreneur as: 
An individual aimed at profit maximization through opportunity recognition and its 
pursuit, which has resulted in unique, tangible action towards opportunity 
recognized.  
 
Business success rates or exact profitability could not be obtained or verified within this 
research and as such were not used as a specific measurement for entrepreneurial 
classification.  Additionally, profitability is interpreted as both a measure of monetary and 
non-monetary means81.  
 
Demonstrated tangibility of entrepreneurial action is considered important, as respondents 
could not simply be asked, for example: “if they are an entrepreneur?”, or “if they are 
innovative?”.  It was expected that the respondent would answer in absolute terms to these 
questions and may also have different understandings or perceptions of specific terms used.  
Therefore this researcher felt asking more generalized questions in relation to business 
activity or circumstances would result in more concrete evidence and more accurate 
responses, which could then be analyzed within the greater context.  Outcomes were inferred 
from respondent responses in regards to the examples provided to actual strategies, actions or 
implementation taken, barriers overcome, histories survived, as well as current market 
perceptions.   
                                                        
81 Profitability is addressed through both monetary and non-monetary means due to the fact that respondents, 
especially smallholder producers, were observed to typically analyse and assess their overall success or failure 
in regards to earnings as a more complete package, i.e., what overall was received for their  
work.  This included payment in-kind via labour provision, payment through foodstuffs, training received, 
relationships built etc.  Additionally, no smallholder producer respondents were found to maintain P&L 
statements, financial records, or receipts of purchases/ sales.  As such, success in regards to ‘earnings’ or profit 
had to be assessed through more than just physical cash revenue earnings.  
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Understanding entrepreneurship within these contexts requires an acceptance that some 
examples may seem obvious or elementary in some respects, however as entrepreneurship is 
relative to specific settings and contexts, actions that may be considered entrepreneurial 
within the given research area, may not be in alternative settings.  For example, portfolio 
diversification for enhanced financial security and improved profitability may seem obvious 
and not especially entrepreneurial within some environments.  However, for a rural, small 
scale producer with limited business and/ or academic training, operating with restricted 
market access, in a traditionally risk adverse environment, taking risks to attempt new action 
for a unique business plan and portfolio diversification is entrepreneurial within that context, 
and is considered so within this research.  While not every action can be reported, the most 
observed types as well as and unique occurrences, actions and perceptions are presented here.  
 
As mentioned above, it became evident that producer groups could not be equitably defined 
simply as Entrepreneur or Non-Entrepreneur and additional segments were developed to 
reflect findings.  As such, additional segments emerged to further classify ranges of 
entrepreneurship across the Entrepreneurial Range, resulting in Non-Entrepreneur, Potential 
Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur.   Commercial Farmers, Processors and Exporters were more 
easily classified as Entrepreneurs as they had undertaken clear pursuit of an opportunity as 
demonstrated through current coffee businesses.  The visualization of the range of 
entrepreneurial classifications and related business segments is presented in Figure 5.1 
below.  
 
Figure 5.1. Visualization of the Entrepreneurial Range and Business Segments 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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As shown in Section 3.3.3, respondents were classified using strategic parameters built from 
distinct understanding of the literature and interpretation of respondent actions.  The 
classification of respondents was based on answers to a variety of questions conducted 
through semi-structured interviews looking to assess market perspective, business operation, 
portfolio compilation, future plans (or lack thereof), unique and innovative business models 
and methods, product portfolio, unique financing attraction and lending schemes, as well as 
risk taking and risk management measures in relation to their coffee businesses.  It is feasible 
that respondents could be classified as Entrepreneurs despite having failed in previous 
attempts at opportunity pursuit, as Entrepreneurs were not measured by success or failure, 
but by opportunity recognition and its ensuing unique, tangible pursuit. 
 
This Entrepreneurial Range was developed out of the research and interview process and 
aids as a framework in testing results and drivers against business segments.  The range will 
be used throughout this research to discuss, analyse and showcase differences and similarities 
not only across the coffee chains of Ethiopia82 and Rwanda but to also demonstrate the 
differences and similarities between Non-Entrepreneurs, Potential Entrepreneurs and 
Entrepreneurs.  
 
5.3 Socio-Demographic Results 
As individuals obviously do not operate in a vacuum, additional socio-demographic 
characteristics were collected and analysed in the attempt to better understand particular 
make-ups and traits inherent to Entrepreneurs and related choice making behaviours.  While 
larger contextual and operating environments will be further dissected in Chapter 6, personal 
findings include age, gender, education, business inheritance, familial history with coffee, 
cooperative involvement, perceived importance of coffee as a business, and current 
investment.  Results are presented in Tables 5.2 through 5.5.   
 
 
 
                                                        
82 Research in Ethiopia was conducted in the months building up to and during the May 2015 National 
Elections, with respondents visibly on edge about talking to ‘outsiders’ or talking about Ethiopian politics, the 
regime, or how this impacted daily life.  
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5.3.1 Age, Gender and Education 
 
Table 5.2. Demographics: Age, Gender and Education 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
5.3.1.1 Age 
Analysis of age across the ranges and between both countries does not reveal wide-ranging 
differences.  One element of note, however is that mean respondent ages were between 40 
and 50 years of age, indicating that heads of businesses tended to be older in both countries 
as compared against life expectancies of 63 and 64 for Ethiopia and Rwanda, respectively. 
 
5.3.1.2 Gender 
The majority of respondents in this study were men and this corresponds with socio-cultural 
norms in both countries where business leaders, as well as heads of households are typically, 
traditionally, men, regardless of entrepreneurial classification.  The coffee sector dominance 
by men is thus more related to wider cultural influences, than a sector specific rarity or 
entrepreneurial phenomenon.  The observed dominance of men as entrepreneurs was 
triangulated from the use of additional methods throughout the study and does reveal a 
current reality within these specific research contexts.  However, this is also a result of the 
non-gender stratified sampling technique used in this study, as discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
Without accounting specifically for gender, the sampling strategy facilitated men as 
respondents and as such, specific analysis into the related power dynamics, which may 
 
Age 
(Mean) 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Education                            
(% over Primary level) 
 N: (221) Ethiopia Rwanda Ethiopia Rwanda Ethiopia Rwanda 
Decaffeinated Producer (Rwanda) 
Unclassified  (14)  43  93%  29% 
Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneur  (35) 46 48 100% 84% 25% 19% 
Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur (32) 47 41 100% 100% 24% 33% 
Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur (29) 40 48 100% 96% 33% 26% 
Commercial Farmer (Ethiopia) 
Entrepreneur (22) 51 
 
77% 
 
100% 
 Processor 
Entrepreneur (46) 40 47 96% 95% 100% 60% 
Exporter 
Entrepreneur (43) 50 49 95% 83% 100% 83% 
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prevent women from pursuing entrepreneurial action, were unable to be distinctly analysed.  
Through further discussion with respondents it was a common discussion point that men tend 
to be empowered in business and head of household activities; as is culturally appropriate.  
Women respondents typically expressed pride that as a woman, they were able to manage 
their own businesses and be successful.  Some women recognized additional hardships in 
regards to being taken seriously as an entrepreneur and businessperson, especially through 
interaction with other (male) actors.   
 
Ethiopian Commercial Farmers had the highest proportion of women respondents at 23%.  It 
is unknown exactly why there is a relatively high female representation in this segment.  
However, in theory, anyone can be allowed to purchase land for the specific use of private 
commercial farming once a business plan is approved by the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Trade, as well as by the Ethiopian Commercial Bank.  In a growing economy that has seen 
wealth echelons expand, women are also, obviously, looking to maximize this opportunity.   
 
Rwandan respondents resulted in an overall higher proportion of women across business 
segments than Ethiopian counterparts.  Women interviewed in Rwanda who ran their own 
business all reported to have started following the war in 1994 in which husbands or family 
members were killed and they were left to rebuild; some had remarried, others had not.  One 
such example is described below in Case Study 5.1.  Overall, Rwanda is seen to have strong 
gender equity across many sectors, particularly within politics.  Much of gender equity has 
come from the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in which women, as a means of survival, took 
up new roles in public and private sectors (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012).  
 
Case Study 5.1. Women in Business 
 
The Founder and Managing Director of a highly successful coffee export business, lost her farm and husband in 
the war in 1994.  After the war she began to work for Ugandan traders, sourcing area coffee for cross-border trade; 
paid RWF 10 per kg of red cherry ($0.04/kg).  As a Sourcing Agent she built large networks and close 
relationships with farmers and saw an opportunity to make additional money from processing and exporting.  She 
applied for support to the Rwandan Government during the ‘new-movement of coffee’ in the early 2000s.  She has 
received additional support from Oxfam and USAID and currently owns her own farm, 2 washing stations and an 
export business.  One of the country’s largest exporters, she now sources from over 7,000 farmers.  When asked if 
there are any additional challenges to being a woman in business, she coyly smiled and responded “they (men) 
used to not take me seriously, but now they come to me for advice.” (Ex_R_4, 2014) 
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5.3.1.3 Education 
As could be anticipated, Smallholder Producers in both countries, regardless of entrepreneur 
classification, had low proportions of respondents completing and or reaching education 
levels above the primary level; similar to national trends (World Bank, 2014c; 2015). 
Overall, just 27% of Smallholder Producers received education above the primary level.  
Respondents classified as Entrepreneurs in both countries, had higher levels of education.   
 
As seen in Table 5.2, Rwandan respondents saw progressively increasing rates of education 
levels between the Producer, Processor and Exporter segments.  Respondents classified as 
Non-Entrepreneurs had the lowest rate of individuals attaining education above the primary 
level.  Ethiopian respondents also saw progressively increasing rates of education from 
Producer, Processor and Exporter segments.  Interestingly, Ethiopian respondents operating 
formalized businesses: Commercial Farms, Processing and Export, resulted in 100% of 
respondents achieving education levels above primary level as a further breakdown in Table 
5.3 shows: 
 
Table 5.3. Ethiopia, Higher Education 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
As will be discussed throughout this research and specifically addressed in Section 6.2.2.1, 
many economic sectors in Ethiopia are populated with individuals benefiting from an innate 
reward of opportunity and access, being better equipped to access support mechanisms such 
as education, financing and markets, than those born into situations without similar, innate 
benefits.  The discrepancy between education rates of respondents within Smallholder 
Producers and individuals operating formalized businesses presents evidence to that case.   
 
5.3.2 Inheritance and Family History 
Further analysis of backgrounds or perceptions about the coffee sector is used to provide a 
clearer picture into business mind-sets, starting points and perceived points of value for 
Entrepreneurs and respondents across the chain as seen in Table 5.4 below. 
 
 
N: (68) 
Completed 
Primary School 
Completed High 
School 
Received 
University Degree 
Commercial Farmer (22) 100% 95% 68% 
Processor (26) 100% 81% 35% 
Exporter (20) 100% 85% 45% 
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Table 5.4. Demographics: Inheritance and Family History 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
5.3.2.1 Inheritance and Family History with Coffee 
The number of respondents that inherited their current coffee farm or business presented 
across both countries show lower rates of inheritance among entrepreneur segments.  With 
respondents classified as Non-Entrepreneurs or Potential Entrepreneurs having much higher 
rates of inheritance.  
 
Individuals, who did not inherit, had to make the conscious choice and take tangible steps to 
start a business; incurring start up costs and persevering through greater learning curves.  
Case Study 5.2 below, presents a Smallholder Producer in Rwanda choosing to get into the 
coffee business, despite his non-inheritance.  Inheritance rates in Ethiopia were higher at 
every classification stage than Rwandan counterparts.  Research found that Ethiopian 
Entrepreneurs involved in processing and exporting businesses are also from long lineages of 
family involvement in the sector, currently part of 2nd, 3rd or 4th generation businesses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% Inherited 
Family History with 
Coffee 
 N: (221) Ethiopia Rwanda Ethiopia Rwanda 
Decaffeinated Producer (Rwanda) 
Unclassified  (14)  93%  79% 
Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneur  (35) 100% 68% 100% 84% 
Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur (32) 82% 53% 82% 87% 
Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur (29) 17% 17% 33% 74% 
Commercial Farmer (Ethiopia) 
Entrepreneur (22) 14% 
 
45% 
 Processor 
Entrepreneur (46) 58% 5% 69% 80% 
Exporter 
Entrepreneur (43) 42% 13% 50% 48% 
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While the individual at the helm of these inherited businesses may not have established the 
business on their own, entrepreneurial behaviour was found through their own work to 
expand business models in order to successfully manage a business through changing market 
and political climates, as well as continually work to evolve product viability within the 
international market83.  An example of family history described by an Ethiopian Exporter is 
below: 
My family has been involved in the coffee business for a very long time.  My great- 
grandfather was a trader in the 1940s.  He, my grandfather and father all worked in 
coffee, but informally, trading beans from the countryside into the city; later my 
father started selling machinery to the coffee processing stations.  My family knows 
coffee very well, but I started the export business. We exported over 500 tonnes green 
in 2014.  My family’s long history and connections with area farmers and traders has 
been very beneficial in helping us scale rapidly and continue to be successful. 
(Ex_E_6, 2015) 
 
Conversely, an Ethiopian Smallholder Producer, Non-Entrepreneur, who also has a long 
family history with coffee, described his inheritance experience: 
I finished High School, but could not find a job and returned to inherit our family 
farm; I am the oldest.  Our farm was somewhat involved in coffee production; we are 
in a coffee area so everyone has always grown it. I have added a few trees and we 
now have 60 trees.  Coffee is there so I harvest and sell (it), but we focus most on 
other crops.  (P_E_21, 2015) 
 
 
                                                        
83 The international market has consistently undergone great transformation as consumer preferences change, 
logistic possibilities widen and coffee’s global reach stretches ever farther.  
Case Study 5.2. Coffee Despite Lack of Inheritance 
A Rwandan Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur explained why he chose to go into coffee:   
 
“I grew up on a farm, but we did not grow coffee.  I am one of the younger children and did not receive land from 
my father.  I worked as a laborer for a while and was able, with some support from my father, to invest in a small 
plot.  But I decided to plant coffee as I have seen others in the area be very successful.  I continued working as a 
laborer until my first harvests came in and I invested my earnings back into my coffee.  It is difficult to find more 
land, so I rent plots from other farmers in the area.  I do not intercrop on these plots and re-invest all profit into my 
plantations.  I live far from the nearest (washing) station, but I always take my coffee directly to the station to make 
sure it is sold the right way and I get my right price.  Some people only produce what their parents did, but I 
believe coffee is a better option for me.  Last season (2014) was a low (price) season, but I am in the process of 
taking a loan so I can continue to expand my production.”  (P_R_62, 2014) 
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5.3.3 Business Strategies: Cooperatives, Asset Valuation and Investment Plans 
Table 5.5 presents respondent data on cooperative membership, coffee’s perceived asset 
value and current investment strategies.  
 
Table 5.5. Business Strategies: Cooperatives, Asset Values and Investment Plans 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
5.3.3.1 Cooperative Membership 
Cooperatives are strong forces within both countries and operate similarly in that the 
cooperative structure, in theory, should avail to the smallholder producer the opportunity to 
increase returns via volume sales and collective bargaining power; as opposed to minimal 
individual sale by a single producer.  Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs in Ethiopia 
and Rwanda are members of a cooperative at 50% and 58% respectively.  However only 17% 
and 35% of Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs for Ethiopia and Rwanda are members of a 
cooperative.  Indicating that the more entrepreneurial an individual, the less likely they are to 
be a member of a cooperative.  Insight into the thought process and values of the individual 
Entrepreneur shows that Entrepreneurs clearly value the ability to assess opportunity and to 
supply their product to different buyers offering the best value and benefits, with 
Entrepreneurs not wanting to be forced into supplying only one buyer.  This also 
demonstrates evidence to the Entrepreneurs’ ability in reading market options and potential.  
This can shed light as to personal feelings on trust, effectiveness, or ineptitude of 
 
Member of Co-op 
Coffee is Main 
Income Earner / 
Most Valuable Asset 
Currently Investing 
in Farm /Business 
 N: (221) Ethiopia Rwanda Ethiopia Rwanda Ethiopia Rwanda 
Decaffeinated Producer (Rwanda) 
Unclassified  (14)  36%    36% 
Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneur  (35) 50% 58% 25% 68% 0% 0% 
Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur (32) 47% 40% 81% 87% 18% 67% 
Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur (29) 17% 35% 83% 96% 83% 91% 
Commercial Farmer (Ethiopia) 
Entrepreneur (22) 0% 
 
86% 
 
68% 
 Processor 
Entrepreneur (46)   81% 75% 50% 75% 
Exporter 
Entrepreneur (43)   70% 87% 45% 83% 
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cooperatives as both countries have highly effective, as well as highly inept, corrupt and 
mismanaged cooperatives. 
 
5.3.3.2 Coffee Valuations 
Questions were posed as to whether or not respondents considered their coffee business to be 
the largest income earner or most valuable asset in the attempt to understand industry 
perceptions, market valuations and future business strategies.  Traditionally, Smallholder 
Producers focus available land on the production of cash crops and crops for household 
consumption.  Owners of Processing and Exporting businesses reported to also own or be 
involved with other enterprises, either within the coffee sector or externally; an example is 
shown below in Case Study 5.3.  Analysis of this data from respondent interviews found that 
the more entrepreneurial a Smallholder Producer, the more highly valued coffee was as it 
was also more likely to be the main income earner.  Despite high market volatility and 
constant threat of low prices, coffee was still reported to be the most highly valued 
commodity by Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs84 in both countries.   
 
Formal business owners of Processing and Exporting businesses also saw a high proportion 
of respondents reporting coffee business to be the most valuable.  Interestingly, these 
proportions are lower than smallholder producer segments, indicating that greater choice or 
investment opportunities are available and taken by individuals wishing to establish and 
                                                        
84 Through visual mapping techniques used during field research, it was evident that smallholders involved with 
coffee production, especially those that reporting to be relatively successful were wealthier.  Additionally, 
communities with a higher density of coffee producers were observed to be relatively wealthier as compared to 
communities with lower levels of coffee producers.   
Case Study 5.3. Coffee Valuations 
Some entrepreneurs have chosen to diversify away from coffee for a variety of reasons.  An Ethiopian 
Exporter described how and why his coffee business fits into his larger portfolio: 
 
“When I was a child I used to sell coffee on the street and got inspired by seeing the larger businessmen.  I 
started as an informal trader but was able to scale my businesses quickly when the Emperor was in power.       
I did have a farm, but it was taken by the Derg, so now I just focus on sale and supply, not production.  The 
sector is much more difficult now, I am not sure it is better.  To protect myself I have diversified my business 
and invested in other areas.  I now own shares in 5 different banks, several buildings that I rent out and have a 
fleet for 40 transport trucks for rent.  I am not sure if coffee is my most valuable business.  It probably means 
the most to me, but it is a financially less secure option now.”  
(Ex_E_12, 2015) 
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expand formal businesses, providing evidence into entrepreneurial perceptions and 
recognition. 
 
5.3.3.3 Current Investment Strategies 
Not surprisingly, the more entrepreneurial an individual, the more likely respondents were to 
be actively investing in their coffee business.  For Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-
Entrepreneurs, 0% reported to be currently investing, while 67% of Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneurs were investing, and 91% of Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs 
reported to be investing.    In addition, Rwandan Processors and Exporters reported high 
levels of respondents currently investing at 75% and 83%, respectively.  Strategies reported 
by Rwandan Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs as to why current investment was 
important or needed for their business resulted in the following reasons: understanding of the 
business as a long-term activity opposed to a single seasonality and focus on product 
differentiation through improved quality requiring year round work and maintenance, as 
described by a Rwandan Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur,  
Through coffee I realized I could be very successful, and it is a way to improve 
yourself and your family, but only if you are exceptional in your production, volume 
and quality – you have to be recognizable to make buyers want to support you.  
Coffee can be difficult year to year, but if you approach coffee with a long-term 
strategy you will be successful.  But that means continuing to invest in your business; 
too many people stop (investing) after low prices and they hurt themselves the 
following season. (P_R_80, 2014) 
 
Rwandan Non-Entrepreneurs in contrast, reported to consider themselves not to be in the 
financial position to invest in this way and perceived continual investment as a waste of 
resources or were reluctant to invest following a year of low pricing85; an example can be 
seen in Case Study 5.4 below.  Much of coffee’s off-season corresponds with typical 
‘hungry-seasons’ and understandably, some actors did not have the means to spare additional 
resources during this time to invest in coffee production.  
                                                        
85 Trends of involvement and or investment in coffee at a typical Smallholder Producer level follow pricing 
trends.  Years of low prices result in limited involvement and/ or years of high prices are followed by large 
investment and involvement in the sector from current and new entrants (also creating reduced prices due to 
unexpected higher volumes/ oversupply).  Entrepreneurial respondents, while accepting this volatility and 
market influx, approached understanding of their business from a longer term perspective in which individual 
season successes were weighted less in regards to overall profitability from the life of a plantation.  
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In contrast, Ethiopia saw much lower 
levels of current investment across the 
chain with 0% of Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneurs, 18% of Smallholder 
Producer Potential Entrepreneurs, and 
83% Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs 
investing.  Likewise 68%, 50% and 45% 
of Commercial Farmers, Processors and 
Exporters, respectively, reported to be 
investing currently.  Through respondent 
interviews, reasons for this appear to be threefold: a lack of available capital or financing 
mechanisms to enable investment, low rates of confidence in the ability to recoup money and 
a high risk aversion to external interference in their businesses.  An Ethiopian Smallholder 
Producer Potential Entrepreneur discussed his reasons for not being able to invest:  
There is no way to get money.  Recently a micro-finance business has come to our 
area, but they will not lend to coffee farmers, as prices are not predictable and they 
will not use (coffee) trees as collateral; I have no other assets they want.  I will not 
take a loan from a bank.  I do not trust it and I do not like them having all my 
information. (P_E_18, 2015) 
 
5.3.4 Entrepreneurship Probability  
This section looks to combine a selection of the socio-demographic elements shown to be 
most impactful in Section 5.3 to determine if and what relationships exist and how this may 
influence entrepreneurship probability.  The analysis uses Binary Logistic Regression 
Models86, to test for the influenced probability of entrepreneurship.  Respondents are tested 
by country only.   
 
5.3.4.1 Socio-Demographics  
Education levels, inheritance and financial access were all found to have a significant 
relationship in determining the probability of entrepreneurship when modelled.  Models 
                                                        
86 Binary Logistic Regressions correspond with variables that only have two possible outcomes (i.e. success / 
failure).   The controlled variables are Binary – thus only account for datasets inclusive of 0 and 1 to determine 
the expected value or probability (P-Value) of the model (Landau and Everitt, 2004; Montgomery et al., 2012).  
Case Study 5.4.  Coffee Investments 
A Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneur, 
described difficulty with investing: 
 
“I inherited from my father 200 trees, but have had to 
remove many to grow crops for the household; we 
have just 60 trees now.  Growing coffee is also very 
hard and people don’t like all the work for the little 
gain.  I do invest my energy on coffee at harvest time, 
but cannot invest money other times.  All our money 
is used for home (consumption) and not expansion 
because we do not have much.  I cannot get a loan and 
cannot expand land and you never know the price of 
coffee, so why would I invest?”  (P_R_17, 2014) 
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controlling for gender, age, cooperative membership and investment strategies were not 
found to have a statistical significance and thus are not considered influences to 
entrepreneurship probability.  However, as will be seen below, education, inheritance and 
financial access all maintained significance in the model and are considered to be influential 
to entrepreneurship probability. 
 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present the results of the regression model for entrepreneurship 
probability when accounting for inheritance, years of education, and degrees of financial 
access for Ethiopia and Rwanda respectively.  
 
Table 5.6. Ethiopia, Socio-Demographic Probabilities  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopia 
Respondent inheritance is significant.  Through testing the relationship of entrepreneurs who 
did not inherit, this model found that Ethiopian respondents that did not inherit, increased 
probability of being an entrepreneur by more than nine times.  While not shown in the above 
table, respondents that did inherit coffee businesses were found to have a reduced probability 
of entrepreneurship by 10%. 
 
Education is also significant to entrepreneurship probability.  This model found that for each 
additional year of schooling, an individual is 1.7 times more likely to be an entrepreneur.  
Ten years of schooling, or reaching the end of Secondary School, results in a 17% increase in 
the probability of entrepreneurship.   
 
Finally, the degree of financial access was also found to be significant in determining 
entrepreneurship probability. Analysis into the degree of financial access, used cross-
tabulation to consolidate responses of financial accessibility into either ‘low’ or ‘high’.  A 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Inherit (No) 2.209 0.974 5.148 1 0.023 9.11 
Education (Years) 0.551 0.14 15.555 1 0.000 1.735 
High Degree of 
Financial Access 1.791 0.909 3.880 1 0.049 5.995 
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low degree response is interpreted as a result of one, two or three on the likert scale 
questionnaire and a high degree response is interpreted as a four or five; likert scales used 
will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4.1.  The above model found that a high 
degree of financial access increases the probability of entrepreneurship nearly six times.  A 
further analysis of respondent financing availability and accessibility can be found in Section 
6.5.1.1. 
 
Table 5.7. Rwanda, Socio-Demographic Probabilities  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Rwanda 
Within Rwanda, this model found that those who did not inherit were 14 times more likely to 
be an entrepreneur.  Conversely, respondents that did inherit were found to have 
entrepreneurship probability reduced by 1/10th.   Years of education were found to also be 
significant, whereas each additional year of schooling results in 1.2 times more likely to be 
an entrepreneur.  A high degree of financial access was also found to be statistically 
significant to entrepreneurship, increasing its probability over 13 times.  A further analysis of 
respondent financing availability and accessibility can be found in Section 6.5.1.2. 
 
5.4 Investigating Similarities and Differences of Drivers per Business 
Segment and Along the Entrepreneurial Range 
 
5.4.1 Likert Scale Testing Explained, Driver Indexes Employed  
Likert Scales are the most commonly used method when testing range, dimension and depth 
of individual characteristics such as resilience, self-efficacy, risk tolerance, and opportunity 
recognition (Chen et al., 1998; Bernard, 2000; Zhao et al., 2005; Bullough et al., 2013).  
These tests were used to better understand and quantify elements of the individual construct 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig.  Exp(B) 
Inherit (No) 2.658 0.626 18.037 1 0.000 14.27 
Education (Years) 0.208 0.072 8.338 1 0.004 1.231 
High Degree of 
Financial Access 2.615 0.613 18.20 1 0.000 13.667 
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from results of drivers tested.  As research did not want to merely gauge driver strength as 
simply yes or no/ low or high, corresponding Driver Indexes were developed from the results 
of the likert scale to determine the strengths or weakness of specific drivers for each segment 
and along the Entrepreneurial Range.   
 
The likert scale developed and used for this research offered respondents a range of choices 
from one to five, (Absolutely Never to Definitely Always).  Answers at the low end of the 
scale (one) show a low degree of the tested driver, or low Driver Index, and answers at the 
high end of the scale (five) show a high degree of the tested driver, or high Driver Index. 
Respondents were asked to complete a structured questionnaire in the form of a likert scale in 
which reactions and individual perceptions were ranked against sets of generalized questions 
related to a specific driver. The complete Likert Scale Questionnaire used in testing drivers 
can be found in Appendix D.  It is important to note that respondents were classified 
following analysis of responses 87  to semi-structured interviews and were then asked to 
complete the likert scale test (i.e. the respondent was not classified along the Entrepreneurial 
Range based on their specific results of the likert scale).  Analysis of likert test responses was 
conducted only after individual classification was completed, in the attempt to provide the 
truest, unbiased measurement of each specific segment outcomes.   
 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the specific drivers used in this analysis are Resilience, Self-
Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial 
Orientation (OR+EO).  Results from the likert scale test and corresponding analysis of Driver 
Indexes was used to determine if specific drivers are more likely to provide a foundation or 
predisposition within the individual construct for entrepreneurship.  Looking to further 
understand the more nuanced picture from each driver index point, Figure 5.2 below, 
presents each of the Driver Indexes (a range of one to five) per each driver tested, providing 
descriptive context for each driver index point along the index scale.  
                                                        
87 Segment and range classifications described and defined in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 
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Figure 5.2. Driver Index Scale Descriptions 
 
(Source: Chen et al. 1998; Sinclair and Wallston, 2004; Zhao et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2008; de Jong and den Hartog, 2010; Bullough 
et al., 2013; Author Construct) 
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5.4.2 Likert Scale Preliminary Analysis   
While more detailed analysis of the Driver Indexes will be found in Section 5.4.3, an initial, 
preliminary analysis of the likert scale results are presented below.  This initial analysis of 
respondent responses to the likert scale tests used mode to determine an initially presumptive 
score for each tested driver, per business segment, by country.  Mode was used as it is the 
ordinal measurement for the most common response answer.  Given that analysis was 
looking to understand the most common choice for each question, mode was used instead of 
mean, which is the measurement of the central tendency (Boone and Boone, 2012).  Section 
5.4.4 presents additional, more in depth analysis of the exact Driver Index scores for specific 
segments through statistical analysis of likert scale results.  
 
Through an initial look at these preliminary results in the tables below, a difference can be 
seen between the varying business segments as well as between Non-Entrepreneurs and 
Entrepreneurs.  While greater variation was initially expected between different business 
segments, i.e. between Producers, Processors and Exporters, this initial review indicates a 
split along Non-Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur classifications as opposed to business type.  
Tables 5.8 and 5.9, show the mode score of drivers for the range of business segment 
classifications.  As can be seen, scores tend to increase (one as low and five as high) as 
entrepreneurial classifications increased from Non-Entrepreneur to Entrepreneur.  
 
Table 5.8. Ethiopia Preliminary Analysis of Drivers using Mode 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopia 
 
 
N: (95) 
Resilience 
Self-
Efficacy 
Innovativeness 
Risk 
Tolerance 
Opportunity 
Recognition + 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
Non-Entrepreneur 
Smallholder Producer (4) 4 3 1 2 2 
Potential Entrepreneur  
Smallholder Producer (17) 4 4 2 2 4 
Actual Entrepreneur      
Smallholder Producer (6) 4 5 5 3 5 
Entrepreneur 
Commercial Farmer (22) 4 4 4 3 5 
Entrepreneur 
Processor (26) 5 4 5 3 5 
Entrepreneur 
Exporter (20) 5 4 5 3 5 
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In both countries, results show a similar picture with higher scores of drivers resulting from 
segments classified as Entrepreneurs as compared to Non-Entrepreneurs.  This however is 
clearer in Rwanda and it is thought to be an outcome of Rwanda’s open market structure, 
which enables entrepreneurial mobility across the chain.  Ethiopia, in contrast is marked by a 
restrictive market structure that does not allow for free movement of businesses and 
entrepreneurs across the chain.  Therefore individual actors, while potentially having the 
mind-set to be an entrepreneur, may not actually be able to take tangible pursuit. Ethiopians 
had a lower Risk Tolerance across all segments than their Rwandan counterparts and this 
may be another outcome of the market structure.   
 
Table 5.9. Rwanda Preliminary Analysis of Drivers using Mode 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
The analysis as seen above in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, hints to a difference between Non-
Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs, however this preliminary analysis is not yet enough to fully 
understand the significance of the driver indexes and relationships between segments.  With 
the selected drivers clarified and an understanding of how the likert scale test will be used to 
determine scores for the specific drivers tested, the next section looks deeper into the specific 
driver strengths by conducting statistical analysis of comparisons per business segments, 
across the Entrepreneurial Range and by country.  
 
Rwanda 
 
 
N: (126) 
Resilience 
Self-
Efficacy 
Innovativeness 
Risk 
Tolerance 
Opportunity 
Recognition + 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
Unclassified  
Decaffeinated Producer (14) 2 4 2 1 3 
Non-Entrepreneur          
Smallholder Producer (31) 2 2 2 2 2 
Potential Entrepreneur  
Smallholder Producer (15) 5 4 2 4 5 
Actual Entrepreneur       
Smallholder Producer (23) 4 5 5 4 4 
Entrepreneur  
Processor (20) 5 5 5 4 5 
Entrepreneur  
Exporter (23) 4 5 4 4 4 
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5.4.3 Driver Indexes – Explanations, Comparisons and Results 
The following analysis presented in Section 5.4.4 works to determine an actual depth of each 
Driver Index as well as the significance of comparisons between business segments. Figure 
5.3 below, depicts the Author’s conceptualization of the Driver Index Scale, with high scores 
(five) interpreted as a higher degree for a specific driver and low scores (one) interpreted as a 
lower degree of a driver.   
 
Figure 5.3. Driver Index Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
By determining the specific scores of each Driver Index per business segment and comparing 
Index Scores between segments, analysis was taken following these three steps: 
 
1. Exploratory descriptive statistics were used to determine the specific Driver Index 
Score for each classified business segment by calculating the mean of the mode 
for all respondents per segment and by country. 
2. Driver Index Score results, for each business segment, were compared across the 
Entrepreneurial Range.  Statistical significance tests were conducted to determine 
similarities and/or statistical differences between segment comparisons.   
3. Driver Index scores were entered in graph form for visual comparison of varying 
business segments by entrepreneur classification, per country and driver.  
 
Statistical analysis was done through Non-parametric, 2-Independent Sample tests; using the 
Mann-Whitney U88 statistical significance test to determine the statistical significance of 
comparisons between business segments and/ or entrepreneur classifications. A statistically 
significant result indicates a difference in driver scores, interpreted as a difference in the 
                                                        
88 This type of significance test works to understand the significance between two unrelated variables within a 
sample to determine if samples consist of similar or statistically different cases (Bryman and Cramer, 2009).  
Significance testing taken at 95% confidence is understood as an arbitrary measurement and used as a guide for 
comparisons of similarity.  
Driver Index Score 
 
Low      High 
Resilience Index 1 2 3 4 5 
Self-Efficacy Index 1 2 3 4 5 
Innovativeness Index 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk Tolerance Index 1 2 3 4 5 
OR+EO Index 1 2 3 4 5 
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degrees of the Driver Indexes of the compared business segments.  A result finding no 
statistical difference is understood to indicate that no driver difference exists between the two 
compared segments and thus, the segments have a similar degree of the Driver Index.  
Comparison of segments was important as it allowed analysis to determine if differences of 
the individual construct exist between respondents in different business segments or 
entrepreneurial types such as Non-Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur.  Statistical significance 
was taken at the 95% confidence level, unless otherwise noted.  
 
5.4.4 Segment Comparisons 
This chapter looked to identify if the specific drivers tested in the following sections are 
indeed more prominent within Entrepreneurs.  As such, the specific driver investigations 
conducted in Sections 5.4.4.1 to 5.4.4.5 test the degree of specific driver strengths or 
weaknesses across the Entrepreneurial Range, per business segment and between countries.  
Following the understanding of the degree of a specific driver index per segment, analysis 
conducted in Sections 5.4.5.1 to 5.4.5.3 builds from these findings to analyse and showcase 
the nuanced differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs within a specific 
country and for comparison between countries.  Analysis was designed in this way in order to 
determine: the significance and strength of the specific drivers tested to the individual 
entrepreneurial construct, the potential differences of Entrepreneurs across differing business 
segments, the existence of differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs, and 
finally the differences of Entrepreneurs operating in different country contexts.  
 
The ensuing analyses of the specific Drives Index results are presented separately for each 
driver across corresponding business segments.  Comparison outcomes for each driver are 
presented in table format to show results of statistical significance testing revealing the 
similarity or difference between compared segments.  The following graphs are used to 
present the exact scores of each Driver Index for business segments, enabling the reader to 
visualize the strength or weakness as well as similarity in the drivers tested for varying 
business segments and across the Entrepreneurial Range as presented in Figure 5.1.  
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Analysis presented below shows results, per segment, by country according to each driver.  
As discussed previously, Decaffeinated Producers were only found in Rwanda and 
Commercial Farmers were found only in Ethiopia, and while each is presented though these 
findings, no cross-country comparisons are possible.   
 
5.4.4.1 Resilience 
Resilience is described in Section 2.4.1.1, as the ability to positively rebound from, and adapt 
to, adverse situations, specifically relying on effective coping and adaptation mechanisms to 
overcome difficulty (Sinclair and Wallston, 2004; Bullough and Renko, 2013).  As such, the 
continual perseverance through volatile impacts from innate market structures as well as 
international dynamics of the coffee sector provide tangible evidence as to the actualities of a 
Resilience Index for Entrepreneurs.  Elements of resilience were observed directly through 
the responses to price volatility and its unpredictability from daily and seasonal fluctuations 
in international and corresponding domestic markets.  However, greater obstacles have 
existed for both Ethiopian and Rwandan markets including war, internal conflict and drastic 
(often violent) political regime changes as will be discussed further in Sections 6.2.2 and 
6.3.1.  Many producers in Rwanda reported having to rebuild households, farms and 
businesses following the war in 1994, which saw much of the national infrastructure and the 
majority of rural farmland, including over 60% of coffee farms destroyed (MINAGRI, 2014).  
Operators in Ethiopia, particularly older entrepreneurs involved in the coffee sector since the 
1970s and 80s reported having to operate through political phases of the nationalization 
schemes and redistribution of wealth and businesses (farms as well as private business) 
during the Derg Regime.  Respondents discussed the challenges of continuing business 
operations or having to re-establish businesses following conflict and/ or regime change.  As 
such, Entrepreneurs with a high degree of resilience are perceived to be better equipped to 
continue business operations and persevere through market volatility within current contexts.   
 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 below present the comparisons for Ethiopian and Rwandan Resilience 
Indexes respectively, with comparisons per each segment.  Statistical significance is taken at 
the 95% confidence level, unless otherwise stated and comparisons found to be statistically 
significant are bold in the table. 
  173 
Ethiopia 
Table 5.10. Ethiopia, Resilience Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold. 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
No statistical difference (at the 95% level) was found when comparing Smallholder 
Producers (Non, Potential and Entrepreneurs), indicating similar levels of resilience for all 
Smallholder Producers.  Additionally, Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs were found to 
have no statistical difference between Commercial Farmers or Exporters showing a similar 
level of resilience among entrepreneur classifications.  However, statistically significant 
differences were found when comparing Smallholder Producer Non, and Potential 
Entrepreneurs with Commercial Farmers, Processors and Exporters, indicating a difference in 
Resilience Indexes between Non-Entrepreneurial respondents and those classified as 
Entrepreneurs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETHIOPIA – Resilience 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 25.000 -0.883 0.377 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 6.500 -1.326 0.185 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 14.500 -2.339 0.019 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 8.000 -3.104 0.002 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 11.500 -2.420 0.016 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 40.500 -0.821 0.411 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 100.500 -2.708 0.007 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 70.000 -4.101 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 82.000 -2.914 0.004 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 46.000 -1.277 0.201 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 33.000 -2.528 0.011 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 37.000 -1.531 0.126 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Processor) 201.000 -2.031 0.042 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Exporter) 201.500 -0.527 0.598 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 206.000 -1.406 0.160 
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Rwanda 
Table 5.11. Rwanda, Resilience Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold. 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Decaffeinated Producers 89  revealed no statistically significant difference to Smallholder 
Producer Non or Potential Entrepreneurs, showing those segments to have a similar 
Resilience Index.  Additionally, no significant difference was found between Smallholder 
Producer Potential or Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, Processors and Exporters 
indicating a similar Resilience Index for all segments above the Smallholder Producer Non-
Entrepreneur classification. However, statistical differences were found between Smallholder 
Entrepreneurs, Processors and Exporters, indicating a difference in levels of resilience.  
Comparison of Processors and Exporters did not find a statistical difference, showing 
Processors and Exporters to have a similar level of resilience.   
 
Graph 5.1 below, presents the Resilience Index score for each segment, with comparison by 
country.  This depiction attempts to visually demonstrate the strength or weakness of the 
Resilience Driver Index within each segment. 
                                                        
89 Interestingly, many Decaffeinated Producer respondents reported to not believe the coffee sector was viable 
and were uncomfortable with the unpredictable prices and as such preferred to focus on other, multi-harvest 
crops (such as banana, maize, sorghum, inset and on occasion, specific vegetables) which had more stable, 
albeit lower, prices, perhaps revealing evidence to market perception and resilience in pursuing opportunity.  
RWANDA – Resilience Mann-Whitney U Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@95%) 
Decaff vs. Non Ent (Smallholder) 146.500 -1.780 0.075 
Decaff vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 72.000 -1.500 0.134 
Decaff vs. Ent (Smallholder) 65.000 -3.207 0.001 
Decaff vs. Ent (Processor) 62.000 -2.867 0.004 
Decaff vs. Ent (Exporter) 70.500 -3.003 0.003 
Non Ent vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 100.000 -3.242 0.001 
Non Ent vs. Ent (Smallholder) 85.000 -4.914 0.000 
Non Ent vs. Ent (Processor) 36.500 -5.421 0.000 
Non Ent vs. Ent (Exporter) 25.000 -5.952 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 165.500 -0.219 0.827 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 122.000 -1.007 0.314 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 134.000 -1.248 0.212 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 154.000 -2.001 0.045 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 167.000 -2.320 0.020 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 223.000 -0.190 0.849 
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Graph 5.1. Resilience Driver Scores, per Segment, by Country 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs tested lower on the Resilience Index at a 
score of 2.4, than any other segment, demonstrating a distinctly lower degree of resilience 
capability than other actors.  All other segments showed a higher level of Resilience as 
compared to Smallholder Non-Entrepreneurs.  A higher Resilience Index could also be 
interpreted to show a higher self-belief in the ability to overcome the decision to decaffeinate 
as shown through the higher Resilience Index Score for Decaffeinated Producers as 
compared to Rwanda Smallholder Non-Entrepreneurs.  
 
Overall, Ethiopian Entrepreneurs registered a slightly higher degree of resilience as 
compared to their Rwanda counterparts.  As previously discussed, the coffee sector requires 
high capital investment and a prolonged timeline for financial return and business life 
throughout and often, in spite of market volatility.  Ethiopian entrepreneurs working within 
the sector reported to have taken a long-term perspective as opposed to short-term, seasonal 
comparisons, which may have bearing upon Resilience Indexes and an aided predisposition 
to persevere and continue the business, despite difficulties.   
 
Overall, differences were found in the Resilience Index between Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneur 
and Entrepreneur respondents, with Entrepreneurial segments showing a higher degree of 
resilience. 
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5.4.4.2 Self – Efficacy 
As described in Section 2.4.1.2, Self-Efficacy, or the belief in one’s self, is an individual 
construct that can be motivating or de-motivating and is continuously influenced through 
preferences, actions, choices and experiences built by the entrepreneur (Zhao et al., 2005; 
Bullough and Renko, 2013; Douglas, 2013).   Respondents from both countries reported 
having low confidence in being successful in coffee also scored lower on the Self-Efficacy 
Index: Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs.    
 
If market structures are restrictive and in essence, result in the de-motivation of 
entrepreneurial action, it could result in lower individual self-efficacy in the entrepreneur’s 
ability and self-belief to break through boundaries and pursue opportunity.  Through 
respondent interviews, Ethiopian actors across the chain perceived a limit on choice and 
ability to pursue growth aspirations; reportedly being “leashed” or experiencing ceilings due 
to market structure and regulatory constraints, as will be further discussed in Section 6.4.1.1.  
Conversely, Rwanda has an open market structure and wider supporting environment, as will 
be seen in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.4.1.2, leading to an inherently more motivating environment   
As will be seen in Graph 5.2, Ethiopian respondents had lower levels of self-efficacy as 
compared to Rwandan counterparts.  Tables 5.12 and 5.13, below present the significance 
comparisons for Ethiopian and Rwandan Self-Efficacy Indexes, respectively. 
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Ethiopia 
Table 5.12. Ethiopia, Self-Efficacy Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.  @ 
0.1 = significance at 90% and is highlighted 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopian Self-Efficacy Index comparisons reveal the only statistically significant result to be 
the comparison between Smallholder Potential Entrepreneur and Commercial Famer.  
However these results are thought to have more to do with the sample size that actual 
response difference.   All other comparisons revealed no statistically significant differences 
in regards to Self-Efficacy Indexes.  As such, results reveal that Ethiopian actors all have a 
similar level of self-efficacy, regardless of business type, operating environment or 
entrepreneurial classification.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETHIOPIA – Self-Efficacy 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 24.500 -0.885 0.376 
Non- Ent  (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 10.000 -0.452 0.651 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 34.000 -0.771 0.441 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 48.500 -0.222 0.824 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 35.000 -0.406 0.684 
Potential Ent  (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 30.000 -1.525 0.127 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 103.000 -2.512 0.012 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 156.000 -1.657 0.097 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 111.500 -1.850 0.064 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 63.000 -0.183 0.855 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 72.000 -0.302 0.762 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 58.000 -0.128 0.898 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Processor) 256.000 -0.659 0.510 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Exporter) 204.500 -0.420 0.675 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 251.000 -0.209 0.835 
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Rwanda 
Table 5.13. Rwanda, Self-Efficacy Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.  @ 
0.1 = significance at 90% and is highlighted 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
The Rwandan Self-Efficacy Index reveals statistically significant differences between 
Decaffeinated and Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs when compared to segments 
across the rest of the chain.  Conversely, no statistical difference was found between 
comparisons of any other segment, indicating similar levels of self-efficacy from respondents 
above the Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneur classification.  Graph 5.2 below depicts 
the strength and weakness found in the Self-Efficacy Index Scores for each segment, by 
country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RWANDA –Self Efficacy 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@95%) 
Decaff vs. Non Ent (Smallholder) 146.500 -1.780 0.075 
Decaff vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 72.000 -1.500 0.134 
Decaff vs. Ent (Smallholder) 65.000 -3.207 0.001 
Decaff vs. Ent (Processor) 62.000 -2.867 0.004 
Decaff vs. Ent (Exporter) 70.500 -3.003 0.003 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 86.000 -3.535 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 28.500 -5.871 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 42.000 -5.293 0.000 
Non Ent  (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 45.000 -5.573 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 121.000 -1.683 0.092 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 106.000 -1.582 0.114 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 126.000 -1.509 0.131 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 230.000 0.000 1.000 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 258.500 -0.149 0.882 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 224.000 -0.164 0.870 
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Graph 5.2. Self-Efficacy Driver Scores, per Segment, by Country 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopian respondents scored lower across all segments as compared to Rwandan 
counterparts, except for Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs.  This could be 
due to the fact that pursuing business activity and the ability to at least to some degree 
control the outcome, is more difficult in Ethiopia and thus, a reduced self belief developed by 
the individual respondent due to a demotivating environment. Ethiopian actors all have a 
similar Self-Efficacy Index, regardless of business type, operating environment or 
entrepreneurial classification. 
 
Similar to the Rwandan Resilience Index, Decaffeinated Producers also resulted in a higher 
Self-Efficacy Index score as compared to Smallholder Non-Entrepreneur respondents, with a 
score of 3.1 to 2.3 respectively. Decaffeinated Producers reported to feel strongly about the 
decision to uproot and focus on other income generators, despite the practice’s illegality, 
providing evidence to higher degrees of self-assurance and belief in actions taken. Reviewing 
Graph 5.2, a distinct difference can be seen in the degree of Self-Efficacy for Non-
Entrepreneurs and the rest of the Rwandan chain, showing Non-Entrepreneurs to have a 
relatively low self-belief as compared to Entrepreneur segments.  
 
Overall, segments above the Smallholder Non-Entrepreneur classification showed higher 
levels of Self-Efficacy, with Rwandans revealing a higher Self-Efficacy Driver Index than 
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Ethiopians.  Considering the continually evolving construct of Self-Efficacy, the higher 
degree for Rwandans could be due to a motivating environment and positive outlook on a 
sector that has supported and enabled positive results and business expansion without the 
restrictions occurring in the Ethiopian market.  
 
5.4.4.3 Innovativeness 
Innovativeness, introduced in Section 2.4.1.3, provides the individual with creative capacity 
to perceive needed improvements to a structure or market in order to develop ‘unique 
combinations’ in solving problems or driving growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Janssen, 2000; Hall 
et al., 2012).  Innovativeness can be revealed not only through new products, but also 
through efficiency improvements, or improvements to services, management, business 
models or technologies (Okpara, 2007).  As will be shown, differences revealed in the 
analysis of the Innovativeness Index are observed between Non-Entrepreneur segments and 
Entrepreneur segments.  Considering this result within research contexts, a distinct split in 
respondent innovativeness indicates an entrepreneur’s ability to understand obstacles to 
expansion and more specifically, overcome obstacles by unique combinations.  Admittedly, a 
low score for innovativeness could also be due to lack of awareness, market information, 
market nearness or technological advancement.  Tables 5.14 and 5.15, below, present the 
comparisons for Ethiopian and Rwandan Innovativeness Indexes, respectively. 
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Ethiopia 
Table 5.14. Ethiopia, Innovativeness Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold. 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
No statistical difference90 is found in comparing Smallholder Non-Entrepreneurs to all other 
segments, however, as will be seen in Graph 5.3, Ethiopian Smallholder Non-Entrepreneurs 
reveal a much lower Innovativeness Index Score.  No statistical significance was found for 
business segments considered as Entrepreneurs, indicating that Ethiopian Entrepreneurs, 
regardless of business type or environment have similar degrees of innovativeness.   
 
Interestingly, comparisons between Smallholder Potential Entrepreneurs and all other 
Entrepreneur segments were found to be statistically significant, showing a difference in 
innovativeness degrees.  As such, respondents classified as Potential Entrepreneurs may have 
the potential to be classified as an entrepreneur, but had yet to take tangible steps forward.  
Reasons for the lack of tangible action could be due to lower levels of innovation as well as 
other inherent drivers or external influences prohibiting individuals from innovating around 
barriers. 
 
 
                                                        
90 This is believed to have more to do with sample size than result outcome. 
ETHIOPIA – Innovativeness 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 30.500 -0.326 0.744 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 5.500 -1.489 0.137 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 27.500 -1.237 0.216 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 30.000 -1.440 0.150 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 26.000 -1.142 0.254 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 12.000 -2.833 0.005 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 72.000 -3.377 0.001 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 80.000 -3.639 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 72.000 -3.094 0.002 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 47.500 -1.110 0.267 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 64.000 -0.740 0.459 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 42.000 -1.185 0.236 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Processor) 254.000 -0.701 0.483 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Exporter) 206.000 -0.373 0.709 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 220.000 -0.945 0.345 
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Rwanda 
Table 5.15. Rwanda, Innovativeness Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
@ 0.1 = significance at 90% and is highlighted 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs again, showed statistical differences 
when compared to all other segments, indicating Non-Entrepreneurs to have a different 
Innovativeness Index.  A statistical difference is also seen when comparing Smallholder 
Producer Potential Entrepreneurs to Smallholder Entrepreneurs.  This difference in 
innovativeness could be an additional reason as to why Rwandan Potential Entrepreneurs 
also had not been able to take tangible steps towards opportunity pursuit.  Finally, no 
statistical difference was observed between Entrepreneurial segments of Smallholder 
Producer, Processor and Exporter, indicating a similar level of innovativeness for 
Entrepreneurs.  Graph 5.3 below, depicts the strength and weakness through Innovativeness 
Index Scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RWANDA – Innovativeness 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@95%) 
Decaff vs. Non Ent (Smallholder) 190.000 -0.949 0.343 
Decaff vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 33.500 -3.433 0.001 
Decaff vs. Ent (Smallholder) 1.500 -5.17 0.000 
Decaff vs. Ent (Processor) 0.000 -5.136 0.000 
Decaff vs. Ent (Exporter) 2.000 -5.148 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 89.500 -3.950 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 12.500 -6.397 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 4.000 -6.352 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 15.500 -6.342 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 107.000 -2.066 0.039 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 72.000 -2.801 0.005 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 118.000 -1.714 0.086 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 180.000 -1.367 0.172 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 238.000 -0.635 0.526 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 156.000 -1.999 0.046 
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Graph 5.3. Innovativeness Driver Scores, per Segment, by Country 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
A distinct difference is apparent when looking at Ethiopian Entrepreneur segments to Non-
Entrepreneur segments.  A statistical difference was found in comparisons between Ethiopian 
Smallholder Producer Potential and Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, with Smallholder 
Producer Entrepreneurs showing a much greater score for innovativeness (4.5) than Potential 
Entrepreneurs (2.9).  These results reveal additional evidence as to why Ethiopian actors 
classified as Potential Entrepreneurs are unable to take tangible steps towards opportunity 
pursuit due to a low degree of innovativeness.  
 
Rwanda Smallholder Non-Entrepreneurs again, revealed a very low Innovativeness Index 
score of 2.1.  A distinct difference is also seen between Smallholder Potential Producer 
Entrepreneurs and Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, with a score 3.5 to 4.3 respectively, 
with Entrepreneurs having a higher degree of innovativeness.  Decaffeinated Producers 
resulted in the lowest score for the Innovativeness Index at 1.9, perhaps shedding light on 
reasons why decaffeinated respondents were unable to be successful with coffee, choosing to 
uproot as opposed to investigate alternative options to improve coffee’s viability.   
 
5.4.4.4 Risk Tolerance 
An individual’s tolerance to, and relationship with, risk as well as the ability to manage it is 
one of the most definitive areas for entrepreneurship (Fairlie and Holleran, 2012), as 
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discussed in Section 2.4.1.4.  While both countries showed relatively lower levels of the Risk 
Tolerance Index, Ethiopians overall, tested lower across the spectrum as compared to 
Rwandan counterparts.  To be discussed in Sections 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.2.1, in relation to the 
restrictive coffee market structure in Ethiopia and the high levels of top-down control and 
regulatory oversight, respondents reportedly appeared to be influenced through a reduced risk 
propensity (Entrepreneurs and Non) and thus pursued less risky actions in the efforts to 
maintain business stability and existence.  Conversely, Rwandan respondents reported to 
have higher feelings of control over businesses than Ethiopian counterparts and likewise a 
higher feeling to have the ability to determine own business path.  Tables 5.16 and 5.17, 
below present the comparisons for Ethiopian and Rwandan Risk Tolerance Indexes, 
respectively. 
 
Ethiopia 
Table 5.16. Ethiopia, Risk Tolerance Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Investigation into Ethiopia’s Risk Tolerance Index found no statistically significant 
difference across any comparison pairing, showing all business segments and entrepreneur 
classifications to have similar degrees of Risk Tolerance.  As will be seen in Graph 5.4 
below, Ethiopian Risk Tolerance was the lowest mean score for any driver index, with a 
mean result score of 3.1.  
ETHIOPIA – Risk Tolerance 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 26.000 -0.797 0.426 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 6.000 -1.316 0.188 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 28.500 -1.136 0.256 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 37.000 -0.937 0.349 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 27.000 -1.034 0.301 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 29.500 -1.608 0.108 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 145.500 -1.230 0.219 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 187.500 -0.863 0.388 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 138.500 -0.999 0.318 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 51.000 -0.870 0.384 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 59.500 -0.916 0.360 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 46.500 -0.849 0.396 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Processor) 276.500 -0.202 0.840 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Exporter) 215.000 -0.130 0.896 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 256.000 -0.901 0.927 
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Rwanda 
Table 5.17. Rwanda, Risk Tolerance Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Analysis of Rwandan segments revealed statistically significant differences in comparisons 
between Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs to all other segments.  Significant 
differences were also found between Smallholder Producer Potential and Smallholder 
Producer Entrepreneurs, presenting an additional point of evidence as to why Potential 
Entrepreneur respondents differ from Entrepreneurs and perhaps reasons as to why Potential 
Entrepreneurs remain unable, or unwilling to take risk through tangible action towards 
opportunity.  No statistical difference was found in comparisons between Entrepreneur 
segments, indicating that Entrepreneurs have similar degrees of Risk Tolerance.  
Decaffeinated Producers and Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs in Rwanda revealed 
very high aversions to risk and a distinct, lower score when compared to entrepreneur 
segments.  Graph 5.4 below, depicts the strength and weakness of the mean Risk Tolerance 
Index scores for each segment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RWANDA -- Risk Tolerance 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
@ 95% 
Decaff vs. Non Ent (Smallholder) 216.000 -0.028 0.978 
Decaff vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 36.000 -3.161 0.002 
Decaff vs. Ent (Smallholder) 30.000 -4.367 0.000 
Decaff vs. Ent (Processor) 17.000 -4.464 0.000 
Decaff vs. Ent (Exporter) 24.000 -4.410 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 53.500 -4.574 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 31.500 -5.986 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 11.000 -6.019 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 22.500 -6.081 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 107.500 -2.180 0.029 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 70.500 -2.852 0.004 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 93.000 -2.494 0.013 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 186.500 -1.203 0.229 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 228.000 -0.875 0.381 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 221.500 -0.224 0.823 
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Graph 5.4. Risk Tolerance Driver Scores, per Segment, by Country 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopia’s Risk Tolerance Index revealed a mean Risk Tolerance Index score of 3.1.  Across 
all segments, regardless of business type or operating environment, respondents all had a 
similarly high aversion to risk and low degree of Risk Tolerance.  It is believed this is a 
direct outcome not only of the restrictive market environment, but also stems from 
complicated histories of an oppressed, controlled society and risky economic climate.   
 
Rwandans had a higher overall score for Risk Tolerance and showed a higher Risk Tolerance 
Index across nearly all business segments as compared to Ethiopian counterparts91.  No 
differences were found in comparisons between entrepreneur segments, indicating that 
Rwandan Entrepreneurs have similar degrees of Risk Tolerance with a mean score of the 
Entrepreneur segments of 4.1, as compared to Ethiopia.  While respondents in both countries 
revealed lower Risk Tolerance Indexes in comparison to other drivers tested, Ethiopian 
respondents had by far the lowest scores as compared to Rwandan counterparts. 
 
5.4.4.5 Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO) 
Section 2.4.1.5, discusses Opportunity Recognition (OR) as an individual’s ‘pull’ or alertness 
to market opportunity (Webb et al., 2009).  Comparatively, Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) 
is a specific interest by an individual to pursue alerted opportunity through an innate desire to 
                                                        
91 Only Ethiopian Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs scored higher. 
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explore these opportunities (Boso et al., 2013).  Both are recognized as inherent traits to the 
entrepreneur and have much overlap.  Given this natural overlap, testing was joined to 
develop a combined OR+EO Driver Index.  Considering these inherent characteristics 
outside of a theoretical assessment and inside the operational research, individuals may be 
alerted to opportunity, however despite willingness, may still be unable to transform that into 
tangible action due to restrictions or barriers inherent to a market structure.  Tables 5.18 and 
5.19, below present the significance levels for each comparison for Ethiopian and Rwandan 
Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation Indexes (OR+EO), respectively. 
 
Ethiopia 
Table 5.18. Ethiopia, OR+EO Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Statistically significant differences were found when comparing Smallholder Producer Non-
Entrepreneurs and Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneurs with the rest of the chain.  
These results indicate that respondents within these segments had a lower propensity for 
recognizing opportunity and were less orientated towards entrepreneurial behaviour as 
compared to other segments of the chain.  In addition, no statistically significant differences 
were found in comparing Entrepreneur business segments of the chain (Smallholder 
Producer, Commercial Farmer, Processor and Exporter).  This is understood to indicate 
ETHIOPIA – OR+EO 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 9.500 -2.301 0.021 
Non- Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 0.000 -2.657 0.008 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 0.500 -3.335 0.001 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 1.000 -3.334 0.001 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 2.000 -3.075 0.002 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 21.000 -2.246 0.025 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 78.000 -3.312 0.001 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 108.000 -3.023 0.003 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 104.000 -2.133 0.033 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Commercial Farmer) 64.500 -0.096 0.924 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 72.000 -0.325 0.745 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 48.000 -0.794 0.427 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Processor) 259.000 -0.628 0.530 
Ent (Commercial Farmer) vs. Ent (Exporter) 174.000 -1.276 0.202 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 228.000 -0.777 0.437 
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similar degrees of OR+EO within entrepreneur segments.  These results also show a clear 
distinction in entrepreneur actors being innately more entrepreneurially inclined and more 
able to recognize opportunity.   
 
Rwanda 
Table 5.19. Rwanda, OR+EO Segment Comparisons and Significance  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
@ 0.1 = significance at 90% and is highlighted 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Significant differences were found between Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-
Entrepreneurs and comparison with the rest of the chain.  However, no statistical difference 
was found between Smallholder Producer Potential and Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, 
Processors and Exporters revealing a similar level of opportunity recognition and 
entrepreneurial alertness for respondents classified as Potential Entrepreneurs and 
Entrepreneurs.  These results present evidence that respondents may be equally able to 
recognize opportunity, but for other reasons are unable to take tangible action towards it.   No 
statistically significant difference was found between Entrepreneur segments of the chain, 
revealing a similar propensity for opportunity alertness and inherent orientation among all 
Entrepreneurs.  Graph 5.5 below, depicts the strength and weakness of the mean OR+EO 
Index scores for each country.  
 
RWANDA – OR + EO 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@95%) 
Decaff vs. Non Ent (Smallholder) 173.500 -1.143 0.253 
Decaff vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 63.500 -1.873 0.061 
Decaff vs. Ent (Smallholder) 57.000 -3.388 0.001 
Decaff vs. Ent (Processor) 44.000 -3.521 0.000 
Decaff vs. Ent (Exporter) 39.500 -3.996 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Potential Ent (Smallholder) 94.000 -3.386 0.001 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 55.500 -5.416 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 40.000 -5.373 0.000 
Non Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 16.500 -6.123 0.000 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Smallholder) 127.500 -1.437 0.151 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 96.500 -1.923 0.054 
Potential Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 107.000 -2.124 0.034 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Processor) 196.500 -0.909 0.363 
Ent (Smallholder) vs. Ent (Exporter) 230.500 -0.845 0.398 
Ent (Processor) vs. Ent (Exporter) 223.000 -0.195 0.845 
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Graph 5.5. OR+EO Driver Scores, per Segment, by Country 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopian Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs have the lowest score on the OR+EO 
Index at 2.3.  The mean Index Score for Ethiopian Entrepreneur segments is 4.4, 
demonstrating a clear difference between those less able to recognize opportunity and those 
more inclined to.  
 
Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs had the lowest OR+EO Index score at 
2.5. Decaffeinated Producers were found to have a higher index score than Smallholder Non-
Entrepreneurs: 2.9 to 2.5 respectively.  This could be attributed to the fact that Decaffeinators 
saw different, unique opportunities outside of the coffee sector and took action to pursue the 
opportunity recognized.  Additionally, Rwanda Entrepreneur segments had similarly high 
levels of the OR+EO index.  Higher levels of OR and EO are also know to result in 
individuals with higher levels of innovativeness (Boso et al., 2013).  Comparisons between 
Innovativeness Indexes, Section 5.4.4.3 and OR+EO Index scores identified above do show 
similarities in Entrepreneur segments for both Ethiopian and Rwandan respondents.  The 
difference observed between Potential Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs for each country 
provided additional evidence that Entrepreneurs do in fact recognize and are pulled towards 
opportunity in a more significant manner than Non-Entrepreneurs or Potential Entrepreneurs.   
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This analysis showed the specific Driver Index results for actors across varying business 
segments of the coffee chains of Ethiopia and Rwanda, and also demonstrated elements of 
the individual construct of Entrepreneurs operating within each marketplace.  The following 
analysis builds from these findings to compare Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs within 
and between countries.  
 
5.4.5 Nuanced Results from Driver Indexes   
The previous analysis investigated the degrees of each Driver Index, per segment and by 
country.  The following phase of analysis looks to understand the more nuanced relationships 
by running additional comparisons using varying compilations of aggregated business 
segments along the Entrepreneurial Range, such as comparing Non-Entrepreneurs to 
Entrepreneurs or comparing Ethiopian Entrepreneurs to Rwandan Entrepreneurs.  Statistical 
analysis was again preformed using Nonparametric, 2-Independent Sample Tests and Mann-
Whitney U Statistical Significance Tests. 
   
5.4.5.1 Entrepreneurs vs. Non-Entrepreneurs, Irrespective of Country 
The following analysis looks to build on the outcomes revealed thus far to actually determine 
if differences exist between Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs, regardless of country or 
business environment.  As first presented in the literature, the selected drivers are recognized 
as common entrepreneurial characteristics and as such it should be expected for 
entrepreneurial individuals to achieve a higher degree of the drivers tested as compared to 
non-enterprising individuals and will be further investigated in the ensuing section.  As seen 
through Section 5.4.4, analysing the differences across business segments and between 
different market structures has provided further evidence that Entrepreneurs do have similar 
levels of drivers (and generally higher Driver Index scores) as compared to Non-
Entrepreneurs.   
 
For a final determination whether or not differences exist, segments have been grouped as 
Non-Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur, irrespective of country or business segment.  The Non-
Entrepreneur (Non-Ent) grouping is comprised of Smallholder Producer Non and Potential 
Entrepreneurs.  The Entrepreneur (Ent) grouping is comprised of Smallholder Producer 
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Entrepreneurs, Processors and Exporters.  Decaffeinated Producers were excluded from 
analysis.  Table 5.20, presents statistical significance testing for Entrepreneur groupings as 
compared to Non-Entrepreneur groupings.  Graph 5.6, shows the mean driver scores of 
selected drivers.    
 
Table 5.20. Entrepreneur vs. Non- Entrepreneur, irrespective of country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
As seen in Table 5.20, a clear, high statistically significant difference is found in 
comparisons between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs for each driver, indicating 
differences in the driver index for Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs, irrespective of 
country.  Graph 5.6, shows the degrees of difference for each Driver.   
 
Graph 5.6. Entrepreneur vs. Non-Entrepreneur Driver Comparison 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
As shown through this analysis, Entrepreneurs show a distinctly higher Driver Index Score 
for each of the drivers tested.  The differences observed are statistically significant, providing 
evidence that overall, the individual construct of the entrepreneur does indeed have higher 
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Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Resilience (Ent vs. Non-Ent) 1816.000 -7.519 0.000 
Self Efficacy (Ent vs. Non-Ent) 2163.000 -6.528 0.000 
Innovativeness (Ent vs. Non-Ent) 1373.000 -8.55 0.000 
Risk Tolerance (Ent vs. Non-Ent) 2138.500 -6.515 0.000 
OR+EO (Ent vs. Non-Ent) 1523.000 -8.285 0.000 
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degrees of Resilience, Self Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and OR+EO drivers, 
than a non-entrepreneur irrespective of business type, operating environment or country.  
While Non-Entrepreneurs have lower scores across all Indexes, Innovativeness and Risk 
Tolerance are the lowest, providing evidence as to why some individuals may be unable to 
take entrepreneurial action given the very low propensity or tolerance for risk and are 
unwilling or unable to pursue innovative action in pursuit of opportunity.  
 
5.4.5.2 Non-Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur, by Country 
Given the distinct difference between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs as demonstrated 
above, this section looks to investigate further through an analysis of Non-Entrepreneurs and 
Entrepreneurs within the specific countries.  The following analysis tranche has again 
aggregated segments into Non-Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur groupings, analysing by 
country.  Non-Entrepreneur groupings consisted of Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs 
and Potential Entrepreneurs.  Entrepreneur groupings were comprised of Smallholder 
Producer Entrepreneurs, Commercial Farmers (Ethiopia only), Processors and Exporters. 
Decaffeinated Producers were excluded from analysis.  Table 5.21, presents the statistical 
significance testing for each driver for comparisons between Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneur 
and Entrepreneur groupings.  
 
Ethiopia 
Table 5.21. Ethiopia, Non-Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur, per Driver Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Comparisons of each Driver Index between Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneurs and Ethiopian 
Entrepreneurs show statistically significant differences for each Driver except Risk 
Tolerance.   Risk Tolerance results for Ethiopians for any comparison along the 
Entrepreneurial Range did not reveal a significant difference and thus degrees of Risk 
Ethiopia 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Resilience (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 333.500 -4.379 0.000 
Self Efficacy (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 528.500 -2.335 0.020 
Innovativeness (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 325.000 -4.234 0.000 
Risk Tolerance (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 599.500 -1.639 0.101 
OR+EO (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 314.500 -4.462 0.000 
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Tolerance are considered to be similar for Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs.  
Graphs 5.7, below presents the comparisons of Driver Index scores for Ethiopian Non-
Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur groupings.   
 
Graph 5.7. Ethiopia, Non-Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur Driver Comparison 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire)  
 
From this analysis it is understood that Ethiopian Entrepreneurs have different, and higher 
degrees of Resilience, Self Efficacy, Innovativeness, and Opportunity Recognition and 
Entrepreneurial Orientation than Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneurs.  However degrees of Risk 
Tolerance are considered similar.  Table 5.22 presents the statistical significance testing for 
each driver for comparisons between Rwandan Non-Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur 
groupings.  
 
Rwanda 
Table 5.22. Rwanda, Non-Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur, per Driver Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
3.5 3.5
2.8
2.7
2.9
4.4
3.9
4.2
3.3
4.4
1.0
5.0
Resilience Self Efficacy Innovativeness Risk Tolerance OR+EO
Ethiopia
Non Ent
Ent
Rwanda 
Mann-
Whitney U Z 
Asymp. Sig  
(@ 95%) 
Resilience (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 582.000 -5.727 0.000 
Self Efficacy (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 468.500 -6.472 0.000 
Innovativeness (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 329.000 -7.317 0.000 
Risk Tolerance (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 336.000 -7.271 0.000 
OR+EO (Non-Ent vs. Ent) 443.000 -6.628 0.000 
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Comparisons for each Driver Index between Rwandan Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneur 
groupings showed statistically significant differences for all drivers.  As such, Rwandan 
Entrepreneurs do have different, and higher degrees of Resilience, Self Efficacy, 
Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial 
Orientation when compared to Rwandan Non-Entrepreneurs.  As seen in Graph 5.8 below, 
Index Score results show that regardless of business type or environment, Rwandan 
Entrepreneurs had higher degrees of selected Drives.  
 
Graph 5.8. Rwanda, Non-Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur Driver Comparison 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
5.4.5.3 Ethiopian Entrepreneur vs. Rwandan Entrepreneur 
This next analysis compares only the Entrepreneurs from each country to determine what, if 
any differences exist between entrepreneurial respondents of different country and market 
structures.  Each driver tested is considered a key element or characteristic of an entrepreneur 
and as such, it could be expected for the resulting Driver Indexes to be highly similar.  
Interestingly, this is not entirely the case. Entrepreneur groupings for both Ethiopia and 
Rwanda are comprised of Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, Processors and Exporters.  
Commercial Farmers are included within the Ethiopian Entrepreneur grouping.  Table 5.23 
presents the statistical significance testing for each Driver, per country.  
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Table 5.23. Ethiopian Entrepreneur vs. Rwanda Entrepreneur  
* Significance levels < 0.05 = statistical significance and are considered statistically different, marked bold.   
@ 0.1 = significance at 90% and is highlighted 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Testing between Entrepreneurial groupings for each country revealed no statistically 
significant difference for Resilience, Innovativeness, and OR+EO Indexes, indicating similar 
driver strengths for Entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Rwanda.  However, statistical differences 
were found for Self Efficacy and Risk Tolerance, revealing different driver degrees for 
Entrepreneurs within each country.  In both cases, Rwandan Entrepreneurs revealed higher 
Index scores than Ethiopian counterparts, as will be seen in Graphs 5.9. 
 
While the literature has presented these drivers as key entrepreneurial elements, given these 
results, external influences, environments or operating structures are believed to have 
resulted in adverse impacts for some Entrepreneurs, and will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Graph 5.9. Ethiopian Entrepreneur vs. Rwandan Entreprener Driver Comparison 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
4.5
3.9
4.1
3.2
4.4
4.2
4.4 4.3
4.1
4.4
1.0
5.0
Resilience Self Efficacy Innovativeness Risk Tolerance OR+EO
Entrepreneur vs. Entrepreneur, by Country
Eth
Rw
 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
Z 
Asymp. Sig 
(@ 95%) 
Resilience (Eth Ent vs. Rw Ent) 2061.000 -1.764 0.078 
Self Efficacy (Eth Ent vs. Rw Ent) 1688.000 -3.377 0.001 
Innovativeness (Eth Ent vs. Rw Ent) 2200.500 -1.090 0.276 
Risk Tolerance (Eth Ent vs. Rw Ent) 1364.500 -4.667 0.000 
OR+EO (Eth Ent vs. Rw Ent) 2312.000 -0.606 0.544 
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As seen in Graph 5.9 above, Ethiopian Risk Tolerance and Self – Efficacy are noticeably 
low.  Interestingly, Entrepreneurs in both countries scored the same for the Opportunity 
Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation Index (OR+EO).  Clearly, Entrepreneurs have a 
highly similar capacity to recognize opportunity however, as seen through evidence from 
Section 5.4.5.3 and will be seen in Chapter 6, all entrepreneurs are not always able or 
permitted to pursue opportunity recognized.  
 
Sections 5.4.5.1 to 5.4.5.3, built from the specific Driver Index findings per segment to 
specifically analyse Entrepreneurs within and between countries in order to understand if 
similarities and/ or differences exist between Entrepreneurs operating within differing 
contexts.  Additional analysis was made between Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs, 
showing Entrepreneurs to have a statistically significant, and higher, degree of the Driver 
Indexes as compared to Non-Entrepreneurs.  
 
5.4.6 Entrepreneurship Probability  
This final section looks to build from results found through the Driver Indexes by using 
regressions to model entrepreneurship probability in regards to driver strengths as revealed 
above for Entrepreneurs within each country.  Again, the analysis uses Binary Logistic 
Regression Models, to test for the influenced probability of entrepreneurship when 
controlling for certain variables.  Respondents are tested by country only.   
 
5.4.6.1 Drivers 
As each of the selected drivers analysed is recognized to be an element to entrepreneurship, 
the tests below looked to understand driver probability influence on entrepreneurs analysed 
in this study.  Controlling for the selected drivers tested in this study, Binary Logistic 
Regressions were used to model the significance of a selected driver on entrepreneurship.  
Again, cross-tabulation was used to consolidate likert scale results into low and high degree 
scores.  Tables 5.24 and 5.25 present the results of the regression model when accounting for 
Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and OR+EO for Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, respectively.  Significance is again taken at a 95% confidence level. 
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Table 5.24. Ethiopia Driver Index Probabilities  
 (Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Ethiopian Entrepreneurs were found to have statistically significant relationships with high 
degrees of the following drivers: Resilience, Innovativeness and OR+EO.  Similar to the 
earlier results showing Ethiopian Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs having no statistical 
difference to Risk Tolerance and Self-Efficacy, this model has demonstrated that high 
degrees of Risk Tolerance and Self-Efficacy do not influence entrepreneurship probability in 
Ethiopia, although Self – Efficacy could be seen as significant at 90% confidence.  As seen in 
the Table 5.24, respondents with a high degree of Resilience have an increased 
entrepreneurship probability of nearly six times.  A high degree of Innovativeness increases 
the probability of entrepreneurship four and a half times.  And finally, a high degree of 
OR+EO increases the probability of entrepreneurship by more than five times.   
 
Table 5.25. Rwanda Driver Index Probabilities  
 (Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Rwandan entrepreneurs were found to have statistically significant relationships with high 
degrees of the following drivers: Resilience and OR+EO.   A high degree of resilience was 
found to have an increased probability of entrepreneurship by nearly four times.  
Additionally, a high degree of OR+EO was found to have an increased probability of 
entrepreneurship of more than six times.  Considered significant at 90% confidence, a high 
degree of Innovativeness can also be seen to increase entrepreneurship probability.   
 
 
 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
High Degree of Resilience  1.756 0.836 4.418 1 0.036 5.791 
High Degree of Self Efficacy  1.171 0.649 3.251 1 0.071 3.224 
High Degree of Innovativeness 1.526 0.735 4.312 1 0.038 4.599 
High Degree of Risk Tolerance -0.26 0.733 0.126 1 0.723 0.771 
High Degree of OR+EO 1.688 0.677 6.214 1 0.013 5.406 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
High Degree of Resilience  1.355 0.68 3.974 1 0.046 3.878 
High Degree of Self Efficacy  0.934 0.777 1.442 1 0.230 2.543 
High Degree of Innovativeness 1.447 0.75 3.728 1 0.054 4.252 
High Degree of Risk Tolerance 1.079 0.726 2.207 1 0.137 2.942 
High Degree of OR+EO 1.837 0.794 5.352 1 0.021 6.276 
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5.5 Conclusion and Emerging Findings  
This chapter worked to create a better understanding of the individual construct of the 
entrepreneur operating within the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda in the attempt to 
determine if a difference does exist between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs.  Within 
this research, the individual construct was tested concerning inherent characteristics, or 
drivers, which if possessed in a high degree, are believed to predispose an individual towards 
entrepreneurial action.  In order to answer this, respondents were classified along business 
segments within the coffee sector and were analysed according to the developed 
Entrepreneurial Range.  Socio-demographic data was also used to provide more personal 
insight into Entrepreneurs operating varying business models and in different business 
climates.  Designing research analysis in this way aimed to lend clarity and credence to 
results in terms of how respondents and Entrepreneurs were received and analysed within the 
premise of this research.   Understanding these results, within the wider confines of this 
research approach and aim allowed for a more intimate understanding of the individual 
entrepreneurial construct through the deconstruction of one element within the greater Co-
Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus.  
 
The analysis conducted, resulted in the investigation of the individual element of the 
entrepreneurship phenomenon through a fuller, more personal as well as empirical capacity.  
Deconstructing the entrepreneurship nexus in order to analyse just the individual construct of 
the entrepreneur, as seen in this chapter, enabled research to understand an element of the 
nexus in order to more fully understand and appreciate other aspects to the conceptual 
framework, the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus in its entirety.   Chapters 6 and 7 will 
build from the information gathered through this investigation of the individual construct of 
the entrepreneur.  Chapter 6 goes on to analyse the how elements of an operational context 
influence entrepreneurship and Chapter 7 examines the reflexive nature of the entrepreneur 
and entrepreneurial action on wider systems and structures.   
 
Results of research conducted and presented in this chapter, have focused on understanding 
the individual construct of the Entrepreneur and determining if and how certain elements 
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predispose an individual towards entrepreneurial action.  Key findings and research 
contributions from this chapter are presented below. 
 
Emerging Findings of Chapter 5: 
 Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial action is relative and while the individual 
entrepreneur can be analysed in a multitude of ways (Lee and Peterson, 2000; Chell, 
2008), this investigation proves viability to the conceptual framework used, reinforced 
through the presentation of grounded, tangible evidence showing the predisposition of 
entrepreneurial behaviour.  However, empirical findings of this analysis are highly 
contextualized to actors in the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets and as such, may 
hold less applicability for alternative sectors. 
 
 The tested drivers: Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and 
Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO), analysed in detail in 
Sections 5.4.4.1 to 5.4.4.5, are understood as inherent components of entrepreneurship 
(Chen et al., 1998; Bernard, 2000; Zhao et al., 2005; Bullough et al., 2013).  Accordingly, 
research analysis resulted in the development of specific Driver Indexes to measure 
strengths of the tested drivers per business segment, across the Entrepreneurial Range 
and by country.  Research findings have not only reinforced, through empirical evidence, 
the understanding that Entrepreneurs do indeed have higher degrees of the tested drivers 
when compared to Non-Entrepreneurs, but also results have reaffirmed the understanding 
of the specific drivers in regards to predisposition of entrepreneurialness.  Additional 
nuanced investigations provided a clearer understanding as to why.  
 
 Results of each Driver Index shed light onto varying reasons an individual may or may 
not actually be able or willing to take tangible action towards opportunity pursuit.  Driver 
Index results in Section 5.4.5.1, clearly showed that Entrepreneurs, irrespective of 
country, to have a higher propensity for Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk 
Tolerance, and OR+EO as compared to Non-Entrepreneurs.  Additionally, Innovativeness 
and Risk Tolerance were found to be particularly low for Non-Entrepreneurs, irrespective 
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of country, providing evidence as to why Non-Entrepreneurs are unable or unwilling to 
take tangible steps towards opportunity pursuit.   
 
 Interestingly, comparisons of Entrepreneurs between each country, in Section 5.4.5.3, 
revealed the same OR+EO scores for both Ethiopian and Rwandan Entrepreneurs, 
proving Entrepreneurs to have a similar ability to perceive opportunity, however the 
ability to achieve tangible pursuit remains another matter.  Additional analysis between 
Potential Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs from both countries revealed similar scores for 
OR+EO Indexes, but statistically significant differences in Self-Efficacy and Risk 
Tolerance, indicated that recognizing opportunity as a clear indicator towards the 
potential for entrepreneurial behaviour, but other factors such as higher risk aversion or a 
lower self-belief can prohibit the actual pursuit; admittedly, this may also be impacted by 
alternative driver strengths or external influences.   
 
 The drivers tested are believed, theoretically at least, to predispose individuals towards 
entrepreneurial action and as such, similar results could expect to be found.  However 
results from this chapter did not fully support that hypothesis; as seen in the country 
differences presented in Section 5.4.5.2: 
 
o Ethiopian Entrepreneurs were found to also have statistically significant 
differences to Non-Entrepreneurs, but only for Resilience, Innovativeness and 
OR+EO.  Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs revealed similar degrees for Self-
Efficacy and Risk Tolerance.  Ethiopian respondent’s low degrees of Self-
Efficacy and Risk Tolerance could be traced to outcomes of restrictive operational 
contexts, perhaps demonstrating impacts from a demotivating economic 
environment.   
 
o Rwandan Entrepreneurs were found to have statistically significant differences to 
Non-Entrepreneurs for all tested drivers.  The country’s more open market 
structure and support for entrepreneurship in the coffee sector is believed to be 
impactful in enabling entrepreneurial opportunity pursuit and thus, enabling 
separation of Entrepreneurs from Non-Entrepreneurs.  
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 The major socio-demographic elements found to have significant influence on 
entrepreneurial behaviour were education level achieved, non-inheritance of current 
business and degree of financial access. 
 
o In both countries, education was found to be influential to entrepreneurship as 
presented in Section 5.3.1.  Education is a contributing factor to human capital 
development and can improve one’s ability in recognizing, attaining and using 
information to pursue opportunity (Shane, 2003; Vaghely and Julien, 2008).  
Within these research contexts, higher attainment of education influences 
entrepreneurship probability, but also revealed evidence to potential differences in 
starting points or inherent opportunity, as will be discussed in Section 6.2.2.1. 
 
o A lack of inheritance was revealed to have significant influence on Entrepreneurs, 
as presented in Section 5.3.2.  Respondents reporting to have not inherited 
business were found to be much more likely to be an entrepreneur and these 
respondents consciously chose to become involved within the coffee sector.  Non-
Entrepreneurs in both countries resulted in a higher proportion of having inherited 
businesses.   
 
o High degrees of financial access also proved to be impactful and influential for 
entrepreneurs, as seen in Section 5.3.4.  Improved financial access was impactful 
in supporting entrepreneur achievement in opportunity pursuit, but also speaks to 
wider impacts of political and market structures.  Greater investigation into 
financial access and usage will be presented in Sections 6.5.1.1 and 6.5.1.2.   
 
Research Contributions of Chapter 5: 
 Currently, existing empirical evidence as to the individual construct of an entrepreneur is 
limited for actors in developing economies (Rogerson, 2001; Chell, 2008; Boso et al., 
2013; Thai and Turkina, 2013).    In this regard, this research has made important 
contributions through the empirical research conducted, showing a higher degree of the 
tested driver to be more present in Entrepreneurs than Non-Entrepreneurs.  This result 
reinforces theoretical thought by presenting empirical evidence that certain elements have 
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been proven to predispose entrepreneurial action within the individual construct, however 
results remain highly contextualized to the specific coffee sectors analysed.  
 
 This research reinforced theory on varying predispositions towards entrepreneurial 
behaviour (Chell, 2008), but also contributed to it by providing empirical results 
demonstrating statistically significant differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-
Entrepreneurs for the drivers tested, with Entrepreneurs achieving higher Driver Index 
Scores and thus a higher degree of the tested drivers: Resilience, Self-Efficacy, 
Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial 
Orientation, than Non-Entrepreneurs.  
 
 The conceptual framework developed for this analysis, the Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship Nexus, has shown viability at this initial analysis stage, in providing an 
actionable framework in which to approach entrepreneurship and the study of its 
components, particularly through analysis of the internal construct of the entrepreneur.  
 
Understanding the individual as an interdependent element within the entrepreneurship nexus 
provides a basis for ensuing analysis of the individual entrepreneur’s interdependence to and 
influence from a specific operational context.  While Driver Index Scores could be 
anticipated to be the same for all tested drivers, this was not found to be the case for 
Entrepreneurs analysed within these two countries.  As such, results are interpreted as 
Entrepreneurs within this study have a similar ability to recognize opportunity, however may 
be prevented from doing so due to alternative characteristics or external, contextual 
influences that enable or prohibit entrepreneurial opportunity pursuit.  Differences are 
thought to stem, in part, from the external influences of different contextual operating 
environments, and whether or not individuals can use these drivers towards the pursuit of 
opportunity within different operational contexts will be explored in greater detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 6  - Defining Determinants.  Identifying the Contextual 
Operating Environments that Shape Entrepreneurship. 
6.1 Introduction  
Investigations in Chapter 5 resulted in a deeper understanding to the make-up and individual 
construct of the entrepreneur, particularly within the contexts of the Ethiopian and Rwandan 
coffee markets.  Understanding this internal make-up included analysis of socio-
demographics of respondents as well as the determination of specific driver strengths as 
tested per business segment and across the Entrepreneurial Range.  While the drivers92 tested 
could be expected to unanimously result in similar results for all entrepreneurs, regardless of 
country or context, results from Section 5.4 showed otherwise.  With this knowledge, 
attention is now turned to the second element of the deconstructed Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship Nexus: the operational context. Chapter 5 showed differences of the 
individual construct and are perceived to be influenced, in part, either positively or 
negatively by elements of the operational context.  In addition, the operational context has 
the potential to shape entrepreneurship outlook, ability and action and will be investigated in 
this chapter.   
 
While a macro-level analysis presented a distinct split along tested Driver Indexes between 
Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs, nuanced differences were found across the varying 
business segments and entrepreneur classifications within each country.  As such, results 
indicate potential for differences of Driver Indexes to be shaped by different socio-cultural 
environments or operational contexts.  Specifically, differences were found showing 
Ethiopian Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs to have statistically similar, and relatively 
low degrees of Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness 93  and Risk Tolerance.  Rwanda showed 
statistically significant and relatively higher degrees for Self-Efficacy and Risk Tolerance 
than Ethiopian counterparts.  
                                                        
92 Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial 
Orientation (OR+EO) 
93 Analysis results showed a statistically significant difference, however the Innovativeness Driver Index also 
proved to be relatively low.  
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This chapter now looks to investigate the external dynamics and operational contexts, or 
determinants, of entrepreneurs within each country in order to analyse and present a clearer 
picture of what and how specific structures and systems influence and shape 
entrepreneurship.  The unique environment an entrepreneur operates within is a complex 
mixture of socio-economic factors inclusive of the distinct political, legal and market systems 
(Chell, 2008).  As described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.2, entrepreneurship informed by 
Structuration Theory, is a continual process of evolution between an entrepreneurial 
orientated individual and a specific operational context (Sarason et al., 2006).  
Entrepreneurship is viewed as an interdependent part of a larger social system and not a 
separate entity operating independently (Sarason et al., 2006; Chell, 2008).  As such, 
information in this chapter builds from the specific country profiles detailed in Sections 4.3 
and 4.4, which presented the complicated histories, political evolutions and coffee market 
developments of Ethiopia and Rwanda, respectively.  Understanding these determinants not 
only aids in the broader understanding of entrepreneurs (internal elements and external 
influences) operating within these marketplaces, but also presents an opportunity to discuss 
and investigate how external influences can support or impede private sector expansion and 
entrepreneurial growth.  
 
Through results found in Chapter 5, empirical evidence was put forward to support the notion 
that the individual construct of the entrepreneur and operational contexts are interdependent.  
Results from Chapter 5 demonstrated the existence of differences between the individual 
construct of Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs as well as indicating the operational 
context does influence entrepreneurial outlook and action.  Discussed in Section 2.5, the 
operational context for entrepreneurs is a combination of socio-economic factors inclusive of 
political, legal, regulatory, economic, market and socio-cultural systems (Acs et al., 2008; 
Chell, 2008).  As such, entrepreneurship is believed to be influenced by these systems 
through resource availability, political outlook as well as market and regulatory enhancement 
or interference (Gregoire et al., 2010; Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  The specific 
determinants selected for this research, initially presented in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2: 
political environments, market structures, available resources, and historical, socio-
cultural settings, represent broad themes identified from current literature and were selected 
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due to applicability for this research.  The examination and comparative analysis of how 
these elements influence entrepreneurship within these themes are the specific outcomes and 
results of this research. 
 
This chapter conducts a comparative analysis through the examination of potential influences 
to entrepreneurship from nuanced elements discovered within these broader themes and is 
designed in order to address:  
1. Underlying historical relationships and socio-cultural settings 
2. Current political environments 
3. Operational market and corresponding regulatory structures 
4. Availability of resources 
 
Evidence presented in this chapter stems largely from the use of qualitative tools and is 
written as an investigative narrative, using aspects of the coffee sectors and related economic 
and political climates to show examples towards entrepreneurial influence and corresponding 
entrepreneur actions.  Information was gained from secondary sources reviewed before, 
during and after data collection, with evidence examined through a systematic, analytical 
approach.  This chapter also relied heavily on primary data obtained in data collection 
through respondent and key informant interviews94 and information from primary sources are 
referenced throughout this discussion.   
 
6.2 What Are the Historical and Socio-Cultural Influences to 
Entrepreneurship? 
Historical, social and cultural influences have created complex and unique environments in 
which entrepreneurs must navigate today.  Given each country’s history, socio-cultural 
dynamics were found to affect entrepreneurs in not only business operation, but also in how 
opportunity pursuit is perceived as well as who is enabled to pursue it.  This section 
highlights some of the main influences observed and recognized through this research in 
regards to domestic relationships with coffee, historical influences and cultural appreciation 
for entrepreneurial success.  Specific analysis surrounding the equitable accessibility or 
                                                        
94 Similar to respondent coding, key informant interviews are coded by country of operation, number of key 
informant and year of interview.  For example the first key informant interview held in Ethiopia in 2015 is 
coded as: E_1, 2015. 
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inaccessibility of women’s pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity was not specifically 
researched within the wider socio-cultural analysis of entrepreneurship within these specific 
research settings, however women entrepreneurs found through this research are featured.   
 
Table 6.1 below, has distilled elements of the historical, socio-cultural influences per 
business segment discussed throughout this section in order to provide an overview of the 
differing, specific elements found to have influenced entrepreneurship within Ethiopia and 
Rwanda.  Information presented in the table represents a synthesis of data gathered from 
observation, respondent responses, key informants and secondary source data.   
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Table 6.1. Historical and Socio-Cultural Influences, per Segment 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 Ethiopia Rwanda 
S
m
a
ll
h
o
ld
er
 P
ro
d
u
ce
r
s 
- Strong historical and cultural ties to coffee 
- Typical long history of family involvement in production 
- Coffee a major part of life and livelihood, difficult for producer to 
leave, fear of ostrization if cease production 
- Nationalization of Derg Era, forced participation in rural cooperatives, 
remaining distrust/ reluctance 
- Significant population pressure in coffee producing areas, steady 
reduction in land holdings (specifically in areas of research focus) 
- Successful producers are perceived to have link to current Regime 
- Lack of entrepreneurial incentives, inability to advance business to 
alternative business segments 
- Limited cultural ties with coffee, recognized history of introduction and forced 
cultivation by colonizers and past governments 
- Destroyed crop, farm land, rural infrastructure from 1994 war 
- Many coffee producers killed/ fled during ‘94 
- Need to rebuild, coffee promoted as way forward  
- Returnees brought unique entrepreneurial skills post ‘94 
- Coffee businesses, cooperatives promoted as means of reconciliation 
- Current perception of high earning potential despite price volatility 
- Successful actors / entrepreneurs regarded & respected for hard work 
- Path for self-improvement/ entrepreneurial business expansion, increasing support 
mechanisms and eased regulation to support doing so 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l 
F
a
rm
er
s 
- Strong historical and cultural ties to coffee 
- History of family involvement via production, trading, (private 
commercialized farming, a new legal entity allowed in sector) 
- Post ’91 encouragement in specific business areas, specifically for 
large scale land purchase for agri-business 
- GoE support of Export Sector results in attractive business investment 
incentives, for those of means 
- Business success, perceived link to current Regime 
 
 
P
ro
ce
ss
o
rs
 
- Strong historical and cultural ties to coffee, family history in trading   
- Business holdings nationalized during Derg Era 
- Difficulty in reclaiming business/ land nationalized 
- Post ’91 support for investment into economy, however Processors 
currently not recognized with preferred export status 
- Business success, perceived link to current Regime 
- Limited cultural ties with coffee, recognized difficulty in securing supply, however 
still perceived to be lucrative 
- Returnees brought unique entrepreneurial skills post ‘94 
- Coffee businesses, cooperatives promoted as means of reconciliation 
- Top-level promotion of sector, popularity.  Implementation of business incubation 
and support strategies enacted to help new actors  
- Path for self-improvement/ business expansion, shown via actor expansion 
E
x
p
o
rt
er
s 
- Strong historical and cultural ties to coffee, family history in trading 
- Business holdings nationalized during Derg Era 
- Difficulty in reclaiming business/ land nationalized 
- Post ’91 support for investment into economy, easier/ more attractive 
options to invest within specific sectors, Export recognized with 
preferred business status due to ability to generate foreign exchange 
(Private Export is relatively new business) 
- Business success, perceived link to current Regime 
- Limited cultural ties with coffee, perceived as lucrative business 
- Path for self-improvement/ business expansion, shown via actor expansion 
- Private Export is new business sector to be involved with since removal of Sate 
Market Agency.  GoR support/ advocacy of re-emergence of Rwanda Coffee to 
International Market/ Buyers 
- Successful actors highly regarded for hard work, but also for willingness to use 
success to help others/ those less fortunate 
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6.2.1 Domestic Relationships with Coffee and Entrepreneurship  
Entrepreneurship and coffee are understood and internalized differently within these two 
countries, however the respective domestic relationships are critical in order to appreciate 
related action and preferences.  This analysis presents additional differences in which to 
review entrepreneurship as Ethiopia and Rwanda have distinctly different histories with, and 
public perceptions of, coffee.  
 
6.2.1.1 Ethiopia  
Ethiopia, the birthplace of coffee, is currently the 5th largest exporter in the world as well as 
largest producer and exporter in Africa.  Discussed in Section 4.3.3, the country’s coffee 
sector includes an estimated 4.2 million smallholder producers, directly reliant on coffee, 
with an additional 15 to 20 million people involved across the industry through employment 
in transportation, processing, trading, financing and marketing (Herhaus et al., 2014a).   
While many coffee-producing countries have already reached natural coffee endowments in 
terms of available quality varieties and attainable production volumes, Ethiopia is estimated 
to have reached just 60% of its perceived potential (E_5, 2015).  Coffee is of significant 
importance to Ethiopia not only economically, but also culturally.  One of only two 
producing countries to be a major consumer of its own production, annual consumption nears 
two hundred thousand tonnes, an estimated 50% of total production95.  As such, there is a 
thriving domestic market96  and corresponding demand, and local consumption forms an 
important part of everyday life, ritual or ceremony (Tefera and Tefera, 2013).  
 
This strong cultural attachment is recognized in this research to have the potential to skew 
individual relationships with, or perspectives of coffee in terms of impacting entrepreneurial 
choice mechanisms in regards to coffee as a ‘way of life’ as opposed to a ‘business’.  For 
example, this research found no individuals within Ethiopian coffee areas that had 
decaffeinated fields and the act of decaffeinating was unheard of for respondents within 
producing zones, with a distinct fear of being ostracized for the removal of coffee trees.  
                                                        
95 Total production figures remain difficult to determine exactly, as much of what is produced becomes 
consumed at household and never makes it to market or is officially accounted for. 
96 Due to Government export mandates, only the very lowest quality is available for domestic consumption 
today.  
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Coffee, it seems is a business people live and die by, but will never leave.  Explained by a 
Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur in the Yirgacheffee production zone,  
In this area, we must grow coffee; it is what people do.  I believe coffee is my most 
valuable crop for getting cash, but ensete97 is the most valuable crop for my family 
because it will sustain us even if we do poorly with coffee.  For coffee, the prices are 
too low for the work required and yes, people make losses, but you cannot remove it; 
you are not a real farmer in this area if you do not have coffee.  We do as our father’s 
did.  (P_E_9, 2015) 
 
Within the traditional high-intensity coffee zones (Yirgacheffee and Sidama regions) visited 
during data collection, smallholder producers were found to mainly produce ensete for 
household consumption and coffee as a cash crop; wealthier households also had livestock.  
While coffee production zones have increased as the sector has grown and reintegrated with 
the international market, producers in the heart of coffee producing areas, reported income 
generation to be centred on coffee.  However smallholder producers operating on the fringes 
of the production zones reported more flexibility in producing alternatives to coffee, such as 
khat, maize, teff and some vegetables.  
 
Coffee is widely perceived to be a lucrative business, however this is largely dependent upon 
who is asked and within which specific business segment.  While Ethiopia does not enforce a 
mandate to produce coffee like Rwanda, the social pressure to do so is evident and 
individuals are expected to continue production and investment in the country’s most 
prominent product.  Due to coffee’s long history, actors in the sector also have high rates of 
family history and involvement, as initially discussed in Section 5.3.2.  66% of Smallholder 
Producers (regardless of entrepreneurial classification) reported to have inherited coffee 
plantations, with 60% of Processors and Exporters reported to come from 2nd, 3rd and even 4th 
generation coffee businesses.  
 
This intense and long experience with coffee certainly can be seen to add to the 
entrepreneurial knowledge stock.  However, respondents located in areas considered as 
‘traditional coffee zones’ were observed to show lower levels of entrepreneurial tendencies, 
                                                        
97 Ensete is the key staple consumable for households in Southern Ethiopia  
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such as innovation, risk taking or new opportunity pursuit, perhaps unwilling to try or test 
new methods for fear of societal backlash. These reduced entrepreneurial tendencies were 
observed through comparisons with individuals operating in ‘fringe’ areas or areas more 
recently undergoing coffee cultivation, which tended to show more unique and dynamic 
business models.  Newer coffee entrants were reported to consciously choose to get involved 
with the sector and work to implement strategic measures to mitigate perceived challenges, 
rather than just continuing production out of a perceived social obligation.  Given the 
restrictive nature of the market, the relatively low Innovation, Self-Efficacy and Risk 
Tolerance Index results (presented in Section 5.4.5.3) point to an outcome of market 
dynamics as well as an adverse influence on an individual entrepreneur’s ability and choice 
behaviour given coffee’s long history and product dominance within an area.  Many 
respondents reported to have continued coffee cultivation due to social pressures, despite 
recognized low returns.  An example is provided below in Case Study 6.1. 
 
Given the social pressures of continuing coffee production, despite its questionable economic 
viability, it becomes evident why the six Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs found in this 
research, were diversifying to other sectors.  As will be seen throughout this chapter, 
challenges for the Ethiopian smallholder coffee producer were observed to have become 
increasingly difficult given the restrictive market environment, limiting many actors from 
being able to improve business prospects, despite seeing opportunity (Potential 
Entrepreneurs) as well as prohibiting many of the potential benefits of the coffee chain from 
flowing back to actors most in need.  
 
 
Case Study 6.1. Coffee Expansion 
A Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur explained coffee’s recent expansion and the differences he has seen.  
 
“Coffee production has expanded in the area since my involvement (15 years ago).  Most of the land that 
was previously bare is now cultivated with coffee.  It (coffee) used to grow wild in the forest in this area, 
but with people now farming in this area, it is added as a cash crop.    Coffee is valuable to have if you can 
harvest enough (volume). I have several income activities and now have added coffee.  I feel fortunate 
living here as the soil allows me to be able to produce more crops; I am adding khat that is now getting a 
better price than coffee.  People are not producing good quality coffee; that is why our prices are down over 
the last years.” (P_E_27, 2014) 
  211 
6.2.1.2 Rwanda  
As presented in Section 4.4.3, Rwanda’s coffee industry, which accounts for less than 1% of 
global trade, involves an estimated 400,000 people.  While the country’s history with coffee 
is comparatively, relatively new, its economic importance is widely recognized in the country 
despite the slow growth of cultural significance within the traditionally tea drinking nation.  
Significant value addition and business opportunity is perceived to be possible by increasing 
domestic consumption, however this is occurring mainly within the urban centre of Kigali 
and not at a household producer level.  The newfound domestic taste for coffee currently 
exists as a drink of wealthier Rwandans, as other commercial drinks are not only cheaper, but 
also more widely available throughout the country (R_2, 2014; R_3, 2014).  Efforts are being 
made to increase coffee’s domestic marketability, mainly led through local coffee shops, 
however progress is slow.  Several entrepreneur respondents reported to have started locally 
roasting and packaging their coffees for sale in the domestic market, but this remains largely 
targeted to the local expat community.  Case Study 6.2 below, shows how one Rwandan 
business is scaling and trying to capture greater market share.    
 
 
 
Given the intense and widespread growth of the coffee sector in Rwanda since the mid 
1990s, the sector is now widely regarded for its high-earning potential.  However, as seen in 
Graph 4.6 in Section 4.5, the garden gate cherry price for Rwandan Smallholder Producers 
Case Study 6.2. Capturing Additional Market Share via Growing Local Interest 
This Exporter focuses on producing high quality, single-origin coffees, from a peninsula jutting into Lake Kivu, 
along Rwanda’s western border, mainly for export to European and North American Markets.  The business 
began in the early 2000s with his father, a former Rwandan Senator and member of the President’s Economic 
Council.  Recently he has been working to develop innovative ways to tackle barriers to improve domestic 
demand and develop a presence in the local Rwandan market.   
 
“We have been successful within the international market, but really, the lucrative, untapped market is here in 
Rwanda.  We started a local roasting facility in 2006 in order to be able to sell our coffee directly to the market.  
In 2006 we sold 300 kg of roasted beans, in 2013 we sold 3.5 tonnes, but we believe most of that is purchased 
by expats.  Now we are trying to find easy and inexpensive ways for Rwandans to be able to drink our coffee.  
While most people drink tea here, the Nescafé sachets (instant coffee) are popular so we have been 
experimenting with several recipes for our coffee to be manufactured into the sachets of instant coffee.  So far 
market response is favourable.  I believe the key will be to make a product that the ‘normal Rwandan’ can 
appreciate in taste and price.  Currently coffee is a drink of the upper class because it is still so expensive for 
most people.” (Ex_R_23, 2014) 
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averages 20% to 40% less than Ethiopian Smallholder Producers98.  Truth behind coffee’s 
perceived lucrative earning potential for smallholder producers is highly questioned and the 
perception of high profitability is thought to stem from the sector norm of a lump-sum 
payment for cherries delivered.  Many producers reported that this relatively large, one time 
payment made them believers in coffee’s high profitability.  However, it is recognized that 
coffee may still be more profitable when compared to other more, traditional crops.  
Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs reported and were observed to have a stronger capacity 
for financial management of their business and financial returns.  Additionally, Smallholder 
Producer Entrepreneurs reported continuing to believe in the sector’s profitability, despite 
market price variability and many entrepreneurs perceived coffee’s profitability in terms of 
re-investment and wider benefit potential, viewing coffee as a long-term, vested business 
interest, as opposed to a year-by-year income generator.  
 
Rwandan smallholder producers are in a similarly difficult position to their Ethiopian 
counterparts in terms of coffee’s low prices, however, as will be seen throughout this chapter, 
despite low economic returns, given Rwanda’s open market structure and freer movement of 
actors and benefits, entrepreneurs were observed to be orientating business models and 
operational strategies in order to capitalize on benefits and new market opportunity, resulting 
in an overall improved product and increased benefit flow to traditionally hard to reach areas.   
 
While some smallholder producers may struggle with profitability, the lucrative potential 
attached to the sector continues to entice entrepreneurs as Producers, Processors and 
Exporters continue to look to establish businesses and capitalize within the re-emerged 
sector.  As evidenced in Section 5.3, 88% of Rwandan Entrepreneurs are operating first 
generation businesses.  Described by a Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur,  
You can make good money from coffee and it is a secure investment.  Year to year it 
can be difficult, but over the lifetime of your trees (40-50 years) you can be very 
successful.  From my coffee earnings, I have put four children through university with 
two more in university now. (P_R_65, 2014) 
 
 
                                                        
98 Largely due to demand, consumer recognition and high cost of export related transportation in Rwanda 
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6.2.2 Historical and Socio-Cultural Impacts on Entrepreneurship  
Examining historical and socio-cultural environments provides an understanding of not only 
where and how entrepreneurs operate, but also how entrepreneurs are integrated into a 
society; forming an understanding as to the wider level of acceptance and promotion.  Recent 
histories also continue to play a significant role in current politics, influencing 
entrepreneurial action as well as providing insight as to who specifically is, or can be, an 
entrepreneur.  As discussed in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, and as will continue to be detailed 
throughout the rest of this chapter, both countries are characterized by histories of control, 
oppression and political influence into the private sector sphere.  However, these histories 
also provide insight into backgrounds of selected entrepreneurs and what specific individual 
starting points may have been.   
 
For example, many entrepreneurs currently involved with formal businesses (Processing and 
Export) in Rwanda are former refugees.  Discussed further in Section 6.2.2.2, many had lived 
for years if not decades in neighbouring countries and returned following the war in 1994, 
bringing unique experience and greater comparable wealth, business connections and 
knowledge from lives abroad (Prunier, 1997).  These returnees were integral in re-starting the 
Rwandan economy, providing evidence to outcomes and potential benefits from necessity 
entrepreneurship as first presented in Section 2.6.2. 
 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, a class of ‘new entrepreneurs’ have emerged through connections with 
current state-leadership, many with Tigrean lineage.  This ‘preferential’ treatment for 
individuals was evident in the respondents operating formal businesses (Commercial Farms, 
Processing and Exporting businesses) who reported familial or heritage linkages with Tigray, 
which will be further discussed in Section 6.2.2.1.  
 
Socio-cultural environments looked to the desirability for entrepreneurship or business 
success within a specific sphere as well as how societal or cultural perceptions may impact 
entrepreneurial action.  This may be presented through perceptions of business successes, 
strategic targeting of entrepreneurs and cultural beliefs regarding the success and failure of 
opportunity exploitation (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Shane et al., 2003).  Given the often-
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complex cultural environments of Ethiopia and Rwanda, and coffee’s tangled existence 
within the economic histories and social fabrics, it is believed to be integrally linked to the 
ensuing discussion on entrepreneurship. 
 
6.2.2.1 Ethiopia 
Historical as well as socio-cultural influence in Ethiopia is relevant in nearly all aspects of 
current society, culture and Statehood.  Given its history and relatively recent unification 
process, described in Section 4.3.1, Ethiopia remains dominated by the current ethno-
federalist administration which continues to manage different ethnic areas according to the 
Government’s pursuit of its own supremacy and survival (Vaughan, 2015).   Using the ethno-
federalist hierarchical platform, the Ethiopian Government is able to extend its reach from 
the top most levels down to the rural village levels, creating restrictive or inclusive 
environments, as deemed necessary by state-led agendas (Vaughan, 2006; Fiquet and 
Feyissa, 2015).  Given the state-led economy and its intense involvement in market activity, 
additional advantages are given to public sector, State actors, projects or agendas in terms of 
where and how resources flow, or not.  This will be discussed in greater detail in section 
6.3.1.1.  
 
Understanding the evolution of preferential treatment during recent history requires tracing 
Ethiopian history back to the death of Tigrean Emperor, Yohannes IV, in the late 1800s, 
which saw the end of the Tigrean power centre.  Since, the post-Yohannes IV era has seen 
much political grievance and economic decline within the Tigrean Region, culminating with 
the Derg Regime’s Red Terror campaign which, outside of the Capital, had the largest impact 
and aggression against Tigrean people (Tedasse, 2015).  The current state-led EPRDF party 
was originated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and led by Meles Zenawi.  
Following the Tigrean ascension into power once again in 1991, the state-managed market 
economy is widely acknowledged to, and accused of, providing nationalist preferential 
treatment to Tigreans at the expense of other Ethiopians99 (Vaughan, 2015). 
                                                        
99 An open secret in Ethiopia is the preferential treatment received due to family connections or ethnical 
linkages for Tigreans.  Admittedly difficult to detect is whether rumors are from individuals legitimately 
discriminated against or a particular respondent who has been unsuccessful in a particular business venture and 
prefers to place blame elsewhere.  
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As discussed by an Exporter with a long family lineage (non-Tigrean) in the coffee sector,  
It is never formally acknowledged, but there is a history in Ethiopia of a system of 
connection based on who is in power.  It is also a system that is very difficult to 
change with many people now making money and entrenched in the structure.  
Currently, many feel it is connection with Tigray and there are legitimate reasons for 
those feelings. (E_4, 2015) 
 
Through research observations, it became apparent that having a formal, successful business 
was a not only a sign of success and wealth, but also of connection.  While, admittedly 
generalized, and perhaps unfair to many hardworking business people, this perception 
became clear not only though speaking with research respondents, but also from speaking 
with other actors both in and outside of the coffee sector.  Within the coffee sector, strong 
historical business linkages obviously exist through the many 2nd, 3rd and 4th generation 
businesses.  Specifically, many Processors and Exporters reported to have family origins in 
Tigray or admitted to being Tigrean.  Reports of nepotism were also found to be widespread.  
While petty corruption was not particularly evident at a ‘street-level’ it is believed to be 
common occurrence within higher levels of negotiation and are perceived to impact 
allowances to new opportunity; however, this could not be independently verified.   
 
As will continue to be discussed throughout this chapter, the direction of opportunity to 
certain segments or ‘selected entrepreneurs’ within the state-directed private sector presents 
the divergent perception of, and case for, have’s and have not’s in which certain individuals, 
areas or sectors are allowed to progress and expand and other segments are not.  For 
example, not one Ethiopian Smallholder Producer was found to have transitioned his 
business from smallholder farming to another more lucrative business or industry (the 
opposite case from Rwanda).  This can also be evidenced from educational attainment 
presented in Section 5.3.1.  This apparent glass ceiling is being reinforced through 
obstructive market structures, but also dictated by national agendas and backed by a 
controlling culture, resulting in the country’s lack of entrepreneurial dynamism and business 
success tinged with the perception of suspicion. 
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It appears evident that linkages with the current Government have enabled some 
entrepreneurs to be able to be more successful than others due to the strong internal, regional 
ethnic identities and natural networks (social, business).  However, these networks were 
reported to also influence market side selling, or the non-transparent coffee sale at the 
national ECX Auction.  As will continue to be discussed through this chapter, this presents 
evidence to the demotivating entrepreneurial environment, which has limited interest from 
entrepreneurs and dissuaded potential new entrants.   
 
6.2.2.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda’s socio-cultural environment and history has also impacted entrepreneurship in the 
country, but by different means.  As has been described in Section 4.4.1, the politically, 
economically and ethnically motivated violence in 1994, is estimated to have killed over 
800,000 people, forced 2 million to flee the country and internally displaced an additional 1.3 
to 1.8 million people (Prunier, 1997); out of a population of 5 million people in 1993 
(Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).  These figures do not account for the thousands of refugees 
who had fled to neighboring countries throughout the decades of conflict and turmoil, 
stemming from the 1950s (Cooke, 2011).  Additionally, given the preferential treatment 
through the Belgian Colonial administrative system, Tutsi were large landowners with many 
focusing on coffee in the Southern and Western regions of the country’s major coffee 
production zones; with some of the worst massacres of the genocide occurring in these areas, 
taking huge human toll, but also shattering economic infrastructure for the areas.  
 
While a formal economic analysis has never been conducted on the families that fled to 
neighbouring countries (mainly Burundi, Uganda and DRC) it is generally accepted that a 
majority of the individuals leaving the country were of an at least slightly higher economic 
standing or capacity as they were able to afford to leave (Prunier, 1997).  These new 
experiences and exposures provided opportunity to develop social as well as human capital.  
Additionally, adaptive behaviour and innovation strategies may have also been forged 
through conflict or adverse situational experiences (Leonardo, 2010).  Given the long ranging 
conflicts over many decades, two main types of Rwandan returnees are considered.   
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1. Tutsi refugees that left Rwanda from the 1950s to early 1990s, many becoming 
involved with business in neighboring countries, relying on contacts, family and 
even-growing business connections used in establishing a new life.  Upon returning, 
these individuals and families brought greater wealth, business experience and 
connections.   Post-1994, the opportunity to return interested many who had lived for 
decades in neighboring countries, returning with connections, relative wealth and 
business skills gained through years and even decades abroad (Prunier, 1997).  These 
first returnees were some of the initial Rwandan investors back into the formal 
economy and continue to be key major actors in economic and political scenes today.    
 
Since the Hutu Revolution in 1959, Tutsi had largely been excluded from the political sphere, 
instead focusing on activities in the private sector, having gained wealth through successful 
business and even large land holdings distributed through the colonial administration.  
During this research, many of the Processors and Exporters interviewed admitted to living 
and even being educated in neighbouring countries, mainly Uganda, DRC or Burundi, 
returning after the war to re-establish themselves in Rwanda and bringing these unique 
skillsets, knowledge base, experiences and networks with them.  Many people, returning after 
the 1994 war, saw coffee as an economic opportunity to rebuild lives or continue the work of 
relatives.  Admittedly many of these returnees not only had the financial resources to invest 
and start businesses, but also had escaped witnessing the traumas of the genocide.  It was 
these initial returnees, with many being considered as entrepreneurs that benefited from the 
enormous needs of the destroyed economy and virtually non-existent private sector  (Prunier, 
1997; R_1, 2014).   One such story is described in Case Study 6.3, below.    
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2. Refugees, mainly Tutsi, who fled during the violence of 1994, were largely relocated 
into refugee camps in neighboring countries.  This group mainly settled with refugees 
that left before the 1990s but were unable to integrate into new countries, living for 
years, if not decades, in the camps (some of these returnees post 1994 were born in 
these camps).   Individuals in refugee camps were a mix of differing social classes 
and distinct class structures within the Tutsi clan system, and marriage across ‘class 
lines’ was common.  The economic status, and harsh restrictions imposed, resulted in 
many ways as a type of necessity entrepreneurship as these refugees did not own land 
or traditionally acceptable assets and were unable to access typical financing reserves 
for start-up capital.  As such, many were forced to establish creative ways for income 
generation and indeed survival (Prunier, 1997).   Many of these refugees also brought 
these unique experiences and business skills when returning to Rwanda. 
 
Both ‘types’ of refugee returnees, or diaspora entrepreneurs are believed to have had large 
influences in rebuilding the country and expanding sectors of their chosen pursuit (R_1, 
2014).  Another example is below in Case Study 6.4. 
 
Case Study 6.3. Returning to Rwanda 
The story below presents the history and experience of a successful Exporter and businessman in Rwanda, who 
grew up in Burundi.  
 
“My Family traded in coffee in Burundi as refugees from the 1960s.  I grew up there and trained as an 
Economist.  I learned everything about coffee in Burundi.  When we returned to Rwanda I initially worked with 
the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) for three years as a Finance Analyst on the post-war strategy for 'Agro-
Business Initiatives'.  I was on front lines of re-establishing the coffee sector and was involved in the decision 
for the strategic shift from ordinary coffee (sun-dried) to specialty (fully-washed).   In 2005 I wanted to start my 
own coffee business and used bank contacts I had made from working at RDB to secure a loan to establish my 
own washing station and exporting business; initially just processing at 30% capacity due to low farmer supply.   
Supply was always a problem, and the business has evolved to become a 'service provider' for other Producers 
and Processors as this was and continues to be a real problem for the market.  As a Service Provider, my 
business provides bank guarantees for farmers, co-ops, or washing stations needing finance but are unable to get 
a bank loan.  I also provide technical business support.  Finally, I link my clients with end buyers and charge 
about 30% of end product value as a fee.  This business is growing slowly, but steadily and I believe we have a 
large market that will benefit from these services….  I think my and my family’s experience in Burundi has 
helped me with my businesses and business outlook today.  I still travel and do business in Burundi and DRC 
frequently.”  (Ex_R_19, 2014)  
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As discussed, many of the returnees were Tutsi, including nearly all of the RPF military, 
political party and current Government forces.  While ethnicity records are no longer 
officially maintained, accusations, which are vehemently denied from the top most levels of 
Rwanda’s Government, are that Tutsi are back in power at the expense of the Hutu, in 
political structures as well as the private sector.  Perceptions of Tutsi disproportionate 
involvement in business are discussed in Case Study 6.5 below.   
 
 
 
Case Study 6.4. Restarting a Coffee Business 
“My family left Rwanda before the start of the war.  Relatives on my father’s side owned land and had a large 
coffee farm, but they were all killed.  After the war, my father decided to move us back to Rwanda and we 
relocated to that farm area and decided to take up coffee in memory of our relatives.  We were able to make an 
application to the municipality, proving we were kin and were granted rights to the land.  We started as 
farmers and had to rebuild and replant everything; our plantation is now about 10,000 trees.  However we 
soon realized that by only farming we were not making enough money and decided to invest in the business 
and build a washing station to increase our margins.”   
 
“Our farm and washing station are in a very remote area and we also wanted to provide opportunities to help 
other farmers in the area. We started exporting in 2013 and last year exported about two containers (each 
container holds 19.2 tonnes).  We work closely with area farmers and focus on quality.   Coffee has been an 
opportunity for us and we recognize that we have been lucky in some ways and want to help area farmers.  
We provide loans to farmers against their future coffee harvest, provide health insurance and quality trainings.  
If we are profitable for the season we will make a 2nd payment back to the farmers to increase their share of 
the profits….  I manage the business with my father.  I am also a structural engineer and work in Kigali in the 
off-season.”  (Ex_R_14, 2014) 
 
Case Study 6.5. Perceptions for Preference 
The following presents an overview of a discussion with an expat who has lived in Rwanda for the past 10 
years, working as a consultant within the financial sector. 
 
“Tutsi linkages within the private sector (as well as Government) are a common claim.  Data on ethnic 
backgrounds is no longer kept, but a large proportion of Tutsi involvement in business is still considered 
highly likely.  Before the war, Tutsi were heavily involved within the private sector and Tutsi comprised 
much of the refugee flight, and naturally they were also many of the returners.  These returners had to start 
back in business in order to restart a livelihood.  It is undeniable that from this perspective Tutsi have 
perhaps had a better opportunity to be involved in entrepreneur related activities and yes, given history, 
there can be some very high level networks, but I do not believe there is a preference of one group over 
another and Tutsi involvement today is not coming at the expense of Hutu.  The Government is also very 
sensitive to that and are trying to create a climate where everyone can be successful, but also an 
environment where they (Rwandan Government) cannot be accused of preference.” (R_7, 2015) 
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Within Rwanda, coffee has become largely synonymous with not only opportunity, but also 
as a mechanism in which to improve yourself and your community.   In Rwanda, success and 
entrepreneurship was not observed to be the perceived nepotism taboo as it largely appeared 
in Ethiopia.  As will be discussed throughout the rest of this chapter, the histories and societal 
norms in regards to entrepreneurship clearly influence individual behaviour but also form the 
wider acceptance framework in which individuals can and do operate.  
 
In Ethiopia, it was observed that business success, or ambition, appeared to be held with 
suspicion and it was found actors did little to dissuade those sentiments through investing 
good fortunes back into areas of operation.  Conversely, in Rwanda, success seemed to be 
much more widely appreciated and business appeared to be an environment where 
individuals give credit and respect to those more successful.  Through research observations, 
successful Rwandan entrepreneurs in these environments were found to actively work to 
share benefits with a wider community that had helped success, appearing to become more 
integrated with local areas of operation.  This of course can also be a tactic in gaining a 
competitive advantage in an area and while entrepreneurs reporting these actions included 
them as part of a wider strategic operational plan, a sincere effort to use business success in 
order to provide benefits to others was a commonly perceived theme.  This will be explored 
in greater depth in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
6.3 What Are the Current Political Environments Influencing 
Entrepreneurship? 
Political environments are inclusive of the current political system, government perceptions 
of, and relationship with, the private sector, economic stability, legal restrictions, ease (or 
difficulty) in conducting business, and corresponding support mechanisms.  In order for 
entrepreneurship to be cultivated within an economy, the political system should be 
transparent and dependent upon “individual rights, democratic rules and checks and balances 
of a government” (Lee and Peterson, 2000, p. 408).  However as will be seen, this is not 
always the case.   
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Most governments (especially developing economies) do not have specific policies designed 
for outright entrepreneurship promotion, and particularly for developing or emerging 
economy governments are not actively working to use the entrepreneur as a key ingredient in 
pushing the country’s economic frontier forward (Rocha et al., 2004; Boso et al., 2013).  
Neither country observed through this research was found to have established specific 
policies geared directly at entrepreneurship.  Instead, entrepreneurship is a by-product, 
recognized as an employment generator, used to absorb rural to urban migration and in some 
cases, fill gaps left by the public sector in terms of providing means of additional income and 
services to otherwise neglected areas.  However, entrepreneurship within the economies and 
private sectors researched, are not completely open to ‘free-spirited impulses’ of 
entrepreneurs and remain, to varying degrees, liberated and leashed.  Through this research, 
government relationship with the private sector was observed to be a direct reflection of a 
government’s relationship with, and perspective towards, entrepreneurship.  
 
Table 6.2 below, has distilled elements of political environment influences per business 
segment discussed throughout this section in order to provide an overview of the differing, 
specific elements found to have influenced entrepreneurship within Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
Information presented is a synthesis of data gathered from observation, respondent responses, 
key informants and secondary source data.   
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Table 6.2. Political Environment Influences, per Segment 
(Source: Author Construct)  
 Ethiopia Rwanda 
S
m
a
ll
h
o
ld
er
 P
ro
d
u
ce
r
s - Smallholder Producer not prioritized by GoE, efforts to push all 
producers to co-ops.  Inefficient logistics, distrust, poor management by 
co-op: only 20% of coffee producers currently co-op members 
- Lack of investment in agricultural training, infrastructure 
- Producer perception of reduction in overall wellbeing, land reduction, 
population pressure, inability to ‘improve self’ 
- Fear of challenging Government, local Authorities  
- Forced supply to designated area Traders, difficult market access  
- Weak spread of timely, accurate market information 
- GoR used donors to support sector rebuild, provide training, finance, 
market linkages 
- Improvement to main production zone infrastructure, much need 
remains in very rural areas, smaller production zones 
- Promotion of large-scale investment, less successful in effectively 
providing finance for small scale actors 
- GoR instituted Development Bank to offer specialized financing 
packages and business support for qualified sector actors 
- GoR mandated Input Distribution Fund (free provision of inputs only 
supplying 35% of need) 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l 
F
a
rm
er
s 
- Large scale production & export prioritization of commercial agri-
business for export = ease of export requirements/ access to finance 
- Targeted by GoE Growth and Transformation Plan 
- Able to access information via ECX (Export Information) 
- Export Priority = attractive loan, land purchase and scale incentives  
- Reports of different ethnicities treated differently 
 
P
ro
ce
ss
o
rs
 
- Legal restrictions on exporting has resulted in increased difficulty in 
financial access 
- High tax burden, inability to access finance/ high cost of credit 
- Legally unable to expand business to other segments 
- Lack of formal business support mechanisms 
- GoE looking to replace private Processors with Cooperatives 
- Donor financed establishment of ECX supposed to increase transparency, 
highly questionable effectiveness 
- GoR used donors to support sector rebuild, provide training, finance, 
international market linkages 
- Streamline of business registration, legal, taxation requirements   
- GoR offered attractive investment opportunities for Returnees 
- Introduced ‘starter-funds’ for new (formal) business entrants 
- GoR regulating areas of ‘over competition’ via sourcing zones 
- Rwandan Development Bank to offer specialized financing packages 
and business support for qualified sector actors 
E
x
p
o
rt
er
s 
- Export Priority = attractive financial access, ease of business 
establishment and scale incentives 
- Reports of different ethnicities treated differently 
- Targeted by GoE Growth and Transformation Plan 
- Able to access information via ECX (Export Information) 
- Harsh restrictions on unsanctioned cross-border trade, pushes all trade 
through ECX 
- Legally unable to expand business to other segments 
- Donor financed establishment of ECX supposed to increase transparency, 
highly questionable effectiveness  
- GoR used donors to support sector rebuild, provide training, finance, 
international market linkages 
- Streamline of business registration, legal, taxation requirements   
- GoR offered attractive investment opportunities for Returnees 
- Introduced ‘starter-funds’ for new (formal) business entrants 
- Rwandan Development Bank to offer specialized financing packages 
and business support for qualified sector actors 
- Top-level effort to re-introduce Rwandan Coffee to International 
Market, direct support to advancement of export potential  
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6.3.1 Political Economies, Perceptions of Entrepreneurs and the Private Sector  
Both Ethiopia and Rwanda have strained histories of government involvement within the 
economy and coffee sectors.  Sections 4.3 and 4.4 presented a picture of each country’s 
formative history of oppressive control defined by militaristic existence within political and 
economic spheres.  In the early and mid 1990s, both Ethiopia and Rwanda were faced with 
rebuilding economies following entrenched conflicts and economic collapse.  Additionally, 
both countries evolved from histories of state-managed economies, in which industry and 
‘private sector’ largely served to fulfil state-led agendas and coffers (Prunier, 1997; 2015; 
Lefort, 2014; Vaughan, 2015).   Today, both Ethiopia and Rwanda are run through tightly 
controlled, top-down ‘democracies,’ that have benefited greatly from the improvement and 
expansion of the coffee sectors.  However, from these near mutual starting points, the 
countries differ on recognizing benefits of the private sector as well as approaches to 
engendering support for entrepreneurs, with each having diverged onto differing paths.   
 
To say either government has been ineffectual in re-building and restructuring economies or 
in achieving high economic growth is untrue, given that each country has achieved high 
growth rates over the past two decades and have been lauded as some of the best preforming 
economies (Holodny, 2015).  However, digging deeper, each government has specific 
relationships with, or perceptions of the private sector, which have been found to influence 
today’s entrepreneurs as well as the wider economy; often creating separate paths for wealth 
creation or increasing wealth disparity (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012; Vaughan, 2015).  
These perceptions shed light onto market evolutions, government activity, or lack thereof, 
and depending upon the specific sector, its promotion.  Conveniently, coffee is considered a 
priority product in both countries, but as will be discussed, ‘priority status’ fails to be spread 
evenly across all actors of the industry.  An overview of each country’s economic 
development is presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, below. 
 
6.3.1.1 Ethiopia 
Through Imperial nepotism and nationalized socialism, to the current market orientated, yet 
state-managed economy, Ethiopia has achieved recent impressive growth and is projected as 
the world’s highest growing economy for 2015 (Holodny, 2015).  However, the high growth 
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rates must be considered in appropriate contexts and while economic returns are not as 
widespread, high rates of income disparity are (Lefort, 2013).  A brief political and economic 
history is presented below in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3. Ethiopia, Economic History 
(Source data: Lefort, 2013, 2014; Prunier, 2015; Vaughan, 2015). 
 
The Ethiopian Government is commonly perceived to not have fully relinquished its socialist 
tendencies, with a hangover-effect on current market orientation, resulting in competing 
views as how to best further Government agendas: through pure profit generation by and for 
a state-led agenda or through the more equitable distribution of profit sharing from truer 
market mechanisms.  
 
Economic achievements are seen largely through specific, prioritized sectors: of export 
commodities, manufacturing, construction, textiles and energy generation (Holodny, 2015).  
Ethiopia has adopted market-orientated economic policies since the early 1990s, having 
instituted several frameworks aimed at fostering the role of the private sector within the 
overall economy, most recently through the 2010 and 2014 Growth and Transformation 
Plan100 (GTP).  Additional policies targeted to enhance and further develop the economy are 
                                                        
100 This national strategy aims to provide support for large-scale agriculture; create favourable conditions for 
export orientated and import substituting industries and enhance spread of infrastructure quality  (Ethiopia 
Public Private Consultative Forum (EPPCF), 2014).   
Timeline Regime Economic Outlook 
Pre –  
1900s 
Prior to State 
Unification 
Decentralized state-management via ethnically dominated regions.  
Expansive trade networks built from regionally dominated economies.  
1916 –
1974 
Imperial Regime 
Pursuit of a market based economy.  Private sector created and dominated 
through political connections and appointments.  State-led Marketing Boards 
controlled agricultural trade and export goods.  
1974 – 
1990 
Derg Regime 
Nationalized private sector, economic ideology based on socialist principles.  
State-managed Marketing Board, controlled trade goods and export revenue, 
used for State purposes. 
1991 – 
1995 
Post – War, 
Transitional 
Government  
Careful opening of economy and simplification of economic barriers from 
the Derg Era.  Solidified creations of ethno-regionally structured state. 
1995 – 
Present 
EPRDF Party – 
Led State,  
Zenawi Regime 
Market orientated economic policy with semi-liberalized economy (non-
liberalized coffee sector).  Mistrust in private sector, belief that the State is 
the best actor for ensuring economic growth through a 'controlled 
development capitalist' ideology.   
  225 
reflected in additional policy documents 101  which focus on sustained economic growth 
through increased commercialization of specified sectors within given, specified ‘zones’ of 
production and increased market integration.  Within the agricultural sector, focus is shifted 
to high-value export commodities and improved market integration at both the domestic and 
international levels (Gebreselassie and Ludi, 2008).  However, exact impact and wider 
ranging benefits have yet to be felt by the majority of the population (EPPCF, 2014). 
 
Considered to have a harsh-business climate due to high taxes, a weak regulatory structure 
and unequal benefit distribution following political affiliations, the gap between public and 
private sector actors has narrowed in comparison to previous regimes, however, today’s 
private sector still faces many obstacles in regards to administrative hurdles, policy 
acceptance, finance acceptability and regulation entanglement.  Ethiopia’s business 
environment favours incumbent firms, deterring new entrants through limited access to credit 
and a restrictive regulatory environment.  Despite progress, accusations continue to mount 
concerning market distortions in favour of selected sectors and Government involvement 
(World Bank, 2014a).  While not an exhaustive list, these include:  
 
- Applications of different tax rules for similar, but competing businesses 
- Involvement of the Government as an active trader 
- The unequal application of rule between private and state-owned businesses 
- Government monopoly (infrastructure, banking, telecommunications), resulting in 
restrictive policies and regulations against private sector participation 
- Lack of transparency and objectivity in national procurement procedures, with preference 
often provided to state-enterprises or the few, ‘preferred’ private suppliers 
- Unequal access of resource allocation including land, loans, foreign currency and 
information; with favouritism towards specific ethnic groups 
- Disproportionate requirement of private banks to devote 27% of loan disbursements to 
Government projects 
- Weak governance systems to confront illegal and informal trading activities 
(Access Capital Research, 2011; EPPCF, 2014, p. 22, 31-32; E_1, 2015) 
 
 
                                                        
101 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (2005, 2010) and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (2005, 2011). 
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In attempting to understand the apparent aversion to the private sector, an understanding of 
the country’s history as well as current actions and outlook is helpful in appreciating its 
stance.  A discussion with an Ethiopian Senior Finance Manger at the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), presented below in Case Study 6.6, revealed the Government to harbour a 
fundamental mistrust of the private sector, maintaining a belief that the State is often a better, 
more equipped and more effective entity in which to pursue goals and targets than a private 
sector (E_1, 2015).  This belief has contributed to difficult operating environments for 
entrepreneurs unaffiliated with the Government.  This sentiment was also widely 
acknowledged across a range of actors who felt preferential treatment has had an adverse 
impact on their business.   
 
 
 
While, it could be thought that some respondents may harbour disgruntled feelings following 
a lack of business success or poor returns, triangulation was use to verify evidence and 
outcomes, and this perception was a common theme. Described by an Exporter,  
The Ethiopia system, it limits producers, it limits processors and it limits buyers.  The 
Government has an idea of what they want and just push towards it.  People/ 
businesses that challenge or create alternatives are not tolerated.  It is very difficult 
to improve yourself or to change from the circumstances you were born into.  I am 
very lucky, but I can see that many others are not.  (Ex_E_1, 2015) 
 
Case Study 6.6. Discussions with the IFC 
Several discussions were held with an Ethiopian Senior Manager at the IFC in trying to understand why and how 
the Ethiopian Government has taken such a restrictive approach to the private sector and elements of the 
discussions are presented below.   
 
“Much goes back to the Zenawi Philosophy of ‘yes, work closely with a productive private sector, but work to 
curtail the activity of a rent seeking private sector.’  And by, ‘productive’ it means meeting its own goals… And 
by ‘rent seeking’, (it means) anything deemed disruptive.  Eliminating rent seeking behaviour in itself may be an 
acceptable goal, however the Government’s definition of ‘rent seeking behaviour’ is so broad it is used to 
disrupt and discourage businesses that are not seen to be ‘in-line’ with its agendas… And as (the Government) 
continues to be an active player in the economy, seeming to nationalize and privatize at will, it uses this strategy 
to gain a competitive advantage as it believes it (the State) is best suited to achieve its targets, more effectively 
and efficiently than a private sector.  This disruptive behaviour has resulted in many actors or potential 
entrepreneurs to pursue alternative employment… You also have a general lack of business experience within 
government technocrats and senior policy makers and because of that lack of experience; they do not value the 
needs of a private sector within an overall policy environment… The improved investment climate is possible, 
however it must and can only start with a shift in the mind-set of the Government.”  (E_1, 2015) 
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Unlike some of its regional peers, Ethiopian politicians are traditionally technocrats working 
only within and up the political structure for entire careers.  It is unheard of for a politician to 
own a business or to move from the private sector into the political realm (E_1, 2015) and 
this is thought to have indirect consequences in understanding needs between policy makers, 
private sector actors and entrepreneurs. 
 
The suspicion and distinct mistrust of the private sector is evident, from the State’s constant 
attempt to control and dictate action, through what has become commonly known as “The 
Ethiopian Way” (E_9, 2015).  In 2012, Ethiopia had the third highest public investment rate 
into the economy in the world, but sixth lowest private investment rate (World Bank, 2013c).  
As of 2012, the formal private sector contributed just 2.7% of GDP and employed less than 
6% of the labour force (Lefort, 2013).  While the percentage of GDP contribution by the 
private sector has grown from the 0.48% in 1991, key sectors remain secluded from 
traditional private sector actors as well as being off-limits to foreign intervention or 
investment (Lefort, 2013).   Meanwhile, Ethiopia, has built an asset base of over 100 state-
owned companies.  While some were established in previous regimes, it is no secret the 
current Government privatizes and nationalizes as it sees fit, in accordance with its own 
agenda (Access Capital Research, 2011; E_1, 2015; E_4, 2015).  As of 2010, total asset value 
for these companies was estimated at $9.6 billion.  State Enterprises include: 
Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopia Commercial Bank with its 300+ branches, an insurance 
company, a large shipping company, Ethio Telecom, chemical industries, mining 
factories, cement factories, metal works factories, pharmaceutical factories, coffee 
plantations, wineries, flour factories, shoe factories, hotels, and (until recently) 
several beer factories and a day-spa (Access Capital Research, 2011, p. 59).   
 
Additionally, energy generation (The Grande Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) and new 
transportation system (Addis Ababa Tramline) are additions to the State Enterprise Portfolio, 
but are not part of the above valuation.   
 
Efforts to liberalize many areas of Ethiopia’s economy have included the devaluation of the 
Birr, increased private sector trade, consolidated regulations on taxes and export duties, and 
simplified trade barriers from the Derg Regime (Petit, 2007; Worako et al., 2008).  Despite 
attempts at economic restructuring, Ethiopia ranked 132 (down 8 spots since 2012) out of 
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189 economies according to the 2015 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report, ranking 
below the sub-Saharan average in ease of starting a business (168), accessing credit (165), 
and trading across borders (168) (World Bank, 2014b).  The export sector, a key driver for 
the economy is currently experiencing some of its worst performances of the past decade 
(World Bank, 2014a).  Much of this comes from the lack of a competitive environment, over 
and under-regulation, differing requirements between agencies, limited transparency and 
high levels of obstruction (World Bank, 2014a; E_1, 2015), resulting in a severe deficit of 
entrepreneurial dynamism.   
 
Coffee is an admittedly important part of the economy and export sector, responsible for 30% 
of export revenues and the major foreign exchange earner (Herhaus et al., 2014a).  However 
many actors and entrepreneurs alike within the sector are impeded by this purview of the 
Government’s discouragement of the private sector either through intended or unintended 
consequences.  As described by an Exporter:  
Doing business in Ethiopia?  It is not easy.  It is highly controlled and more 
bureaucratic, more regulated than before (early to mid 1990s).  It is especially 
difficult to operate in coffee.  Business can be very good in other sectors, but 
businesses dealing with foreign earnings are highly controlled.  Foreign exchange is 
important, it is where the eye of Big Brother is always focused. (Ex_E_11, 2015) 
 
Research observed a recognized constriction in outlook and approach across business actors 
and entrepreneurs alike.  As shown in Section 5.4.5.3, Ethiopian Entrepreneurs were found to 
have relatively low Risk Tolerance, Self-Efficacy and Innovativeness Indexes.  Ethiopia’s 
Risk Tolerance Index was the lowest mean score for any driver.  While the tested drivers 
form part of the internal construct predisposing an individual towards entrepreneurial action, 
these specific differences in results are believed to also be a direct reflection of the 
environment of operation.  The demotivating and risk filled entrepreneurial environment 
continues to not only discourage actors, thus reducing self belief, but has also increased risks, 
making entrepreneurs much more risk adverse, especially as compared to Rwandan 
counterparts operating in a much more open and supportive structure.  
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6.3.1.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda’s political and economic history as briefly depicted below in Table 6.4 reveals a past 
of strong Government involvement, especially within the coffee sector.  However, while the 
Rwandan Government assumed near total control of the economy following the war in 1994, 
it has slowly relinquished involvement, much to the benefit of private sector actors and 
entrepreneurs.   
 
Table 6.4. Rwanda, Economic History 
(Source data: Prunier, 1997; Cooke, 2011; Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012) 
 
With Kigali and much of the rest of the country in ruins following the war in 1994, the 
Rwanda Transitional Government (led by RPF forces) was forced to assume responsibility 
for rebuilding and re-establishing the country given the scarcity of alternative options or 
actors.  As such, the Rwandan Government assumed much, if not all of the work that a 
private sector would naturally undertake (Prunier, 1997).  It was not so much that the 
Rwandan Government did not want to involve a private sector or did not believe in its ability, 
but was instead, forced into assuming these roles, as the country no longer had a functioning 
economy or private sector, with much of the labour force lost102.   
 
While the Government was initially, highly involved in rebuilding and controlling the coffee 
sector, over the last two decades it has slowly begun to reduce direct involvement and 
                                                        
102 Prior to 1994, Tutsi owned many businesses in Rwanda and were active participants in the country’s 
economy 
Timeline Regime Economic Outlook 
Pre – 
1900s 
Pre Colonial –  
Tutsi Kingdom 
Trade arranged through centralized Kingdom for benefit of central power 
structure.   
1916 –
1959 
Colonial Control 
Economic trade structured through the Belgian-controlled Tutsi Kingdom for 
benefit of Colonial Government and selected local, Tutsi authorities.  
1960 – 
1994 
Hutu Revolution – 
Kayibanda & 
Habyarimana 
Regimes 
Authoritarian regimes, of 'racially controlled democracy'.  Private sector used 
for benefit of the State, but external to policy influence.  State Marketing Board 
controlled coffee trade, revenue used as pay-offs with and for Officials.   
1994 – 
1996 
Post – War 
Transitional 
Government 
State-managed economy directs efforts to rebuild economy and infrastructure 
and re-start private sector.  Revenues largely defined by donor assistance 
1996 – 
Present 
RPF Party – Led 
State, Kagame 
Regime 
Liberalized, market-led economy.  Slow, steady transition of economy from 
Government led, to private sector domination.  Strategic aims to rapidly 
increase economic growth, competitiveness and strength in the region through 
the continued growth of the private sector.  
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ownership103 as the private sector builds capacity, earns confidence and gains trust.  Through 
this relinquished control, an active private sector has expanded and flourished and has 
paralleled with the emergence of entrepreneurs (Ansoms and Rostango, 2012). 
 
In 2010, Fitch Ratings104 upgraded Rwanda to “B” status due to its uninterrupted period of 
economic growth and improvement in its business environment (MTI, 2011).  Third highest 
for the continent, the 2013/14 Global Competitiveness Report cites the country’s “well-
functioning institutions, low levels of corruption and relatively well developed financial 
markets” as key platforms for attracting strong investment and promoting private sector 
growth (Schwab, 2013, p. 42).  An Advisor in the SME Unit of Rwanda’s Development 
Board described tactics and approaches to supporting a flourishing private sector.   
We have worked hard to raise awareness about the work that we do here and to 
educate people on opportunities and entice investment from Rwandan and 
International businesses. We also play a role that many small (local) firms are unable 
to afford, especially in the export sector and that is marketing and letting the 
International Community know Rwanda has things to offer…. The improved 
regulations and our advisory service, has helped small business start-ups as well as 
larger firms.  We offer technical services, business acumen support and even grant 
funds for certain applicants. Now all business registration, application and finance 
coordination is done out of this centre (RDB), instead of multiple offices like before.  
This makes the process easier and cheaper.  There is also a large push to register 
many of the small, informal businesses and we are also involved in that effort. (R_6, 
2014) 
 
While domestic business growth and the overall business climates have improved, foreign 
investment flows 105  remain relatively limited due to high transportation costs and poor 
infrastructure, making exports comparatively expensive (World Bank, 2013b).  However, 
potential barriers to Rwanda’s long-term growth are low levels of higher education, 
infrastructure and overall health levels of the working population (Schwab, 2013).   
                                                        
103 The Rwandan Government still maintains a sizeable portfolio through investment corporations such as 
Crystal Ventures, a privately held investment firm of the RPF.  Crystal Ventures is an owner or majority 
shareholder in the country’s main commercial producers and suppliers of pastoralized milk, bottled water, 
commercial juices as well as the country’s main coffee shop retail chain (Bourbon Coffee) (R_1, 2014).  
104 A global independent financial and credit evaluation and rating firm 
105 FDI within the coffee sector is significant and has been recognized as having a direct impact on growing 
direct export 
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Admittedly ambitious, the Rwandan Government has laid out grand and expansive plans with 
expectations through several key strategy documents 106  for economic development, 
acknowledging the need for a functional private sector filed with ‘home-grown 
entrepreneurs’. While Government aim is to facilitate and promote large-scale investment in 
promotion of a private sector in support of entrepreneurship, current realities present a 
private sector dominated by large-scale industries and small/ micro enterprises (Ansoms and 
Rostagno, 2012).  Rwanda has had one of the world’s fastest growing economies of the past 
decade and continues to expect annual GDP growth of 7 to 7.5% (Holondy, 2015).  And 
while this policy agenda aimed at maximum growth, has had obvious success, the trade-offs 
to income disparity and control of growth potential towards certain sectors must also be 
considered. 
 
Improvements 107  have also been made within governance structures through decreased 
burdensome regulations, improved taxation and increased financing for private sector 
investment and expansion (GoR, 2000; GoR, 2013).  Through playing the role of incubator 
for a re-emerging private sector, the Government has in many ways led and directed 
economic growth and innovation, targeting sectors believed to have the greatest potential; 
specifically focusing investment on: construction, infrastructure, tourism, real estate, energy 
and agricultural exports (RDB, 2014).  However some growth agendas do place an undue 
burden for poor, rural populations108 (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012).  
 
As Rwanda has worked to improve its operating environment for the private sector as well as 
entrepreneurs, it has drastically improved the ability and ease for businesses to become 
                                                        
106 Most notably for this discussion, some of the most defining country strategies: Vision 2020 (2000); 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (2002, 2009, 2013); Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Policy (2010) as well as the National Coffee Strategy (2008, 2014).    
107 Vision 2020’s outlook embodies some innate preferences to large-scale investors and large-scale business 
over small-scale actors. Business facilitation policies incentivize aim towards larger, capital intensive projects, 
which in some respects are understandable, as it is felt to be able to have larger impacts to the economy than 
smaller, informal actors.  However, without policies directly geared in helping small companies prioritize the 
incentives necessary for informal actors to formalize, income means remain isolated (Ansoms and Rostagno, 
2012).  
108 Taxes and fees are used as a strategy to relocate people or for government preferred activities, such as fees 
for not keeping cows in stables, not having acceptable (tin) roofing and fines for local authorities when not 
reaching growth targets.  The Government of Rwanda considered this as part of a wider rural development 
agenda (R_4, 2014). 
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established and operationally effective, currently ranked 46th out of 189 economies on the 
World Bank’s 2015 Ease of Doing Business Report.  Streamlining processes, reducing time 
and cost in registering and starting businesses, improving regulatory environments and 
establishing starter funds for new businesses within specific sectors (World Bank, 2014d; 
RDB, 2014).  This has led to increasingly competitive agendas within formal business 
climates as well as improved aims for agricultural productivity and encouraged foreign direct 
investment109 (GoR, 2000, 2007; Boudreaux, 2010).  
 
Reforms have reportedly led to positive results from the significant, recent increases in local 
business registration and improved productivity for increased export revenue and opportunity 
for those wishing to become involved in business, particularly within the coffee sector 
(Ex_R_2, 2014). While effectiveness and Government support to its development can 
continue to be improved, the private sector and entrepreneurs are seen as an effective and 
needed part of the country’s ever-growing economy.  One Exporter explained,  
The Government policy is positive.  It is difficult to mix public policy with private 
interests, as the private sector must always agree to what the government says.  In my 
father’s time he told me it was difficult to be successful.  But especially since the 
coffee sector has been opened, things have improved.  It is now much easier to 
operate and make more money.  The Government is involved, but I think to our 
benefit.  The President himself has been especially impactful in helping 
(international) buyers know about and appreciate Rwanda. (Ex_R_5, 2014) 
 
For sectors deemed to be high-growth, the Government has directed much focus, support and 
confidence in actors in the private sector.  One of the best examples of the Rwandan 
Government’s practical and proactive belief in the private sector is its evolving relationship 
with the coffee sector and Rwanda has made significant strides in rebuilding a functioning 
and effective private sector.  Case Study 6.7 below, describes the working relationship 
between the coffee industry’s private sector lobbyist and the Government.  
 
                                                        
109 The coffee sector has highly benefited from increases in FDI 
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6.3.2 Support Mechanisms (or lack of) for Entrepreneurship Promotion  
Additional initiatives from government policy as well as non-governmental actors can play a 
role in fostering entrepreneurial growth, increasing access to, and use of market information, 
improved financial acumen and business development trainings to develop human capital and 
managerial skillsets.  Government views of the coffee sectors paired with perception of 
entrepreneurial benefit sheds light on eagerness to use entrepreneurship and profit from its 
success.  Additionally, while entrepreneurship (at least publically), is acknowledged by both 
governments to be important, each country embraces its potential in different ways, 
impacting ability for entrepreneurs to stretch boundaries, innovate change and pursue 
opportunity both through business growth and technical development.  One mechanism for 
embrace in regards to capacity building is through allowances to civil society, international 
donors or non-governmental organizations to play an active role in supporting local actors.  
 
6.3.2.1 Ethiopia 
Involvement with Ethiopia’s business climate as well as coffee sector, from an international 
donor perspective, has not been as wide reaching or as in-depth as compared to Rwanda.  
Specific investment or development programs for entrepreneurs were not found110 through 
this research.  However, elements of entrepreneurial support were found through market 
development initiatives aimed at improving operational access and technical training.  
Specifically in regards to coffee, Ethiopia’s coffee history and importance to the national 
                                                        
110 Reportedly, a USAID funded program has started to implement training courses for women entrepreneurs in 
Ethiopia 
Case Study 6.7. Private Sector Lobbyist 
The Coffee Exporters and Processors Association in Rwanda (CEPAR) is a lobbyist group for Processors and 
Exporters of the coffee sector.  While the Rwanda Development Board focuses on business registration, 
marketing, and external investment, CEPAR links directly with Government agencies to provide feedback to 
policy makers on issues and lobby for needs of the sector.  According to the CEPAR Representative, the 
Government is actively supporting collaborative efforts of actors working together across the sector and while 
not all issues brought up with varying agencies have been addressed, increased responsibility has been allocated 
to private sector actors and the lobby group.  The collaborative nature of the relationship has benefited private 
sector actors, but also improved Government understanding of challenges and bottlenecks hurting sectoral 
growth.  For example, following CEPAR’s petition to have more control in the sector, the Government placed 
CEPAR in control for input distribution, beginning with the 2015 season.  (R_7, 2014) 
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economy has attracted interest and involvement from the international community and work 
has been undertaken for training, marketing support and cooperative development by 
USAID, TechnoServe, the Europe Union and World Bank (E_5, 2015).  The majority of 
development financing for the coffee sector, specifically in terms of improved practices, 
awareness raising and trainings, comes largely from ‘typical’ projects financed by these 
donors (Schubler, 2009).  Additional, significant bi-lateral investments have been made in 
support of Government policies and agendas to facilitate the country’s continued economic 
growth, however these efforts have not been ‘entrepreneur development specific’ (Triodos 
Facet, 2013; Ambaye et al., 2014).  
 
Perhaps the most significant multi-lateral support has facilitated the establishment of the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, which received large donor support from the European 
Commission, USAID, DFID and Oxfam, among others111.  USAID has continued to play a 
major role through the establishment of a Quality Lab providing quality (cupping) testing for 
product export, training and certifications112 for cuppers from across Africa (E_5, 2015).   As 
explained by a leading coffee quality expert,  
There is a lot of money going into the system for Ethiopian coffee, but it is not 
directed at the root problems and addressing these problems, from a productivity and 
quality standpoint is not prioritized.  Without incentives for quality, the local market 
continues to decline.  There is not a lot of innovation going on here as compared to 
other countries in terms of production, processing, and introducing new varietals; the 
more finite areas of maximizing quality potential.  (E_5, 2015) 
 
The establishment of the ECX marketplace and Auction for unified quality control of coffees 
was intended, in theory, to enable entrepreneurs and actors to improve productivity and sell 
products in a more efficient and transparent manner.  However, in reality, it has been 
observed to only support select Exporters, and not actors across other segments, with 
restrictive supply routes and quality classifications, hurting entrepreneurial growth potentials.  
Additional focus continues to be on the promotion of the establishment of successful 
cooperatives and cooperative unions to centralize training initiatives and investment (Petit, 
2007; Schubler, 2009; E_4, 2015).  However, less than 20% of producers are currently 
                                                        
111 Rumors persist as to the Exchange’s profitability and continued need for capital injection from donors to 
keep it afloat. 
112 Training and certification for Q-Level cuppers (highest level) continues to be funded through USAID. 
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involved in cooperative structures, with many smallholder producer respondents reporting to 
not wish to be involved with cooperatives do to a lack of trust (Minten et al., 2015). 
 
Direct Government efforts have focused significant investment into improved agricultural 
productivity (Minten et al., 2015).  Guided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MoARD), significant financing has been invested in providing technical 
support 113  of at least three agricultural extension agents in every Kebele 114  since 2010 
(MoARD, 2010; Minten et al., 2015).  Nationwide, these efforts have been reported by 
smallholder producers to improve awareness and technical training as well as increase 
production, however national yields have largely remained stagnant and frequent visits by 
extension agents were not found to be widespread (Minten et al., 2015).  While additional 
investment has been earmarked for the agricultural sector, direct investment to 
entrepreneurial promotion or support has been found wanting and entrepreneurial opportunity 
remains constricted. 
 
6.3.2.2 Rwanda 
Despite some of the criticism to the country’s growth maximization at all costs mentality, 
promotion of entrepreneurship and corresponding entrepreneurial motivation is recognized as 
an important input as well as by-product to the country’s continued growth and is an element 
within many of its economic policies (MTI, 2010; Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012).  As trust 
has been gained and effectiveness proven, business development support initiatives 115 
continue to be instituted to develop and support operational and financial management 
capacities, improve access and understanding of market information as well as simplify 
regulations to ease local business operations (MTI, 2010).  Evolving policies have led to 
greater incentives for the private sector to make and take decisions, risks, and investments 
based on market potential and profitability (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012).   As a result of 
                                                        
113 Technical training and support is provided for a variety of consumption and cash crop, however coffee is a 
major focus of training 
114 A Kebele is the smallest administrative unit designating land areas or wider communities and 
neighborhoods.  
115 Technical training of farmers as well as the initial establishment of additional processing centres has been 
largely fulfilled through the implementation of NGO projects and donor grants, beginning in the late 1990s and 
gaining speed in the early 2000s.  
  236 
some of this positive action, private investment into the economy has grown six times since 
2000 (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012). 
 
Rwanda, while largely financially unable to directly provide support via Government 
extension agents to its agricultural sector in support of improved technical proficiency and 
productivity output, has instead employed a wide use of international actors and donors to do 
much of the work of training, capacity building and financing on its behalf.  As such, support 
for enterprise development more broadly as well as specifically for the coffee sector has 
come through traditional donor avenues (Mutandwa et al., 2009).   
 
Rwanda’s economy, including its coffee industry, began to rebound at the end of the 1990s 
and early 2000s thanks in large part to donor programs, namely SNV, USAID, TechnoServe 
and the European Commission.  These entities not only built some of the initial infrastructure 
that enabled returning private sector actors and entrepreneurs to become involved with the 
coffee sector to not only begin businesses, but also to flourish through providing technical 
training, (both business and agricultural), financing mechanisms and by establishing market 
linkages with international coffee buyers (Ex_R_20, 2014; R_3, 2015).  Investment 
promotion also focused on improving the physical infrastructure for producing high quality 
coffee: constructing washing stations as well as providing the initial financing for many new 
entrants to the sector116.  In addition to capacity building at the farm level, donor projects 
worked with entrepreneurs, namely private export companies and processors, providing fee-
based services such as working capital, risk assessment, and management services, export 
logistics and connection with international buyers (TechnoServe, 2013a).    
 
USAID implemented some of the first in-depth support mechanisms to the coffee sector in 
the late 1990s, and its projects were very active in establishing and training processors, 
exporters and cooperatives in quality control, processing techniques and marketing, as well 
as providing financial support to entrepreneurs (Boudreaux, 2010).  President Kagame was 
also a critical part of international publicity pushes, increasing internal market exposure and 
attraction of international buyers (R_3, 2015).  However, direct Government investment 
                                                        
116 Prior to NGO project involvement the country had two washing stations in country it currently has 227.  
  237 
remains limited from an agricultural perspective in terms of training via agricultural 
extension agents, with many respondents reporting to have no dealings with Government 
Extension agents (MINAGRI, 2014; R_3, 2015).  The limited capacity for public sector 
investment can perhaps provide some explanation as to the concerted use of the Government 
to use the private sector and entrepreneurship to fill gaps it cannot.  Case Study 6.8 below, 
describes how one Exporter has used his business to provide benefits or fill gaps of public 
sector involvement.  
 
 
As will be seen in Section 7.4, the proactive practice of government to empower private 
sector actors or businesses as a wider development mechanism has not only provided market 
incentives for entrepreneurs to do so, but has increased access to hard to reach areas, 
increased indirect benefits through entrepreneurial business expansion and the attempt by 
entrepreneurs to gain or maintain a competitive edge, proving to have further stretched the 
frontiers of the coffee sector.   
 
6.4 What Influences Do Market Structures Have on Entrepreneurship? 
Market structures referred to in this research encompass tangible market dynamics (social, 
cultural and political norms), market pathways to opportunity, as well as political 
involvement within a certain sphere (Lee and Peterson, 2000).   While Rwanda has realized a 
winding down of Government involvement and an opening of market mobility for actors in 
its coffee sector, Ethiopia has seen a winding up of Government involvement and a 
constriction of actor’s market mobility.  Admittedly, influences to entrepreneurship within 
Case Study 6.8. Entrepreneurs Using Business to Provide Public Benefits 
This Exporter has five washing stations, operating within Rwanda’s southwestern coffee zone.  While 
admittedly operating a very large operation, he has also used his businesses to invest in social programs 
across his areas of operation.  Given the lack of Public agricultural programs, these investments include 
constructing infrastructure for local water supply, building schools and youth training programs.  He has 
also started to turn the cherry waste into compost and distributes it to his farmers to improve their 
production.  In addition, 2nd payments are made after the season to his suppliers.  He partnered with a 
Japanese buyer, which pays an additional $0.44/ kg green, for his speciality coffees as an additional 
investment for the implementation of social programs.  This is a unique partnership negotiated by this 
Exporter directly with his Japanese buyers.  The partnership enables this Exporter to provide much needed 
services to local areas of operation, securing supply and incentivizing farmers to provide high quality 
coffee, also giving the Japanese buyer a unique sales pitch to their consumers.  (Ex_R_20, 2014) 
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these specific contexts, particularly for smallholder producers, are also the existing 
limitations within a market structure, which may impede individuals from actually being able 
to pursue an opportunity recognized as an entrepreneur.  While the structures discussed 
below highlight norms and localized institutions that were found to encourage as well as 
discourage or impede entrepreneurship, Ethiopia and Rwanda are countries where market 
access can be limited for rural producers and as such, this has wider implications for an 
analysis on entrepreneurship considering who is allowed/ able to pursue entrepreneurial 
action.   
 
This section presents the differing approaches and structures to the Ethiopian and Rwandan 
coffee markets, analysing how differing market structures play a key role in supporting or 
impeding entrepreneurial action.  Table 6.5 below, has distilled elements of market structure 
influences per business segment discussed throughout this section in order to provide an 
overview of the differing, specific elements found to have influenced entrepreneurship within 
Ethiopia and Rwanda.  Information presented in the table is a synthesis of data gathered from 
observation, respondent responses, key informants and secondary source data.   
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Table 6.5. Market Structure Influences, per Segment 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 Ethiopia Rwanda 
S
m
a
ll
h
o
ld
er
 P
ro
d
u
ce
r
s - Forced supply to designated ECX Primary Market / Trader 
- No longer knows buyer 
- Limited ability to negotiate price , limited market accessibility 
- Eliminated opportunity for value add  currently incentivized to focus on 
quantity, not quality 
- Prohibited from moving ‘up’ chain, unable to expand coffee business 
- Eliminated opportunity for accessing financing from buyers, lost key avenue 
for expansion or investment, limited market accessibility  
- Entrepreneurial producers found to be investing profit in new, non-coffee 
ventures 
- Freedom to supply to any chosen buyer based on belief for best return  
- Proven opportunity for smallholder producer to expand business and move 
‘up’ chain 
- Incentivized to improve quality to attract increased sale price 
- GoR set minimum cherry price provides floor price, complaints of unfairly 
protecting producers at expense of processors and exporters 
- Environment can still result in limited market accessibility for some 
- Forced mandate to produce coffee if in ‘coffee zone’, decaffeinating 
illegal 
- Opportunity for innovation, business expansion, trail new techniques  
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l 
F
a
rm
er
s 
- Vertical Integration prohibited (Commercial Farm business forced to include 
production, processing, export facilities on-site) 
- Able to achieve certification due to traceability of product from farm 
production 
- Reduced incentive for out-sourcing with area farmers 
- Lack of single Government Agency to address concerns/ problems 
 
P
ro
ce
ss
o
rs
 
- Vertical Integration prohibited, unable to expand across segments 
- Forced to buy from ECX Primary Market, unable to know suppliers 
restricted from investing to improve product received 
- No longer knows buyer  unable to receive investment to improve product 
supplied 
- Eliminated option for certification/ reduced potential for value-add 
- Lost speciality value-add due to standardized ECX Grading  
- Lack of single Government Agency to address concerns/ problems 
- Vertical Integration promoted, actors freely able to move across chain in 
order to maximize business opportunities 
- Able to invest directly with supplier to improve capacity, quality and 
create incentives for ensured supply 
- Source from chosen producers via open competitive environment resulting 
in innovative incentives to suppliers 
- Opportunity for certification, Rw has highest #s of certified businesses  
- Forced mandate to produce FWC can have adverse impacts during low 
Prices or under supply 
E
x
p
o
rt
er
s 
- Vertical Integration prohibited, unable to expand across segments 
- Forced to purchase product at ECX Auction via blind purchase (never test 
product pre-purchase), questionable accuracy of ECX Grades 
- Lost speciality value-add due to standardized ECX Grading  
- Does not know suppliers, unable to invest to improve quality received 
- Increased cost of end product, increases difficulty for sale on Int’l Market 
- Eliminated option for certifications/ reduced potential for value-add 
- 80%+ national trade forced to flow through ECX structure 
- Lack of single Government Agency to address concerns/ problems 
Vertical Integration promoted, actors freely able to move across chain in 
order to maximize business opportunities 
- Able to invest directly with supplier to improve capacity, quality and 
create incentives for ensured supply 
- Opportunity for certification, Rw has highest #s of certified businesses  
- Forced mandate to produce FWC can have adverse impacts during low 
Prices or under supply 
- Int’l Buyers investment can strengthen business/ improve product  
- High-Quality, Speciality FWC increasing interest from Int’l Market 
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6.4.1 Market Structures, Regulations 
Structures of both coffee markets present an especially unique opportunity in which to view 
entrepreneurial action and understand the impacts from its external influences.  The ability of 
entrepreneurs to move in and throughout a market as well as the freedom to obtain needed 
resources in pursuit of opportunity recognition is found to be critical in enabling 
entrepreneurial action.  Through this research, markets encouraging mobility and actors 
operating with autonomy and access were found to have greater entrepreneurial dynamism.  
Where market mobility was restricted and opportunity access and resource allocation denied, 
entrepreneurship was found to be constricted or even severely lacking.  
 
6.4.1.1 Ethiopia 
No other coffee producing country has experienced as many institutional changes and drastic 
alterations to its coffee sector’s operational and regulatory environment as Ethiopia (Herhaus 
et al., 2014c).  Since the 1950s, nine different institutions have been formally responsible for 
the country’s most valuable product.  Prior to 1992, the coffee market was strictly regulated 
with fixed producer prices and operated through a monopoly of the State marketing entity, 
which placed additional taxes on producers (Worako et al., 2008).  At its peak, the State 
controlled more than 90% of the entire trade (Abate et al., 2003).  Private sector involvement 
was through politically connected businesses but otherwise had a very limited role (Clapham, 
2015).   
 
Abolishing the state-managed marketing agency in 1992 allowed actors throughout the chain 
to better negotiate and sell their product at the true market price.  However, while higher 
prices could be received, it ended the state-led, price stabilization mechanisms, increasing 
risk due to the industry’s inherent, high price volatility (Petit, 2007; Schubler, 2009).  In 
addition, many of the processing centres and plantations nationalized under the Derg Regime 
re-opened to private sector investors approved by the Government for purchase (Dempsey, 
2006).  Table 6.6 below, presents the differing authoritative and marketing institutions 
responsible for ensuring Ethiopia’s coffee production, processing and marketing.   
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Table 6.6. Ethiopia’s Coffee Oversight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source data: Herhaus et al., 2014c) 
 
Ethiopia’s economy re-opened in the early 1990s, but its coffee sector was believed too 
important to leave to the mercy of the uncontrolled wills of a private sector.   While the 
coffee sector has increased private sector participation and added opportunity for new actors, 
regulations and marketing controls have remained an established and effective mechanism of 
top-down control.  The country’s current marketing body, the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange (ECX), recognized as one of the most complicated coffee markets in the world, has 
maintained the systemic, top-down control for the Government117.   
 
Established initially in 2008 to support the high-volume trade of key domestic crops118 
(wheat, maize, teff), the ECX quickly shifted to high-volume, high-value, export 
commodities, starting first with coffee 119  (Chemonics, 2010; Sutton and Kellow, 2010; 
Tefera and Tefera, 2013; E_2, 2015).  The ECX system, in theory, has sought to regulate 
market flows, increase trade transparency, break export monopolies and increase negotiating 
power for producers, however as shown in Figure 4.2, it actually serves as a means to control 
the flow of harvested, processed, export bound coffee by driving it through the auction-based 
                                                        
117 ECX is legally an independent body, but comes under the direct purview of the Prime Minister’s office and 
the coffee sector is managed by Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and the ECX on equal platforms (Herhaus et al., 
2013c; E_3, 2015).  
118 A commodity exchange for only domestic market crops proved non-viable, and while the structure remained 
the same ECX market shifted to high-potential export crops (E_6, 2015).  
119 The ECX Market eventually added sesame, haricot beans, maize and wheat. Maize and wheat were initially 
forbidden for export due to food security concerns, however surplus grain quotas are allowed for export  
  Oversight Institution  
1956 Coffee Division, Ministry of Agriculture 
1957 - 1975 National Coffee Board  
1975 - 1977 Coffee Producing & Processing Enterprise  
1977 - 1978 Coffee & Tea Development and Marketing Authority  
1978 - 1992 Ministry of Coffee & Tea Development  
Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation  
1992 -1994 Ministry of State Farms, Coffee & Tea Development  
1994 - 2003 Coffee & Tea Authority  
2003 -2008 Ministry of Rural Development and Agriculture  
2008 - Present Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development & Ministry of Trade  
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) 
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exchange120 (Chemonics, 2010).  Through establishing this standardized structure for the 
market, vertical integration is now prohibited, eliminating potential benefits from sourcing 
relationships such as training or informal finance arrangements (Chemonics, 2010; E_3, 
2015).  While Government data on farm gate price is lacking, improved negotiating power 
and thus prices for producers are not thought to have improved.  Despite efforts attempting to 
limit vertically integrated monopolies, a handful of large companies (export sales over $5 
million USD/ year) continue to dominate the market and account for 80% of all export trade 
(World Bank, 2014a; E_4, 2015).  This current setup not only affords the State tremendous 
control over the sector but also through direct control linkages created within production, 
processing and export segments as well as through supply routes; instituting additional layers 
of bureaucracy and cost between Producer and Processor, Processor and Exporter, and 
Exporter and International Buyer121.  This control not only reduces supply flow efficiency, 
but also increases cost to doing business, suffocating entrepreneurial action with the pursuit 
of opportunity highly impeded, if not impossible.  
 
Ethiopia’s market structure, depicted in Figure 6.1 below, demonstrates the often convoluted 
market environment as well as the added layers (additional to production, processing and 
export segments) instituted through the ECX and the disruption to the market, from 
Government-mandated interventions.  Inability of actors to integrate across the chain has 
eliminated opportunity for financial investment between actors as well as incentives for 
improved product quality.  The inability of foreign investors and international buyers to 
invest in the chain prohibits a key avenue for needed financial injection into the sector or 
direct dealings to occur between supplier and buyer (E_5, 2015).  Additional constraints for 
the sector include high transport cost, distance to processing stations, and limited awareness 
about proper processing techniques and improved price potentials (Musebe et al., 2007).  An 
Exporter explained his changing perspectives below,  
I try to avoid risk in my business, it is a very difficult market and it is difficult to 
predict.  Recently we have put in strategies in order to limit the purchases of cherries 
(at the ECX Primary Market) to only what I can guarantee I can sell and will only 
                                                        
120 Ethiopian coffee is 93% more expensive to produce than Brazilian.  While costs are added through 
inefficient production systems, the added ‘levels’ within ECX also serve to push up prices (Chemonics, 2010) 
121 Reportedly, the auction system allows Government to keep track of product sales and export volumes as well 
as impose additional tax to ensure receipt of foreign exchange through its contract system.   
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purchase according to a set price.  In this way we minimize cost and risk. Usually the 
higher quality product is more unpredictable and so I buy mid-range now.  (Pc_E_7, 
2015) 
 
As shown through Figure 6.1, Government regulation via the ECX structure severely inhibits 
movement of operators throughout the chain, reducing entrepreneurial incentive and 
entrepreneurial action.  This forced supply impacts producers in where and how they are able 
to sell their products.  As described by this Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur, 
We (producers) have no other option than to sell to the traders we are told to.  If a 
farmer finds an ‘outside trader’ to sell to, the other traders make him an outcast and 
make it very political.  There used to be more choice, but now farmers are afraid and 
have no power and just sell to who they can, when they can (P_E_16, 2015). 
 
Considered an outcome of this research is the result from the market structure of the 
unexpected, disproportionately large number of smallholder respondents considered as 
Potential Entrepreneurs.  It was observed that many respondents had strong grasps of the 
market and even had plans for how to expand business to take advantage of market 
opportunities, however were seemingly prohibited from doing so.  
 
As discussed in Section 4.3.3.1, Smallholder Producers are required to supply to ECX 
Primary Markets or Cooperatives (if they are a member), although some producers reported 
to sell to area traders who sell on to Primary Markets.  The mandated sale to Primary Markets 
was observed to limit market accessibility for some smallholder producers.  Only ECX 
licensed Procurement Officers can buy from ECX Primary Markets for supply to Processing 
Stations and processing is undertaken either by private processing stations, cooperatives or 
processing venues within Commercial Farms.  Following processing, all trade flows through 
ECX warehouses where it is tested and graded/ approved for quality and classified according 
to processing type and sourcing zone and presented for purchase through the ECX Auction.  
A limited number of licences are available for Exporters to purchase directly from the ECX 
Auction so Exporters must either obtain a licence122 to purchase directly from the Auction or 
pay for an ECX licenced Broker to purchase in their stead.   Meant to ease the system, the 
                                                        
122 One Exporter reported to have purchased his ECX Export License in 2012 for over Eth Birr 2 Million 
($100,000), however cost is anticipated to have increased  (Ex_E_17, 2015). 
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intense regulation, added checks and business layers have instead increased Government 
control as well as end price.   
 
While Commercial Farmers and Cooperatives can bypass the ECX Auction and sell directly 
to international buyers, the segments only comprise approximately 15 to 20% of national 
volumes (Herhaus et al., 2013a).  As such, over 80% of the country’s production, processing 
and export is forced to pass through this regulated market structure.  This structure was 
observed to have a significant adverse impact on entrepreneurs and reduced interest in 
becoming involved with the sector from potential new entrants and entrepreneurs.  
 
Ethiopia’s coffee market structure is depicted in Figure 6.1 below.  Grey boxes depict areas 
of direct Government involvement through regulation, with arrows designating supply lines 
and service provision.  Additionally, while the ECX oversees the marketplace, the Ministries 
of Agriculture and Trade are equally responsible for the oversight of agricultural productivity 
and international promotion, respectively.  As such, there is not a single managing entity for 
the coffee sector, just multiple players equated on the same level (E_2, 2015; E_5, 2015; 
E_6, 2015).  As presented in Sections 4.3.3.1 and 5.2.2, business segments researched in 
Ethiopia are Producer, Commercial Farmer, Processor and Exporter, which are highlighted in 
red below.  As an element of production, private Commercial Farms have been included 
within research for the Ethiopian context, however, as previously described, privately held 
Commercial Farms are not part of the smallholder producer designation and thus are able to 
bypass ECX Auction and sell directly to International Buyers.  Due to regulatory 
constrictions, Exporters are designated as either ECX Members allowed to buy directly at the 
ECX Auction, or Non-ECX Members who must buy through Brokers prior to export.  
However, basic business operations and requirements are the same, so both were evaluated.  
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Figure 6.1. Ethiopia Coffee Market Structure and Product Flow 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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Figure 6.1 presented the flow of the market chain depicting forced product supply levels, 
ECX direct regulatory market intervention, areas of direct Government oversight as well as 
opportunity for financial investment within business segments and across the chain.  The 
country’s history and current implementation of oppression and restrictive market nature 
stifles entrepreneurial action, limiting means for expansion and/ or business innovation with 
actors less willing or able to take risk or pursue new opportunity.  One Ethiopian Processor 
described the environment:  
There is no new innovation in the market.  People just think inside the box and no one 
will do anything unique or new or unproven because they do not want to risk their 
business or jeopardize (their) standing with the Government. (Pc_E_11, 2015) 
 
The prohibited interaction between business segments has resulted in not only Producers, 
Processors and Exporters not knowing who they are selling to, or buying from, but has 
reduced market mobility and eliminated investment or financial flows from actors throughout 
the chain.  Prior to the establishment of ECX, vertically integrated companies were able to 
invest directly in suppliers, providing support mechanisms such as training or financing (E_4, 
2015).  As described by a Processor,  
Before ECX, I could buy directly from farmers, if there are issues with quality, I know 
who/ where to go.  This system impacts our relationship with farmers and my ability 
to invest in the quality of my product; I can’t.  Without connections, it is very difficult 
to receive quality cherries and I have now instituted a buying quota for my station to 
try to limit our risk. (Pc_E_21, 2015)  
 
6.4.1.1.1 Quality Classification 
Ethiopia’s market system aggregates coffee according to production region and specific 
quality grade.  However despite the possible 229 classifications123, some distinct regions, 
zones and specific varietals have yet to be classified.  Presenting a threat to speciality or 
distinctive coffees, if a variety has yet to be officially classified it is automatically blended 
with coffees of standardized classification.  This blending results in significant lost value and 
opportunity to increase prices received from the Producer to Export level (Chemonics, 2010).  
In addition, the inability to trace specific supplies back to specific processors, growers or 
                                                        
123 Coffee grades consist of coffee production type, production zone and quality grade.  10 Quality Grades exist 
for Ethiopian coffee with grades 1-8 mandated for export and 9 and 10 allowed to be sold for domestic 
consumption.   It is illegal to sell export quality coffee in the domestic market (Chemonics, 2010).  
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distinct area origins due to blending and forced classification has removed the option to 
capitalize upon certain certification schemes due to a lack of traceability.  In effect, this 
system removes more than 80% of the country’s most valuable product from benefiting from 
value added schemes such as certification, single origin and micro-lot specialties; removing 
another key opportunity for entrepreneurs to improve business standing (Herhaus et al., 
2014a; E_5, 2015).  As discussed with an expat, working as a USAID contractor responsible 
a coffee technical quality and training project:  
Most producing countries have largely reached their maximum production and 
quality potential.  However, Ethiopia has reached, perhaps 60% of its potential.  But 
there is no incentive or pressure to improve or take advantage of this extra 40%.  In 
Ethiopia, nobody is researching or testing new varieties or new processing 
techniques or areas of the country.  And because this current system does not support 
it, it is all lost opportunity and money. (E_5, 2015) 
 
An EU sponsored market assessment found that losses of potential revenue from not only 
low productivity but also the inability for certification of the majority of Ethiopia’s coffees 
results in an estimated annual loss of two to three times the current market value124 (Herhaus 
et al., 2014a).  This lost opportunity is a lost opportunity for entrepreneurs unable to improve 
efficiency or maximize potential of specialty products or diversify product portfolios.  
Additionally, given variability of price, this has largely removed incentives to scale up or 
focus on quality.  
 
6.4.1.1.2 Quality Control and Marketing 
All processed coffee is submitted to the ECX for quality inspection grading and then traded 
at the ECX Auction through an open, call-out, competitive bidding process (Chemonics, 
2010).  Ethiopia’s traditional auction system125 allowed buyers and sellers to literally smell, 
touch and taste the specific products offered, determining quality and negotiating price.  
However, now the physical coffee is never brought to the auction house in Addis Ababa and 
buyers are unable to see the product prior to bid (E_3, 2015).  No longer able to see or pre-
test physical quality of the coffee pre-purchase, buyers must rely on the ECX standardized 
                                                        
124 2014 coffee revenue was an approximate $800 million, out of a Government target of $2.5 billion 
125 Ethiopia’s traditional auction system was first introduced in the early 1600s, but was not a formalized entity 
until 1971. 
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grading system.  Still an unproven system, this has resulted in entrepreneurs reducing buying 
strategies and international buyers beginning to look elsewhere.  
 
From the grade given at ECX inspection, buyers are theoretically able to ‘source’ from 
specified regions, different grades and at somewhat regulated (suggested) prices126 as the 
ECX has sought to standardize all coffees traded per region 127   (Worako et al., 2013).  
However, many respondents complain of vastly differing grades received from what they 
believe was delivered; to date, no mechanism exists to challenge ECX grades.  Diminished 
trust in the market system and in the truth of product quality has resulted in condensed 
business outlooks with many entrepreneurs reducing operations in an effort to limit or 
mitigate risk.  As one Exporter explained:   
I do not believe the ECX grading, so I have stopped purchasing the top grades 
because I do not trust them. I have had experiences thinking I bought Grade 3 and 
when I test it myself it is grade 5 or 6 and I then have problems with my buyers 
(international importers).  I am not alone in experiencing this.  It is an expensive 
product and you are not guaranteed to get what you pay for.  And if you don’t agree, 
there is nothing you can do, so you must protect yourself in other ways.  I estimate I 
generally loose 30% from grade differentials between what I receive and what I 
export, following my own grading and sorting. (Ex_E_18, 2015) 
 
The restrictive and dictated market structure was found to severely limit entrepreneurial 
potential for opportunity pursuit or business expansion.  The difficult business climate and 
restrictive market structure was also found to create an adverse influence on entrepreneurs 
resulting in reduced risk taking and innovation and reduced self-belief in abilities to take 
advantage of opportunity or willingness to pursue business success.  
 
6.4.1.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda liberalized its coffee sector in 1995 and has since worked to more completely open 
its market in order to increase its effectiveness.  As will be seen, the market structure allows 
for, if not promotes, vertical integration of actors not only to improve product flow and actor 
                                                        
126 Region and grade determined by agro-ecology, origin, bean shape, processing method and cup profile 
(Workao et al., 2013). 
127 This system makes coffees untraceable and also limits potential for unique, diverse batches to be maximized 
and sold independently. 
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mobility, but to enable actors, specifically entrepreneurs the opportunity to provide services 
and fill gaps left by the public sector, including financing, training, input supply and product 
sourcing.  The market structure also enables producers the opportunity to select buyers.  
Additionally, Processors and Exporters have the opportunity to determine exactly from 
whom they will buy, creating incentives in a mutually beneficial, competitive environment.  
More entrepreneur respondents have embraced this opportunity, working with dedicated 
supply bases in which they could direct and influence quality standards in accordance with 
unique market opportunities.  This process was observed to have improved competitive 
environments and enabled entrepreneurial action. While some producers 128  reported to 
simply supply to the closest buyer, more entrepreneurial minded producers reported to weigh 
supply options between what was best believed to garner the largest benefit package, both in 
cash and in kind.   As described by this Rwandan Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur, 
I have always been in coffee, but now the market is much easier.  Now, one, we do not 
have to process by hand and can just sell cherry to washing stations and two, there 
are more stations in my area now and that is good for me because the stations 
compete for my cherries. I do not make my choice (of station to supply) only on price, 
I decide to supply based on the entire package I can receive, sometimes it means 
transporting longer distances, but it is better for me. (P_R_70, 2014) 
 
While Rwanda does have a much more open and fluid market structure than Ethiopia, the 
Government has also used regulation to push agendas.  Minimum cherry purchase prices are 
set by the Government throughout the season, calculated off the NY-C price, established, in 
theory, to protect smallholder producers (R_3, 2015).  However, many Processors and 
Exporters say this artificially pushes prices up, making on-sale difficult (R_1, 2014).  In 
addition, the National Agricultural Export Board (NAEB) mandates the free distribution of 
chemicals and fertilizers for producers.  However, due to free input supply, no local, private 
market exists for coffee input providers 129  and producers have high difficulty sourcing 
additional supplies.  
 
                                                        
128 The two main options for supply is to a cooperative or directly to a private coffee washing station, although 
supply to Informal Traders was common for producers in more remote areas, further from markets or with 
difficult transport options.   
129 Fertilizers and chemical inputs are distributed for other selected crops as well.  Some inputs are reported to 
be available on the local market for use on crops not receiving free input distribution, however these products 
are not compatible with coffee.  
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This Input Distribution Fund is financed through taxes levied on Exporters for all coffee 
exported.  Additional costs are also calculated into minimum purchase prices set at producer 
level so producers essentially, are partly subsidizing their own ‘free’ receipt of inputs.  
Actual distribution of inputs was transferred in 2014 to CEPAR, a private sector lobby group 
comprised of Processors and Exporters; demonstrating another area in which the Rwandan 
Government continues to relinquish control to an ever evolving and more fully equipped 
private sector.  However, distributions are chronically underfunded and undersupplied, and 
input provision for 2014 only met 35% of required amounts (R_4, 2015).  Given this 
challenge, innovative Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs reported to be either producing 
their own compost, or were sometimes able to secure the purchase of fertilizer from other 
producers.  A Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur explained,  
We never get all the fertilizer we need.  It is very difficult to find additional fertilizer 
that has been distributed, people will sell what they are given, but it is very expensive.  
I make additional from animal manure and compost and that helps our trees produce 
a good quality. (P_R_63, 2014)  
 
An additional regulation imposed by the Government is the mandate to produce and process 
only fully washed coffee, as sun-dried production was made illegal in 2011130 (R_3, 2015).  
This was found to hurt some entrepreneurs, whose business models targeted sun-dried 
production, mainly selling cross-border to Uganda (Ex_R_13, 2014).  As presented in 
Section 4.4.3.1, the only way for Rwanda to compete within the international coffee market 
is through the production of the highest quality coffee in order to offset difficulty and 
expense of export as well as its relatively low production volumes131.  In 2002, only 1% of all 
exported coffee was considered fully washed; as of 2014, 41% was sold as fully washed.  
This is the result of not only a political will to revitalize the sector, but efforts from the 
private sector and entrepreneurs who were enabled to expand market reach, push boundaries, 
increase supply and improve sector efficiency (MINAGRI, 2014; R_3, 2015). 
 
                                                        
130 While sun-dried production is still technically illegal, 2014 processing results revealed only 41% of total 
production is fully washed; 59% of national production is sun-dried.  While efforts to improve are made to 
increase processing, often the government is reported to turn a blind eye in the sale of semi-washed.  However 
sale across borders is being monitored and restricted mainly due to lost revenue. 
131 Rwanda produces less than 1% of the internationally traded volume  
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The Rwandan Government has also outlawed the decaffeination of coffee farms for 
producers located in coffee production zones (the majority of the country, except for very 
arid zones in the north-east).   This forced production was reported to be very challenging for 
many producers due to the prolonged time-delay before harvest possibility and thus 
prolonged economic returns.  Additionally, actual farmland space competes with 
consumption crops creating difficulty for households reliant on production for means of its 
own consumption. 
 
Figure 6.2 below, depicts the product flow, financial investment and direct government 
involvement in the Rwandan coffee market.  As seen in the diagram below, the Rwandan 
market is a much more open and fluid structure, inherently enabling entrepreneurs to create 
new opportunity and push the boundaries of the sector forward.  As seen, financing can be 
sourced and flows freely between actors throughout the chain.  Again business segments 
identified in this research are Producers, Processors and Exporters, highlighted in red.  As 
seen, the chain benefits from the more open structure as compared to Ethiopia and product 
flow stems from a natural, uninhibited sourcing environment, enabling and incentivizing 
business segment overlap, fostering an environment in which entrepreneurial action can 
flourish through unique processing techniques, sourcing schemes, and financial investment, 
much to the benefit of the wider sector.  Arrows depict product and financial flows and grey 
boxes indicate direct government oversight.  
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Figure 6.2. Rwanda Coffee Market Structure and Product Flow 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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As seen in Figure 6.2, direct Government involvement and oversight comes only at the end 
of the chain through the National Agricultural Export Board whose mandate is to review all 
export contracts and coffee for approval, prior to release of customs132.  While technically 
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI), NAEB operates as an 
independent government entity, which serves to advise policy makers on needed regulations 
as well as achievements of the sector.  
 
6.4.1.2.1 Quality and Marketing 
The open structure of the Rwandan coffee market enables incentive structures to be 
introduced for Producers, Processors and Exporters able to recognize and take steps to 
maximize opportunity towards the advancement of business agendas or to pursue new 
opportunity.  In addition, vertical integration allows actors to operate at multiple segments 
along the chain and can provide much needed financing through pre-order purchases, to 
secure supply or invest in improved quality.  A monopolizing effect from vertical integration 
has yet to be observed within the Rwandan market.  An Entrepreneur who began as a 
Smallholder Producer, and expanded his business across the coffee chain is presented in Case 
Study 6.9. 
 
 
Entrepreneurial individuals were found to have recognized and took steps to maximize 
advantages through the pursuit of improved quality, production volumes and specific 
                                                        
132 NAEB states this role is necessary to be able to enforce contract fulfillment on behalf of Exporters to ensure 
and protect the Rwandan Brand.  However, Exporters view this an unnecessary step with additional cost.  
Case Study 6.9. Rwanda Vertical Integration 
This Rwandan Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur was vertically integrated throughout the coffee chain.  
He grew up in a coffee producing family, but did not receive any land through inheritance.  He invested in 
his own small farm and also worked construction, building washing stations (he estimates to have been a 
part of constructing over 20 stations).  From this experience, he saw potential for improving his margins if 
he were able to process his own coffee. He built his own washing station, initially sourcing cherry from a 
small number of neighbours.  He has expanded his own farm to now 12,000 trees and has registered as an 
export business, and is currently looking for a buyer.  He has also invested his own money to build a local 
farmer training school for area coffee growers.  When asked for why he has pursued this strategy he stated, 
“I want to first improve myself economically, but then I also want to support others and help my 
community.” (P_R_68, 2014) 
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growing requirements as required through certifications133 such as Fair Trade and Organic.  
Entrepreneurs were found to have expanded and increased business holdings by increasing 
involvement and investing in new business opportunity along the chain in order to improve 
market holdings and take advantage of additional new market opportunities.  As described by 
this Rwandan Exporter 
I produce, process and sell high, niche quality, micro-lot coffees; only about 12 
tonnes (green) per year.  I am working with area farmers to expand, but only if their 
quality is right.  I do provide training on proper practice for proven farmers.  While it 
is not a high volume, my price per kilo is very high because this is so unique and of 
limited supply. (Ex_R_3, 2014) 
 
Rwanda’s coffee sector has witnessed rapid scaling and expansion since the early 2000s.  In 
order to maintain competitiveness, Rwandan Processor and Exporter Entrepreneurs looked to 
institute options to attract reliable and sustainable sourcing from an area’s best Producers.  
While not all Processors and Exporters chose to invest in the supply chain at the producer 
level, those that did were observed to be more interested in capturing select or niche markets.  
Several Processors had also instituted unique steps in grading product supply with an 
according payment scale, to further incentivize producers (Ex_R_1, 2014); as will be seen in 
Section 7.4. 
 
The openness of Rwanda’s market structure also allows international buyers to invest in the 
sector at processing and exporting stages.  While this can provide significant financial flows, 
(pre-purchase of product as a means of providing up-front financing) some Rwandan 
companies are struggling to compete against larger international firms attracting capital at 
significantly lower levels134.  A worrying trend for Rwandan coffee businesses has been the 
recent emergence of Processors and Exporters being bought out by larger conglomerates or 
becoming insolvent due to the inability to compete with international actors (R_1, 2014; 
2015).  Evidence to a wider global trend of dominance by large international importing and 
                                                        
133 An individual smallholder producer cannot be certified, but instead certification comes at the point of 
Processing and/ or Export and in return, these individuals institute working arrangements with producers to 
adhere to certification requirements.  
134 International borrowing rates were reported to be as low as 3% for international companies, whereas lending 
rates from a Rwandan institution are 14-21%. 
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roasting companies (Ponte, 2002), this recognizably can, and conceivably may, impact the 
feasibility and viability of national entrepreneurs to compete within Rwanda’s coffee sector. 
 
This trend further provides evidence to current difficulties Rwanda continues to have within 
its banking sector, largely tied to issues with liquidity and high lending costs.  This trend has 
been acknowledged to put pressure for the national banking sector to improve its services.  
While it remains to be seen if this is directly deterring new market entrants or entrepreneurial 
expansion in the sector, it is something actors, lobbyist and policy makers are watching 
closely.  Additionally, the Rwandan banking sector is highly risk averse due to its recent 
history of being unable to recoup much of the initial investment from the first lending waves 
to cooperatives in the late 1990s and early 2000s (R_3, 2014). 
 
The open, relatively unrestricted structure of Rwanda’s coffee market has embraced the 
nature of entrepreneurship in terms of opportunity exploration and pursuit.  This has enabled 
entrepreneurs operating along the chain to take risks and use innovative schemes to secure 
supply routes, improve product flow and provide both financial incentives and non-monetary 
benefits to increase competitive standing and overall business outlook.  As a result, not only 
has Rwanda’s coffee market improved through increased market potential and product 
supplied to the international market, but entrepreneurs have also been able to fill market gaps 
as well as gaps left by the Public Sector.  
 
6.4.2 Commoditization and Specialization, Effects on Entrepreneurship from a Non-
Liberalized vs. Liberalized Market  
Building from the understanding of the market structure, analysis between the Ethiopian and 
Rwandan markets presents another valuable comparison for entrepreneurs operating at 
differing ends of a liberalized spectrum.  Rwanda operates within a fully liberalized, 
relatively open marketplace geared towards enabling the private sector with free movement 
of actors throughout the chain.  Ethiopia however, is characterized by state–led control and 
oversight, restricting movement of actors and thus removing incentives for entrepreneurs to 
look outside operational segments or work with supply chains up or down stream.  Ethiopian 
and Rwandan markets are in pursuit of divergent paths of commoditization and specialization 
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and analysis of the non-liberalized and liberalized sectors provide differing opportunity 
pursuits and impacts entrepreneurial action in different ways.  Analysing market growth 
trends towards a commoditized or specialized product provides not only additional evidence 
to the impacts of an open or closed marketplace on the coffee sectors, but demonstrates the 
limited or increased options for entrepreneurial action. 
 
6.4.2.1 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia’s non-liberalized market has seen the evolving commercialization of its coffee 
sector become commoditized through ECX’s focus of incentivizing volumes over and instead 
of quality and variety; reducing product diversity and unifying price structures135.   This 
research found the sector to be less entrepreneurial due to the restrictive nature of its market 
structure, which prohibits movement, dis-incentivizes innovation and risk taking due to the 
increased oversight and Government involvement.  It has also eliminated opportunity for the 
overlap of segments across the chain, removing opportunity for informal training or 
financing investment.  Many respondents were found to often recognize opportunity and 
potential that could improve individual business competitiveness or provide business 
expansion but were unable to take advantage, or even pursue because of restrictive market 
access or inaccessibility of resources.  The inability of movement and action by respondents 
within this research context increased difficulty in being able to determine a clear distinction 
between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs due to of the reduced action taken.    
 
Despite the many market restrictions, Ethiopia has not limited the type of coffee processing: 
fully washed or sun-dried.  While no restrictions exist for processing method, for decades 
Ethiopia’s fully washed production has stagnated at just 30% of total volume, thus only 30% 
is processed in a way believed to maximize quality potential.  The remaining 70% is sun-
dried coffee, processed by hand by producers on farm site (E_2, 2015; MoT, 2015).  An 
example of the non-liberalized market repercussions and the severe limitations of financial 
                                                        
135 In this research, commercialization is defined as the process by which a product is brought into a general 
market (Ethiopia’s specific experience has seen an evolving modernization of its involvement with the 
international coffee trade since the 1970s).  Likewise, commoditization is defined as a process in which goods 
within a specific category become relatively indistinguishable overtime and become so similar the only 
remaining distinguishable element is price (Pingali et al., 2005; Lotti, 2010).  Highlighting this distinction is 
believed important to this research in order to show the evolving coffee market of Ethiopia and how the current 
system is impacting product offering diversity, price and incentive structures throughout the chain.  
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accessibility, is a common practice of Smallholder Producers incentivized to produce 
generally lower quality, sun-dried coffee on farm site and store it at home for use as a savings 
mechanism.  This is believed to indicate outcomes from reduced pricing from diluted or 
diminished quality grading structures, with lower overall price due to focus on volume and 
not quality.  Sun-dried as a savings mechanism is described by this Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur,  
I sell some of my red cherry after harvesting to the market for cash and process the 
rest (sun-dried).  We store it at home and sell throughout the rest of the year; 
sometimes I sell to a trader or another farmer if I really need money.  I cannot sell all 
at once because I am afraid I will spend it all and not have money for later. (P_E_9, 
2015) 
 
The entrepreneur’s inability to access finance or accrue savings (to be further discussed in 
Section 6.5.1.1), presents a natural limit for scale-up potential of fully-washed production.  It 
also presents lost opportunity for the wider sector in regards to lost added value through 
fully-washed production as sun-dried coffee is sold to Processors as dried pods.  In pre-
processed, dried pod form, buyers are largely unable to determine quality, putting undue risk 
and burden on Processors as well as the additional missed opportunity to maximize natural 
quality potentials.  
 
Ethiopian Smallholder Producers complained of high restrictions on where and to whom 
supply was allowed.  Restrictions are enforced at the Ethiopian producer level in terms of 
large area classification on distinct type of coffee zone136 (i.e. Sidama A, B, C, D, E or 
Yirgacheffee A or B), however, within those large zones individuals theoretically should be 
free to supply to any ECX buyer or ECX Primary Market they wish (E_7, 2015).  However, 
producer respondents reported to not have the freedom to supply to their choice of processor, 
buyer or trader, revealing that often, local law enforcement officials enforced where and how 
product is supplied137.  The forced supply of the smallholder producer at the Primary Market 
level further eliminated incentives, potential benefits and choice, resulting in reduced 
bargaining power for Smallholder Producers.  Reduced ability to choose own market is 
                                                        
136 Different ‘zones’ have different varietals and distinct tastes, thus reason to maintain zone separation 
137 Discussions with ECX officials and the Managing Director of the Cooperative Union in the area both 
disputed the claim 
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another lost potential action for respondents who might otherwise be able to be classified as 
an entrepreneur.  As described by one Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur, 
We used to be able to sell directly to processing stations or sell sun-dried directly to 
the market.  Now there is nowhere to sell to but designated traders.  The Police 
enforce where we are able to sell, they keep close watch on people. (P_E_8, 2014) 
 
6.4.2.1.1 Commoditization  
Ethiopia’s coffee industry has been built over centuries and the name and long history helps 
to maintain a very recognizable product on consumer shelves.  Additionally, Ethiopian coffee 
has a naturally high quality baseline, making it inherently superior to most other coffees in 
the world (E_5, 2015; E_8, 2015).  Despite the country’s most valuable export, the ECX 
system has steered coffee on a track towards commoditization through market structures and 
regulation, resulting in lost opportunity for specialization, innovation and business 
expansion.  Given Ethiopia’s quality potential, focus on commoditization (as opposed to 
specialization) is not only lost opportunity, but also creates increased international 
competition from the majority of other producing countries, which typically produce a lower 
grade or commercial quality due to limited inherent natural endowments and naturally 
reduced quality potentials.  By competing internationally with these suppliers, price is further 
reduced through the international oversupply of commercial and low-grade coffee.  Given 
Ethiopia’s expensive production costs, already small margins become further minimalized.   
 
While the current Government and economy rely heavily upon the coffee sector, it also relies 
heavily upon its history and coffee’s natural high quality baseline for the product to in 
essence, sell itself.  A discussion about the impact and lack of success of the ECX 
commoditization system with a CEO of a large exporting company, with a family history in 
coffee since King Menelik II (1870s), is detailed below in Case Study 6.10. 
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The Ethiopian structure of commoditization through the ECX is creating an environment 
built to incentivize quantity over quality.  While operational models geared towards high 
volume management could also be an entrepreneurial endeavour, entrepreneurs have reported 
to diversify less and become less innovative as they are working to pursue success in areas 
that are already proven, as opposed to risk new ventures or business expansion into new 
areas.  Entrepreneurs that are expanding, are doing so within the existing business segment, 
such as adding additional processing stations or pursuing additional international buyers, but 
are not becoming involved at multiple stages along the chain.  Additionally, some are simply 
pursuing coffee profits in order to invest in other businesses.  Several entrepreneurs 
interviewed reported to be hesitant of new opportunity despite the possibility of viable 
returns if results do not fit appropriately into the ECX system as it currently stands.   An 
Ethiopian Exporter explained,  
From my perspective, as an entrepreneur taking risk, theoretically the Government 
should not interfere.  But people feel there is this intervention by the Government and 
so are scared to push boundaries and take risk.  Also, the over regulation keeps 
individuals from doing just that.  You can call it a negative influence on 
entrepreneurship. (Ex_E_10, 2015) 
 
Case Study 6.10.  Challenges of ECX Commoditization 
“There are many problems with the ECX system and I believe we are doing permanent damage to Ethiopia’s 
coffee.  The country will never reach the Government’s annual target ($2+ billion in coffee revenues) because we 
can no longer focus on specialty coffee and are loosing opportunity for maximizing the product, getting premium 
prices and building the brand; in 2014 the industry brought in what, less than $800 million?  The Government 
knows the system is not the best and not preforming as wished.  But you now have many people very interacted in 
the system and making money, so it is difficult to change, it is risky politically and the Government cannot take 
rapid, large disruptive action.  In Ethiopia it is difficult to control 90 million people, and usually the Government 
falls back into familiar tactics…  As a business, we had to become more sensitive to risk than we used to be and 
have reduced some business activity.” 
 
“In theory, commoditization is not bad and it is what the World Bank and IMF push for in terms of broader 
economic development.  But the rest of our economy is not yet at a stage (to be able) to fully support a 
commoditized industry.  You have to also realize that there was also much pressure from international buyers to be 
able to buy speciality product at cheap, commodity level prices because it is a benefit for their domestic markets.  
Consider the financiers of the ECX system: USAID, Oxfam, DFID, the EC.  What are the major import markets 
for Ethiopian coffee?”  (E_4, 2015) 
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Through the current regulatory environment, Commercial Farms are being established in 
western coffee producing zones with large land availability138.  While private commercial 
farm models may be much more efficient and productive than decentralized, rural 
smallholder producers, Ethiopia’s Commercial Farms are located in areas with naturally 
lower quality ceilings and thus are producing large volumes, but at lower quality potentials.   
As such, entrepreneurs operating business in these areas have the most efficient production 
mechanisms, however are producing very large volumes of a lower quality product (E_5, 
2015).  This is believed to result in a long-term decline in the market with potentially 
significant damage to the Ethiopian Brand.  However, discussions with policy makers and 
managers within ECX showed an overall lack of belief in the needs for quality improvement 
and disbelief in the required cost outlay for debateable returns (E_3, 2015; E_8, 2015).  This 
was also reflected through the very limited investment in local research institutions and 
overall lack of commitment towards entrepreneurial innovation in the sector, which, as has 
been shown, damages entrepreneurship outlook and potential for opportunity pursuit. 
 
6.4.2.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda’s liberalized market concentrates on product specialization, focusing on speciality, 
high-grade, fully washed coffee.  It is a marketplace in which Entrepreneurs have greater 
space to take risk, innovate and build upon positive self-belief and experimentation to push 
boundaries within the more open market structure.  Rwandan Entrepreneurs, specifically in 
respect to this research, were found to be much more innovative, risk tolerant and in eager 
pursuit of opportunity, actively filling market gaps across the chain.   The liberalized market 
created a system where Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs were also more easily 
distinguished, with those that saw opportunity able to pursue it.  A Rwandan Exporter 
described some of his business success with regards to the current market system,  
The Government has reduced taxes and regulations and we can now move our coffee 
much faster to the port (Mombasa, Kenya).  The Government has also encouraged 
business people to become ‘job creators’.  Entering into business in coffee is 
challenging, but operationally it is becoming easier to deal with licences and while I 
think the banks can improve lending procedures, things are moving in a positive 
direction.  (Ex_R_9, 2014) 
                                                        
138 Often irrespective of current communities living in or near the areas 
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Rwanda presents an ideal climate (both environment and business) for high-grade coffee 
production as well as the pressure to maximize in order to stay competitive and relevant 
within the international market. While the country has exported commercial grade coffee for 
decades, large-scale speciality coffee for export from Rwanda remains largely unknown to 
the international consumer (MTI, 2008).   This recognized need to stay competitive 
corresponds to the focus of fully washed production as well as a supported liberalization of 
the domestic coffee market.   While the Government has supported policy initiatives to 
improve production quantity and quality, it is also working to establish an alternative national 
narrative.   
 
Several areas of the market (and this is believed to be growing) are based around incentive 
systems for quality where enterprising individuals can take advantage. The open market 
platform enables entrepreneurs to innovate and pursue opportunity via quality differentials, 
product diversification as well as methods to increase volumes.  Specific evidence for this 
can be seen through the advancement of product certification of Rwanda’s coffee.  A 
Processor explained the benefits he has experienced through certification in Case Study 6.11.   
Specialization and value added opportunity could not only result in higher prices for 
producers, but also (in theory) improve social, economic and environmental conditions.  
However, the actual effectiveness of certification and impact at the smallholder level can be 
questioned in terms of the added value proportion received by the smallholder.  Regardless, 
Rwanda has one of the highest numbers of Fair Trade Certified coffee businesses on the 
continent (Elder et al., 2012; MINAGRI, 2014).   
 
Case Study 6.11. Certified Coffees 
“I bought my washing station from the bank following the foreclosure by the former owner and decided to focus on 
certified coffees.  I now have Rainforest Alliance and Organic Certifications.  It is an expensive and intensive 
process, but I have found I make more money on final export prices.  In addition, I can work with producers as well 
as workers at my processing station to implement and develop social programs.  Through these programs (healthcare, 
local savings schemes, trainings and helping to pay for school fees) I have been able to rebuild relationships with the 
farmers, as it was badly damaged by the last station owner.   I also recently started a consulting company to provide 
certification services to other station owners and exporters.  The only way Rwanda can compete is through high, high 
quality and value-addition.  Certifications allow us to do that, but they also provide a payment for social services we 
are able to provide.” (Pc_R_2, 2014) 
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The Rwandan Government targeted the coffee industry as one of three main industries to 
jump-start the economy following the war in 1994 (MINAGRI, 2014).  Following 
liberalization, much popularity has been raised across the country and with international 
actors, to attract local entrepreneurs as well as woo international investors, through a focus 
on Rwanda’s high quality, speciality product and specialized industry focus.  Preferential 
lending rates have also been established for qualifying businesses and the Government 
directed many actors in the NGO sector to support development through the construction of 
processing stations and attracting international buyers139 .  Through Rwanda’s pursuit of 
quality, the market has begun to specialize itself and capitalize upon and continue to work to 
maximize the naturally high quality potentials and ability of entrepreneurs to push boundaries 
in pursuit of new opportunity.  Some entrepreneurs in the Processing and Export segments 
have instituted grading systems to incentivize quality as well as provide non-monetary means 
as benefits to attract and secure supply.  
 
6.5 What Are the Available Local Resources Influencing 
Entrepreneurship? 
An entrepreneur may in fact recognize potential and be inclined to pursue opportunity, 
however, opportunity recognition cannot be realized without the existence of necessary 
resources (Sarason et al., 2006).  As described in Section 2.5.1, the existence of, or ability to 
access these resources may dictate potential and depth of entrepreneurial action, especially 
within markets where financial, regulatory and legal systems are deficient (Shane et al., 
2003).  Within this research context, available resources are understood as access to and 
availability of financing, land ownership and usage rights, access to information (market 
demand, trends, and price) and available technology.  Local resource availability outlined 
through these determinants creates structures for enabling or prohibiting an entrepreneur’s 
action toward opportunity pursuit as well as influences the strategies made or of decisions 
taken (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Shane et al., 2003; Rocha, 2004).  Financial access, land 
ownership and labour divisions within a household may impact men and women differently, 
                                                        
139  President Kagame himself was instrumental in attracting international clientele, spearheading initial 
marketing pitches and meetings with International Buyers, Donors and Funding Governments and was 
instrumental in implementing and scaling up first coffee donor initiatives via USAID projects (R_4, 2014).  
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specifically within these research settings (Aterido et al., 2013).  Additional institutional 
factors may also represent restrictions for women to pursue entrepreneurial opportunity 
through property right restrictions and differences in access to financial credit services 
(Aterido et al., 2013; Ali et al, 2014).  As will be discussed throughout this section, legal land 
ownership for smallholder producers remains a challenge and is additionally compounded by 
women actors in these settings due to traditional social norms restricting access and 
ownership potential (Ali et al., 2014).  While this inaccessibility is recognized as having the 
potential to impact outcomes of this examination of entrepreneurship, this study did not take 
a gendered approach and as such, did not specifically investigate the possible adverse 
impacts from inaccessibility of finance or land ownership for women entrepreneurs.  
 
Table 6.7 below, has distilled elements of resource availability influences per business 
segment discussed throughout this section in order to provide an overview of the differing, 
specific elements found to have influenced entrepreneurship within Ethiopia and Rwanda.  
Information presented is a synthesis of data gathered from observation, respondent responses, 
key informants and secondary source data.   
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Table 6.7. Local Resource Availably Influences, per Segment  
(Source: Author Construct) 
 Ethiopia Rwanda 
S
m
a
ll
h
o
ld
er
 P
ro
d
u
ce
r
s - Inability to access formal finance due to limited acceptable collateral, 
relatively small loan request size, lack of credit history  
- Limited availability of formal financial institutions in rural areas 
- Mistrust in formal lending institutions, need for increased awareness  
- Strong informal savings and loan system in rural communities 
- Increased pressure of land, reduced availability 
- Producers have usage rights, not ownership rights 
- Market Information access is difficult, reduced negotiating ability 
- Improved rural finance availability/ increased access, in some cases formal 
finance remain prohibitive  
- Rural producers difficulty in financial access due to lack of appropriate 
collateral, lack of credit history, high cost of financing  
- Open market structure enables attraction and provision of finance 
- Some degree of mistrust in formal finance institutions, need for increased 
awareness 
- History of Government ownership of land, new legislation allows legal 
ownership; requirements remain prohibitive for many smallholders  
- Limited land available for expansion 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l 
F
a
rm
er
s 
- Due to Export and attraction of foreign exchange: Priority Finance Status 
- Continued difficulty with high collateral demands, high lending cost 
- Need for improved banking regulations to address liquidity constraints, cost 
and prohibitive access, difficult repayment conditions 
- Often loan size received is significantly less than request 
- GoE maintains technical ownership of land, however large-scale agricultural 
production able to procure for long-term usage 
- Able to retrieve market information via EXC Export Link  
 
P
ro
ce
ss
o
rs
 - Need for improved banking regulations to address liquidity constraints, cost 
and prohibitive access, difficult repayment conditions 
- Due to inability to export, not a Prioritized sector to receive financing 
- Often loan size received is significantly less than request 
- Restrictive market structure prohibits investment across chain/ in suppliers  
- Restrictive market structure prohibits receipt of investment from buyers 
- Open market structure enables attraction and provision of finance 
- Rwandan Development Bank offers specialized financing packages and 
business support for qualified sector actors 
- Implementation of innovative financial usage to attract / secure suppliers 
- Access to finance used as incentive structure 
- Market information sourced from current trading trends/ buyers 
E
x
p
o
rt
er
s 
- Due to Export and attraction of foreign exchange: Priority Finance Status 
- Need for improved banking regulations to address liquidity constraints, cost 
and prohibitive access, difficult repayment conditions 
- Continued difficulty with high collateral demands, high lending cost 
- Often loan size received is significantly less than request 
- Restrictive market structure prohibits investment across chain/ in suppliers.   
- Able to retrieve market information via EXC Export Link  
- Restrictive market structure prohibits receipt of investment from international 
buyers 
- Open market structure enables attraction and provision of finance 
- Rwandan Development Bank offers specialized financing packages and 
business support for qualified sector actors 
- Implementation of innovative financial usage to attract / secure suppliers 
- Access to finance used as an incentive structure  
- Use investment from Int’l Buyers to strengthen business/ improve product  
- Market information sourced from current trading trends, distilled through 
suppliers. 
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6.5.1 Financial Availability and Accessibility  
One of the most significant enablers for business start-up and expansion is the ability to 
access adequate means of finance, which can enable and propel business operation and 
growth (EPPCF, 2014).  Through this research, access to, and availability of, finance was 
found to be a critical aspect to respondent decisions and actual ability for pursuit.  While both 
countries were found to have challenging financial environments for respondents across the 
coffee chains, entrepreneurial actors responded to challenges in different ways in order to 
overcome barriers of financial accessibility.  Within each country, financial availability for 
actors is tied to national sector preference, national foreign exchange needs and liquidity.   
 
Financial accessibility, while linked, was found to impact Smallholder Producers differently 
from Commercial Farmers, Processors and Exporters.  Typically, coffee trees and farms are 
not considered as adequate means of collateral due to the volatile nature of international 
prices and thus unstable valuation; stations or equipment are also traditionally undervalued.  
Additionally difficult financial requirements of the coffee industry are the prolonged start-up 
time across business segments.   At the Producer level, trees average between three and five 
years before maturity can provide a viable harvest140.  At the Processor and Exporter level, 
building stations, sourcing equipment, establishing infrastructure and securing sourcing and/ 
or supply routes as well as end-buyers can also take several years and is highly capital 
intensive.  Actors that choose to become involved in coffee need to secure adequate income 
or resources in order to be sustained for several years before a coffee business begins to 
generate financial returns; theoretically, financial services would play a role in supporting 
this business start-up phase.    
 
6.5.1.1 Ethiopia 
Access to credit and financial services is considered to be the most important barrier to doing 
business in Ethiopia (EPPCF, 2014).  The country’s largest bank, by far, is the state-owned 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) which is also the largest provider of loans to both the 
public and private sector.  However, given the country’s liquidity constraints and banking 
                                                        
140 Immature tress will still produce but it is of significantly lower volume and considered to be of generally 
lower quality.  Many Producers reported to still harvest and sell from immature trees.  
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requirements, public enterprises absorb a disproportionate amount of available credit.  High 
collateral requirements, chronic under-valuation of collateral and strict acceptance rules also 
reduce the pool of available loan recipients within Ethiopia’s financial climate.  The highly 
controlled financial system and its collateral based lending system creates an especially 
difficult arena for entrepreneurs or business start-ups that do not have a pre-existing capital 
base.  These restrictions on individual access and lending availability stifle growth and 
suppress innovation (EPPCF, 2014).   
 
In 2013, public enterprises received 83% of all credit provided to the market, with just 17% 
provided to private sector enterprises.  Additionally, all private banks are mandated to ensure 
at least 27% of lending portfolios are earmarked for public sector projects; with interest rates 
at just 3% (Lefort, 2013; EPPCF, 2014).  Given the country’s high inflation, 10%+ as of 
2015, the required lending and low interest rate equates to a tax on private banks and those 
that deposit with them.  This ‘tax’ on private banks is part of the country’s wider banking 
regulatory stature, which has proven to distort financial regulations, creating uneven 
competition between private banks and the large state-owned CBE.  Cost structure and 
financial services of the CBE are also not bound by wider financial regulations as other 
banks are (EPPCF, 2014).  Due to the limited credit access for smaller firms (thus limited 
scope and scale for business activity), the majority of private sector actors are established 
firms that continue to diversify and increase holdings, as opposed to new market entrants.  As 
of 2010, not one of Ethiopia’s top 50 firms had started as a ‘small firm’ (World Bank, 
2014a).  Difficulty in accessing finance is described by this Processor,  
Exporters can get loans if they have an agreed contract with an international buyer.  
But we Akarabis (Processors) cannot.  With the lack of financial assistance, we must 
rely on our own cash.  With the limited capital I have to invest, I am unable to 
purchase the full volume needed to maximize the capacity of my station, so my 
business is becoming less efficient.  In general, I do not see any support currently by 
the Government. (Pc_E_4, 2015) 
 
Despite the country’s impressive recent growth, access to adequate financial services remains 
one of the largest issues for private sector development (Tridos Facet, 2013) and 
entrepreneurs reported limited access to credit as one of the most challenging hurdles.  This 
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has resulted in high interest rates and exceedingly high collateral demands141 from financial 
lenders due to the strict control (and often illiquidity) of foreign currency in the banking 
sector (Tridos Facet, 2013), for those private sector actors even able to obtain loans.  While 
the majority of loans are provided to public sector projects, private sector investments are 
typically made only in prioritized industries such as manufacturing, large-scale agriculture 
and export products (EPPCF, 2014).  Ethiopia’s financial sector is one of the least developed 
and most ‘under banked’142 on the continent (Tridos Facet, 2013; Zerihun et al., 2014).  As of 
2012, only two commercial bank branches per 1,000 km existed in Ethiopia, with 
approximately just three branches per 100,000 adults (Villasenor et al., 2015).  
 
6.5.1.1.1 Financial Priority 
Much discussion has been made thus far about the preferential treatment of prioritized 
sectors, and coffee, as an export product and key foreign exchange earner, is a prioritized 
sector in Ethiopia.  However in practice, this priority only extends to Exporters (including 
Commercial Farmers who are also allowed direct export) and does not trickle through the rest 
of the chain. Prioritization results in priority access to formal financing options and those 
businesses directly bringing in foreign exchange are more likely to receive financing (E_1, 
2015).  However, banks will typically only approve a loan for an Exporter once a signed 
import contract is received.  This continues to put actors at a disadvantage as cash is required 
to buy the actual product and thus contracts have to be concluded before stock can be 
purchased prior to knowing market prices (EPPCF, 2014).  The result has been actors either 
pre-purchasing stock or negotiating a contract and then purchasing stock, creating additional 
risk due to pricing variability and potential differentials. 
 
Accessing credit can take three to four months and loan disbursements typically cover 50-
80% of request (EPPCF, 2014; E_1, 2015).  Additional limits have been put on the volume of 
loans a bank can disburse as either short-term or long–term143 .  The National Banking 
Directive recently changed the definition of ‘short-term loan maturity’ from 36 months to 
                                                        
141 Interest Rates reported to reach up to 27% and collateral demands as high as 125- 200% of loan request 
(Tridos Facet, 2013).  
142 Financial sector includes: 3 public banks, 16 private banks and 31 registered MFIs (Zerihim et al., 2014) 
143 As described earlier, start-up for coffee businesses can take several years before financial returns begin, 
short-term loans (1 year or less) make it very difficult to be able to invest in long-term plans. 
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now only 12.  Resulting in 40% of all loans now considered as ‘short-term’ and required to 
be repaid within one year (inclusive of the often three to four month delay for receipt) 
(EPPCF, 2014).  As discussed, coffee is a long-term investment requiring several years of 
business operation and start-up prior to initial revenue generation as well as high upfront cash 
flow at the beginning of each season, with typical delayed returns of payment due to 
prolonged processing and sale methods required.  The bias in resource allocation and 
resulting regulation continues to push a divergence between small and large size actors with 
smaller entrepreneurs unable to not only keep pace with larger competitors, but also unable 
to act as viable partners due to an inability to meet ‘transaction costs’144 (Lefort, 2013; E_1, 
2015).   Some actors reported to purposely limit growth and scalability because of recognized 
inability to compete, considering it cheaper as well as safer to stay at a lower profitability 
level, but to be able to stay in business.  
 
With Smallholder Producers excluded from formal financing, entrepreneurs operating 
Commercial Farms, Processing and Exporting businesses have instead turned to different 
types of business registrations that are more responsive to alternative financial arrangements.  
Incorporating as either a Private Limited Company (PLC) with up to 50 shareholders or a 
Sole Proprietorship (SP), with single owner liability.  Many formal businesses use PLC 
regulatory statutes, benefiting from shareholder buy-in as a means of generating start-up 
capital or business financing.  Table 6.8, shows the different registration proportions for 
respondents operating formal business.   
 
Table 6.8. Ethiopia Business Registration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
                                                        
144 Transaction costs are considered to be regulatory fees, licensing requirements, or upfront capital demands.  
Institutionalized graft could also be considered as a transaction cost.  
Business Registration     
N: (68) 
PLC SP 
Commercial Farmer (22) 68% 32% 
Processor (26) 54% 42% 
Exporter (20) 80% 20% 
Total mean 67% 31% 
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Widespread difficulty in financial access has resulted in the emerging trend in which the 
majority of coffee exporters are using ‘priority status’ for bank loans earmarked for coffee, 
but are instead using these loans to finance import businesses.  Businesses importing goods 
abroad for domestic sale are reported to be much more lucrative than coffee, with coffee 
export business often used as a front145 for capital access for funds enabling the external 
purchase of goods.   As described by the CEO of a large coffee export company with a long 
lineage in Ethiopian coffee,  
Many Exporters are now involved in the coffee sector, not because they specifically 
care about coffee, but because they use their coffee business to get a loan for other 
business activity.  Using foreign exchange from the sale of coffee to fund import 
business, as it is cheaper to then buy products abroad and import.  Exporting 
companies are ‘ok’ with loosing money in coffee because they are only involved to get 
the foreign exchange or bank loans.  Imports are generally very lucrative; so overall 
their business will still be profitable. (E_4, 2015) 
 
This strategy to use coffee intended financing to diversify from coffee holdings was observed 
in Entrepreneurs operating at Processor and Exporter levels.  Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneurs, while unable to access formal finance, also reported to be divesting from 
coffee in order to diversify in alternative investments. 
 
As discussed, while coffee is a prioritized sector, all actors do not receive the same priority 
and Smallholder Producers and Processors have limited options for financing.  With high 
restrictions on formal banking sectors and services, Ethiopia has developed a strong tradition 
for informal products and a low uptake of formal ones (Villasenor et al., 2015).  Informal 
savings and loans do exist, however depth and performance are highly varied.  In addition, 
many respondents reported that loan size potential from these funds was not large enough for 
business expansion (P_E_12, 2015).  As will be shown below, Smallholder Producers are 
unable to access formal financing mechanisms and as a result must use own capital, however 
this obviously limits scope of operations and expansion potential.  Formal financing 
arrangements can be available to Processors, but were reported to be very difficult to receive.  
As described by one Smallholder Producer, Potential Entrepreneur,  
                                                        
145 Additional indications as to the direction and fragmentation of the sector considering quality implications 
given preferences and willingness of operators 
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The main barriers to being an ‘entrepreneur’ are the lack of financing and people’s 
mistrust in taking financing from those institutions.  Also Government structures keep 
people in place.  Either people are too scared to expand, challenge the structure, or 
individuals are pushed back down with restrictions or land being taken. (P_E_20, 
2015) 
 
As discussed in Section 6.4.2.1, without a mechanism for saving, Smallholder Producers 
process sun-dried cherry on farm site for use as a savings proxy, selling as needed throughout 
the rest of the year.  As shared by another Ethiopian Smallholder Producer Potential 
Entrepreneur:  
In season, I will sell a small amount of cherry if I need cash and prepare the rest 
(sun-dried) and keep it at my house to sell when I need.  It never keeps us to the next 
year’s (cherry) harvest.  I sell this as needed for things we need actual Birr (cash) 
such as school fees.  I have no other means of savings.  There is an informal 
community savings and loan group and I sometimes participate and can get a small 
loan if I need from them, but it is very small. (P_E_11, 2015) 
 
Shown in Section 6.4.1.1, the restrictive nature of Ethiopia’s market and the abolishment of 
vertical integration has removed a key and needed element for alternative financial services 
to be provided to actors across the coffee chain. Additionally, Ethiopia does not allow 
external, non-Ethiopian actors to invest within the coffee sector146.  As such, international 
buyers (importers) can only buy from Exporters once coffee is purchased from the ECX 
Auction, removing opportunity and ability for external financing to be injected into the 
sector.   
 
6.5.1.1.2 Respondent Finances 
Looking to better understand actual sourcing mechanisms for respondent financing, research 
investigated the preferred as well as actual financial sources of respondents and entrepreneurs 
across the specific business segments.  Understanding financial means and ability to expand, 
provided evidence to an entrepreneur’s conceivable likelihood for opportunity pursuit.  The 
difficult financial climate may also shed light on to the reasons why many Smallholder 
Producer respondents in Ethiopia were found to be Potential Entrepreneurs as opposed to 
                                                        
146 However, international actors can however purchase land for large scale agri-business, including coffee 
plantations 
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Entrepreneurs; with respondents obviously recognizing opportunity, but unable to succeed 
with pursuit of tangible action.   
 
Ethiopian respondents were asked to rank their current, actual sources of financing and 
preferred sources of financing according to the following list:  
- Formal Lending Institutions  
- Informal Community Lenders 
- Rural Credit Unions or Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs)  
- Family/ Friends 
- Buyers 
- Other – respondent’s own capital, such as savings, income from off-farm employment or 
business savings, shareholder investment, annual profits.   
 
Research investigated respondent’s actual usage of, and preference to, available financing by 
having respondents rank options according to a scale of one (high/ most used or most 
preferred) to five (low/ least used or most preferred).  This information was analysed across 
the Entrepreneurial Range and per business segment presented in Section 5.2.2.  Graphs 6.1 
and 6.2 below, show results for the top ranked option for respondent’s preferred financing 
source and top ranked option for respondent’s current source of financing, for each business 
segment.  Percentages are listed for the top ranked option.  
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Graph 6.1. Ethiopia, Top Ranked Finance Preference 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Graph 6.1 shows a strong preference from all business segments to obtain financing from a 
formal lending institution.  Financial availability and accessibility are considered a reflection 
of a wider market structure and while the majority of respondents top preference was to 
source financing from a formal lending institution, the actual financing sources shown in 
Graph 6.2 were much different.  
 
Graph 6.2. Ethiopia, Top Ranked Current Source of Finance  
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
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Graph 6.2 above, shows the top ranked current sources of finance per business segment.  The 
majority of Entrepreneurs were found to use own means of finance, either through own 
capital or shareholders, shown as Other in the graphs.  Entrepreneurs of formal businesses 
had a much higher use of financing from formal lending institutions as compared to 
Entrepreneurs of informal business.  Commercial Farmers and Exporters, due to ‘priority 
lending status,’ had higher usage of Formal Lenders such as banks.  Processors, while still 
using finance from a formal lending institution, also relied strongly on family or friends and 
own capital. Interestingly, no business segments reported receiving financing from buyers 
along the chain, very different from what will be observed for Rwanda in the following 
section.  
 
6.5.1.2 Rwanda  
As discussed in Section 6.4.1.2, through Rwanda’s open market structure, financial 
accessibility can be obtained through formalized institutions, informal community lenders, 
actors along the coffee chain as well as external buyers.  Rwanda has made substantial 
progress in improving financial access and inclusion through increasing the number of 
branches and easing its regulatory environment in order to enable additional traditional as 
well as non-traditional entities to offer financial services (Villasenor et al., 2014).   Distinct-
level efforts were also made to improve the financial environment following the war in 1994 
in an attempt to entice returnees to set up local businesses and invest in the country, such as 
incubator tax benefits and start-up support funds (R_1, 2014).  
 
As the country is predominately rural, (an estimated 70%+ of the population resides in rural 
areas) accessibility remains a significant challenge (Villasenor et al., 2015).  Despite 
challenges, financial access and usage have recently improved in rural areas.  In 2009, the 
Rwandan Government mandated that at least one Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) 
be established in each of the country’s 416 woredas147.  As of 2012, 90% of adult Rwandans 
lived within a 5km radius from a formal financial institution (Murenzi, 2013).  These credit 
unions have been very impactful in providing financial services to rural communities. 
However, SACCOs were reported to be used mainly as a means of savings and not a means 
                                                        
147 Smallest administrative area 
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for accessing credit, although SACCOS do offer lending services.  Instead, the majority of 
individuals accessing formalized loans chose to source from a commercial lending 
institution, such as a bank (Murenzi, 2013). 
 
While the rate for Rwandan smallholder producers using formal savings mechanisms has 
increased, as of 2012, the banked population was only 23% of adults, with proportions 
significantly lower in rural areas and within lower income quintiles.  Education on financial 
services and access to institutions continues to remain the most difficult hurdle (Murenzi, 
2013).  However many of those surveyed were found to rely on informal financial 
mechanisms148 such as Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA), family members or 
local area traders (Murenzi, 2013).   A separate study on smallholder producers found that 
producers use VSLAs but also take credit from cooperatives and local area traders149.  The 
same study found that these loans were typically not spent on productivity improvements, but 
were typically used for “consumption smoothing or health related emergencies,” as opposed 
to business activities (Mujawamariya et al., 2013, p. 78).   
 
Financing remains a major issue for Processors and Exporters, as the structure of the sector 
and nature of the coffee business requires large amounts of up front capital.  During a season, 
working capital requirements demand 70-80% of the projected cash flow at the beginning of 
the season to enable adequate ability to source and purchase supply (cherry or processed 
parchment). This high demand of upfront cash flow often results in liquidity constraints for 
the banking industry constricting cash flow for the country and sector during peak season 
(R_1, 2015).   
 
Briefly discussed in Section 6.3.1.2, as part of an overall strategy to improve its business 
climate, the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) has prioritized financing, working to 
improve regulation in order to provide small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and cooperatives 
with loans earmarked for agricultural activities in processing, marketing, equity financing 
                                                        
148 The vast majority of adults using only informal financial mechanisms tended to be rural, female, with no or 
very little formal education and from households of lower socio-economic status (Murenzi, 2013, p. 40). 
149 Some traders would provide loan services in exchange for cherry delivery at time of harvest and the trader 
would sell on to local processing stations 
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and equipment leasing options through various, designated fund options 150  (R_5, 2014).  
Despite initiatives, access to finance remains a problem largely due to liquidity constraints 
and is reportedly compounded by a banking sector’s misunderstanding of coffee’s 
operational requirements, an inability of repayment by customers151 following low pricing 
seasons, or liquidity constraints on behalf of lenders (MTI, 2010).   While options for 
commercial lending have expanded, often specified funds are targeted for specific sectors 
such as the coffee sector or specific types of businesses (processing stations and exporting 
businesses reported to receive prioritized rates).  Regardless, cost remains high and often 
prohibitive, with interest rates ranging from 14-21% and collateral demands typically at 
125%+ of loan request (R_2, 2014; R_1, 2015).  To manage demand within a careful 
liquidity balance, Rwandan banks limit funds granted and distribute funds late at differing 
points throughout the season; however this is not as Processors or Exporters wish (R_1, 
2015).  As described by the following Exporter,  
Delays in getting finance are a real problem.  If you don’t have cash at the start of 
the season, you cannot operate and miss valuable time and product and it puts your 
season at risk.  It is also a lost opportunity for farmers if there is no one to buy they 
usually will process at home and sell to traders or buyers from Uganda, but with that 
they cannot maximize the true value of their coffee. (Ex_R_7, 2014) 
 
While entrepreneurial actors can provide financing down the chain to suppliers (Exporters to 
Processors, Processors to Producers), financing from external investors is permitted (if not 
encouraged by national policy in order to increase cash flow into the sector).  This injection 
of capital from international buyers, typically in the form of a pre-financed purchase 
agreement has helped to overcome some of the financial constrictions of national banks.  It 
has also increased competition among suppliers in the attempt to access this benefit, 
improving efficiency and quality (R_1, 2015).  It was observed through this research that 
more entrepreneurial actors have been able to secure pre-purchase arrangements.  While this 
reduced the risk of selling product at the end of a season, it was also understood to be an 
added risk during the season as contracts usually agree on a price floor and celling (with 
                                                        
150 USAID, GTZ, World Bank, Bank of Kigali and IFAD have also established designated funding schemes to 
support SME development (MTI, 2010).    
151 Repayment remains an issue for Coffee Co-ops and CWS 
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varying schemes for price differentials), long before product is ready for export.  Depending 
on spot price, profit can be made or lost depending on daily price of transaction. 
 
6.5.1.2.1 Respondent Finances 
To more fully understand barriers or enablers to entrepreneurial action, financial sources 
were investigated.  Research analysed responses for each business segment for preferred and 
actual current sources of financing, identified in the following list:  
- Formal Lending Institutions  
- Informal Community Lenders 
- Rural Credit Unions or Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs)  
- Family/ Friends 
- Buyers 
- Other – respondent’s own capital, such as savings or income from off-farm employment 
 
Graphs 6.3 and 6.4 below show the top ranked preference and top ranked current source of 
financing.  Percentages are given for the top choices per each business segment.  
Respondents ranked options according to a scale of one (high/ most used or most preferred) 
to five (low/ least used or most preferred).  
 
As seen in Graph 6.3 below, the wish for financial access from a formal lending institution 
increases within entrepreneurial business segments.  In addition, due to the availability of 
accessing financing from buyers, all segments reported to be highly eager to access financing 
in this manner.  Again, ‘buyers’, does not only mean International Importers, but often and 
more likely is from corresponding purchasing segments of the chain: Producer to Processor, 
Processor to Exporter.   
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Graph 6.3. Rwanda, Top Ranked Finance Preference  
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Respondents were also asked to rank their current means of finance in regards to their current 
businesses and the top ranked finance source is found in Graph 6.4 below. 
 
Graph 6.4. Rwanda, Top Ranked Current Source of Finance 
 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
As observed in Graph 6.4, Processors and Exporters do access much of their financing from 
formal institutions, however large proportions are also sourced from Buyers.  While 
Exporters receive finance from international buyers (importers), the rest of the chain is also 
financed from their respective buyers, whether this is Entrepreneurial Exporters financing 
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Processors or Processors providing finance to Producers.  This flexible mobility in providing 
financial access is a direct result of the open market structure, enabling entrepreneurs to 
access as well as provide financing mechanisms in which to advance business agendas and 
incentivize improved product provision. 
 
Graphs 6.1 to 6.4 showcased the top ranked response in terms of current or perceived sources 
of finance, and Table 6.9 below, lists respondent rankings of available financing sources: 
formal lending institutions, informal community lenders, rural credit unions or micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs), family/ friends, buyers and other/own capital.  This table is the outcome 
of ranking exercises conducted with respondents in order to demonstrate the more complete 
listing of preferred and current sources of financing, per business segment.  Nuanced 
differences can be observed in comparisons between Ethiopian and Rwandan respondents in 
regards to the listings of current sources of finance, where Ethiopians across business 
segments ranked use of own capital relatively higher, and more often, than Rwandan 
counterparts.  This is understood to be a reflection of the relative difficulty in accessing 
alternative forms of financing.  Likewise, Ethiopian actors were much more likely to list 
family/ friends as a viable source of accessing finance than Rwandan counterparts.   
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Table 6.9. Ranking of Current Financial Sources and Preferred Financial Sources 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 Ethiopia - Financing Sources Rwanda - Financing Sources 
 Current  
Sources 
Preferred  
Sources 
Current  
Sources 
Preferred  
Sources 
Smallholder  
Producer  
Non- 
Entrepreneur 
Own Capital Formal Lending Institution Own Capital MFI 
Family / Friends Family/ Friends Earnings from other jobs  Own Capital 
Rural Credit Association Informal Lenders Sale of assets Buyers 
  Family/ Friends   
  MFI/ Informal Lenders   
Smallholder 
Producer 
Potential 
Entrepreneur 
Own Capital Formal Lending Institution Buyers Own Capital 
Family / Friends Buyers (via Co-op) MFI Earnings from other jobs  
Rural Credit Association Own Capital Own Capital Buyers 
Informal Lender Family/ Friends Earnings from other jobs  MFI 
 Informal Lenders     
Smallholder 
Producer 
Entrepreneur  
Own Capital Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution 
Earnings from other jobs Own Capital MFI MFI 
Sale of assets Buyers (currently not possible in 
ECX system) 
Family/ Friends 
Buyers Buyers 
 Informal Lenders Own Capital 
 MFI/ Informal Lenders  Earnings from other jobs  
Commercial 
Farmer  
Entrepreneur 
Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution     
Own Capital Buyers (Importer)    
 Own Capital    
 Family/ Friends     
Processor 
Entrepreneur 
Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution 
Own Capital Family/ Friends Buyers Buyers 
Shareholders / other business 
income 
Buyers (currently not possible in 
ECX system) 
   
 Family/ Friends      
Exporter 
Entrepreneur 
Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution Formal Lending Institution 
Family/ Friends Own Capital Buyers Buyers 
Shareholders / other business 
incomes 
Buyers (currently not possible in 
ECX system) 
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6.5.2 Land Usage and Expansion Potentials 
National oversight and regulatory statutes in regards to land access, usage and ownership for 
individuals and private sector operators are key issues, which can also impact entrepreneurial 
decisions for action or opportunity pursuit.  Both Ethiopia and Rwanda have challenging 
legal constraints in regards to land access and usage, especially within key agricultural zones 
or coffee production areas. However, legal recognition and policies regarding land rights and 
land ownership are comparable.  Current mind-sets can be traced to historical perceptions of 
and influence by each State, in which land, considered an integral state-asset, can be 
provided to and taken from users as deemed to be in the best national interest.  An 
understanding of land policy enables a better understanding of the current contexts 
entrepreneurs are operating within and related potential for expansion.  
 
6.5.2.1 Ethiopia  
A remaining tangible and largely unimproved impact from the Derg Regime is the country’s 
landholding policy.  While the initial decree from 1975 has changed, change has largely 
come through multiple, ambiguous efforts, bringing no real solutions to ordinary people 
(Tridos Facet, 2013; Prunier, 2015).  In effect, land confiscated and nationalized, has not 
returned to its pre-revolutionary state, nor has it been privatized outright.  While small steps 
have been made in regards to land rental and inheritance, specifically at the smallholder 
producer level, land ownership continues to be owned and controlled by the State (Geda, 
2008; Lefort, 2013).   While, technically there is no private ownership of land, individuals 
and companies can agree to a 99-year lease with local municipalities.   However, this 
structure has made land available mainly to large investors wishing to establish 
manufacturing plants or large-scale agri-businesses (Tridos Facet, 2013).  As of 2015, an 
estimated 3.5 million hectares have been allocated to foreign investors, often disregarding 
local inhabitants of sold land152 (Lefort, 2013).   
 
Commercial Farmers have benefited through these land distributions, agreeing to ownership 
and purchase rights.  However this process is reported to be highly selective and was reported 
                                                        
152 Agreements reportedly offer unlimited use of ground water and underground resources (Lefort, 2013). 
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to take anywhere between three months to six years (CF_E_2, 2015).  One Commercial 
Farmer described his experiences in Case Study 6.12.  
 
 
 
In contrast, traditional coffee production zones have significant local population pressure153, 
with very little if any available land remaining.  The second most populated country on the 
continent, population growth is impacting local, rural communities, straining economies and 
resources.  Recent generations have seen family land holdings significantly reduced as land 
has been parcelled off to dependents (Ficquet and Fyissa, 2015).  In many coffee-producing 
zones, particularly areas with histories of traditional coffee production or high quality zones, 
new land acquisition is virtually unheard of.  A Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur described 
his previous ability to scale up,  
I was able to expand land and expanded my trees before, and I would buy more if I 
could today because there is much potential in coffee, but there is no land in this 
area.  It is very rare to hear of any transfers now; I try to expand my business into 
other, non-coffee areas. (P_E_23, 2015) 
 
The limited number of Ethiopia Smallholder Producers classified as Entrepreneurs through 
this research, had all found ways to expand production area either through rental agreements, 
or purchase from neighbours.  These land holdings reportedly tended to be far distances from 
each other making for admittedly inefficient business management.  Several of the 
Smallholder Entrepreneurs reported that as soon as they made profit from coffee, investments 
were made in alternative sectors, such as transportation options for the local area 
                                                        
153 This was especially evident within research areas visited. 
Case Study 6.12.  Commercial Farming 
“I am from Illababour (southwestern Ethiopia, bordering South Sudan).  Coffee is dominant in the area, but it is 
mostly forest coffee and farmer production is very basic and traditional.  I worked before as a coffee trader to 
learn the business.  I saw an opportunity to establish a business using more modern practices.  I applied to the 
local Municipality and National Government for land permits in 2007 and was granted in 2009.  I have 500 
hectares and use 200 for coffee.  I also grow spices and honey.  I am now exporting coffee, but I am just 
focusing production on my own farm and not surrounding, local farmers as their techniques are basic, but I also 
don’t want to have to deal with organizing finance in order to pay them when they deliver.”  (CF_E_13, 2015) 
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(motorbikes, mini-taxis), construction businesses or retail shops.  Described by this 
Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur,  
Coffee can generate income, actual cash, but I think the only way to make real money 
is to have a very large land or large-scale production.  I don’t have that and have 
instead invested my coffee earnings in commercial shops I rent out.  I also have cattle 
that I also sell to the market.  I have tried to get a loan form Awash Bank, but they 
want such huge collateral and will not accept my current coffee farm.  (P_E_26, 
2015) 
 
The inability to expand land, in addition to financial inaccessibility, presents a challenge to 
scaling up and constricts entrepreneurial potential.  While exact land sizes were difficult to 
determine, respondents were able to provide an estimated number of trees at the time of 
business start as well as their current number of trees.  Shown below in Table 6.10, 
Entrepreneurs had the lowest starting point in terms of the number of trees, but showed the 
largest expansion.   
 
Table 6.10. Ethiopia Smallholder Producer Starting Points  
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
6.5.2.2 Rwanda 
Most rural farmland in Rwanda remains recognized by traditional family holdings, passed 
through generations, however land is understood not as outright ownership, but as a usage 
right.  Legislation enacted in 2005 now makes customary land ownership a legal reality, but 
only through the legal registration for ownership.  Through this legislation, Government hope 
was to increase confidence and security in land ownership, thereby increasing investment in 
business, land conservation as well as improved agricultural efficiency (Ansoms and 
Rostagno, 2012).   However, land titles must be registered, procured, mapped and paid for, 
prior to receipt of ‘ownership certification’; creating inherent disadvantages for poorer 
individuals.  The law also creates difficulty in that it prohibits division of land less than one 
hectare, proving a major constraint for smallholder producers, the majority of whom operate 
Ethiopia 
N: (27) 
Starting Size  
(# of Trees) 
Current Size  
(# of Trees) 
Smallholder Producer Non Entrepreneur (4) 700 1,000 
Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur (17) 1,122 3,032 
Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur (6) 640 7,916 
  283 
on less than one hectare (Ansoms and Rostagno, 2012).  In Rwanda, recent legislation also 
enabled formal businesses to invest directly with national and local governments in securing 
rights to land.  Coffee Processors have been granted rights in establishing washing stations 
through agreed long-term usage rights; price and payment structures are agreed with local 
officials and approved at a national level (R_3, 2015).   
 
Despite restrictions, many respondents classified as Entrepreneurs were found to have 
expanded land in some way.  Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs reported to have expanded 
coffee holdings through the acquisition of land from another smallholder.  Several 
entrepreneurs reported to also rent land from neighbouring farmers, paying an annual rent 
fee, but profiting from sale of production; a long-term and risky business strategy.  Described 
by a Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur,  
I have purchased additional land and continue to be watchful if more becomes 
available, but it is less common now.  Instead I have also started to rent land from 
other farmers and have planted coffee and banana.  I also have a cow and use the 
banana leaves for mulching and cow manure for additional fertilizer for the coffee.  
Some neighbouring farmers have started to also use that practice with their animals. 
(P_R_61, 2014) 
 
Non-Entrepreneur respondents that had not expanded land, had chosen not to increase coffee 
holdings, or who had increased very minimally, cited inherently small starting land size as 
the reason to lack of expansion.  These reasons are legitimate in several ways.  First, land 
may in fact be too small to garner any type of collateral guarantee, even from informal 
financiers.  Likewise, typical smallholder producers must also use their land for producing 
means for household consumption.  As coffee is not edible at the household level, in some 
situations, respondents believed it too risky for a household to focus primarily on coffee 
without a safety net of consumables, especially given the price volatility of the coffee market.  
As such, these respondents felt they could not grow enough coffee to become financially 
viable as well as also produce crops to sustain household survival.   
 
While these are legitimate and understandable reasons for not scaling up, equally important is 
an individual’s perception about what can be achieved despite a specific starting point and 
differences were again observed here in regards to Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs.  
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Similar to Ethiopia, reporting exact land size proved difficult and instead respondents were 
asked to state starting number of trees and current number of trees.  As seen by Table 6.11 
below, respondents classified as Entrepreneurs were also found to have the lowest starting 
point in terms of number of trees, but largest expansion rate. 
 
Table 6.11. Rwanda Smallholder Producer Starting Points  
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Compared with Table 6.10, a lower number of trees are observed in Rwanda than Ethiopia.  
In general, Smallholder Producers in each country have comparably, small land sizes 
(typically significantly less than one hectare).  However Ethiopian respondents reported and 
were observed to have less space between trees, resulting in more trees per plot.  This may 
also be a reason to the lower productivity and quality.  
 
6.5.3 Accessing Market Information and Technology Usage 
Access to information, specifically market information concerning price, demand and/ or 
product availability, is a critical element in the entrepreneurial decision making processes 
and can highly influence actors who are able to retrieve market information and those who 
are not (Boudreaux, 2007; Shane et al., 2003).  Additionally, due to the high potential for 
clusters within producing areas as well as across the coffee chain, the spread of information 
can be highly impactful to entrepreneurial outlook and opportunity pursuit (Rocha, 2004).   
 
In comparison to other global coffee producing countries and industry leaders, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda have a relatively low level of technology introduction and uptake (Daviron and 
Ponte, 2005; Boudreaux, 2007), however within this research, this was found to largely be 
due to differing reasons.  
 
 
 
Rwanda 
N: (69) 
Starting Size  
(# of Trees) 
Current Size  
(# of Trees) 
Smallholder Producer Non Entrepreneur (31) 307 750 
Smallholder Producer Potential Entrepreneur (15) 340 2,429 
Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur (23) 200 3,906 
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6.5.3.1 Ethiopia  
Ethiopia’s Commodity Exchange system was designed in part, in theory, to increase 
transparency between suppliers and buyers across the chain and spread critical market 
information such as price between actors (E_3, 2015).  However, while this has proven to be 
a benefit for actors able to have access, it has shown to increase disparity between those who 
do not, namely rural producers (E_4, 2015).  An asymmetric relationship has been found to 
exist between rural producers and traders in which typically, traders have more up to date, 
accurate information than rural producers (Tadesse and Bahiigwa, 2015).  At the time of 
writing, within the ECX system, no mechanism had been implemented to address the 
information dearth felt by rural smallholder producers who largely remain reliant upon 
information from cooperatives, area traders, processing stations, other producers or the ECX 
Primary Market, continuing to put smallholder producers at a disadvantage for access to 
market information and current prices.  
 
Through the automated, electronic auction system of the ECX, in theory, Exporters and 
Processors are able to retrieve information in real time for the range of coffee availability and 
quantity once products have cleared the ECX Warehouse following testing and quality 
control (E_4, 2015).  However, in practice, trading was reported to continue to be done in 
person at the EXC Auction base in Addis Ababa.  Within the current structure, information 
typically flows ‘backwards’ from Exporter 154  to Processor to ECX Market Trader to 
Smallholder Producer creating natural time delays and inherent disadvantages (Minten et al., 
2015).  Additionally, as discussed in Section 4.2.3, coffee is traded daily and product inflows 
of diverse profiles maintain constant price volatility and without access to constantly 
changing price data, buyers and sellers across the chain operate at disadvantages.   
 
Mobile phone technology has been widely lauded as a mechanism for improved access to 
market information, specifically for rural producers.  While Ethiopia mobile phone 
ownership and usage rates are expanding, the country continues to be plagued by poor 
network coverage from state-owned Ethio Telecom, and increased access to mobile phones 
                                                        
154 As coffee is traded on the global market, producing countries have little to no ability to dictate price and or 
trade terms and are themselves prices takers. 
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by smallholder producers has not necessarily resulted in improved information or market 
prices (Tadesse and Bahiigwa, 2015; Minten et al., 2015).  Conversely, mobile technology 
has been proven to improve information, negotiating power and market efficiency for 
Brokers and Traders, but not Producers (Tadesse and Bahiigwa, 2015).   
 
Table 6.12 below, presents information obtained from respondents ranking methods used to 
access market information.  As seen, Non-Entrepreneur and Potential Entrepreneur 
Smallholder Producers were more likely to obtain information from Traders or directly from 
buyers at ECX Primary Markets, while Entrepreneur Smallholder Producers were more likely 
to obtain information from external sources, as well as Traders and Buyers at ECX Primary 
Markets.  Interestingly, segments, legally able to export: Commercial Farmers and Exporters, 
had a higher degree of dealings with International Buyers and also reported information 
gathering methods following international pricing trends.  Differences with wealth 
stratification can also be observed through the types of methods used.   
 
Table 6.12. Most Common Methods for Accessing Market Information, Ethiopia 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Technology usage in Ethiopia, while not as dominant as many South American or Asian 
producing countries, is still heavily utilized within processing and exporting businesses.  As 
first demonstrated in Graphs 4.4 and 4.5 of Section 4.5, Ethiopia’s immense volume of 
production, need for efficiency has seen the industry realize an increasingly mechanized 
Ethiopia (N: 95) Market Information Access Methods  
Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneur 
Area Traders, ECX Primary Market, Cooperative, Radio 
Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur 
ECX Primary Market, Other Farmers, Radio, Newspaper, Phone, Community 
Lenders 
Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur 
Radio, TV, Other Farmers, Area Traders, ECX Primary Market, Community 
Leaders, Phone 
Commercial Farmer 
ECX Exporters Association, Internet, Bank Association, Ministry of Trade 
Representative, Int’l Buyers, Investors, ECX Primary Market, Other 
Commercial Farmers, TV 
Processor 
Internet, ECX, Newspaper, Phone, Buyers, Radio 
Exporter 
Internet, ECX Exporters Association, Int’l Buyers, Phone, NY-C Commodity 
Trading Site, Ministry of Trade Reps, National Bank, Other Exporters 
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trend (E_5, 2015).   However traditional production, harvesting and sun-dried processing 
practices of smallholder producers continue to be widespread (Backman, 2009).    
 
Ethiopia, the birthplace of coffee, has been at the forefront of international trade since it was 
first exported from Ethiopia in the 15th century (Sereke-Brhan, 2010).  Historical dominance 
and continued demand has inevitably brought ideas and technology to the sector from 
external actors.  While the sector has chosen to remain relatively closed to outside influences, 
global interaction has undoubtedly brought opportunity and access for technological 
improvement and advancement, which many entrepreneurs today have benefited from.  As 
will be discussed in Section 6.5.3.2, Rwanda, relatively new to the international scene, is 
only just beginning to realize this opportunity and influence.  
 
6.5.3.2 Rwanda 
As seen in Section 6.4.1.2, Rwanda’s liberalized market structure has created opportunity for 
actors to expand business operations across the chain as well as choose to provide direct 
support to suppliers via benefits such as finance or technical training.  This open market flow 
has also created opportunity for individuals to interact within multiple segments of the chain 
in order to gain market information and intelligence.  This strategy was specifically observed 
in entrepreneurial-minded smallholder producers who actively sought market information 
and benefit provision offered by competing Processors, prior to cherry delivery.   
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, price volatility remains a major hurdle for actors and 
entrepreneurs alike and while recognizing an inability to dramatically alter pricing structures, 
entrepreneurial producers were observed to actively source the best buyers for their needs 
within an area; price was often only one element in the decision making process as will be 
discussed in Section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.  Gathering this market information typically came 
through the building of relationships and personal communications, which were also used to 
discover pricing information.   
 
A major area of needed improvement and difficulty for information access for smallholder 
producers is the timely promotion of the established floor prices for Garden-Gate Coffee 
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Cherry Purchase Price (Boudreaux, 2007; Backman, 2009).  Set at the beginning of the 
season and adjusted as deemed necessary, many producers complain about not being able to 
know if prices have been adjusted (R_4, 2014).  The Set Prices are reportedly advertised by 
radio, however this was disputed by some respondents.  Access to functioning radios at time 
of price announcements was also reported to be an issue.  Entrepreneurial Processors and 
Exporters were observed to actively monitor global prices, trends and changes and would use 
this information to update buying and selling prices as necessary, as opposed to simply 
building from the set floor price.  Table 6.13 below, presents the information obtained from 
respondents ranking methods of accessing market information.  
 
Table 6.13. Most Common Methods for Accessing Market Information, Rwanda 
(Source: Author Questionnaire) 
 
Rwanda is also recognized as having a relatively low level of mechanization across its 
industry (R_8, 2015).  While Processors and Exporters do use mechanized processes many 
reported to actively have chosen not to introduce additional mechanization with the 
recognition that it would off-set the often hundreds of seasonally employed labourers, as will 
be shown in Case Study 7.4.  Additionally, given Rwanda’s relatively small production 
volumes, purchase of more efficient machines was often deemed prohibitive given high cost 
and relative low volume potentials for the country, especially as compared to larger 
producing countries such as Ethiopia (R_4, 2014; R_7, 2014).   
 
 
 
Rwanda (N: 112) Most common means of accessing market information  
Smallholder Producer 
Non-Entrepreneur 
Washing Station, Cooperative, Radio, Other Farmers, Community Leaders 
Smallholder Producer 
Potential Entrepreneur 
Radio, Other Farmers, Phone, Washing Station 
Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur 
Radio, Other Farmers, Newspaper, Phone, Washing Station 
Processor 
Investors, Other Processors or Exporters, Internet, TV, Newspaper, Phone, District 
Leaders, Area Farmers 
Exporter 
Internet, Int'l Buyers, Other Exporters or Processors, NAEB Reps, TV, Newspaper, 
Phone 
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6.6 Conclusion and Emerging Findings 
Investigation into the second element of the deconstructed Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship 
Nexus: the operational context, examined and analysed specific determinants found to be 
especially influential for entrepreneurship, within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee 
markets.  Reinforcing current literature initially discussed in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, 
political environments, historical and socio-cultural settings, specific market structure, and 
resource availability were all found to have strong positive, as well as adverse influences on 
entrepreneurial outlook, action and opportunity pursuit.  Building from current literature, this 
comparative study of Ethiopia and Rwanda has provided deeper a understanding through the 
contrasting assessments of economies and market structures with differing approaches to 
entrepreneurship and operating environments found to both embrace and reject 
entrepreneurial potential.  
 
This chapter investigated the determinants, or external operational contexts, of entrepreneurs 
in the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda, identifying several key areas found to have 
particular influence in shaping entrepreneurial action, behaviour and opportunity pursuit.  
The unique economic ecosystems analysed have further supported the perspective that 
individual entrepreneurs, despite proving to have internal characteristics predisposing an 
individual towards entrepreneurial action, are still highly influenced by environments.  As 
shown throughout this chapter, each country’s complicated history, political perceptions to 
the effectiveness of entrepreneurship, specific market developments, as well as resource 
availability and accessibility were found to have significant influences on entrepreneurship.  
Emerging findings, observations and research contributions are presented below.  
 
Emerging Findings of Chapter 6:  
 As seen through this research, Ethiopia and Rwanda present differing paths as to how 
entrepreneurs are perceived and received within developing economies and emerging 
markets.  From interest in, tolerance of, or outright containment, entrepreneurship from a 
government’s political perspective not only influences policy, regulations and willingness 
to engage with entrepreneurs through a proactive private sector, but as seen, can enable as 
well as deter business expansion or sectoral growth. 
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 This research found Ethiopia’s restrictive markets and increased state-led involvement 
into the market economy and reduced financial access to severely constrict 
entrepreneurial dynamism through reduced opportunity, reduced willingness of actor 
involvement or the actual ability to pursue opportunity.  In contrast, this research found 
Rwanda’s open market structure to encourage entrepreneurial mobility but also enabled 
additional service provision and product diversification as entrepreneurs look to increase 
competitive advantages in pursuit of new opportunities. 
 
 Ethiopia continues a state-led growth agenda that is distrustful of the unaffiliated or 
prioritized private sector, preferring to direct growth opportunities through state-led 
enterprises and by instituting harmful regulations to entrepreneurship across sectors.  This 
research found the Ethiopian Government to show less interest and trust in private sector 
actors, specifically entrepreneurs, operating outside of dictated national interests.  
Ethiopia’s restricted market and financial climate have further confined entrepreneurial 
action along the coffee chain with entrepreneurial actors unable to source adequate 
financing needs or diversify business involvement throughout the chain, and this research 
showed that entrepreneurs are essentially forced to limit their own business scope and 
scalability.   
 
 As described in Section 6.3.1, without top-level acceptance and perceived effectiveness 
for entrepreneurial potential into a national agenda, entrepreneur mobility is constricted, 
opportunity is less likely to be pursued and entrepreneurs are more risk averse and less 
willing to innovate or push boundaries.  This difficult and restrictive business 
environment of the Ethiopian coffee sector has resulted in the finding of many Potential 
Entrepreneurs, (those that see opportunity and wish to engage in its pursuit, but are 
unable to take tangible action due to external factors) as opposed to actual Entrepreneurs.  
Demonstrating not only a severe lack of entrepreneurial dynamism but also resulting in 
individuals preferring to pursue alternative employment outside of the coffee area and 
alternative to traditional entrepreneurial activities.  This entrepreneurial restriction is also 
believed to have further diluted Ethiopia’s coffee sector.  
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 The Rwandan Government, while initially having to assume the role of a functioning 
private sector, has worked to increase the role and use of entrepreneurs and the private 
sector in not only supporting economic growth and wider development but also 
embracing the entrepreneurial role as an employment generator and enabler in 
revitalizing the country’s nearly lost coffee sector.  The Rwandan Government was found 
to be more proactive in supporting private sector development and entrepreneurship and 
these specific benefits will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.  The Rwandan 
Government, lauded for relinquishing its control as the effectiveness of private sector 
actors and entrepreneurs gained ability, capacity and confidence, has resulted in a private 
sector, led by innovative and dynamic entrepreneurs.  Additionally, many of these actors 
played key roles in restarting and reinvigorating the industry as well as wider economy.   
 
 Rwanda has embraced the potential for effectiveness of entrepreneurship using actors to 
play a role in national development, employment creation and revenue generation.  
Through the liberalized market structure, entrepreneurial mobility has created a system in 
which entrepreneurs are actively taking risk and implementing innovative services to 
push boundaries in order to maintain or gain competitive advantages.  This has also 
resulted in entrepreneurial actors moving ‘up’ the chain to add business activities, 
increase margins and expand opportunity.  While Rwanda also deals with liquidity 
challenges as well as the difficulties in providing formal financing to smallholder 
producers, (typically the most difficult and expensive clientele) the open market structure 
has enabled innovative financial flows throughout the chain, providing tangible 
opportunity for entrepreneurs to scale if and as wished.   
 
Research Contributions of Chapter 6: 
 Evidence found through this research and analysed in this chapter has reinforced previous 
discussion on the varying effects of socio-economic influences to entrepreneurship.  
However, this analysis has taken empirical understanding further by determining what 
and how specific influences affect entrepreneurship within the developing country 
contexts of Ethiopia and Rwanda and throughout a variety of differing types of 
entrepreneurs (Brixiova and Asaminew, 2010; Gregoire et al., 2010). 
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 While each theme investigated in this chapter is believed to have direct influence on 
entrepreneurship and wider economic ecosystems of operations, the largest impacts to 
entrepreneurial behaviour found through this research were market structure (mobility), 
resource availability (access to adequate financing) and political environment (perception 
of the effectiveness of entrepreneurship). Historical and socio-cultural influences were 
also found to be highly impactful, but were shown to be more influential in laying the 
foundation to the perception and embrace of entrepreneurs within a society as well as to 
an extent, determining who can succeed as an entrepreneur.  
 
 While product flow and related actor involvement has been a common value chain 
analysis for each country’s coffee sector, the market structures of each country, via direct 
government involvement and internal financial flow presented the difficult climate for 
private sector actors and entrepreneurs in the coffee sector.  Analysis has not been 
developed or presented in this way previously for the Ethiopian context and was found to 
be actively discouraged during field research. 
 
 Analysis from this chapter presented tangible evidence of influences to entrepreneurs 
operating in emerging markets and developing economy contexts and presented a new 
analysis of the coffee sectors.  Table 6.14 presents a synthesized overview of the specific 
evidence presented in this chapter, from the varying determinants found to influence 
entrepreneurship.  
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Table 6.14. Determinant Outcomes to Entrepreneurship  
(Source: Author Construct) 
 Ethiopia Rwanda 
M
a
rk
et
 S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Restrictive market structure, elimination of vertical 
integration with focus on product commoditization.   
Resulting in: 
- Eliminated knowledge of, direct links with 
suppliers or buyers 
- Lost potential for financial flow 
- Eliminated incentive structure 
- Prohibited vertical integration  
- Increased top-down control mechanisms 
- Increased transparency in product flow due to 
ECX system, questionable success 
Open market structure with corresponding incentive 
structures promoting emerging market potential and 
speciality product.   
Resulting in:  
- Improved demand for product quality 
- Innovative schemes to maintain competitive 
advantage 
- Improved market infrastructure  
- Increased outlets for cost effective distribution 
- Vertical integration 
- Diversified business & product profiles 
R
es
o
u
rc
e
 A
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
 
(F
in
an
ci
al
 A
cc
es
s)
 
Constricted financial climate, lending provided to 
selected, priority sectors/ actors.   
Resulting in: 
- Constrained business operations due to limited 
available cash flow 
- Reduced business expansion due to lack of 
availability / access to capital 
- Divergent paths for business success, wealth 
creation 
- Sectors with Prioritized Export Status have easier 
access to formal finance 
- Need for improved information access, especially 
for Producer segment  
Increased financial availability, disbursement and 
amount, lower cost of lending.   
Resulting in: 
- Improved financial flow throughout market & 
between actors 
- High cost/ collateral demand prohibitive for some 
actors 
- Increased pressure on national finance sector for 
improved services, reduced lending cost 
- Innovative financing schemes (within coffee 
chain) support entrepreneur ambitions  
- Need for improved information access 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
Restrictive political environment, distrusting of 
private sector actors, use of entrepreneurship.  Belief 
that state-led market involvement is best way to 
facilitate economic growth.   
Resulting in: 
- Adverse business environment/ impeded business 
expansion 
- Reduced risk taking, innovation by market actors/ 
entrepreneurs 
- Difficult climate for business registration, lack of 
incentives for business formalization 
- Demotivating entrepreneurial environment  
- Lack of entrepreneurial dynamism  
Largest influence is political embrace, understanding of 
entrepreneur as a benefit, reliant upon government 
mind set and willingness to use entrepreneurial 
potential.   
Resulting in: 
- Private sector used to provide public sector 
services/ expand sector frontier  
- GoR risk perception of  ‘over competition’ in 
coffee areas resulting in designated sourcing 
zones, questionable effectiveness  
- Motivating entrepreneurial environment 
- Promotion of International Rwanda Brand & 
consumer recognition 
- Conducive environment for risk taking/ innovating 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l,
 
S
o
ci
o
-C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
Cultural support for business, success met with 
scepticism of corruption or connections.  Lack of 
resulting social benefits following business success.   
Resulting in:  
- Post ’91 improved climate for economic 
involvement, increased opportunity for certain 
actors within specific sectors 
- Successes viewed with suspicion  
- Developed apathy towards profitability of coffee 
sector  Demotivating Environment 
- Limited interest or actionable investment in 
implementing social benefits  
Cultural support of business, entrepreneurial pursuits.  
Expectation of wider community to benefit from 
business success.  Successful business people/ 
entrepreneurs regarded as role models. 
Resulting in: 
- Reduced fear of risk taking / failure 
- Opportunity for reconciliation  
- Increased investment from external actors 
- Recognition of returnees restarting economy 
- New business opportunities opening to private 
actors  
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While improvements continue to be needed and neither government has implemented direct 
support mechanisms targeted exclusively at growing an entrepreneurial based economy as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3, this chapter has demonstrated that embracing the potential for 
benefits of entrepreneurial dynamism can create positive impact into a sector and economy.  
However, the distrustful exclusion of the potential of entrepreneurship constricts 
entrepreneur mobility, removing incentives for innovation, business expansion and limits 
willingness for risk taking.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 have thus identified and presented the internal drivers and external 
determinants influencing both the individual entrepreneur and wider operational context, 
specifically within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets.  Chapter 7 looks to combine 
this information in order to understand how the two are fused, analysing if and how 
entrepreneurs can influence operational contexts through entrepreneurial reflexivity and 
create benefits through entrepreneurship additionality.  
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Chapter 7 – The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem.  Identifying 
Potential for Entrepreneur Reflexivity and Additionality  
7.1 Introduction 
Discussion thus far has focused on the analysis of the two deconstructed elements of the Co-
Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus: the individual construct and the operational context.  
Investigation has specifically looked at these deconstructed elements as 1) the individual 
internal construct found to play a key role in the predisposition of the individual towards 
entrepreneurial action, and 2) influences from the external operational context, found to 
shape entrepreneurial outlook, approach and action.   
 
Given the understanding of the entrepreneur as a reflexive agent, influenced by, and in turn, 
influencing a wider system of operation, research now looks to further investigate the idea of 
the co-evolving, reflexive nature of entrepreneurship within an emerging market context.  
Building from the idea of the entrepreneur’s reflexive nature back to and across systems, 
research also looks into the potential for entrepreneurs to be architects of change.  
Investigating the nexus in its entirety, the following analysis and discussion looks to 
understand the potential influences (both positive and negative) that entrepreneurs can have 
on wider contexts in order to present the specific influences and action outcomes discovered 
in the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee contexts.  
 
Entrepreneurship is recognized to have the ability to enable wide-ranging (largely positive) 
impacts on economic development and wider economic growth, creating new economic 
activity through the pursual of market gaps and the further pushing of boundaries (Rogerson, 
2001).  Considered a significant factor in socio-economic development, particularly in 
developing country contexts, entrepreneurship has the potential to enable as well as create 
transformative change (Lee and Peterson, 2000).  However, while much can happen 
organically, as seen in Chapter 6, entrepreneurship can be greatly hindered or helped by the 
specifics of the operational context surrounding opportunity.  Successful entrepreneurship 
must be encouraged, supported and fostered through an allowance of the inherent flexibility 
needed to test, experiment and attempt new combinations vital for opportunity pursuit 
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(Shane, 2003).  This embrace can provide benefits as well as challenges to existing structures 
with the potential to create positive effects on an economy and society more broadly.  
Conversely, if entrepreneurship is stifled, not only does a specific sector or economy suffer 
from limited sector expansion and a reduced competitive environment, this lost 
entrepreneurial dynamism removes opportunity for additionality benefits following 
entrepreneurial exploration, business growth and frontier advancement.    
 
With the investigation and understanding of the individual construct and influences from 
operational contexts complete, attention is now turned to assessment of the greater whole of 
the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, in order to investigate and analyse the evolutionary 
potential of the reflexive entrepreneur to its structure.  Building from this framework, this 
research has investigated the understanding of entrepreneurship within this paradigm and 
now tests applicability and relevance of entrepreneurial reflexivity through the analysis and 
outcomes of empirical evidence.  Presented in Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4, the ensuing 
discussion is designed as follows: 
 
1. Present the initial structural conceptualization of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem. 
2. Demonstrate entrepreneurial reflexivity through individual choices and actions taken 
in relation to the specific driver identified as part of the individual construct.  
3. Investigate the potential for entrepreneurs as architects of change, analysing outcomes 
of additionality following entrepreneurial action. 
4. Present the completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem of the Ethiopian and Rwandan 
coffee markets, inclusive of influences on the wider economic, interpersonal, 
community and institutional structures from entrepreneurial reflexivity and 
additionality.   
 
This chapter is again reliant upon the use of mixed methods and information presented 
throughout is built from the systematic analysis of data gathered from primary and secondary 
sources.  Building from the premise that entrepreneurship is relative, both in consideration to 
the individual and to the context, conclusions drawn have again been formed through the 
author’s own understanding of entrepreneurship as detailed through this investigation and its 
understood potential within the confines of this specific research approach and design.  
Gathering these conclusions has resulted in understanding a more complete picture of 
entrepreneurship, as will be discussed throughout this chapter.  
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7.1.2 Presenting the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Structure 
As has been discussed, entrepreneurship is a phenomenon in which the system influences the 
agent and in turn the agent’s action influences the system.  Therefore, this research has 
approached entrepreneurship as a co-evolving paradigm in which the entrepreneur and 
distinct social system, or operational context, are interdependent forces understood as a 
complete structure.  As such, an entrepreneur is propelled or constrained by specific 
opportunities or structures identified through the venturing process, within a specific context.  
Likewise, specific opportunities or structures may be created or constricted through the 
results of entrepreneurial actions (Sarason et al., 2006).  Initially introduced in Sections 2.3.1 
and 3.2.1, this research approach and corresponding analysis understands entrepreneurship as 
the dynamic process of an agent engaging with, and responding to a specific structure; thus 
understanding the entrepreneur and specific context as a duality.   
 
The outcomes from this research reflect the conceptual framework of the Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship Nexus, presented in Figure 2.3, however results have further built from that 
entrepreneurship nexus to more accurately define and depict a structure for entrepreneurship 
which better presents if and how entrepreneurial action and opportunity pursuit can influence 
systems, structures and political outlooks within a wider economy.  The main findings from 
Chapters 5 and 6 created the foundations critical to the understanding of the wider view of 
the entrepreneurship nexus, revealing tangible application towards this researcher’s 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship as an active element within a comprehensive, yet 
living, evolving organism: the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem.  The following section presents a 
brief review of the theoretical basis used in the development of the conceptual framework in 
preparation for the presentation and analysis of the structure for this ecosystem155.  
 
The author’s conceptualization of a model for the entrepreneurial ecosystem is presented 
below in Figure 7.1.  While much of this analysis is highly contextualized to entrepreneurs 
within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets, the conceptualized framework for the 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem below, attempts to present a more generalized model, which may 
                                                        
155 The idea of entrepreneurship as an ‘ecosystem’ was first found in Isenberg, 2010 and Acs et al., 2014, 
however the development and structure conceptualizing, analysing and depicting the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
within this research is the authors. 
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be applicable for analysis outside of the coffee sectors.  Likewise, the completed ecosystem 
representing the specific entrepreneurial outcomes and additionality for the Ethiopian and 
Rwandan coffee markets, presented in Figure 7.4 in Section 7.4.1, was built from the robust 
empirical findings of this research and as such, remains highly applicable to entrepreneurs 
within these unique contexts.  
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Figure 7.1.  Author’s Conceptualized Structure of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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As seen in Figure 7.1, interdependent elements and ensuing outcomes are tracked with 
weighted arrows portraying influence importance of determinants as analysed in Chapter 6.  
Arrows also represent entrepreneurial action both as an outcome of the entrepreneurship 
nexus as well as a reflexive influence flowing back to the nexus.   
 
The remaining discussion presents evidence to the reflexive entrepreneur and corresponding 
outcomes as well as the policy and wider government strategy adaptation needed to account 
for, and even use, entrepreneurial action in order to pursue national agendas.  Tangible 
analysis of entrepreneur reflexivity against specific drivers provides additional empirical 
evidence to correspond to reflexive action, which will be examined further in Section 7.2.   
  
7.2 Perceptions and Choice Making Behaviour of the Reflexive 
Entrepreneur 
An entrepreneur’s perceptions and choices for opportunity pursuit are determined through the 
individual’s understanding and analysis of context and use of internal characteristics to 
enable analysis, decision and action within a unique environment (Casson, 1982; Lee and 
Peterson, 2000; Shane, 2003). This combination of context analysis and use of internal 
characteristics presents the opportunity to see evidence of tangible entrepreneurial action, but 
also to witness evidence as to how this tangibly influences operational structures.  The 
following section presents entrepreneurial action demonstrating reflexivity to a wider system 
in relation to drivers analysed as part of the individual construct.  As such, this research 
defines reflexivity as the consequence to political, financial, market and socio-cultural 
institutions due to entrepreneurial actions.   
 
7.2.1 Resilience  
Discussed in Sections 2.4.1.1 and 5.4.4.1, high levels of resilience, or an ability to positively 
rebound following adverse events, can better equip an entrepreneur to more productively 
adapt to difficult situations (Sinclair and Wallston, 2004).  Given the nature of the coffee 
sector, individuals involved are forced to deal with and overcome many obstacles.  An 
example of market resilience is specifically linked here with responses to the frequent and 
erratic price fluctuations and overall market volatility of the coffee sector, providing 
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examples of entrepreneurial adaptation and market resilience.  As described in Section 4.2.3, 
single actors do not have the ability to influence or impact international market prices, 
specifically futures markets156 from which domestic price structures are largely derived.  As 
such, actors within the coffee chain of producing countries are forced to be market takers, as 
opposed to market makers.  Additionally, both countries have emerged following entrenched, 
tragic conflict and political transition, forcing many to completely rebuild businesses as well 
as lives; also requiring resilience.  As will be seen below, responses to market forces and 
price fluctuations are viewed as part of a wider profile of resilient adaptation strategies for 
actors and entrepreneurs reacting to adverse market conditions.  However, it must also be 
acknowledged that despite the difficult conditions, some actors were forced to continue, as 
coffee is often the only choice of income generation for some households.  Forced 
continuance could also be hardened by exit costs or the probability of incurring greater losses 
following business transfer.  
 
Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneurs and Potential Entrepreneurs in both countries, 
reported to fall into the pattern of expecting one good price year followed by one or two low 
or bad price years157.   Additionally, coffee producing communities in both countries were 
observed to suffer adverse effects of low prices together, as opposed to a specific 
ostracization of a producer due to poor business results and/ or ensuing financial difficulties.  
The widespread and entrenched nature of coffee often resulted in an apparent 
communalization of both success and failure, appearing to almost mitigate some risk from 
fear of societal judgement, despite poor business results. 
 
During low price seasons, many smallholder producers, while resilient in continuing 
production despite discouraging pricing scenarios, simply accepted the situation and related 
“helplessness”, developing a common adaptation strategy of reduced household 
consumption.  As one Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-Entrepreneur shared,  
                                                        
156 Global market prices are expressed in relation to prices established in futures markets which are comprised 
on short-term combination of market fundamentals including production, expected consumption, stock price 
trends as well as existing hedges (Daviron and Ponte, 2005). 
157 This pattern rarely occurred when compared to historical price indexes 
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If prices are low, you cannot get return on your investment and loose money; there is 
nothing we can do so we hope for better next year…. Coffee is the best way to earn 
cash in this area but you just must accept whatever you can get from it. (P_R_28, 
2014) 
 
Conversely, entrepreneurs within both countries took varying action in attempts to maintain 
resilience as well as mitigate risk of price volatility, through restarting business activity, as 
detailed through the remainder of this section.  
 
Ethiopia 
While Ethiopian Producers, Processors and Exporters remain at the mercy of international 
price volatility, a reduced ability was observed for these actors to be able to improve 
standings or business prospects in order to mitigate risk from price volatility.  While Non-
Entrepreneurs maintained a view of season-to-season profitability, Entrepreneurs not only 
were observed to perceive the coffee sector as a long-term business, but also were actively 
investing any profits outside of the sector, diversifying portfolios away from coffee.  These 
resilient market adaptation strategies shed light onto larger issues within the country’s coffee 
sector and mistrust from current actors.  As described by this Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneur,  
This area is a coffee area, so of course that is what people do, but now we 
(producers) are not free to sell to whom we want and we get no benefits from our 
buyers.  I do not think coffee is as profitable as it used to be.  I am still in coffee, but 
now I look for other opportunities to invest in order to bring in more money for my 
family.  I have gotten involved in construction and I also travel to more rural areas 
and buy (sun-dried) coffee from those farmers farther out.  I will store it and sell 
when the prices increase. (P_E_26, 2015) 
 
As discussed in Section 6.4.1.1, the current structure of the coffee market, regulated through 
the ECX market structure, limited opportunity for businesses across the chain to invest in 
order to diversify coffee portfolios, increasing the need for resilience, but also reducing 
ability for risk mitigation strategies through diversified investment.  Additionally, buying and 
selling product through the ECX Primary Markets has been proven to largely remove 
opportunity and incentive for the implementation of graded pricing scales for quality, and 
purchases of red cherry or sun-dried pods remain at per volume only.  
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Discussed in Section 6.5.1.1, Ethiopian Processors are highly restricted in ability to 
differentiate payment measures as the purchase of coffee is only offered at the ECX Primary 
Market level.  As such, Processors typically can only secure as much product as cash 
available on-hand and must manage through seasonal projections for an unpredictable 
market.  From the Processors interviewed during this research, 85% reported to need 
additional financing in order to purchase product stock as wished.  Resilience strategies for 
these operators revolved around surviving within current financial means and adopting new/ 
different purchase strategies.  While Processors recognized the importance of quality and its 
ability to garner higher on-sell pricing potential, the market’s incentive structure has shifted 
since the onset of the ECX system to prioritize quantity over quality.  As the quality of the 
product cannot be guaranteed, it has become a safer option to purchase larger volumes of 
lower quality158.  As one Ethiopian Processor explained his business resilience strategy:   
I have reduced the volume of trading of my business in recent years.  It is safer for me 
not to over extend myself and I now only buy mid-level grades, but my margins are 
much less. (Pc_E_26, 2015) 
 
A Processor found to have difficulty in obtaining loans also described his resiliency strategy,  
It is very difficult to be a Processor; we are squeezed by the farmer and squeezed by 
traders at the ECX.  Also the lack of financial assistance such as a loan has changed 
the way I do business.  I cannot get (a loan) and must rely on my own cash, but I do 
not have enough to purchase the full amount to meet my station’s (processing) 
capacity, so that is also lost revenue.  The price fluctuations also make it very difficult 
to predict and plan and you cannot follow ECX prices.  I buy what I can and focus on 
buying a larger volume at a lower price (and quality) and hope to sell at a profit.  But 
overall it is difficult to continue in this business.  (Pc_E_4, 2015) 
 
Due to resulting market structures, Ethiopian resiliency and adaptation strategies across the 
chain were implemented to reduce risk by limiting business and market activity.  This has 
resulted in reduced overall product quality, reduced investment across sectors as well as 
reduced receipt of investment by those in need of it most, rural, smallholder producers. 
 
 
                                                        
158 An additional note of evidence in an overall argument that Ethiopia’s current coffee structure has 
incentivized commoditized volumes over specialized niches at considerable long-term damage to the sector. 
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Rwanda  
Entrepreneurial actors in Rwanda, were observed to understand coffee business through a 
long-term lens and believed that overall, despite years of low as well as high price, coffee is 
successful and profitable.  This prolonged view of business life, supported resiliency and 
adaptation strategies in overcoming adverse seasonal challenges and adapt to price volatility.  
Non-Entrepreneurs had a much more short-term, season-to-season mentality.  This mentality 
mirrored the especially low resilience indexes of Rwandan Smallholder Producer Non-
Entrepreneurs seen in Section 5.4.4.1.  It is believed that this comparatively low level of 
resilience (while also coupled with other elements such as a high risk aversion) has impacted 
investment strategies, in which low price years saw Non-Entrepreneurs limit or stop 
investments in production.  This served to impact output quality and yield from these 
producers for the following seasons; resulting in a low-input, low-output cycle, difficult to 
escape.  
 
A common resiliency strategy of Rwandan Entrepreneurs was the focus on quality through a 
variety of unique methods or strategies implemented at the Production, Processing or Export 
level, focusing on higher quality or a more unique product in order to garner a higher value.  
The prioritization of quality was observed to be used as a buffer against volatile market 
prices as it resulted in higher base prices, although these prices were still highly volatile.  
Related entrepreneurial action resulted in the introduction of varying degrees of incentives 
and pricing structures.  Graded pricing structures for higher quality are a recent development 
and while not universally implemented by all Processors and Exporters, it was found to 
provide incentives for producers.  This has aided in the county’s effort to improve its overall 
quality stock, evidenced through improved quality profiles of exported coffee and the 
continued increase of fully-washed coffee (from 1% in 2002 to 41% in 2014) (MINAGRI, 
2014; NAEB, 2015b).  Improved quality has attracted additional buyers and raised the 
international profile of the Rwanda Brand (R_3, 2014). 
 
Case Study 7.1, demonstrates a Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur’s market resilience and 
related strategy for continued investment, which allowed him to capitalize upon resources 
available to protect business, but also improve production and quality.  
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Another Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur took further action and used low price years as 
an opportunity to purchase land if it became available from producers hit especially hard by 
low price or other adverse circumstances.  As described below, 
I was able to buy some additional land to increase my trees, I also focus on 
improving my productivity by mulching and adding manure to the fertilizer; even if 
prices are low I know I can make enough for my family.  Land is scarce now, but 
sometimes people are forced to sell if they must and that is how you can find it (land).  
I have several plots spread throughout this area…. From the increased profits I made 
from my additional coffee I built another house and rent it out as another way to 
generate income. (P_R_69, 2014) 
 
Resilience strategies of entrepreneurs in Rwanda took advantage of market flexibility, 
implementing strategies to create buffers against price volatility, which resulted in increased 
quality and development of unique product portfolios for additional income generation.  The 
improved pricing potential was also observed to participate in the overall improvement to the 
sector through the introduction of quality grades, increased earning incentives, streamlined 
practices to capture quality post-harvest, improved transport opportunities and improved 
relationships to capitalize upon sourcing and/ or purchasing arrangements. 
 
 
Case Study 7.1. Quality Focus 
One highly successful Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur in north western Rwanda, reported to only plant 
coffee trees, and has gone as far as replacing all on-farm consumption crops with coffee trees.  He has slowly 
been able to expand his land area and now owns more than 6,000 trees (one of the largest Smallholder 
Producers found in Rwanda or Ethiopia).  He manages a year round staff of six employees and seasonal 
employment can increase to an additional 25 to 30 people.  This entrepreneur is also the only certified organic 
producer in the area, selling directly to a certified exporter for premium prices.  Prior to becoming certified, he 
reported having difficulty in finding ways to make himself more attractive to area buyers.  Partnering with a 
regional cooperative to be a part of a training on organic production, he has begun producing his own organic 
compost and fertilizer to use on his trees.  He had recently begun to intercrop large shade trees within his 
coffee plantations to further improve quality.   
 
He explained, “You must look at coffee as a 40 year business, that is the only way you will be profitable, you 
cannot judge year on year and over time you earn good money.  I produce very good quality and also have the 
certification and so I know I am protected slightly when very low prices happen.  Others have not been able to 
do what I have done or are not willing to take the risk of having only coffee trees.  But I have built a second 
home in the city and no longer stay on the farm.” (P_R_80, 2014) 
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7.2.2 Self – Efficacy  
Initially presented in Sections 2.4.1.2 and 5.4.4.2, strong self-confidence and belief in 
oneself, self – efficacy is an important aspect in opportunity pursuit and entrepreneurial 
success (Bullough and Renko, 2013).  The coffee sector can be described as a somewhat 
naturally self-selecting endeavour due to comparative labour intensity, high start-up costs, 
large, often upfront seasonal capital requirements as well as seasonal timespans needed to 
meet profitability.  Given the differing market structures equated to either embrace or 
renounce entrepreneurship and its potential, respondents were observed to respond 
differently when operating in either demotivating or motivating economic climates.  
 
Ethiopia  
Discussed in Section 6.4.1.1, Ethiopia’s introduction of a more restrictive market structure 
was observed to have had strong impact resulting in the tangible demotivation of sector 
actors and entrepreneurs alike.  The reduction in self-belief or willingness to take 
entrepreneurial action was observed through restricted business operations and reduced 
potential for opportunity pursuit.  Results from Section 5.4.4.2, revealed no differences to the 
Self-Efficacy Index between Ethiopian Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs, showing all 
actors have a relatively low degree of self–efficacy.  While Ethiopian actors had a slightly 
higher Self-Efficacy Index score than Risk Tolerance, the market environment and political 
perspective is considered to have had adverse consequences on entrepreneurs through 
demotivated outlooks and corresponding lack of action.  A Smallholder Producer Potential 
Entrepreneur described his feelings about the coffee market,  
I am a good farmer and have been able to take care of my family.  But with coffee, it 
is there and the Government says you should grow it so we do, but I do not believe I 
am allowed to be successful in it.  There are unfair benefits for some and restrictions 
for others like me.  I do not feel I get the correct information and what can I do?  I 
take (coffee) to the Market (ECX Primary Market) and sell there…. I do not see how I 
am benefiting from coffee so I no longer spend much effort or resources on it… I do 
not feel a competitive relationship with other farmers.  But there is a very poor 
relationship between this community and local authorities and we have much anger.  
Again, what can we do?  We already know who will win the election. (P_E_8, 2015) 
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A Processor explained his relationship with the coffee sector,  
Now, there is much competition which distorts prices and makes building 
relationships very difficult, but buyers (exporters) can still make some ‘back deals’ to 
get the coffee they want.  I don’t feel I have as much control over my business as I 
used to and I do not trust the system.  I am buying less and do not spend much money 
or effort to source higher quality; the middle grade quality is a safer option. 
(Pc_E_10, 2015) 
 
Coffee is considered a ‘priority sector’ due to its ability to garner foreign exchange, however 
as discussed, the priority status does not stretch across all actors in the domestic industry.  
Without, and even with the priority status, businesses reported difficultly due to the 
constricted regulatory environment, which has proven to further reduce confidence in coffee 
as a viable business option.  Despite having access to formal lending structures, this Exporter 
described his challenges, 
My family has always been in coffee, but as of late, I have reduced my coffee 
businesses to only export.  We have diversified and invested in other holdings such as 
a printing business, import of goods and renting of transport vehicles.  I am waiting 
to see how this current market (ECX) progresses before I make any other large 
decisions on coffee.  Overall, I think quality has gone down because people are 
buying blind at (ECX) Auction, but it is still a good sector for me because my other 
businesses also benefit from the loans I get for coffee. (Ex_E_3, 2015) 
 
As shown above, Ethiopia’s demotivating environment and corresponding low degrees of 
self-efficacy for Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs alike have restricted market 
interaction and willingness for business investment or expansion.  The reduction in business 
purchasing strategies or value-add opportunities also reduces national revenue earnings from 
the sector.  While difficult to ascertain, specific results on quality profiles or differentials, 
Ethiopian actors and international customers alike complain to the perceived reduction in 
quality (E_4, 2015; E_5, 2015).  A trend was certainly perceived in which the removal of 
quality has dis-incentivized the current market structure and regulatory environment, 
resulting in increased focus to commercialization.  Additionally, increasing distrust of the 
sector and related controls was palatable, yet without a conducive system in which average 
populations can have grievances addressed, questions exist as to the true effectiveness or 
success potential for the sector. 
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Rwanda  
The re-emergence of Rwanda’s coffee sector has resulted in a new class of operators, often 
having to work through unchartered territory.  The relatively new sector is widely recognized 
to be fraught with risk as well as its unpredictability.  Thus actors and entrepreneurs choosing 
to be involved already demonstrate a strong sense of self and belief in their own capability to 
succeed.  Additionally, coffee businesses are typically located in remote areas, far from 
typical amenities and with frantic work schedules159; the choice of entering the sector is, in a 
way, a culling effect for less dedicated or less confident actors.  As described by a Processing 
Station Owner:  “If you want to do business, but you want to be at an office with a tie, you do 
not go into coffee” (Ex_R_20, 2014). 
 
Entrepreneur respondents also expressed a pride and indeed strong desire to work for 
themselves, an eagerness to be responsible for decisions made and strategies taken and 
showed a trust in their own judgement.  Choice for entering the sector was explained by this 
Processor, 
Why did I want to get involved in coffee?  My parents grew coffee and I learned about 
it from there ... I know I have the knowledge and expertise to be able to run a station.  
I found a financier willing to invest in me and together the business has been working 
well.  We started small, but are slowly increasing size of operations.  The industry is 
also growing and improving, so it is a good opportunity (time) to get involved.  I 
enjoy the challenge and yes, losses are my fault, but the successes are also mine. 
(Pc_R_19, 2014)  
 
Many Entrepreneur respondents, regardless of business segment or entrepreneurial 
classification, responded positively when asked if they believed they were successful and 
were in control over their own business.  The history of the business start-up of a young 
entrepreneur is presented in Case Study 7.2 
                                                        
159 Most Processing Stations and Exporting businesses operate 24 hours during coffee season in order to handle 
amount of product provided.  Producers typically harvest overnight to be able to transport fresh product to the 
stations in the morning. 
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Improvements to regulatory structures and faith in positive Government interaction continue 
to build trust and confidence within the wider economic framework.  The continued 
development of high self-belief among actors as well as growing pride of the industry across 
the country has also played an important role within socio-cultural settings regarding 
individual or community reconciliation processes, with focused efforts to the future, instead 
of the past.  
 
7.2.3 Innovativeness  
Described in Sections 2.4.1.3 and 5.4.4.3, innovation is understood as the capacity to engage 
in new processes, products, services, ideas or systems.  It is also perceived as improvements 
to ideas through unique or original combinations (Schumpeter, 1934; Janssen, 2000; Okpara, 
2007; Hall et al., 2012).  Additionally, as innovative schemes are introduced, other actors 
pickup on activity or accrued benefits and introduce strategies into their own business.  
While this may be seen as a wider benefit for the development of the sector, entrepreneurs in 
turn must be constantly innovating to stay competitive (Baumol, 1993).  As such, individual 
innovativeness is more than just a single creative, yet static idea, as entrepreneurs need to 
continually engage in innovative processes.  This was observed as such in entrepreneurs in 
Rwanda, but to a lesser degree in Ethiopia.    
 
 
Case Study 7.2. Self-Belief in Business 
This Rwandan Processor was the youngest Entrepreneur interviewed, at age 24.  Hidden with neighbours as an 
infant, he is the only surviving member of his family following the genocide and upon turning 18, was able to 
reclaim some family land.  Since, he has taken an active role in establishing and expanding his business.  He 
reported to recognize that higher margins existed in the processing stage and began investing in his first washing 
station nearly five years ago.  He now has two washing stations, currently buying from over 5,000 farmers and is 
looking to export once he has enough volume.  He described his mind-set and self-belief in his ability to achieve 
his business goals:   
 
“I am very interested in business and have learned to rely on myself only.  I have built this myself and I trust in 
my own judgement.  At first I was not able to get a loan from the bank, as I was too young.   So I started very 
small but have had much success as the business expands.  I encouraged farmers to buy shares in my first 
washing station and that is how I generated some capital to start.  I am trying to maintain a good relationship 
with my farmers.  If you take care of them, they will take care of you.  I have done two years of university, but I 
think it is largely a waste of time for me”.  (Pc_R_4, 2014) 
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Ethiopia 
Given the current, restrictive market structure and regulations, expanding opportunity or 
experimenting with new ideas, products or services was found largely absent and un-
incentivized within the Ethiopian system.  Instead, environment and structures kept actors 
operating through a limited market scope. This inability to operate across the chain or to 
interact with other segments was observed to result in a single-minded approach, focusing 
protection of individual business interests.  Restrictions against vertical integration also 
removed potential for implementation of unique as well as needed service provision 
(financial, technical training, input supply) across the chain, especially at the smallholder 
producer level.  Without an incentive for businesses to do their own research and 
development, there was an obvious lack of experimentation and innovation aimed at 
improving the product or business model and may also be attributed to high risk-aversion for 
private sector actors who have learned to operate expressly within an allowed structure.  As 
one Ethiopian Processor explained,  
It is not worth to expand or try new things.  I stay where I am, with what I know 
works and with what is accepted.  (Pc_E_23, 2015) 
 
Only one, unique Commercial Farming business was found to be especially innovative in its 
business approach and practice and was the only respondent found to be undertaking 
business approach in this way, presented in Case Study 7.3 below. 
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Overall, Ethiopian Entrepreneurs were found to have implemented less innovative practices.  
However, one innovative result stemming from the current market structure in Ethiopia was 
the type of business registration, which was discussed in greater detail in Section 6.5.1.1.  
While many classifications for business registration exists in Ethiopia, the most common for 
independent, private economic entities is through incorporation as a Private Limited 
Company (PLC) or Sole Proprietorship (SP) (Seifu, 2010).  Due to the difficulty in accessing 
financing for businesses, many formal businesses choose to incorporate as a PLC in which 
ownership structures can accommodate up to 50 people (Seifu, 2010).  These structures 
enable the entrepreneur or business initiator to attract their own financing through ownership 
buy-in of an equity share, as opposed to the more ‘typical’ financing options from formal 
banking institutions, as capital is raised from shareholders as opposed to traditional bank 
loans (Pc_E_19, 2015).  Some respondents reported to have chosen to establish PLCs as they 
felt they did not have correct connections or the business was too young to be approved for a 
loan.  Dependent upon the specific ownership structure, it can be cheaper to source capital 
Case Study 7.3. Unique Innovation  
This Commercial Farmer entrepreneur and his sister are business partners, educated in the US and recently 
returned to Ethiopia to pursue its business potential.  He described his business below. 
 
“We started our farm four years ago, but did research for three years prior to starting.  Our Farm is located in the 
southwest of the country, near Gambela.  We grow a very specific variety that is originally from Ethiopia but we 
actually discovered it being cultivated in Panama during a research trip several years ago.  This variety 
commands a lot of attention, but produces a very high and very distinct profile.  Before we settled on this variety 
we did a lot of soil testing and also brought in technical experts to assess the area.  Last year was our first 
harvest, still from premature trees so I expect the price to increase, but we received between $30 and $32/ lb for 
what we exported.  We also work very closely with local communities and are instituting an out-grower scheme 
in order to export the lower grades we buy from area farmers.  In our area, people traditionally do not use the 
coffee cherries and instead chew or brew the leaves of the trees, so a lot of training still is needed.   We are not 
going to certify as Organic because I think organic limits production quantity potential and I want quantity with 
my already high quality variety.  It is very difficult working with local administrators.  We have buy-in and 
support at the Federal Level, but they have little ability to influence or control at the local administrative level.  
Trying new things or operating ‘outside of the ordinary’ brings many headaches.”  (CF_E_19, 2015) 
 
The price quoted above for coffee is the reported export price received by this Commercial Farmer. Ethiopian 
smallholder farmers can typically receive an estimated  $0.40 to $1.60/ lb selling to local ECX Primary Markets, 
however Commercial Farmers produce and process their own beans on site and by-pass the ECX Auction to 
export directly to International Importers.  While this specific export price is noticeably high in comparison to 
‘commercial coffee grades’, high-quality, speciality coffee export prices can reportedly reach up to $100/lb 
(R_3, 2014; E_5, 2015; ICO_2015). 
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from shareholders than from formal lending institutions. Alternatively, businesses can also 
incorporate as a Sole Proprietorship in which a single individual is liable for all business 
actions (Seifu, 2010).  As seen in Table 6.4 of Section 6.5.1.1, 68% of Commercial Farmers, 
54% of Processors and 80% of Exporters reported to be currently registered as PLCs.  The 
experience of a Commercial Farmer is described below,  
My father had a large coffee plantation during the Emperor’s time, but it was taken 
during the Derg.  After the Derg we tried to get the land back but could not and also 
many people had relocated to the site and we could not remove them.  By this time, 
we had all our collateral tied to other businesses (textiles) and could not get another 
loan.  Instead we shopped for investors, friends and family members who could invest 
in us and be a part of our (PLC) company.  That is how we got the capital to start.  
Now all earnings we make are shared with shareholders and not the bank.  
(CF_E_16, 2015) 
 
Several respondents reported to have started businesses as PLCs only to later change to SPs 
upon becoming further established, with a successful credit history.  One of Ethiopia’s 
largest Exporters, who in 2014, exported 18,000 tonnes green, with revenue earnings over 
$57 million, described the difficulty he faced in getting initial finance and his experience 
starting his business in 2005.  
To be an entrepreneur it is very difficult to get established because the banks require 
such high collateral levels.  The banks do not understand the sector.  Only once you 
have a positive credit history with them it is easier to deal with them – but loans are 
still only made against signed sale contracts with an importer.  We struggled for six 
years and used all of our liquid assets to set up the warehouse to start the business, as 
we could not get a loan.  Now that we are established with a business and credit 
history we still are a PLC, and still benefit from our shareholders.  (Ex_E_18, 2015) 
 
The otherwise limited innovation observed in Ethiopia is believed to be an output of the 
operational context but was also observed to be a contributing factor to the adverse 
operational and financial climate due to the lack of actors consciously willing, or able to push 
boundaries, experiment with new ideas, processes, techniques or operational models.  The 
lack of innovation, not only hindered the organic evolution and improvement to the sector, 
but also limited potential for individual business expansion through reduced earning 
prospects.  Without competition to the commercial financial sector, improved financing 
options do not appear likely. 
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Rwanda 
Rwandan Entrepreneurs were found to be more innovative than Ethiopian counterparts in a 
variety of ways, mainly centred on product quality, processing techniques, sourcing methods 
and financing schemes.  Producers that recognized and chose to prioritize quality turned to 
experimentation with different, largely organic composts and growing methods – such as the 
introduction of shade trees to limit direct sun on the coffee trees and alternative production 
and harvesting practices.  With the emergence of varying certification schemes, namely Fair 
Trade, Organic and UTZ gaining popularity with Processors and Exporters, several 
entrepreneurs were discovering ways of integrating certification into wider business models.  
However, most certifications remain very difficult to obtain and maintain due to higher input 
costs and added difficulty in securing supply that meets not only quality standards, but also 
adheres to strict sourcing and community interaction policies.  One Processor who owns a 
farm but also sources from area Smallholder Producers described his business model, 
On our farm we produce organic, single-origin, micro-lots, mainly for sale in 
Rwanda, but also some regional sale as well.  Our farm and processing station is on 
the coast of Lake Kivu and we are currently setting up an eco-tourism lodge near the 
station.  Tourist will stay on the beach and can tour our plantation and processing 
facilities.  We are constantly testing and trialling new techniques to improve but also 
share that with the farmers in our area.  Some of the best (farmers) we have trained 
for Organic certification and they receive an accordingly higher price when we buy 
their cherries.  That has proven to be a good incentive for other area farmers who see 
what they also could achieve if they improve as well.  Overall, I think the community 
benefits from increased employment from us, but also from increases in money 
coming into the area and into these households of poorer farmers.  (Pc_R_17, 2015)   
 
Processing and Exporting businesses in Rwanda not only demonstrated high levels of 
innovativeness as well as resilience in regards to continued operation despite price volatility, 
but also through the ability to innovate around the seeming barriers posed by financing 
challenges.  These businesses have a higher capital intensity and are less able to defer losses 
when prices are low, posing additional risks.  High cash flows160 are required during seasons 
as product (cherry or parchment) is typically paid for in cash at point of sale and all product 
                                                        
160 It was also reported as a security risk to hold such large amounts of cash either at station or manager home.  
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must be purchased across just a two to three month span161.  While default and bankruptcy is 
especially high for these segments (NAEB, 2015b), some entrepreneurs operating these 
businesses reported to have introduced specific, unique strategies in order to maintain 
operations, cash flow and sourcing ability.   
 
Overall, liquidity constraints in Rwanda continue to be problematic due to inadequate cash 
availability during coffee season as well as the high cost of credit, as discussed in Section 
6.5.1.2.  However, despite these challenges operators continue to persevere and some 
entrepreneurs have even proven to flourish.  Case Study 7.4, demonstrates one Processor’s 
innovative solutions to overcoming financial challenges and sustaining an expanded business 
model.  
                                                        
161 Standard seasonal span is three months, but can stretch as long as five months, however with quality profiles 
noticeably reduced.  
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For comparison, Ethiopian Processors would not be able to introduce a similar system as 
presented in Case Study 7.4, due to market restrictions and legal regulation resulting in the 
inability to trace product or know producers, as all product is pushed through the ECX 
Primary Markets.  
 
Rwanda innovations observed within the Processing and Export segments also resulted in 
varying and unique attempts at improving product price through unique sale pitches, 
trainings, or other incentive packages.  As will be discussed in Section 7.3.1, many of these 
innovations also contain a social benefit as a means to increase or maintain a competitive 
edge through indirect, non-monetary means.  
 
Case Study 7.4. Gaining a Competitive Edge through Financial Innovation  
The Founder, Owner and Managing Director of a coffee processing and exporting business and one of Rwanda’s 
most successful coffee entrepreneurs, overcame his cash flow challenges by using his business as a ‘savings tool’ 
for producers.  Typically, Processors must pay in cash at time of purchase from Producers, or buy on credit, as is 
common for many cooperatives.  However, Producers prefer to receive cash payment as opposed to credit notes 
when selling their cherries and this has left many processing stations reduced to only buying according to 
availability of cash on hand.  Additionally in many coffee zones, increased competition from the increasing 
numbers of processing stations has enabled Smallholder Producers’ greater flexibility in choosing to sell to stations 
able to pay in cash, at the expense and chagrin of many Processors.   
 
Seeking to overcome these challenges, this Entrepreneur developed and implemented an innovative financing 
scheme in which Producers can either choose to be paid in cash at time of cherry delivery to his washing station, or 
can choose to open an individual ‘savings account’ at the processing station and be issued a savings receipt at time 
of each delivery of product (each producer has an individual account).   Reportedly, the vast majority of Producers 
selling their cherries have chosen to ‘save’ payments with the processing station, using it as a savings institution.  
Providing a savings mechanism for Smallholder Producers in an area that has yet to see the establishment of 
formal finance institutions, freed the need for such large upfront cash requirements and also allowed Producers an 
opportunity to save money, accessing as and when needed throughout the year.  It has also created an additional 
benefit of securing loyalty, building a more reliable supplier network and establishing relationships with these 
Producers, ensuring return of supply year on year, despite increasing competition from other processing stations 
within the area.  Operating in a highly competitive coffee area, this entrepreneur also provides year round technical 
training and agricultural support for his loyal farmers, ensuring their continued supply, but also improving the 
quality of coffee received. 
 
“We had some very difficult first few years, struggling to be able to source the volume needed to cover operational 
costs of the station as well as to be able to pay farmers for deliveries.  It took me a few seasons to test and improve 
this strategy, but I believe we are providing a valuable service to the farmers and overtime we have a very good 
relationship built on trust.  My farmers trust in what I tell them and listen to trainings and as a result we have been 
able to improve quality and sell at higher prices, which is another benefit to us both. ” (Ex_R_1, 2014) 
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Rwanda was observed to not only have the space conducive for innovative action and trial of 
new combinations, but new strategies were found to be implemented that were observed to 
be actively improving individual businesses, local communities, and wider markets.  Ethiopia 
was found to have a comparatively reduced number of innovative actions and this is believed 
to be an outcome of the restrictive market structure, reduced risk tolerance and inability of 
actors to source finance to enable innovative or new business expansion.  While this study 
was an investigation on entrepreneurship, innovativeness and related actions taken form an 
important element in its broader understanding.  The actions and strategies listed in Table 7.1 
below, present innovative actions observed in each country in relation to specific business 
strategies.  Admittedly, additional innovations may be occurring, however the list below 
presents the outcome from observations on entrepreneurial action and business strategies 
found following discussions with respondents and key informants.      
 
Table 7.1. Observed Comparative Innovations  
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Innovation Strategies 
  Rwanda  Ethiopia 
Production Strategies  Production Strategies  
  Shade grown Shade grown 
  Organic (conscious choice) Organic production due to traditional practices 
  New compost/ mulching production  (on sale to other 
producers) 
Introduction of new varieties  
  
Business Strategies Business Strategies 
  Land Expansion (Rent, Purchase) Land Expansion (Rent, purchase) 
  Business focus on unique, quality product  Certification schemes, Commercial Farm only 
  Employment of laborers (Smallholder Producers) Diversified Business holdings (non-coffee) 
  Certification Schemes Employment of laborers, Smallholder Producers 
  Diversified Product / Business base (coffee & non)  
Sourcing Strategies  Sourcing Strategies 
  Purchase contracts (guaranteed market for Producers/ 
Processors) 
Pre-finance options 
Pay off to ECX Primary Traders for selected, 
preferential supply  
  2nd Payments 
Input Supply 
  
  In-kind payments via area social benefits:    
   - Technical trainings    
   - Payment of school fees for qualified producers   
   - Purchase of annual healthcare costs for qualifying      
producers 
  
   - Building area schools / medical facilities / water 
supply / electricity 
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7.2.4 Risk Tolerance  
Discussed in Section 2.4.1.4, entrepreneurs have a higher tolerance for risk and are more 
likely to see potential endeavours as opportunity, as opposed to a risky activity.  However, 
risk taking is still a carefully calculated undertaking and entrepreneurs do not take risks 
simply to engage in risky behaviour (Josien, 2012).  As seen in Section 5.4.4.4, respondents 
from both countries showed a relatively low degree of Risk Tolerance as compared to other 
drivers, with Ethiopia scoring much lower than Rwandan counterparts.  The specific results 
to risk aversion were found to be related to the specific environments of operation, in which 
entrepreneurs demonstrated highly calculated approaches towards risky endeavours such as 
new ventures, market expansion and portfolio diversification.  Operating a business within 
the coffee sector of either country is recognized as a risky endeavour.   
 
While all business pursuit inherently carries some degree of risk, some of the most common 
risks observed within this research were price fluctuations, shifts in international demand, 
lack of market control, financial inaccessibility, production challenges such as climate 
variability or pests and disease, market access, transportation of goods, and product sourcing 
challenges.  
 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopian Smallholder Producers, reported to acknowledge quality as important, however 
payment was largely accorded only to volume delivered and not a specific quality standard, 
and producers therefore were found to thus afford less time to quality.  Smallholder Producer 
Entrepreneurs reported to use profits to expand business opportunity, however all expansion 
came through diversification out from the coffee sector.  While coffee was maintained, 
preferred investment was made in construction, retail or transportation endeavours, which 
were believed to deliver greater returns.  As an Ethiopian Smallholder Producer Entrepreneur 
stated,  
I used to be a tailor before, but that was not profitable and so I switched to coffee 
because with one harvest you can make cash and use that to invest in other 
businesses.  In addition to coffee, I built a commercial shop that I rent out and grow 
eucalyptus trees to sell as lumber.  Coffee can be very profitable, but also 
unpredictable and risky and I make more money from these other businesses. 
(P_E_23, 2015) 
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Given the ECX structure and inability to trace coffee origins, Ethiopian certification schemes 
are only available to Cooperatives and Commercial Farms.  In addition, local sale of coffee 
within the domestic market is highly restricted, despite an estimated 50% of total country 
production consumed domestically.   Due to this, many actors choose not to be involved 
within the domestic coffee market.  Ethiopian actors appeared to be highly restricted in what 
was operationally feasible and were also highly opposed to be regarded as someone who is 
challenging the system or attempting something new, and as a result, did not.  As described 
by one Exporter,  
The lack of a hedging mechanism for this market is a problem.  It puts us at a 
disadvantage with other international sellers from countries that have some sort of 
hedge.  Many Exporters operate in the ‘traditional way’ by purchasing and holding 
on to stock and then trying to find a buyer, but within this system, this incurs great 
risk.  I only purchase what I can sell, once I have an agreed contract….  The business 
climate is very difficult in Ethiopia.  There is high system instability, high levels of 
legal regulations and restrictions; those who have never been outside (the country) 
don’t actually know how difficult it is here. (Ex_E_10, 2015) 
 
Ethiopia’s difficult environment has shown to make actors and Entrepreneurs alike more risk 
averse.  This was shown in Section 5.4.4.4, in which Ethiopian Entrepreneurs and Non-
Entrepreneurs were found to have no difference in Risk Tolerance Indexes, also having 
significantly lower score as compared to the other driver tested.  The lack of risk taking and 
lack of the willingness to pursue or test new opportunity was found to have resulted in 
limited expansion to the sector, reducing potential for national economic revenue generation 
and reduced entrepreneurial dynamism. 
 
Rwanda 
Smallholder Producer Entrepreneurs, particularly in Rwanda, were found enabled to work to 
improve quality in order to provide a buffer on pricing in order to mitigate the risk posed by 
price instability and variation.  Entrepreneurial Smallholder Producers actively looked to 
protect quality investments by sourcing additional input supplies or producing own compost.   
While land expansion or new acquisition admittedly has a high degree of risk due to 
challenges in ownership legality, entrepreneurs that pursued this route believed it would be in 
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their best long-term business interest, despite the risk.   Described below by a Smallholder 
Producer Entrepreneur, 
Coffee is challenging and difficult to be successful as a business.  I have grown my 
business slowly so to not over-stretch my capability.  I started with a very small 
number of trees but have slowly expanded.  I invested in a local bar, which also 
brings in money, but I now use that (bar) as collateral to get a loan to expand my 
land and coffee production.  (P_R_67, 2015) 
 
Overall, Rwanda’s business climate has been improved through the streamlining of legal and 
regulatory processes, improved institutional capacity and reduced cost of registration and 
licensing requirements (Crisafulli, and Redmond, 2012).  These improvements, paired with 
the open market structure, were found to facilitate a higher risk tolerance and opportunity 
pursuit, leading to many entrepreneurs taking risks on new ventures or operational strategies.  
Many have enacted unique schemes to promote a competitive edge through benefits accrued 
via non-monetary means, which will be explored in greater detail in Section 7.3.1.   
 
While improvements can still be made, the existence and continued development of private 
sector lobbyist groups such as the Coffee Exporters and Processors Association of Rwanda 
(CEPAR), highlighted in Case Study 6.7, as well as Rwanda’s Private Sector Foundation 
(PSF), point to effects of the evolving, open dialogue between policy makers, private sector 
actors and entrepreneurs.  Recognizing these improvements, entrepreneurs reported to feel a 
greater degree of confidence and had developed a lower risk aversion to the sector due to 
gains in efficiencies and corresponding legislative actions. 
 
7.2.5 Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO) 
Discussed in Sections 2.4.1.5 and 5.4.4.5, OR+EO accounts for the individual entrepreneur’s 
predisposed alertness to opportunity based on an individual’s desire to explore new 
opportunities (Arentz et al., 2013; Boso et al., 2013).  In this research, entrepreneurs were 
analysed not only on the opportunity perceived, but also on the opportunity acted upon.  
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Ethiopia 
Ethiopia’s entrepreneurial landscape proved to be much more elusive in tangible opportunity 
pursuit despite entrepreneurial opportunity recognition and orientation alertness.  It was 
observed that respondents and entrepreneurs alike, demonstrated a high propensity to 
recognize opportunity, however had little ability to pursue.  Inherent ceilings appeared to be 
in place and producers were unable to expand further than a ‘smallholder producer’.  
Throughout the research process, no Ethiopian Smallholder Producer respondent was found 
to have been able to significantly expand his or her coffee business into an additional 
segment of the chain (i.e. Commercial Farmer, Processor or Exporter).  This can also be 
evidenced in the disproportionate number of Ethiopian Smallholder Producers classified as 
Potential Entrepreneurs as opposed to Entrepreneurs.  While Commercial Farmers do have 
large business holdings and may have expanded acreage, none started from the smallholder 
producer level, with the majority investing in commercial coffee production purely as a 
business endeavour.   
 
Following the change in Ethiopia’s market structure and ECX establishment in 2008, 
businesses that were vertically integrated were forced to divest in order to operate within a 
single segment.  Businesses wishing to operate across multiple segments are now required to 
establish a legally separate business entity162 in order to operate multiple businesses along the 
chain. Only two respondents were found to have separate, legally registered business entities 
operating in both Processing and Export segments, out of the 46 interviewed.  While 
Ethiopian respondents clearly recognized opportunity and showed an in depth understandings 
of the market, actors seemed to stay within designated segments and reported not to be able 
to pursue expansion as wished.  As described by this Exporter,  
The Ethiopia system limits producers, limits processors and limits buyers.  It is a 
system of control.  It is very difficult for people to improve themselves; people cannot 
change from circumstances they were born into.  (Ex_E_1, 2015) 
 
                                                        
162 Law stipulates that a single person, operating a private business cannot operate in more than one area of the 
coffee chain, forcing some businesses to split into multiple, separate legal entities.  This has reportedly 
dissuaded many from operating multiple businesses or becoming involved across the chain (E_6, 2015). 
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Research observations revealed that while many respondents saw and understood viable 
market opportunity, they were unable to pursue due to external, often inherent ceilings built 
into the system.  This inability for pursuit is believed to stem from the restrictive market 
structure, a lack of resources, the current financial and political environment, which was 
found to have adverse impacts to not only the coffee sector and individual entrepreneurs, but 
also the wider economy as a whole.  
 
Rwanda 
Within Rwanda’s open market structure and encouragement for vertical integration, 
movement across and throughout the chain by entrepreneurs in pursuit of new opportunity 
was common.  This was observed in production expansion through land acquisition, 
diversified business holdings across multiple elements of the chain, and even the 
advancement of businesses from one segment to the next.  One of the most obvious 
demonstrations of OR+EO was examples of entrepreneurs who started as Smallholder 
Producers, eventually expanding to owning and operating processing stations and eventually 
export businesses.   
 
Diversifying product portfolios was a common tool of risk reduction, but also of opportunity 
pursuit.  Rwandan entrepreneurs were found to diversify coffee product lines, improve 
quality and increasingly offer a wider range of products.  Certification schemes have become 
popular with Rwanda’s speciality coffee scene with multiple Processors and Exporters also 
currently expanding to highly specialized batches and capitalize upon unique single-origins.  
In Rwanda, business expansion opportunities also saw some entrepreneurs investing in local 
roasting and packaging schemes in order to sell product domestically and create lines of 
additional revenue.  As described by this Rwanda Exporter, 
My husband and I own a large farm, but are also processing and exporting.  We 
employ a number of people from the surrounding communities and have instituted an 
out-grower scheme for other area farmers.  Coffee is difficult, but our business has 
been largely successful.  We are very remote and there are not other buyers 
(processing stations) in the area.  With all these activities, we have people depending 
on our employment and continued business success.  Farmers are depending on us to 
continue to purchase their coffee, there is a lot of pressure to be successful.  We have 
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started to roast our coffee for sale in supermarkets here.  That has helped us with 
another source of income for any coffee we are unable to export. (Ex_R_11, 2014) 
 
As shown, Entrepreneurs in Rwanda showcased an eager but also an enabled appetite for 
expansion as well as a long-term vision of controlled opportunity pursuit built from distinct 
strategies to not only improve business prospects and increase the bottom line, but to be able 
to use their own, self-recognized knowledge and skillset to expand as and where wished; 
enabling and promoting a distinct and dynamic entrepreneurial sector.  
 
7.3 Entrepreneurship Additionality 
Entrepreneurship is considered to be beneficial to economic development, with multiple 
benefits and impacts generated through the entrepreneurial process such as new innovations, 
employment creation, improved productivity and efficiency, knowledge spill-overs via 
clusters, research and development, or the facilitation of technology transfers (Acs et al., 
2014).  Additional outcomes include, but are not limited to risk diversification, a broadened 
tax base, as well as the introduction of innovative approaches to address a country’s unique 
and specific challenges (Brixova and Asiminew, 2010).  While the relationship between 
development and entrepreneurship is complex and by no means a one-size fits all solution, 
entrepreneurship can be a key element in creating economic growth and poverty reduction 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Baumol, 1993; Shane, 2003; Acs et al., 2008; Brixiovia, 2010).   
 
Entrepreneurs themselves not only benefit from improved revenue streams from successful 
new ventures, but entrepreneurship itself, can be a catalyst for growth through new business 
creation, employment generation, industry expansions and new knowledge creation (Bridge 
and O’Neill, 2012).  Section 7.2 presented evidence to the reflexivity of individual 
entrepreneurial action in order to provide contextual evidence as to how entrepreneurial 
actions are influenced by, as well as shape systems.   
 
Additional benefits can also be incurred directly by the entrepreneur, or trickle through a 
wider system and are referred to in this research as entrepreneurship additionality.  However, 
certain situations of restricted entrepreneurial mobility have resulted in constricted 
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entrepreneurial action in which the lack of involvement from entrepreneurs can actually 
create adverse effects on structures and markets.  This research defines additionality as the 
additional, social and interpersonal benefits created though new entrepreneurial inputs or 
actions, establishing a greater aggregate system.  While additionality is largely meant as a 
positive connotation, negative additionality can also be construed from entrepreneurial action 
due to adverse elements within an operational context or the inaction of entrepreneurs.  
 
While Section 7.2 showed varying evidence to entrepreneurial action and the related 
reflexivity for actors and each marketplace, this next section looks to further understand and 
depict if and exactly how entrepreneurs were found to be architects of change within these 
research contexts.  
 
7.3.1 Additionality and the Wider Benefits from Entrepreneurial Action   
As initially discussed in Section 2.6.1, entrepreneurship can provide benefits to an overall 
society through employment generation, supported innovation, increased structural changes, 
skill development, knowledge transfer, improvements in competitive environments, as well 
as contributions to regional and national fiscal health (Herrington and Kelley, 2012).  While 
difficult to explicitly quantify, potential exists for additional, large-scale direct and even 
indirect impacts to stem from entrepreneurship, given the nature of overlapping influences 
and outcomes between actors and environments (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2005).  These 
wider benefits have been traced to entrepreneurial action and the ensuing effects from those 
actions.  As will be discussed in the following section, results of positive additionality from 
beneficial overflows to wider populations were difficult to find or perceive in Ethiopia as 
compared to Rwanda.  As such, it is believed that there are fewer occurrences of these 
benefits, which is considered an outcome of the wider environment Ethiopian coffee actors 
are forced to operate within.  
 
7.3.1.1 Ethiopia  
Recent structural changes to Ethiopia’s coffee sector has increased private sector 
involvement (as compared to the Imperial and Derg Regime eras), which in some 
circumstances has helped to professionalize a highly inefficient sector through the 
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introduction of Commercial Farms (Dempsey, 2006).  However, Ethiopia’s current coffee 
structure leaves much to be desired and as has been shown, is a difficult and restrictive 
environment for entrepreneurial action with the industry continuing to be dominated by 
inefficient, small-scale production relying on traditional practices.  The sector’s growth, since 
the wider economic opening of the early 1990s, has resulted in expanded networks with 
additional benefits through employment opportunities, such as informal, non-ECX registered 
rural traders and transport enterprises.  The ECX system, while constricting growth in other 
areas has created new employment for operators and traders within the ECX Primary Market 
system as well as within the operational and management bureaucracy of the ECX.  
 
However, as has been seen throughout this research, and as will be depicted in Figure 7.2 
below, the Ethiopian coffee sector has a markedly lower number of perceived benefit 
outcomes as compared to the Rwandan market.  Additionally, an outcome of the restrictive 
market structure is the reduced incentives and in some cases eliminated ability for 
entrepreneurs to even create wider benefits.  Analysis of entrepreneurial action in Ethiopia 
has revealed that negative additionality has occurred due to prohibitive and constricted 
operational contexts and the resulting inaction from entrepreneurs. 
 
Prior to introduction of current ECX regulations, the structure was much more open and 
several respondents discussed that opportunity existed for businesses to overlap across 
sectors and to directly link with suppliers, enabling additional direct and indirect benefit 
provision to be created throughout the chain.  As described by this Exporter, 
In the previous system, you could trace and work directly and invest with farmers 
through specific trainings for quality improvement etc.  Before the ECX even 
Exporters could trace and invest directly in people (producers).  Now, when buying at 
the (ECX) Primary Market you cannot know where coffee comes from.  There is less 
incentive now for farmers and lower quality. Because I cannot trace where the coffees 
are from, my business has directly lost opportunity as some of my buyers have gone 
elsewhere.  I started working in coffee 25 years ago and had built good relationships 
with farmers, but I now can no longer work with them.  (Ex_E_20, 2015) 
 
Ethiopia’s coffee sector involves an estimated 20% of the population.  As seen in Section 
4.3.3, over 4 million smallholder producers are involved through the direct production and 
  325 
harvesting of coffee, with another 15 million working through processing, transportation and 
market related activities throughout the rest of the chain.  The coffee sector generates 
additional seasonal employment in many rural, often poor areas, providing needed additional 
income sources (Sutton and Kellow, 2010).  These are not new changes, however despite the 
added jobs generated through the ECX system, a net loss is believed to have incurred in 
regards to employment generation and wider business expansion (E_4, 2015).  Additionally, 
through recent increased usage of technical equipment for the sorting, processing, grading 
and packaging of coffee, seasonal employment, often hundreds of seasonal employees per 
processing station and export business, have been replaced.  
 
Figure 7.2 below, presents an Effects Diagram of Ethiopia, specifically depicting the direct 
and indirect effects and benefits (or lack thereof).  While not an exhaustive list, the diagram 
depicts entrepreneurial action through the coffee chain as observed and interpreted through 
this research.  This Effects Diagram was comprised following research observations and 
discussions with respondents, however research has not analysed effects and/ or benefits 
through quantitative or economic analysis.  Research segments are presented in red.  Direct 
effects are listed under each research segment and linkages shown through arrows.  Indirect 
effects on the sector and entrepreneurial action are presented in the box within the diagram.  
As will be seen, while direct and indirect effects continue to occur through the current market 
structure and entrepreneurial action, it remains limited in scope and the majority of outcomes 
is a result of introspective business strategies, with limited add-on benefits being felt across 
the Ethiopian sector. 
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Figure 7.2. Effects Diagram of Entrepreneurial Action in Ethiopia’s Coffee Sector 
 
(Source: Author Construct)  
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7.3.1.2 Rwanda  
Benefits from entrepreneurship within Rwanda’s coffee spectrum and greater sector wide 
growth were found to have created positive impacts.  While not everyone working within the 
spectrum is or can be considered as an entrepreneur, thousands of jobs have been created 
from direct or indirect entrepreneurial action, new business creation and business expansion 
(Boudreaux, 2010).  Through investment in processing stations and export businesses, part-
time or seasonal employment for large numbers of low-skilled workers has been created.  
Additionally, long-term roles have also been created in management, quality control, 
accounting and marketing for processing and exporting entities.  A specialized segment of 
local quality experts are also being trained to ‘cup coffee’ to determine quality grades and 
distinct profiles of Rwandan beans (Boudreaux, 2010; TechnoServe, 2013b).  Greater 
involvement with other producers through cooperatives and washing stations has resulted in 
increased engagement between ethnic groups, which has further supported the country’s 
reconciliation process (Boudreaux, 2010; Mujawamariya et al., 2013).   
 
Improved garden gate and export pricing opportunities continue to have positive impacts on 
livelihoods throughout the chain.  A coffee retail boom has also taken off in major urban 
areas through the sale of locally roasted beans and speciality coffee shops.  As such, 
enhanced entrepreneurial activities within this sector are not only producing positive 
economic change but also societal, political and institutional change.  Benefits observed in 
this research as both direct and indirect are presented below in Table 7.2 below.   
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Table 7.2. Benefits and Influences from Entrepreneurship in Rwanda 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
While overall, Rwanda’s coffee industry is comparatively technologically sparse, several of 
the largest Processors and Exporters in Rwanda reported to be aware of available 
technologies for cleaning, sorting and grading but reported to be unwilling to implement 
mechanized processes due partly to high costs, but also because it would replace significant 
local employment, especially in rural areas.  Conscious decisions were reportedly made to 
increase business efficiency in alternative ways, as demonstrated in Case Study 7.5.   
 
 
 
Additionality Benefits & Influences 
Direct Indirect 
- Increased income to businesses via expanded 
market potential and product sale 
- Increased cash flow within communities via 
product sale 
- Increased Branding and National Profile recognition from 
improved product  
- Improved household income, ability to diversify income 
base if so wish 
- Trainings provided to producers for increased 
quality / productivity 
- Opportunity for reconciliation within a community 
- International interests from external investment 
- Improved infrastructure development of roads, 
electricity, water sourcing 
- Employment generation, on & off-season 
- Specialist roles created 
- Improved competitive environments 
- Development of cost effective distribution links 
- Improved product profiles and diversified 
business option 
- Increased investment from regional / national 
administrations 
- Increased direct investment from International 
Buyers 
- Increased presence of banking / credit facilities in 
communities 
- Increased income to area resulting in construction of area 
schools, medical facilities 
- Improved quality of life / standard of living 
Case Study 7.5.  Decisions of Social Benefit over Technological Advancement  
A large Exporter in Rwanda explained his choice for not introducing more technically efficient machines in his 
business.   
 
“I hire an additional 200 to 400 workers for each of my (five) washing stations during the coffee season.  
Without this business these people would have no other options for additional employment outside of the farm.  
I know there is machinery available that could do much of this work, but they are very expensive and I am not 
convinced it is in my best business interest or the best way I can use my business.  What would I do with all 
these people if I purchased these machines?  I know I have been successful, but I also know I can support other 
people through this success.  Also through these positive relationships, I have been able to expand my business 
and increase my volumes and there is much community support to my success.”  2014 Export of green bean was 
reported at over 450 tonnes.  (Ex_R_20, 2014) 
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The spectrum of entrepreneurs within Rwanda is wide ranging, from small scale producers 
recognizing opportunity and taking chances in order to maximize, to individuals ‘forced’ into 
entrepreneurial activity out of survivalist tendencies, or entrepreneurs distinctly choosing to 
establish privately owned processing stations, or local export firms operating within the 
formal sector.  These actors are attracting external and internal investment, expanding 
frontiers and improving the scope of the national sector with entrepreneurs creating both 
direct and indirect benefits for actors, wider communities and the economy at large.  The 
corresponding effects and benefits are presented in Figure 7.3 below.  The diagram depicts 
varying actions, corresponding additionality and ensuing direct benefits realized through 
entrepreneurial action at each stage of Rwanda’s coffee chain as observed and interpreted 
through this research.  Wider community, market and national indirect benefits are also 
compiled in the diagram.  This Effects Diagram was comprised following research 
observations and discussions with respondents, however research has not analysed effects 
and/ or benefits through a quantitative or economic analysis.  Again, the specific business 
segments investigated in this research are demarcated in red.  Direct benefits are listed under 
each segment and linkages are shown through arrows.  Indirect effects from the sector and 
entrepreneur actions are presented in the box within the diagram.  
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Figure 7.3. Effects Diagram of Entrepreneurial Action in Rwanda’s Coffee Sector 
 
(Source: Author Construct)  
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Due to Rwanda’s entrepreneurs in its coffee sector, new, multiple off-flow benefits from 
entrepreneurial action were found to have filled voids or provided services that could be 
considered to be under the responsibility of a national government purview.  Additional 
business strategies enacted by Processors and Exporters has led to additional direct benefits 
for Smallholder Producers as seen above in Figure 7.3.  Many direct benefits were found to 
be instituted by entrepreneur’s strategic business strategies, using benefits as incentives to 
secure supply as well as improve prospects of suppliers and wider communities.   
 
As seen through a comparison with Ethiopia, other than the employment generated through 
bureaucratic additions into the ECX regulated market structure, minimal new benefit 
outcomes from entrepreneurial action were found in Ethiopia’s coffee sector due to the 
inability of actors to create additional benefits or institute incentive schemes, revealing an 
adverse additionality climate.  
 
7.3.2 Entrepreneurs as Architects of Change   
As observed through the Effects Diagrams, entrepreneurs, their outlook and related business 
action enables the will, capacity and incentive to pursue and fill not only market gaps, but 
also gaps from a void or lack of public sector activity or involvement.  These ‘gaps’ can 
include extension training services, physical infrastructure development, community 
development, improved goods provision, financing services, production quality provision, 
input supply and transportation services.  Entrepreneurial ability to undertake such tasks must 
also be supported through appropriate incentive structures and supportive environments.  As 
seen throughout this research, Ethiopia has instituted a constrictive environment whereas 
Rwanda has fostered a climate of embraced potential using wider entrepreneurial benefits as 
part of a larger development focus.  It should also be recognized that market opening and 
community ‘development’ increases demand flow and related sourcing opportunities, 
enabling additional prospects for entrepreneurial ventures.  Differences in motivational 
strategies were observed between actors of different countries and the demotivating and 
motivating environments were found to have impacted entrepreneurial strategies and actions 
taken.   
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7.3.2.1 Ethiopia 
Overall, it was observed that Ethiopian actors had a much more introspective focus and/ or 
business approach as compared to Rwandan counterparts.  Actors and entrepreneurs alike 
seemingly focused on limited available business activity currently in operation, with a 
constricted view of the potential or opportunity to use business as a catalyst for change.  
While, perhaps some individuals may be uninterested in this type of business strategy, it is 
believed this outcome and larger impact stems from the political environment and market 
structure.  As described by this Exporter,  
Before ECX, I was involved in multiple businesses stages and had an export and 
processing business, which had approved certifications for Organic and I was 
working towards Rainforest Alliance (certification).  I was also investing in farmers 
and had close working relationships with them, especially my producers and 
processors supplying the ‘certified beans’.  Now, I am not able to have those 
businesses and regulations create barriers and I can no longer trace my supply, so I 
cannot claim certification…  You see in Ethiopia, everyone is suspicious of one 
another and now there is no overlap for coffee and this has made us very inefficient.   
For example, private actors have over-invested and everyone has their own 
machinery.  The Ethiopia coffee industry has the capacity to process 2.5 times the 
country’s current production.  Because there is no trust or willingness to work with 
others, there is no specialization or unique efficient capacities being built in this 
sector.  There is high distrust at every level and businesses have responded 
accordingly.  (Ex_E_10, 2015) 
 
Entrepreneurs operating businesses as Commercial Farmers, Processors or Exporters reported 
a low interest, willingness, or ability to use business as an additional opportunity for creating 
wider benefit as compared to Rwanda.  None of the Processors or Exporters reported an 
interest in, or current implementation of, strategies aimed at creating additional social 
benefits.  Only 23% of Commercial Farmers reported to have a willingness to include 
socially focused business strategies, or admitted to implementing similar schemes.  Even 
respondents who stated to have integrated socially focused operations pre-ECX, reported to 
not currently be interested in, or willing to currently pursue socially focused activities.  While 
Commercial Farmers are legally able to introduce out-grower schemes within the current 
regulatory environment, few have chosen to do so.  With this lost connection and removal of 
integrated segment overlap, the potential for reflexivity and additionality such as farmer 
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training, financial flows, incentive structures, implementation of social benefits or innovative 
competitive arrangements is lost.  Despite obvious understanding of the potential for 
businesses to provide additional benefits to other actors, to improve market structures, or 
address wider community needs, respondents reported that these types of strategic 
investments would not improve business or long-term strategy.  These strategies were not 
only believed to be prohibitive to do so, but were considered a risky undertaking provided the 
current regulatory and political climate.    
 
 With limited interest or ability (actual or perceived) of using business to create wider 
benefits, whether through a purely altruistic purpose, or to create and/ or gain competitive 
advantage, entrepreneurship occurring in this type of entrepreneurial environment has 
obviously limited potential for additional benefit and was found to be severely reduced in its 
ability to positively influence structure or wider communities.  As such, Ethiopia’s 
constrictive market is considered to have widely diffused not only the potential for 
entrepreneurial action, but also potential for positive action to influence the wider structure 
and create benefit overflow.   
 
Despite entrepreneurship’s severely hindered role in the Ethiopian coffee sector, it cannot be 
considered as parasitic to the wider ecosystem.  However the State, its current market 
structure, and regulatory environments, have largely eliminated the entrepreneur’s ability to 
play a more expansive and beneficial role.  Negative additionality is understood through the 
restrictive market nature to have hindered potential for not only entrepreneurial growth and 
expansion, but also quality improvement, lack of financial flows, farmer training, education 
opportunities, improved land management techniques or the creation of wider incentives for 
government investment into enterprising zones.  Adverse reflexivity was seen through 
business strategies of reduced purchasing, a focus away from quality, lack of expansion, lack 
of innovation, eliminated lending opportunities within the chain, a regulatory environment 
non-conducive to entrepreneurship, and a market structure trending away from specialization 
and towards commercialization; eliminating much of the value-add potential.  Additionally, 
entrepreneurs are without a platform to speak out or challenge the current structure 
 
  334 
7.3.2.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda was found to be much more socially conscious than Ethiopia, acknowledging 
potential benefits that may be provided through business action, but also through a wider 
concerted understanding and effort of the need to create these benefits.  Research 
observations found a recognized responsibility from actors to the potential for business as a 
medium in which to provide social benefits and institute change.  Within the growing 
partnership between private sector entrepreneurs and the Rwandan Government, 
entrepreneurship was observed to be developing a symbiotic relationship within the wider 
ecosystem of State agendas, viable business strategy and national need.  This is considered as 
a positive evolution of the open market structure, related political embrace as well as the 
reconciliation with the country’s recent past in which those who have been successful, were 
observed to feel a near universal responsibility towards those less fortunate.  
 
While no Rwandan entrepreneur started a business specifically to provide social good at the 
expense of profit, the majority of entrepreneurs consciously used their business as a means to 
not only provide wider benefits for local suppliers or communities, but also as a longer-term 
strategy mechanism of gaining and maintaining a competitive advantage. Several 
entrepreneurs operating processing and exporting businesses took further distinct steps to 
increase and create a competitive edge and improve business prospects, investing through 
suppliers in monetary and non-monetary schemes, as shown in Table 7.3 below.   
 
Table 7.3. Strategic Business Investment and Perceived Outcome of Rwandan Entrepreneurs  
(Source: Author Construct) 
Perceived Long-Term Outcomes Examples of Strategic Investments Used 
- Strengthened relationship with suppliers - Allowing producers to save payment at station 
- Improved ability to plan supply quantities  - Provide loans to suppliers, repaid in product 
- Improved product quality stock  
- Opportunity to benefit wider community 
- Provide year-round technical training/ services to 
producers 
- Personal and financial investment to secure 
sourcing relationships 
- Establishment of transport services for area producers, on-
transport for processed product 
- Improved area infrastructure to improve 
business / logistics / transportation efficiency 
- Improved trust relationships 
- Improved business planning 
 - Production and distribution of processing waste (cherry 
mucilage waste), supply producers as compost  
- Graded pay scale for quality and time of supply 
- Payment of school fees, medical expenses, funeral costs  
- Improved standing with suppliers and within 
community/ area/ production zone 
- Invest in area infrastructure (electricity, roads, water) 
- 2nd Payment to producers with best quality, (in profitable 
season) 
 - Awards ceremony, rewards provided to area’s best 
producers/ make ‘model farmers’ 
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As presented in Table 7.3, while consciously choosing and budgeting to invest in social 
schemes, entrepreneurs were also calculating for a longer-term payoff through the prospect 
of improved loyalty from suppliers.  With expectation of increased future competition for 
many areas, choosing to operate business models built upon a foundation of social 
conscience was considered a good, long-term business strategy.  
 
In this research, 60% of Processors and 74% of Exporters reported to have vested interests in 
providing social benefits through business.  As presented in Section 7.2.3, much of the 
innovations observed were in relation to socially innovative methods as a type of trade-off to 
secure supply via non-monetary means.  While no actor admitted to putting social agendas 
above business interests, several chose to use socially innovative methods as alternative, 
unique ways to compete within the current marketplace as well as to secure future business 
interests.  Of those respondents found to have vested interests in providing some degree of 
social benefit through their business, 10% and 26% of Processors and Exporters respectively 
consider themselves to be operating a ‘Social Business’ 163 .  Entrepreneurs considering 
themselves to operate a social business did not pursue social strategy at the expense of profit, 
but considered the strategy an additional means of separating from competition.  The 
Processor Entrepreneur’s mind-set in supporting smallholder producers was to attain long-
term success through increased investment to suppliers in the short-term, with the goals of 
improved capacity (production, financial, business acumen) in order to secure long-term 
supply of dedicated and improved producers, with the expectation of increased profitability 
over time.  Similar strategies were also employed by Exporters in support of Processors 
through the use of finance provision, training and pre-season purchase agreements.  
 
As presented in Table 7.3, direct evidence of socially-focused activities were found to be 
through effective out-grower schemes, creating more secure markets for smallholder 
producers, seasonal employment structures, farmer training and support programs, quality 
graded purchase prices, collection services, and payments in-kind such as healthcare 
provision or children’s education costs.  Wider community benefits were established through 
                                                        
163 Defined as a business with the prioritized goal of profit earnings, but also with the distinct approach and 
business strategy to use business in order to provide additional social benefits.  
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the provision of constructing or paving of roads, electricity access, instituting water 
purification systems and establishing schools and health centres for communities.  
Implementation of infrastructure, electricity and water improvements were also made in 
direct accordance with business needs for reduced costs and increased efficiency.   As such, 
these strategies enabled the implementing entrepreneur to compete via non-monetary means 
(in addition to the purchase price) while also providing beneficial services to the producer 
and surrounding communities.  
 
These actions and engrained business strategies were compounded through outcomes realized 
from benefit receivers.  Smallholder Producer respondents in Rwanda reported to have 
observed changes to their community which included: improved standards of living, 
increased ability to pay for household needs such as: school fees, medical expenses, clothing, 
repairs to house or farm area, the ability to increase income, seasonal employment through 
additional work created at area processing stations and opportunities to obtain finance 
through some processing stations.  Rwandan Processors and Exporters reported to have 
observed positive changes through the improvement to not only produce quality, but also to 
reduced taxes and regulations, improvements to area infrastructure and improvements to 
livelihoods and standard of living for area producers.  Business efficiencies have also enabled 
Exporters to move and sell product faster in accordance with increasing demands of 
international markets.   
 
Interestingly, nearly all Ethiopian respondents, while recognizing that area infrastructure and 
standards of living had improved, reported to believe improvements to be a result of overall 
country development, in contrast to the Derg and even Imperial Regimes, and not a direct 
result of the coffee sector expansion or related coffee business activities within the area.  
Ethiopian Smallholder Producer respondents also reported a reduction in opportunity for 
additional employment from a lost opportunity for working at area processing centres during 
the coffee season.  
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7.3.2.3 Rwanda’s Socially Geared Coffee Zoning Policy 
The symbiotic nature of Rwanda’s entrepreneurs within wider national agendas is 
highlighted through legislation such as Rwanda’s Coffee Zoning Policy; set to be 
implemented in late 2016.  At the time of writing, the policy was still being negotiated and 
had yet to complete all required legislative approvals, however administrative institutions 
were already preparing for its rollout.  The proposal, in essence, attempts to enforce 
Exporters and Processors to create a measure of socially beneficial action (heavily favoured 
towards smallholder producers) to be implemented within their ‘designated sourcing zones’.  
In coffee producing areas deemed to be overly competitive 164 , sourcing zones were 
established for each processing station 165 . In order to maintain licences, the legislation 
proposes that processing stations are mandated to institute farmer training schemes, cash 
purchase of cherries, oversight of input supply and promotion of replacement of old trees into 
high-yield varieties.  The processing station is proposed to also act as a financial guarantor 
for individual producers or producer groups.  Through the policy’s attempt at the stabilization 
of overly competitive areas, plans are also being made to impose more uniform coffee 
pricing structures for cherry, parchment and green bean, impacting Producers, Processors and 
Exporters, respectively166.  Increased Export Fees will also now include additional support to 
a Coffee Research Fund (NAEB, 2015b). 
 
This policy has obviously raised many issues and objections from actors both in and outside 
the sector.  Widely geared towards the benefit of Smallholder Producers, Processors and 
Exporters complain to the mandated activities, arguing against forced increases to operating 
costs and a perceived inability to enforce Producer supply within designated Zones.  
Operational policies of private sector actors mandated by a national government as well as 
institutionalized pricing structures remain highly questionable and create an affront to much 
                                                        
164  A legitimate argument can be made to this premise given that within the country’s most popular coffee 
producing areas too many processing stations have been constructed with area production unable to meet 
needed volumes.  In some areas, processing stations are only operating at 60% of capacity due to undersupply 
of coffee cherries (TechnoServe, 2013b).  
165 Policy stipulates that processing stations will only source from their own designated zone and producers will 
only supply to the station managing the zone.   
166 In theory, prices would be revised weekly and disseminated.  Plans have yet to be specified as to how market 
information will uniformly reach all actors. 
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of the positive interaction the Government of Rwanda has made with the country’s re-
emerging private sector, its entrepreneurs and coffee industry.   
 
However, despite the challenges and conflicting economic and business philosophies 
between the Government and critics, this legislation provides evidence to the country’s 
efforts at the top-most levels to use entrepreneurs and business as a medium for creating and 
implementing wider social benefit.  While these efforts may, in some respects be misguided, 
it provides tangible evidence into a wider mind-set and interest from the State’s perspective 
of how the private sector and its entrepreneurs can be architects of change through 
institutionalized additionality. 
 
7.4 The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem: Demonstrating Entrepreneur 
Reflexivity and Additionality  
The initial structural outcome for the entrepreneurial ecosystem shown in Figure 7.1 of 
Section 7.2.1, presented this researcher’s conceptualization of the co-evolving interdependent 
elements: the individual entrepreneur and operational context and can be applied more 
generally to alternative contexts from just the coffee sector.  However, from the review of 
tangible and empirical evidence of entrepreneurial action and related outcomes within the 
specific marketplaces researched, analysed and presented in Chapters 5 and 6 as well as 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3, a clearer and more defined picture of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
has now emerged.  This completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, showed below in Figure 7.4, 
builds directly from the empirical findings of this study and as such, this completed model 
remains highly contextualized to entrepreneurship within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee 
markets.  
 
7.4.1 The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem  
Building from the research premise of the individual entrepreneur as a reflexive agent within 
a wider co-evolving structure of opportunity pursuit, a key development of the 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem reflects a scaffold for the relationship between the individual 
construct and operational context.  Outcomes of this duality also provide evidence of 
entrepreneurship reflexivity and additionality found to have influence in both positive and 
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negative ways.  This ecosystem is built from the foundations formed of the individual 
construct and operational context of an opportunity and each is reviewed briefly below. 
 
Chapter 5 found that a distinct difference does exist between the internal constructs of the 
Entrepreneur and Non-Entrepreneur in which overall, Entrepreneurs demonstrated higher 
degrees of the tested drivers than Non-Entrepreneurs: Resilience, Self-Efficacy, 
Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and Entrepreneurial 
Orientation.  However, more nuanced investigation of Entrepreneurs operating within 
different business segments and between different market structures of the two countries 
revealed variances, most noticeably within Ethiopia.  These variances, specifically 
demonstrated through the relatively low Self – Efficacy, Innovativeness and Risk Tolerance 
Indexes, are believed to be influenced, in part, by the operational context.  As such, 
Ethiopia’s systems were found to have adversely influenced internal constructs of 
Entrepreneurs and their corresponding outlook and actions.  
 
As found in Chapter 6, Ethiopia and Rwanda operate at differing ends of a spectrum in 
regards to both market liberalization and political embrace of entrepreneurship within the 
contexts of the coffee markets.  Relying on state-enterprises and ‘selected entrepreneurs’ to 
direct economic growth, the Ethiopian Government remains highly sceptical and restrictive 
towards a market-led private sector comprised of unaffiliated entrepreneurs.  This has 
resulted in a highly restrained coffee market, dampening prospects for entrepreneurs, which 
in return has severely hindered entrepreneurial dynamism and fostered a development of 
entrepreneurial apathy.  Entrepreneurs have been largely restricted in approach, outlook and 
action and as a result ceased from implementing innovative strategies or continuing pursuit 
of opportunity in the coffee sector.  The resulting political, financial, institutional and market 
regulatory structures have proven to incentivize against risk taking and innovation, resulting 
in de-motivated entrepreneurs limiting business scope and expansion potential, choosing 
instead to pursue proven and approved business agendas; often resulting in reduced market 
potential and revenue.  As discussed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, this has resulted in reduced 
investment between actors across the chain, a largely eliminated ability to improve value 
addition opportunities, strategies of reduced business activity, increased mistrust among 
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actors as well as the removal of opportunities to provide benefits to communities and actors 
throughout the chain.  
 
Since liberalizing its coffee industry, Rwanda has continued to support and enable 
entrepreneurship to flourish, particularly within its coffee sector, reaping the rewards from 
improved product marketability and sector viability through an improved international brand, 
as well as wider socio-economic development.  This has resulted in a marked environment of 
entrepreneurial dynamism and increased entrepreneurial mobility though a climate found to 
encourage innovation, risk taking and ever expanded business outlooks.  Opportunity for 
vertical integration and increasingly competitive environments has resulted in entrepreneurial 
actors not only diversifying business and product portfolios, but also creating wider benefits 
for actors and communities as an added measure of competitive advantage through monetary 
as well as non-monetary means.  
 
Determined through this investigation, key elements of the broader operational context were 
found to be especially impactful to entrepreneurship: openness of the market structure, 
financial resource availability and accessibility, and political environment, specifically the 
political embrace of entrepreneurial potential.  Historical contexts and socio-cultural 
influences were also found to be influential, however influences were perceived to be less 
active in the day-to-day operations and entrepreneurial approach and more impactful in 
regards to wider societal perceptions, acceptance, expectations and allowances.  Historical 
contexts were found to have created a predisposition for successful private sector actors and 
entrepreneurs in regards to specific timing of market involvement or familial background.   
 
The specific approach of this research in relation to analysing entrepreneurship as the entirety 
of a system, resulted in the development of a completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, was 
based from robust empirical findings of this study, in order to further contextualize in and 
out-flow of entrepreneurs operating within the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda, 
depicted below in Figure 7.4.  Foundational elements of the individual construct and 
operational context are displayed with the entrepreneurship nexus of the ecosystem 
comprised of the influences to the operational context found to be especially impactful; 
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arrows are weighted corresponding to perceived, direct influence following analysis 
outcomes of the operational context.   Entrepreneurial reflexivity and additionality findings 
are also presented for each marketplace.  Analysing the co-evolving interdependent, reflexive 
internal construct and operational context in its entirety, a more succinct picture is made not 
only to the appropriateness of viewing entrepreneurship as an interdependent duality of 
individual and context, but also to the distinct differences in entrepreneurial ability and 
achievement depending on specific, inherent operational contexts.  Given the disparaging 
differences in entrepreneurial embrace by governments, and corresponding action and 
outlook by entrepreneurs, this research has found outcomes of entrepreneurial constriction 
and apathy and entrepreneurial mobility and dynamism within the Ethiopian and Rwandan 
coffee markets, respectively.  Figure 7.4 below, is the completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
of the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets, built from the research results of this study.   
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Figure 7.4. Completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem for the Ethiopian and Rwandan Coffee Markets  
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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As presented throughout this research, and as seen in Figure 7.4, entrepreneurial reflexivity 
was indeed found to be influential to wider structures through both positive and negative 
outcomes.  Positive and negative means of additionality were also found, corresponding to 
the specific operational contexts and may be addressed through specific policy 
recommendations which will be detailed in Section 8.4.  
 
7.4.2 Comparative Economic Improvements 
Ethiopia and Rwanda’s economies are considered to have made large-scale changes and 
improvements over the past two to three decades.  Each economy has achieved large, 
sustained GDP growth rates and are projected to continue as some of the global economy’s 
top economic growth performers over the next several years (Holodny, 2015).  However, as 
initially discussed in Section 6.3, each economy has achieved this growth through differences 
in economic and political focus.  Coffee forms a major part of each country’s economic 
profile, export sector and foreign exchange generator, additionally the industries employ a 
large proportion of each population and remains a critical cash crop for many rural 
smallholder producers.  Analysing impacts to national economic growth, while not a specific 
part of this research purview, the success of each country’s coffee sector could be considered 
to be linked to the overall success of each country’s wider economy, and is briefly discussed 
in the following section.   
 
7.4.2.1 Ethiopia 
In 2000, Ethiopia was regarded as having one of the highest poverty rates (56%) in the world.  
However, steady improvements in poverty reduction 167  have been shown, with rates 
decreasing to 44% in 2006 and 30% in 2011  (World Bank, 2015b).  While Ethiopia’s high 
GDP growth rates have been driven by major sectors such as construction, large-scale agri-
business production and commodity export, high rates of income disparity remain (Lefort, 
2013; World Bank 2014b).  Overall, improvements in standard of living, increased per capita 
incomes, increased life expectancy and increasing enrolments in education lend credence and 
evidence to the overall economy’s continued improvement.  However, the very poorest 
segments of the population (much of it smallholder producers) have yet to realize these 
                                                        
167 Proportion of population living on $1.25 PPP per day (World Bank, 2015b) 
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economic improvements, with the country realizing relatively low levels of growth elasticity 
over the past 15 years  (World Bank, 2015b).  Additionally, high inflation rates and 
increasing food prices adversely and disproportionately impact the poor and rural producers.  
It can be argued that the economic improvement for Ethiopia would also indicate economic 
improvement for coffee producing areas, however chronically low coffee garden-gate 
purchase prices, eliminated opportunity for value addition and limited expansion capabilities 
have constrained greater economic improvements from being felt and the coffee sector’s 
trend towards commoditization could have wide ranging adverse impacts on actors across the 
chain in regards to long-term economic development potential.  
 
7.4.2.2 Rwanda 
Rwanda has also seen steady economic growth and high rates of GDP since the early 2000s, 
with GDP per capita more than tripling from 2001 to 2014 (World Bank, 2013b; National 
Institute of Statistics Rwanda (NISR), 2015).  Rwanda is recognized for being hindered by its 
potential growing income disparity with ‘development agendas’ placing undue burdens on 
the poor.  However additional action and investment to rural areas in regards to finance 
institutions, infrastructure and education has attempted to address these concerns (Ansoms 
and Rostagno, 2012; Murenzi, 2013).  Market liberalization and direct Government support 
has also led to increasing economic investment, particularly in rural areas, which has realized 
an increased rate of business establishment by 38.1% in rural areas since 2011, with 47.9% of 
new jobs created by these new, rural area businesses over the same period (NSIR, 2015).  
Rwanda has also realised improvements in standards of living and increased life expectancy, 
but similar to Ethiopia, the poorest populations (smallholder producers) have yet to 
uniformly realize these improvements (NSIR, 2015).  While prices also remain low, the 
sector is perceived to have enabled some degrees of economic development through 
expanded business opportunity and increasing demand. 
 
Information such as national, regional or household survey data detailing economic 
improvement were unable to be obtained and as such, analysis determining correlations of 
national economic improvements to either coffee sector’s advancement, or stagnation were 
unable to be conducted.  However the success, or lack thereof, of each country’s coffee 
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sector are believed to be important elements for the continued economic development of each 
country.  
 
7.5 Conclusion and Emerging Findings  
This final research analysis discussion looked to understand entrepreneurship within, and as 
part of, a larger whole.  As such, findings understood the individual construct and operational 
context as a duality, influenced by distinct operational contexts, which in turn, were found to 
influence wider structures through entrepreneurial reflexivity to institutions and existing 
structures, as well as create benefits to actors through entrepreneurial additionality.  In 
looking at entrepreneurship as a whole, rather than a deconstructed piece, (as was done in 
Chapters 5 and 6) greater connectivity emerged as to the structure and agent, resulting in a 
completed depiction of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem (as presented in Chapter 7).   
 
Emerging Findings of Chapter 7:  
 Upon a final reflection of this discussion, focus, evidence, and outcome appears to trend 
in a more positive light towards Rwanda.  This is believed to stem from not only 
Rwanda’s more open market structure and its perceived encouraging and freeing 
entrepreneurial activity towards opportunity pursuit, but also from a national level 
embrace, revealing national approaches and policy pursuit geared at further engendering 
entrepreneurial action and growth within, and to, a wider populace.  Admittedly, as has 
been discussed, uncovering direct evidence towards entrepreneurial action in Ethiopia 
was found to be more difficult and while entrepreneurship was observed to be much less 
dynamic, this can also be considered a result of the wider economic climate, political 
focus and market structure, and is also considered as an outcome of the research process.  
 
 Entrepreneurs are believed to be contributors to socio-economic development through 
employment generation, pursual of market gaps, introduction of new economic activity 
and pushing sector frontiers further (Brixiova and Asaminew, 2010; Hall et al., 2012; 
Boso et al., 2013), and this research reinforces that current literature.  However, as found 
in this chapter and throughout this research, in order to achieve this, entrepreneurs must 
be reinforced through an supportive and enabling environment allowing for the inherent 
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flexibility needed to test, experiment and attempt new combinations, fill gaps and 
challenge existing structures.  This supportive environment, a key element in the 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, was formed from an enabling market structure, resource 
availability and accessibility, the political embrace of entrepreneurial potential and a 
historical platform for a conducive socio-cultural setting. 
 
 Recognizing potential for entrepreneurs as architects of economic and social change, this 
research looked to understand the influences entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial action 
can have on wider contexts.  Through this analysis, both positive as well as negative 
influences were found and are traced back to operational structures found to create both 
adverse and symbiotic environments for entrepreneurs within the Ethiopian and Rwanda 
coffee markets, respectively.  
 
 This research defined entrepreneur reflexivity as the consequences to political, financial, 
market and socio-cultural structures due to entrepreneurial actions.  Outcomes of 
Ethiopian entrepreneurship were found to have adverse reflexivity, evidenced through 
business strategies of reduced purchasing, focus away from quality towards 
commercialization, a lack of business expansion and opportunity pursuit, and lack of 
innovation.  The Ethiopian environment further eliminated lending opportunities within 
the chain through a regulatory environment non-conducive to entrepreneurship and a 
market structure trending away from specialization and towards commercialization, 
eliminating much of the value-add potential and leaving entrepreneurs without a 
platform to speak out or challenge the current structure.  Given that the continued 
enforcement of an adverse market structure and regulatory environment and the distinct 
lack of political embrace, resulting in a largely eliminated ability for entrepreneurs to 
play a more expansive and beneficial role, it is believed the Ethiopian State perceives a 
market-led private sector dominated by independent entrepreneurs to be a parasitic 
element to the State’s wider agenda and preferred method of operation.   
 
 Rwandan entrepreneurs however, were found to be creating a symbiotic relationship 
within wider national agendas, continually benefiting from the country’s enabling 
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environment and positive reflexivity.  This was particularly evident through improved 
product marketability, sector viability, a climate encouraging innovation, risk taking and 
expanded business outlooks and diversification, with opportunity for vertical integration 
and increasingly competitive environments.  Building from this success, the Rwandan 
Government was observed to be increasingly using entrepreneurs in order to cost 
effectively fill gaps traditionally addressed through the Public Sector and address wider 
socio-economic development challenges; demonstrating the case that entrepreneurs can 
be effective architects of change  
 
 This research defined entrepreneurial additionality as the additional, social and 
interpersonal benefits created though new entrepreneurial inputs or actions, establishing a 
greater aggregate system.  Within Ethiopia, negative additionality was understood 
through the constricted market found to have hindered potential for not only 
entrepreneurial growth and expansion, but also lack of financial flows to actors within the 
chain, producer training and education opportunities, improved land management 
techniques or creation of wider incentive and benefit mechanisms. 
 
 Additionality was evidenced in Rwandan entrepreneurs through the nearly uniform 
embrace of socially conscious measures, used as a means of establishing or increasing a 
competitive advantage via monetary and non-monetary means.  These included, but are 
not limited to, out-grower schemes, seasonal employment structures, farmer training and 
support programs, quality graded purchase prices, collection services and payments in-
kind through healthcare provision or children’s education costs.  Additionally, wider 
community benefits established roads, electricity access, instituted water purification 
systems, schools and health centres for wider community benefit, but were also 
implemented due to business need for reduced operational cost and increased efficiency.  
 
Research Contributions of Chapter 7: 
 The conceptual framework designed for this research resulted in the creation of the Co-
Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, and research analysis led to the development of the 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, presenting empirical findings following analysis of 
  348 
entrepreneurship as an interdependent, co-evolving duality of individual and context 
(Sarason et al., 2006).  With this recognized space to appreciate the reflexive nature of 
entrepreneurs to influence wider structures, empirical evidence was discovered and 
analysed, demonstrating the reflexive nature of, and benefit potential for, the 
entrepreneur as an architect of change. 
 
 This research introduced the author’s conceptualization and development of the 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem as a mechanism in which to model and present the 
interconnected, living and evolving elements within the ecosystem.   Inclusive of the: 
- Individual construct 
- Operational context of an opportunity 
- Influences on structure from entrepreneurial action 
- Entrepreneurial benefit returns to structure 
Creating a macro-level view of differing outcomes based on opposing structures and 
marketplaces.  This conceptualization initially presented a more generalized model 
for possible future application analysing entrepreneurs within alternative 
environments.  The completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem presented a highly 
contextualized, results based ecosystem, which demonstrated entrepreneurship 
specifically within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee market contexts.  
 
 Finally, this research found and demonstrated the analysis of entrepreneurship of the 
Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets.  The outcome of this research analysis 
determined Ethiopia to have developed a climate of entrepreneurial constriction and 
entrepreneurial apathy and Rwanda to have developed a climate of entrepreneurial 
mobility and entrepreneurial dynamism.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
This research has looked to gain amore acute understanding of entrepreneurship within, and 
as part, of a larger whole; interpreting the individual construct and operational context of 
entrepreneurship as an interdependent, reflexive duality.  Given this reflexive notion, analysis 
was also undertaken to understand if and how entrepreneurial reflexivity influences systems, 
structures and institutions, as well as if entrepreneurs have the potential to create additional 
social change.  Perhaps an ambitious endeavour, this study looked to present an improved 
depiction of the entrepreneurial face within a developing economy context as well as add 
clarity to the entrepreneurial blueprint; both of which have remained blurred in the current 
discourse without a uniformed definition across the interdisciplinary field (Jennings et al., 
2013; Mazzucato, 2015).  Through this pursuit, research relied upon the development of 
distinct frameworks, matrixes and result conceptualizations in order to chart not only this 
researcher’s evolving journey of understanding through theoretical application, but also to 
more effectively present and analyse empirical data, research findings and result 
interpretations.  A final list is presented in Table 8.1. 
 
The conceptual framework, the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, first introduced in 
Figure 2.3 of Section 2.3.2, was informed by elements of Structuration Theory in 
understanding entrepreneurship as an interdependent, yet reflexive duality.  This specific 
research approach enabled the initial deconstruction of the nexus in order to analyse first, the 
individual construct (Chapter 5) and second, the operational context for opportunity within 
the respective coffee markets of Ethiopia and Rwanda (Chapter 6).  Finally, research 
analysed the nexus in its entirety in order to capture reflexive influences and additional 
benefits (Chapter 7). 
 
Analysis based from the conceptual framework resulted in a tangible, completed depiction of 
this researcher’s conceptualization of the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem built from empirical 
findings of entrepreneurship within the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee markets; introduced in 
its entirety in Figure 7.4 of Section 7.4.1.  Used to highlight the direct outcomes from 
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analysis of entrepreneurs across multiple different business models within the Ethiopian and 
Rwandan coffee markets, this ecosystem enabled the capture of entrepreneurial action onto 
wider systems, political outlooks, institutions and market structures as well as showcasing the 
direct and indirect interpersonal and social benefit overflow realized across the coffee chains.  
This ecosystem also depicted the differences for entrepreneurs operating within markets at 
opposing ends of the liberalization and political embrace spectrums, demonstrating the 
outcomes of entrepreneurial constriction and apathy to entrepreneurial mobility and 
dynamism for Ethiopian and Rwandan actors, respectively.  Through analysis, configuration 
of the ecosystem further demonstrated the potential, if enabled, for entrepreneurs to be 
architects of change.  While the initial model for of the entrepreneurial ecosystem could be 
applied more generally, the final completed Entrepreneurial Ecosystem is a direct reflection 
of the specific contexts and actors analysed through this study. 
 
Building from the understanding of the individual construct, influences of operational context 
on entrepreneurship, and the results from the marketplaces represented in the Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem, this research concludes with the presentation of an Entrepreneurship Blueprint168 
and its corresponding Entrepreneurship Matrix as a mechanism to provide a contextualized 
macro-level framework, paired with micro-level parameters for improved understanding, 
classification and analysis for future, wider work across the entrepreneurship field.  The 
Blueprint and Matrix were built from the specific research findings from this study, however 
the key insights extrapolated are meant to model a more generalized framework that can be 
used for further analysis of entrepreneurs in alternative settings.  The Entrepreneurship 
Blueprint and Matrix are presented below, in Section 8.3.1 as Figures 8.1 and 8.2, 
respectively.  
 
As seen across this thesis, research relied upon participatory qualitative and quantitative 
methods, using systematic analysis of research data by exercising a heavier concentration on 
participatory qualitative approaches.  The remainder of this discussion will present key 
                                                        
168 The Entrepreneurship Blueprint is meant as a fluid representation built from research outcomes, to be used as 
a guidance mechanism for future conceptualizations and design of entrepreneurship study across differing 
contexts.  As such, this Blueprint is not meant to be interpreted as an absolute construction, but as merely a set 
of parameters to aid future research. 
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research findings and contributions, policy recommendations as well as proposals for further 
study.  
 
8.2 Key Research Findings  
This research conducted a comparative analysis of respondents within the Entrepreneurial 
Range (Non-Entrepreneur, Potential Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur) as well as Entrepreneurs 
across business segments of the coffee chains  (Smallholder Producer, Processor and 
Exporter) of Ethiopia and Rwanda, in order to address the overarching questions of:  
 
- What internal characteristics, or drivers, of the individual construct separate an 
entrepreneur from a non-entrepreneur? 
- What external dynamics of the operational context, or determinants, shape an 
entrepreneur’s approach, outlook and opportunity pursuit? 
- How drivers and determinants can be fused to reveal influences from entrepreneurial 
reflexivity and additionality on wider structures within a co-evolving, interdependent, 
entrepreneurial ecosystem? 
 
This research developed a framework for understanding and testing entrepreneurship within 
emerging markets.  However, findings are based from the specific, comparative examination 
of entrepreneurship within the coffee sectors of two African countries.  While these findings 
are believed to be highly applicable to the sector and specific markets analysed, it is 
recognized that characteristics of entrepreneurship may not be the same across alternative 
sectors. 
 
8.2.1 Analysing the Individual Construct (Drivers) 
Analysing the individual construct of an Entrepreneur through the testing of selected drivers: 
Resilience, Self-Efficacy, Innovativeness, Risk Tolerance, and Opportunity Recognition and 
Entrepreneurial Orientation (OR+EO), served to not only reinforce existing literature in 
understanding these drivers as key components to entrepreneurship, but also demonstrated 
new evidence that a distinct difference does exist between Entrepreneurs and Non-
Entrepreneurs in regards to predisposed strengths of certain, inherent drivers.  Respondents 
were classified across the Entrepreneurial Range, discussed in detail in Section 5.2.3, 
accounting for specific business models and entrepreneurial classifications enabling the 
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ability to analyse the individual construct across business segments, within entrepreneur 
classification and between countries.   
 
Results revealed that overall, Entrepreneurs have higher degrees of the tested drivers than 
Non-Entrepreneurs.  However, Entrepreneurs operating within different business segments 
and between different market structures of the two countries also revealed some variances.  
Interestingly, Entrepreneurs from both countries had the same OR+EO Driver Index score, 
indicating that entrepreneurs, regardless of operational context, have similar degrees of the 
ability to recognize or be ‘pulled’ towards new opportunities.  As such, it can be deduced that 
alternative external factors enable or prohibit the actual pursuit.  Specifically, Innovativeness, 
Self-Efficacy and Risk Tolerance were found to be particularly low for Non-Entrepreneurs, 
irrespective of country or business, providing evidence as to why Non-Entrepreneurs are 
perhaps unable to make, or unwilling to take, the tangible steps towards opportunity pursuit.   
 
Ethiopian Entrepreneurs were found to have statistically significant differences between 
Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs for Resilience, Innovativeness, and OR+EO Indexes 
only.  Respondents revealed no statistical difference between those classified as Non-
Entrepreneur and Entrepreneur for tests on Self-Efficacy and Risk Tolerance drivers, 
indicating similar and relatively low scores for Self-Efficacy and Risk Tolerance Indexes.  
Additionally, Ethiopia’s relatively low degrees for Innovativeness, Self-Efficacy and Risk 
Tolerance are interpreted to be an outcome of the restrictive operational context due to the 
opaque market structure, conscious lack of political support, as well as the difficult and 
impeding institutional and regulatory structures, proving to stifle innovation or interest in 
new opportunity pursuit.  Rwandan Entrepreneurs in contrast, were found to have statistically 
significant differences between Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs for all tested drivers.  
Additionally, the relatively high degrees for each Driver, in comparison to Ethiopia, are 
interpreted as a result of the country’s more open market structure, political embrace of 
entrepreneurship in the coffee sector and its evolving, streamlined regulatory processes 
aimed at improving cost and efficiency for business operations, enabling entrepreneurs so 
inclined, to succeed in pursuit of new and unique opportunity.  
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Differences resulted in variances found between Ethiopian and Rwandan Entrepreneurs 
specifically for Self-Efficacy and Risk Tolerance Indexes.  These variances were found to be 
statistically significant and with lower Index scores for Ethiopian Entrepreneurs as compared 
to Rwandan counterparts, inferring that influences from the specific, external operational 
context of Ethiopia adversely affected Ethiopian actors through a demotivating environment 
and reduced risk tolerance.  No statistically significant differences were found for Resilience 
or OR+EO Indexes, indicating similar levels for Entrepreneurs of both countries.  
 
Additional socio-demographic elements were found to have significant influence towards the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of respondents.   In both countries, higher attainment of education 
was found to be influential to increased entrepreneurship probability as a key contributing 
factor of human capital development.  Business inheritance was also highly impactful to 
successful entrepreneurship probability, with respondents that did not inherit their business 
found to be much more likely to be an entrepreneur.  Respondents that did inherit their 
business were found to have a negative probability of entrepreneurship and were much less 
likely to be an entrepreneur.  An increase of years spent in education was also found to 
increase the probability of entrepreneurship and a higher degree of financial access was also 
found to have a positive influence on entrepreneurship probability, with a lower degree of 
financial access resulting in an adverse probability to entrepreneurship.  
 
8.2.2 Analysing the Operational Context (Determinants) 
Analysing the operational context of both coffee sectors revealed Ethiopia and Rwanda to 
operate at differing ends of a spectrum in regards to both market liberalization and the 
political embrace of entrepreneurship.  Ethiopia’s restrictive market and increasingly strong 
grip from the state-led growth agenda revealed a Government highly sceptical and 
prohibitive towards an unencumbered, market-led private sector and its entrepreneurs.  This 
research found the Ethiopian Government to show less interest and trust in private sector 
actors, specifically entrepreneurs operating outside of dictated national interests and 
sanctioned approaches.  Ethiopia’s restricted market and financial climate have further 
confined entrepreneurial action along the coffee chain with Entrepreneurs unable to source 
adequate financing needs or diversify business involvement throughout the chain.  Results 
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found this to essentially force entrepreneurs to limit their own business scope and scalability 
as well as demotivate new entrants to the sector.  Additionally, the political, financial, 
institutional and market regulatory structures have proven to actively incentivize against risk 
taking.  As such, entrepreneurs enacted business strategies of limited scope and expansion 
potential in which demotivated entrepreneurs choose instead to pursue proven and approved 
business agendas; despite resulting reduction in market potential and revenue.  The reduced 
business strategies were also observed to have limited the wider expansion of the coffee 
sector as a whole. 
 
This has resulted in a highly restrained coffee market, dampening prospects for 
entrepreneurs, severely hindering entrepreneurial dynamism and has fostered the 
development of entrepreneurial apathy.  As such, Ethiopian Entrepreneurs, having been 
largely restricted, were found to have all but ceased from implementing innovative actions or 
continuing pursuit of opportunity.  Additionally, an entrepreneurial ‘brain-drain’ is 
essentially taking place in Ethiopia due to potential new entrants choosing to pursue 
alternative income generating means as opposed to new business establishment within coffee 
or other sectors across the economy.  
 
Rwanda’s open market structure was found to encourage entrepreneurial mobility and 
political and institutional support was found to have enabled entrepreneurship to flourish 
within its coffee sector, reaping the rewards from improved product marketability, sector 
viability as well as wider socio-economic development.  Continuing to build capacity and 
confidence in the private sector, the Rwandan Government has fostered a climate found to 
encourage innovation, risk taking and ever expanding business outlooks.  This has resulted in 
a marked environment of entrepreneurial dynamism and increased entrepreneurial mobility.  
Through opportunity for vertical integration and increasingly competitive environments, 
entrepreneurial actors are not only diversifying business and product portfolios, but are also 
creating wider, innovative strategies and social benefits for actors and communities as an 
added measure of gaining or maintaining competitive advantage through monetary as well as 
non-monetary means.  
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Through investigation into the influences on entrepreneurial outlook, choice and action, the 
largest impacts to entrepreneurial behaviour were found to be openness of market structure 
(mobility), resource availability (access to adequate, affordable financing) and political 
environment (perception of effectiveness of entrepreneurship) identified in Table 6.14 in 
Section 6.6. Historical and socio-cultural influences are also considered highly impactful, but 
were found to be more influential in laying the foundation to the perception, expectation and 
embrace of entrepreneurs within a specific setting.  Historical contexts were found to also 
create a predisposition for successful private sector actors and entrepreneurs in regards to the 
specific timing of market entry (i.e. post conflict) or familial background (specifically in the 
case of Ethiopia), to an extent, determining who can succeed as an entrepreneur.  
 
8.2.3 Analysing Entrepreneurship Interdependence and Reflexivity 
The final analysis of this research looked at entrepreneurship as the entirety of a system.  
Through analysing the interdependent internal construct and operational context of 
entrepreneurship as a whole, a more succinct picture has come into focus not only 
vindicating the appropriateness of viewing entrepreneurship via Structuration Theory, as a 
duality of individual and context (agent and structure), but also in showing the distinct 
differences in entrepreneurial ability and achievement depending on specific, inherent 
operational contexts. 
 
As demonstrated through this research, entrepreneurs must be reinforced through an enabling 
environment allowing for the inherent flexibility needed to test, experiment and pursue new 
combinations as well as challenge existing structures.  This conducive environment is formed 
of an empowering market structure, a favourable regulatory climate, resource availability and 
accessibility, political embrace of entrepreneurial potential and a historical platform resulting 
in an encouraging socio-cultural setting.  Within the marketplaces investigated, both positive 
and negative influences were found and are traced back to the operational structures, which 
created adverse as well as symbiotic environments for entrepreneurs within the Ethiopian and 
Rwandan coffee markets, respectively.  
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Outcomes of Ethiopian entrepreneurship were found to demonstrate adverse reflexivity to the 
wider structure, evidenced through business strategies of reduced purchasing and focus away 
from quality, a lack of expansion, a lack of innovation, eliminated lending or training 
opportunities within the chain and a regulatory environment not conducive to business 
efficiency or entrepreneurship.  With a market structure eliminating much of the potential 
value-addition, this largely eliminated the ability for Ethiopian entrepreneurs to play a more 
expansive role in creating benefit overflow for communities and the wider economy.   
 
Rwandan entrepreneurs were found to have realized a positive reflexivity to wider systems 
and structures which has resulted in the creation and fostering of a symbiotic relationship 
with political agendas and national needs.  This entrepreneur-enabling environment was 
particularly evident through effective market mobility for actors throughout the chain and 
was found to improve product marketability, institute a climate encouraging innovation and 
risk taking, as well as encourage expanded business outlooks and diversification through 
opportunity for vertical integration and increased sector viability. 
 
Demonstrating that entrepreneurs can be effective architects of change within Rwanda, 
entrepreneurial additionality, was found to use benefit overflow in order to establish or 
increase a competitive advantage via monetary and non-monetary means, particularly with a 
social consciousness and alertness to wider need.  While social agendas did not outweigh 
profits, examples of additionality included: effective out-grower schemes creating more 
secure markets for smallholder producers, seasonal employment structures, producer training 
and support programs, graded purchase prices according to quality levels, collection services, 
and in-kind product payment through healthcare provision or education costs.  Wider 
community benefits established roads, electricity access, instituted water purification 
systems, schools and health centres for community benefit, but also to reduce business cost, 
increase efficiency as well as build positive relationships with suppliers and wider 
communities.  
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8.3 Key Research Contributions  
This research into entrepreneurship attempted to implement elements of an approach, which 
had previously only been discussed within a theoretical realm, particularly when concerning 
entrepreneurs within a developed economy context.  As such, this research developed its own 
conceptual framework to specifically allow for the unique approach and ensuing empirical 
analysis into entrepreneurs operating within an emerging market context.  Informed by 
elements of Structuration Theory, analysing entrepreneurship within a developing economy 
or emerging market context, the results of this research reinforced areas of current literature 
as well as contributed new findings in regards to personal characteristics of an entrepreneur 
and potential for structural influences on action.  Research results have also contributed to 
push the theoretical and empirical entrepreneurship discourse further, presenting additional 
evidence and filling gaps within the field in regards to the individual construct, business 
strategies, approaches and outlooks of the entrepreneur, as well as influences from 
operational contexts.  Highlighted contributions from this research, its outcomes, and results 
are presented below: 
 
 This research introduced multiple unique terms and conceptualizations used to define, 
describe and structure this study and are detailed below in Table 8.1.  
 
Table 8.1. Terms, Conceptualizations and Frameworks Introduced in this Research 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 Definition 
Co-Evolving 
Entrepreneurship 
Nexus 
The conceptual framework for this research reflecting the interdependent nature of the 
individual entrepreneur and operational context, showing the potential for entrepreneur 
reflexivity to wider systems.  This conceptual framework built from Sarason et al., (2006) 
theoretical extrapolation from Shane and Venkataraman (2000) individual – opportunity nexus.  
Entrepreneurial 
Range 
A method and classification tool used to classify respondents according to: specific business 
segments (Decaffeinated Producer, Smallholder Producer, Commercial Farmer, Processor and 
Exporter) and entrepreneur classification range (Non-Entrepreneur, Potential Entrepreneur and 
Entrepreneur). 
Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem 
A modelled conceptualization used to depict the evolving outcomes and influences to 
entrepreneurship as well as the tangible reflexive results from entrepreneurial action within 
opposing liberalized and non-liberalized market structures and levels of political embrace as 
found in the Ethiopian and Rwandan coffee sectors. 
Entrepreneurship 
Blueprint 
A macro-level framework attempting to present a more generalized application for representing 
the interdependence of entrepreneurship, providing a fluid guide for supporting future 
approaches for entrepreneurship study and analysis.  Discussed in Section 8.3.1.  
Entrepreneurship 
Matrix  
A micro-level set of parameters to be used in conjunction with the Entrepreneurship Blueprint, 
using evidence gained from this research to showcase specifics of the determinants and drivers 
needed for successful entrepreneurial dynamism.   
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 Given its interdisciplinary nature, a multitude of explanations for entrepreneurship have 
been introduced throughout the existing literature, however the field continues to lack a 
uniformed definition (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2003; Jennings et al., 
2013; Mazzucato, 2015).  Introduced in Section 2.2.1, this research developed and 
presented its own definition of the entrepreneur as:    
 
An individual aimed at profit maximization through opportunity recognition and 
its pursuit, which has resulted in unique, tangible action towards opportunity 
recognized.  
 
Uniquely, this definition understands profit not only in monetary terms, but also through 
non-monetary means through benefits such as secured supply and/ or sourcing routes, 
secured market expansion opportunities, additional earned payments in-kind through 
technical agriculture or business trainings, or the implementation and receipt of social 
benefits.   
 
 As understanding of the internal characteristics of the individual construct of 
entrepreneurs in emerging markets has remained limited (Williams and Nadin, 2010), this 
research further contributed to the understanding of the individual construct of the 
entrepreneur.  Presented in Section 5.4, results determined that there is a distinct, 
statistically significant difference between Non-Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs in 
relation to the drivers tested.  Additional variances of Self-Efficacy, Risk Tolerance and 
Innovativeness were determined to be due, in part, to the specific operational contexts. 
 
 Detailed understanding of influences on entrepreneurship given specific operational 
contexts within emerging markets was limited due to the need for additional empirical 
evidence and specific study (Boso et al., 2013).  However, investigation through this 
research, highlighted in Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, resulted in key elements of the 
broader operational context found to be especially impactful to entrepreneurship: market 
structure, resource availability, affordability and accessibility, and political environment, 
specifically the political embrace of entrepreneurial potential.  Historical contexts and 
socio-cultural settings were found to have greater influence in regards to wider societal 
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perceptions, acceptance, expectations and allowances and less direct impact on day-to-
day business operations.  Discussed in Sections, 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.2.1, historical contexts 
were found to also have potential to create a predisposition for successful private sector 
actors and entrepreneurs in regards to the specific timing of market entry or familial 
background.   
 
 Analysed in Section 7.2 and 7.3, entrepreneurs were found to indeed be reflexive to wider 
systems, being influenced by operational structures and in turn, influencing operational 
structures and wider economies.  Additionally, entrepreneurs were shown to be reflexive 
architects of change through economic advancement, employment creation, 
improvements to production and portfolio diversification, forced improvements to market 
structures, the stretching of sectoral frontiers as well as creating wider direct and indirect 
social benefits.  
 
 The specific, unique research approach and analysis used to understand entrepreneurship 
has shown it as an interdependent, reflexive duality of individual and context (Sarason et 
al., 2006).  Research outcomes of the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus, introduced in 
Section 2.3.1, and the resulting Entrepreneurial Ecosystem of the Ethiopian and Rwandan 
coffee markets, presented in Section 7.4.1, has created a recognized space for 
appreciation of the reflexive nature of entrepreneurs in influencing wider structures as 
well as the entrepreneur’s ability as an architect of change.  
 
8.3.1 The Entrepreneurship Blueprint and Entrepreneurship Matrix  
The final outcome and research contribution of this research is the Entrepreneurship 
Blueprint and corresponding Matrix are meant to be used in tandem as a mechanism in which 
to support a more widely applicable conceptual design and approach for future research.  
Entrepreneurship is believed to be highly relative in regards to the industry, specific timeline 
of economic evolution, operational context as well as the specific enterprising individual.  As 
such, it is understandable that no one conception or even definition can reasonably be used 
across all assessment models. As such, the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem presented findings 
form robust empirical analysis to depict a micro-level assessment and direct outcome of 
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entrepreneurs and their actions in the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda.  Building from 
research undertaken, its corresponding analysis and interpretation, the development of the 
Entrepreneurship Blueprint presents a structural outcome for a macro-portrayal of the 
overlapping and interlocking elements of entrepreneurship, meant to house analysis within 
any context or economy.  While the Blueprint is a macro-level conception, the 
Entrepreneurship Matrix uses direct evidence gained from this research to provide 
corresponding micro-level parameters needed for successful entrepreneurial dynamism 
within a developing economy in order to provide contextual evidence used to guide future 
classification and analysis of entrepreneurial actors and unique contexts.   
 
As will be seen, the Blueprint presents a structure for approaching entrepreneurship as an 
investigation into both the individual and context, demonstrating how the individual 
construct is interwoven into the fabric of a specific context.  Additionally, the influences onto 
the wider structures can be seen through entrepreneurial reflexivity and potential for positive 
as well as negative additionality.  The Matrix in turn, uses research findings to more 
intimately showcase how specific drivers within the individual construct of an entrepreneur 
are interrelated to the foundational elements of the operational context.  Within this Matrix, 
high degrees of the listed drivers are assumed in order to show how an Entrepreneur may 
relate with a specific element of the operational context.  The Entrepreneurship Blueprint is 
presented below in Figure 8.1 and the Entrepreneurship Matrix is presented in Figure 8.2.  
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Figure 8.1. The Entrepreneurship Blueprint 
 
(Source: Author Construct) 
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Figure 8.2. The Entrepreneurship Matrix 
 (Source: Author Construct) 
  
Recognized Political Embrace 
Open Market Structure / 
 Efficient Regulatory Climate 
Financial Availability / 
Accessibility  
Encouraging Socio-
Cultural Setting 
Resilience 
A high degree of belief in self and 
in motivating environment 
improves trust in political 
environment / entrepreneurial 
potential.  Entrepreneur has 
greater trust in ability to be 
allowed to continue pursuit, 
despite potential failures  
Ability to withstand market pressures, 
shocks or business setbacks.  Has 
capability to continue opportunity 
pursuits largely unrestricted, is also 
supported through ease of doing 
business and in trusted legality of 
business operations and structures 
Willingness to continue pursuit 
of finance required for business 
expansion or new opportunity.  
Use of additional capital/ 
financing supports business 
activities and trust in ability to 
also succeed in future endeavors 
Failure is not demonized 
within society and an 
entrepreneur is respected for 
ability to continue, despite 
adverse circumstances. 
Entrepreneur appreciated for 
work ethic and success 
Self-Efficacy 
Recognized acceptance and 
corresponding positive policy 
focus supports entrepreneur’s self-
belief for involvement within 
motivating environment.  
Heightened interest in business 
and related endeavors 
Belief in ability to pursue and succeed 
in new combinations across markets via 
creation of dynamic environment for 
motivating entrepreneurial strategy and 
action.  Entrepreneur has belief in 
sector's and product's profit making 
potential 
Entrepreneurial belief in 
financial returns, willingness 
and ability to pursue new 
activities, belief in self to 
succeed paired with required 
finance in which to do so 
 
Motivating, community 
support provides 
encouragement.  
Entrepreneur also has 
opportunity to act as role 
model and a business success 
story 
Innovativeness 
Creates flexibility for R&D, trials 
and failures needed for 
entrepreneurial innovation and 
sector expansion.  State-led/ State-
financed innovation can provide 
foundational elements 
entrepreneurs can build from  
Active incubation / protective policies 
for start-ups and emerging industries. 
Provides protective environment for 
new trials/ operational methods/ 
product diversification.  Rewarded 
interest to exploration of market gaps  
Enabled space for investment in 
which to test new business 
ideas, expansion, methods, 
products and improvement 
strategies for pursuit into new, 
unique areas 
 
Community does not 
disparage implementation of 
new ideas/ techniques/ 
innovations or new 
operational strategies.  Lack 
of potential criticism 
emboldens entrepreneur 
Risk Tolerance 
Decreased risk aversion from 
protective policies support risk 
taking and innovation.  Failure 
understood as part of 
entrepreneurial process 
Supportive parameters for risk taking 
via supportive regulatory environment 
and protection policies or safety nets 
for failed attempts.  Ease of business 
start-up, licensing  
Access to finance mechanisms 
reducing risk and increases 
ability for diversification into 
untested endeavors, operations 
and techniques. 
Risk taking entrepreneurs do 
not need to see other's prior 
successes before new 
undertaking, limit risk 
perceived for new entrants  
Opportunity 
Recognition        
+ Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
Systems, policies and mechanisms 
enable clearer paths to opportunity 
pursuits, supports 'push – pull' 
effect of entrepreneurship, 
supports individual’s unique 
reading of marketplace  
Free market structure creates visible 
pathways for entrepreneurial read and 
understanding of marketplace and 
ability to enact business strategies.  
Actively use and benefit from use of 
knowledge stock 
 
Increased ability to be an active 
player in the market.  Financing 
accessibility enables ‘pull’ for 
expansion, diversification and 
‘push’ of new pursuits to be 
enacted/ operationalized 
Entrepreneurs supported to 
become active market 
players and enforcers of 
change.  Environment does 
not diminish viability for 
opportunity pursuit  
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8.4 Policy Recommendations 
This research has shown the most significant influences to entrepreneurship within the 
Ethiopia and Rwandan coffee markets to be an open and enabling market structure, access to 
finance, and a conducive political environment willing to embrace entrepreneurial potential 
for wider economic development.  While the findings of this thesis are highly contextual to 
entrepreneurs within these specific research contexts, extrapolating findings and insights can 
inform wider analysis and policy prescriptions for emerging market settings or alternative 
sectors more broadly.  Engendering entrepreneurship within emerging markets or developing 
countries was found to require the opportunity for growth of a vibrant private sector led by 
innovative, risk tolerant entrepreneurial actors focused on profit generation and the potential 
to use business as an additional mechanism to create institutional and social benefit.  Policies 
supporting 1) the coffee sectors researched as well as 2) wider entrepreneurial growth needs 
are listed below and recommendations are built from direct empirical findings and outcomes 
from this research.  While the policies described below are directed from result analysis of 
the specific research contexts, several outcomes are believed to have the potential to also be 
applied more widely.  
 
While Rwanda has been found to have an outlook and related policy implementation geared 
towards the support and expansion of entrepreneurial actors within the coffee sector, 
improvements can still be made.  Conversely, as has been shown, Ethiopia’s perceived 
unwillingness to embrace and support unaffiliated, private sector entrepreneurs operating 
within the coffee sector speaks to a larger concern, and is one that is not considered able to 
be simply rectified by the improvement or implementation of adjusted policy.  Rather, the 
mind set and outlook of the current regime must first be addressed prior to any meaningful, 
legislative changes taking hold.   
 
Given the current coffee markets and political climates analysed, improvements can be made 
in order to better support the sector and to further empower entrepreneurial actors through 
addressing issues of limited resources, human capital development, policy environments, 
financial structures, regulatory climates and infrastructure needs.  Some of the largest 
concerns of the coffee sectors reported by entrepreneurs are centred on: price, finance and 
need for technical training.  A list of concerns and corresponding options for policy 
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improvements addressing entrepreneurship and the coffee sectors of Ethiopia and Rwanda 
are discussed below. 
 
Coffee Sectors: 
Low price, price volatility and inability to predict seasonal pricing was a major concern 
for actors across both coffee chains.  While actors in producing counties have very limited 
means of impacting global pricing, opportunity exists to improve base pricing structures 
through unique product diversification, improved quality and value-added schemes such as 
certification or micro-lot production.  Neither Ethiopia nor Rwanda have instituted hedging 
mechanisms or related safeguards against low prices.  While both governments cite an 
inability to finance such endeavours, the lack of a localized hedge or institutionalized floor 
price continues to leave each market highly susceptible to external shock; with the coffee 
business remaining a highly risky endeavour.  Given the disproportionate number of income 
dependent actors involved in each coffee sector, development of such a mechanism could be 
considered an integral element of a wider development strategy. 
 
Increased technical training and knowledge awareness is a critical need particularly at the 
smallholder producer level.  While some Rwandan Entrepreneurs operating processing or 
exporting businesses have instituted training schemes as a way to build or improve 
relationships with producer suppliers as well as a competitive advantage, widespread training 
schemes are not currently implemented in either country.  As discussed in Sections 6.3.2.1 
and 6.3.2.2, both countries rely on donor-financed projects to provide the majority of 
technical agricultural assistance programs or business training to Producers, Processors and 
Exporters, however the spread and depth of these initiatives are limited.  Improved market 
awareness, especially on pricing information, continues to be a critical need to empower 
actors throughout the chain with accurate, timely information for forecasting, pricing and 
business planning. 
 
Improvements to (physical) infrastructure, specifically roads, electricity access and water 
connectivity will greatly reduce operational costs involved in processing and transportation.  
The high cost of business related to poor infrastructure remains one of the most difficult 
barriers for new business emergence and business expansion (MTI, 2010).  
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Improved contracting systems with international buyers are reported to be a large 
challenge for both suppliers as well as international buyers.  Often, contracts are not finalized 
until a product sample has been tested and approved by a buyer; purchase price negotiated 
and export terms finalized.  Reportedly, most contracts do not include pricing differentials.  
The lack of price differentials, particularly for futures contracts places an undue risk on the 
exporter as most contracts are completed weeks to months following harvest and processing.  
Buyers have also complained of not receiving the same quality and product profile as agreed 
through the approved and accepted sample.  A streamlined contracting system, inclusive of 
improved pricing standards should decrease risk for the exporter and increase product 
stability for buyers.  However, at the time of writing this was considered highly unlikely.  As 
initially discussed in Section 4.2.3, given the current market, large conglomerates of 
international buyers dominate the import market with a single supplier or even country in no 
position to demand terms.  
 
Wider Entrepreneurial Growth: 
Financial inaccessibility and unaffordability continues to be a major hurdle to 
entrepreneurs as well as overall sector advancement for both Ethiopia and Rwanda.  As 
discussed in Section 6.5.1, each country is challenged by liquidity constraints and a distinct 
need for foreign exchange.  Macroeconomic solutions to the liquidity constraint could come 
through bank recapitalization, which could increase liquidity and reduce the cost of lending 
(Traore et al., 2013).  Stabilizing fiscal environments, enabling more reasonable interest 
rates 169  would also make financing more affordable for formal businesses as well as 
improving financial systems to incentivize domestic savings and investment (Beyene, 2002).   
In Ethiopia’s case, this would include restricting the current monopoly the Central Bank of 
Ethiopia has over the financial market and equating the playing field between state-
enterprises and private sector institutions.  Supportive and innovative strategic financing 
initiatives should be implemented in order to support entrepreneurs and further develop the 
sector, inclusive of equity financing and equipment leasing opportunities through designated 
fund options.   
 
                                                        
169 Ethiopian interest rates reported to reach as high as 27%, Rwandan interest rates range from 14 to 21% 
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Improved access to credit for micro, small and medium businesses, including smallholder 
producers, is greatly needed.  Admittedly, micro and small businesses as well as rural, 
smallholder producers are the most difficult, expensive and often inefficient clientele.  
However, these actors do account for the vast majority of operators within both coffee 
sectors and as such, improved financial services would have wide ranging benefits and 
economic implications.  Enabling improved credit access would require the implementation 
of safety nets for investors and investees, increased MFI registration requirements, and easier 
conditions to access credit including widening the range of accepted collateral options 
(Traore et al., 2013).  Undeniably, current financial climates and lending opportunities are 
risky, however the burdensome cost of collateral (125%+ loan requisition) creates a 
discouraging and prohibitive environment.  Specifically for coffee entrepreneurs, land, coffee 
trees, equipment and at times, stations are not eligible as collateral, eliminating most coffee 
actors from any form of formal financing.   
 
Improve and streamline regulatory processes in order to improve ease and efficiency to 
operating a business.  As presented in Sections 6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2, Ethiopia and Rwanda had 
large differences in regards to global rankings in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
Reports, highlighting extreme differences in time, expense and difficulty in business 
registration, licencing and operation.  2015 rankings reveal Ethiopia, which continues to have 
a disabling environment, dropping eight spots in three years to 132, with Rwanda continuing 
to improve, ranked at 46; both rankings are out of 189 countries.  Improvements to both 
countries can still be made through reduced cost of business licencing, registration and 
enhanced facilitation of business operations and needs (Beyene, 2002).  Additional 
improvements can be made in the areas of business entry, taxation, legislative policies, 
acquisition of construction permits as well as land registration and ownership.  Improvement 
can also support reduced cost and increased efficiency for cross boarder trade as well as 
import and export (Traore et al., 2013).  Ensuring ease, cost and efficiency of cross boarder 
trade is particularly important to both countries as both must transport export bound coffee to 
cross-boarder ports in Djibouti City, Djibouti and Mombasa, Kenya.  
 
Improved education access and increasing length of time spent in school.  As analysed in 
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.4, education was found to have an impact on entrepreneurship, with 
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actors receiving a higher degree of education found to have a higher probability for 
entrepreneurship.  In this respect, state-led investment into education sectors should be made 
a priority element within a wider strategy of building a dynamic private sector led by 
entrepreneurial growth.  Additional initiatives aimed at fostering entrepreneurial growth 
should include increasing access to market information as well as business development 
training to improve human capital and related managerial skillsets.  
 
8.5 Proposals for Further Research  
Recently, much has been written, and speculation made, highlighting the budding potential 
for emerging economies as new economic ‘hot-spots’, if only the potential for 
entrepreneurship would be effectively harnessed (Boso et al., 2013).  Given this burden for 
success, the role of entrepreneurs within emerging economies remains a crucial ingredient to 
wider socio-economic development.  In the pursuit of actively moving economic frontiers 
forward, the need for entrepreneurs to play the role of change-maker has never been more 
vital.   
 
While this research has made inroads into the understanding of the individual entrepreneur 
and the interwoven interdependence between the entrepreneur and their specific and unique 
operational contexts, work remains to be done in regards to truly unleashing the power of 
entrepreneurship and the positive impacts, both directly and indirectly, that entrepreneurs can 
create for their environments.  Building from the approach used and outcomes obtained, 
further research should be geared towards using knowledge of the positive impacts of 
entrepreneurship, in order to engage with and advocate for government acceptance and 
implementation of constructive strategies to embrace the political, financial and market 
climates necessary in order to support entrepreneurial outlook and opportunity pursuit.  Ideas 
for further research are as follows: 
 
 This unique conceptual framework, the Co-Evolving Entrepreneurship Nexus or 
Entrepreneurship Blueprint and corresponding Matrix should be implemented in future 
research on entrepreneurship within emerging market contexts to analyse alternative 
sectors and/ or other countries in order to test applicability and effectiveness of developed 
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frameworks.  The cocoa industry in West Africa is recommended due to similar industry 
construction to that of the coffee sector. 
 
 The concept of reflexivity from entrepreneurial action as well as co-evolution of the 
individual entrepreneur and the specific operational context presents a unique and new 
approach for analysing entrepreneurship.  However, to truly gauge and showcase 
evidence of co-evolution, a longitudinal study should be undertaken to examine changes 
and impacts to individuals, institutional structures, and contexts overtime.  Given the 
limited timeframe for this specific study, a longitudinal study was unable to be 
implemented, however it is recognized that it would have added substantive weight to the 
arguments presented in this thesis. 
 
 In Chapter 7 this study discussed entrepreneurs as architects of change and also analysed 
elements of positive additionality found be largely an outcome od entrepreneurial action 
through specific means of maintaining of gaining a competitive edge.  Additional and 
interesting work could be carried out analysing the impacts and outcomes from social 
entrepreneurship within these contexts.  
 
 While this study did not specifically apply a gendered lens to its analysis of 
entrepreneurship, this is recognized as a limitation.  Further research could be undertaken 
in assessing how gender and related power dynamics may change entrepreneurship in 
regards to access within these contexts.  
 
 The formal development of partnerships with local coffee industries should be made, 
enabling proprietary information to be released and analysed.  Corresponding financial 
modelling should be used to test and relate profitability to entrepreneurial performance as 
indicated through this research and against frameworks developed.  
 
 If accurate profitability and revenue receipts can be obtained from Ethiopian and 
Rwandan coffee sectors, data should be used to improve understanding of the financial 
implications on the sector and wider economies due to entrepreneurial involvement.  
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Uncovering and analysing empirical data demonstrating the financial impacts of creating 
an economic climate of entrepreneurial dynamism vs. the impacts of entrepreneurial 
apathy can be a key tool in advocating for appropriate government strategy.  
 
 National, regional and household level data should be used in further economic analysis 
in order to determine wider economic improvements, correlations and patterns between 
successful (or unsuccessful) growth of the coffee sector, individual coffee actors, and 
economic development trends.  
 
8.6 Conclusion  
The entrepreneurship phenomenon has been established through this research to be an 
interdependent duality of the individual construct and operational context, complete only 
with the inclusion of the reflexive outcomes from entrepreneurial actions onto wider 
structures of an emerging economy.  This research has provided evidence and empirical 
analysis showing distinct differences between the individual construct of the entrepreneur 
and non-entrepreneur.   The entrepreneurial approach, outlook and opportunity pursuit 
proved to be influenced by divergent degrees of political acceptance, economic liberalization, 
resource attainability, market structure favourability as well as historical and socio-cultural 
evolutions.  The inherent policies, institutions, regulations, structures and business strategies 
proven through this research to influence entrepreneurship, were also found to be influenced 
by it.  As shown, the colourful mosaic that is entrepreneurship is more than just the unique 
brilliance of a single individual or a government’s agenda in building an economy.  Instead, 
entrepreneurship is a result of the combined efforts of each, built through a vibrantly 
complex and multi-layered process, fusing both the entrepreneurial spirit and its conducive 
environment.   
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Appendix A – Participatory Budgeting  
 
Ethiopia Smallholder Producer Coffee Costing Models for Production and Sale of Red 
Cherry and Sun-Dried  
 
The following presents various costing model scenarios developed through participatory 
budgeting exercises conducted with Ethiopian Smallholder Producers in order to present the 
potential lower and uppermost profit scenarios for seasonal low and high prices.  Models and 
related cost structures are derived from average input calculations, farm size and productivity 
estimates and are calculated on a ‘per farm’ or ‘per producer’ basis.  This model is calculated 
with assumptions of production of 600 trees on ½ hectare of productive farmland resulting in 
a total production of 420kg of red cherry170.  AS discussed, Ethiopian Smallholder Producers 
will typically sell only some red cherry at time of harvest, processing the remaining by hand 
for storage on farm site.  The remaining sun-dried pods are used as a type of savings 
mechanism in which households will sell throughout the rest of the year, as needed.  This 
model has estimated 1/3 of total red cherry is sold at harvest (126kg), with the remaining 2/3 
processed by hand and stored on farm site as sun-dried (249.5kg) for sale throughout the rest 
of the year171.   
 
The figures displayed below in the Table A.1, show total cost of production, harvest and 
transport to buyer (ECX Primary Market) for an average producer with 600 coffee trees.  
Information displayed is from participatory budgeting sessions with smallholder producers in 
Ethiopia, unless otherwise noted.  Data provided was through memory recall and as such the 
potential for inaccuracies are acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
170 Productivity for Red Cherry in Ethiopia is estimated at 0.7 kgs of red cherry per tree (FAO, 2014).  
Accounting for sun-dried processing an additional weight loss of 0.10 kgs is incurred.  Land purchase and/or 
start-up costs are not costed (E_5, 2015). 
171 For most ‘average producers’, coffee earnings are not enough to sustain households throughout an entire 
year, with the 3 to 4 months prior to the start of the coffee harvest, typically being referred to as lean periods or 
hungry season.  
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Table A.1. Ethiopian Average Smallholder Producer Input Cost Requirement 
(Source: Author Participatory Budgeting) 
 
The following scenarios in Tables A.2 and A.3 below, are used to present the possible profit 
range for an average Smallholder Producer, accounting for seasonally low prices and 
seasonally high prices through sale of both red cherry and sun-dried pods.  Prices are taken 
from average pricing data for the 2013 and 2014 seasons.  As seen below in Table A.2, the 
first scenario presents low prices for Red Cherry sold at Eth Birr 8/kg ($0.38/kg)172 and Sun-
Dried sold at Eth Birr 30/kg ($1.43/kg)173.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
172 Internationally, coffee is priced and traded at US cent / lb.  However, this typically does not take place until 
the export level, with smallholder producers dealing in local currency price/ kilo.  As such, prices have been 
accounted for and calculated using producer statements at price per kilo.  
173 Exchange rate taken as an average across 2013/14 seasons at $1.00 = Eth Birr 21.   
Farm: Production, Harvest & Supply of  
Red Cherry & Sun-Dried 
Cost per Unit 
Eth Birr 
# of Units 
Total  
Eth Birr 
Total  
USD 
Labour Off- Season  own/ family labour, not costed   
Labour On-Season 
    
Wages (5 Labourers) 20 10 days 1000 $47.62 
Feeding Labourers (5 Labourer) 4 10 days 200 $9.52 
Tree Maintenance     
Tree maintenance 3 600 trees 1800 $85.71 
Pruning  own/ family labour, not costed 
 
Mulching 500 / farm 500 $23.81 
Compost  300 / farm 300 $14.29 
Ploughing  1000 / farm 1000 $47.62 
Weeding 500 / farm 500 $23.81 
Harvesting / Transport 
    
Cost of harvest sac (estimated 80kg/ sac) 40 5 sacs 200 $9.52 
Labourer transport to Market (2 people) 50 2 people 100 $4.76 
Subtotal Cost – Producing/ Harvesting Red Cherry only 5,600 $ 266.67 
    
  
Household Production / Storage of Sun-Dried   
Cost of Drying Cherry 300 / farm 300 $14.29 
Construction of bed for drying  100 2 beds 200 $9.52 
Transport sun-dried pods to household storage  100 / trip 100 $4.76 
Transport to Market  50 2 trips 100 $4.76 
Subtotal Cost - Producing, Harvesting, Processing Sun-Dried 700 $ 33.33 
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Table A.2. Ethiopian Profit Scenario 1, Sale of Product at Low Price 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Results of the Low Price Scenario show the net, annual profit to be $104.40 or just $8.70 per 
month. Table A.3, presents a scenario of high seasonal prices for Red Cherry sold at Eth Birr 
15/kg ($0.71) and Sun-Dried sold at Eth Birr 32/kg ($1.52/kg).  Given the high price 
scenario, accounting for the input cost requirements shown in Table A.1 above, this model 
reveals a net, annual profit earning of $170.15, or a monthly profit earning of $14.18.  
 
Table A.3. Ethiopian Profit Scenario 2, Sale of Product at High Price 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Demonstrated through the Ethiopian Cost Scenarios, sale of red cherry revealed losses at 
both low price and high price scenarios.  While respondents reported to prefer the sale of 
sun-dried for profitability reasons, the sale of red cherry at time of harvest often presents the 
only opportunity for smallholder producers to obtain actual cash, even if sale results in an 
overall profit losses.   
Scenario 1 
(Low Price) 
 Total Eth Birr 
Total  
USD 
    
Total Cost of Red Cherry     5,600   $266.67  
Earnings from Sale of Red Cherry @ 8 Birr / kg 
 
1,008 $48.00 
Revenue of Red Cherry 
 
-4,592 -$ 218.67 
    
Total Cost of Sun-Dried    700   $33.33  
Earnings from Sale of Sun Dried @ 30 Birr/ kg 
 
7,484 $356.40 
Revenue of Sun-Dried 
 
6,784 $323.07 
    
Net Profit for Season   2,192 $104.40 
Scenario 2 
(High Price) 
 Total Eth Birr 
Total  
USD 
    
Total Cost of Red Cherry     5,600   $266.67  
Earnings from Sale of Red Cherry @ 15 Birr / kg 1,890 $90.00 
Revenue of Red Cherry 
 
-3,710 -$176.67 
    
Total Cost of Sun-Dried    700   $33.33  
Earnings from Sale of Sun Dried @ 32 Birr/ kg 
 
7,983 $380.14 
Revenue of Sun-Dried  
 
7,283 $346.81 
    
Net Profit for Season   3,573 $170.15 
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Rwanda Smallholder Producer Coffee Costing Models for Production and Sale of Red 
Cherry  
 
The following costing models were developed through participatory budgeting sessions with 
Rwandan Smallholder Producers in order to present potential lower and uppermost profit 
scenarios for low and high prices.  Models and related cost structures are derived from 
average input calculations, farm size and productivity estimates, and are calculated on a ‘per 
farm’ or ‘per producer’ basis.  This model is calculated with the assumption of farm 
production of 500 trees on ½ hectare, resulting in a total production of 675kg of red 
cherry174.  In Rwanda, Smallholder Producers typically sell all red cherry at time of harvest 
to Processors operating coffee washing stations (CWS).  The figures displayed below in the 
Table A.4, show total cost of production, harvest and transport to buyer (CWS) for an 
average producer with 500 coffee trees.  While Rwanda productivity of red cherry per tree is 
greater, as will be seen, cost of inputs, including labour, is higher than Ethiopia.  
Additionally, as presented in Section 4.5, Ethiopia typically achieves red cherry garden gate 
prices 20% to 40% higher than Rwanda.   
 
Information displayed is from participatory budgeting sessions with smallholder producers in 
Rwanda, unless otherwise noted.  Data provided was through memory recall and as such the 
potential for inaccuracies are acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
174 Productivity for Red Cherry in Rwanda is estimated at 1.35 kgs of red cherry per tree (NAEB, 2013; R_5, 
2014).  Additionally, Rwandan smallholder producers are reported to leave more spacing between trees, 
resulting in a slightly reduced number of trees per plot.  Average smallholder producers are expected to have 
500 trees on a ½ hectare of production area.  Land purchase and/or start-up costs were not costed. 
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Table A.4. Rwandan Average Smallholder Producer Input Cost Requirement 
(Source: Author Participatory Budgeting) 
 
The following profit scenarios for Rwandan Smallholder Producers in Table A.5 and A.6 
below, present the possible profit range for an average smallholder producer, accounting for 
seasonally low prices and seasonally high prices for the sale of red cherry directly to a CWS.  
Prices are taken from the average pricing data for the 2013 and 2014 seasons.  
 
Table A.5. Rwandan Profit Scenario 1, Sale of Product at Low Price 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Results from the Low Price Scenario in Table A.5, show low prices for Red Cherry sold at 
Rw Franc 150/kg ($0.22/kg)175.  Given the Low Price Scenario, analysis into the annual 
profit actually reveals a net loss of ($35.14).  Table A.6 below, presents a scenario of high 
seasonal prices for Red Cherry sold at Rw Franc 250/kg ($0.36/kg).  Results of the High 
                                                        
175 Exchange rate taken as an average across 2013/14 seasons at $1.00 = Rw Franc 690.   
Farm: Production, Harvest & Supply of  
Red Cherry  
Cost per Unit 
Rw Franc 
# of 
Units 
Total 
Rw Franc 
Total  
USD 
Labour Off- Season  own/ family labour, not costed 
 Labour On-Season         
Wages - Harvest  (2 people, 10 days) 1500 20 days 30,000 $43.48 
On Farm Work Costs (feed people while 
working) 250 20 days 5,000 $7.25 
Farm Maintenance  
    Pruning 60 500 trees 30,000 $43.48 
Mulching  100 500 trees 50,000 $72.46 
Applying Pesticide 
    Labour (1 person, 2 days) 1,000 2 days 2,000 $2.90 
Applying Fertilizer 
    Labour (1 person, 2 days) 1,000 2 days 2,000 $2.90 
Transport, post-harvest  
    Post Harvest Delivery cost 500 13 trips 6,500 $9.42 
    
Subtotal Cost - Producing, Harvesting Red Cherry only   125,500 $181.88 
Scenario 1 
(Low Price)  
Total Rw Franc 
Total  
USD 
    
Total Cost of Red Cherry  
 
 125,500   $181.88  
Earnings from Sale of Red Cherry @ 150 Birr / kg 101,250 $146.74 
    
Net Profit for Season  
 
- 24,250 - $35.14 
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Price Scenario, accounting for the input cost requirements shown in Table A.4, this model 
reveals an annual net profit earning of $62.68, or a net profit of $5.22 per month. 
 
Table A.6. Rwandan Profit Scenario 2, Sale of Product at High Price 
(Source: Author Construct) 
 
Costings could not be generated for specific business segments or between specific 
entrepreneur classifications.  However, as demonstrated through the costing scenarios 
developed through participatory budgeting with Smallholder Producers in both Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, coffee production for the average, smallholder producer was not found to be 
particularly lucrative for actors in either country.  The lucrative perception of the industry 
can perhaps be understood through industry practice of a relatively large lump-sum payment 
received for product delivery 176 .  However, when costing out the required inputs and 
investments, and assessing income potential over-time, coffee for the ‘average’ smallholder 
producer becomes much less lucrative.  Considering that the majority of these coffee-
producing households are essentially required to stretch the cash earned from coffee income 
across the rest of the year it begs the question:  
 
Is coffee really the right investment for the ‘average smallholder producer,’ which is 
not willing or able to take entrepreneurial action in order to improve business 
standing or expand earning potential?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
176 Smallholder Producers typically have just a few harvests over a 1 to 3 month span of the season 
Scenario 2 
(High Price) 
Total Rw Franc 
Total  
USD 
    
Total Cost of Red Cherry  
 
 125,500   $181.88  
Earnings from Sale of Red Cherry @ 250 Birr / KG 168,750 $ 244.57 
    
Net Profit for Season  
 
43,250 $ 62.68 
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Appendix B – Semi-Structured Questionnaire 
Smallholder Producer/ Commercial Farmer/ Processor/ Exporter 
 
Demographics of Respondent  
 
Business history?  
Personal history with coffee / Family lineage with coffee? 
 
How did you learn about coffee?  
What are the major reasons you have chosen to be involved in coffee? 
 
Explain your business model 
What do you believe makes you successful? 
# of coffee businesses owned (how many/ where/ across which segments) 
Strategies for interacting with suppliers / buyers 
 
What have your experiences been as a business owner in this country/ in the coffee sector? 
 
What challenges or risks are you currently facing?  
What risk mitigation mechanisms have/ do you implement? 
Why continue with coffee despite challenges/ hardships/ risks? 
 
Is there competition in your area? 
Date of Interview 
Name 
Contact Details 
Business Name & Location  
Position in Company 
PLC vs. SP, other? (Ethiopia Only) 
Age/ Year of Birth 
Gender 
Education Level 
Year Business Established 
Business Size (Volumes/ Revenue, Land Size, # of Trees…) 
Did you inherit your business?  (Y/N) 
Is coffee main source of income? 
Are you currently engaged with other business interests?  (Y/N) 
What other income generating activities are you involved in (on/off farm)?   
(Producers only) 
Do you hire employees?  Permanent/ Seasonal?  How many? 
Are you currently investing in your business to expand/ improve?  (Y/N)  Why? 
What is the focus of you business (for Profit/ Social?) 
What do you believe your business can achieve? 
Are you a member of a cooperative?  (Producers only) 
Why/ Why not? 
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How do you respond? 
What are the biggest impacts to your business (+/-)? 
What are the top 3 Risks to business: 
How respond? 
 
How have you responded following difficult seasons or when your business has incurred 
losses? 
What do you do when prices low? 
 
Are you doing anything different from your competitors or neighbours? (Innovations?) 
Have you changed your business strategy according to the market?  
How? 
 
What opportunities do you see in coffee/ for the sector? 
What are your future plans? 
Any barriers to your business growth?  
 
How are you different than others who have not been able to make business a success?  
What are specific characteristics of entrepreneurship in sector?  
What is necessary for Entrepreneurs to be successful? 
 
What support if any have you received from NGOs or Government? 
What changes have you observed in yourself and community/ country since becoming 
involved with coffee?  ?  
(i.e. physical infrastructure/ wealth/ increased external involvement?) 
 
Does coffee have any unintended consequences (+/-)? 
 
Any recommendations or improvements would you make for the coffee sector or wider 
business climate? 
 
Views towards Government approaches/ focus 
  395 
Appendix C – Key Informant Interview Example Questions  
Questions below present examples of discussion points held with Key Informants 
interviewed in Ethiopia and Rwanda.   
 
Key Informants included Government Officials, NGO Actors, Sector Actors (exclusive to 
Producer/ Processor/ Exporter), Financiers, International Buyers and Expatriates involved 
with sector or related business ventures.  
 
Example Questions: 
 
What is your role? 
How does it impact/ work with the coffee sector or wider business development themes? 
 
Do you believe the current economic and/ or political climate impacts the coffee sector? 
Specifically impacts entrepreneurs?  How?  Why? 
How can it be improved? 
Are there any adverse policies, financial constraints, regulations that are specifically hurting 
growth?  
 
Does (specific policy, known financing issues, etc) impact actors either positively or 
negatively?  How?  Why?  
 
Has external investment (lack of) changed perspective in the sector?   How? 
 
What does it take for an entrepreneur to be successful in this country? 
What are some of the major obstacles to success for the entrepreneur, coffee sector, more 
broadly?  
What challenges are observed for market development/ business expansion? 
 
What role do you believe entrepreneurship has in helping (or hurting) the coffee sector and/ 
or wider economy at large?  
 
What role has Government (or specific agency, ministry, project, service provider) played in 
developing sector? 
What more can / needs to be done?  
 
How has the NGO/ Donor/ International Buyers sector addressed challenges in the sector or 
wider economic development constraints? 
 
What type of communication or constructive working relationship exists between coffee 
sector actors and Government policy makers? 
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Appendix D – Structured Questionnaire, Likert Scale 
Questionnaires were translated into Amharic and Kinyarwanda for Ethiopia and Rwanda, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Name:_______________________________________________ 
Date of Interview:_______________________________ 
Segment (P-Non Ent/ P-Pot Ent/P- Ent/ CF/ Pr/ Ex ):________________________   
Area of Operation: __________________________________ 
This is a general assessment of how you perceive yourself.  Please be as honest as possible.  The questions are generalized and intended to indicate 
which ranking most accurately reflects you and your behaviors in regards to coffee.  There is no right or wrong answer.  
      Test Question  
 
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral)  
Often  
Definitely 
Always 
When the coffee prices are very high you are happy?   
(1=low, 5=high)  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
      Resilience 
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral) 
Often  
Definitely 
Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Questions           
If you experience losses in your business, how often do you actively 
implement ways to replace the losses encountered? 
1 2 3 4 5 
If an event is very stressful, for example pests invade your coffee 
plantation and the harvest is lost, to what degree is it difficult for you 
to recover personally from that event? 
1 2 3 4 5 
If situations are very difficult, to what degree do you look for ways to 
improve yourself? 
1 2 3 4 5 
When circumstances happen that are outside of your power, how often 
do you still try to control the situation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often are you able to adapt and be flexible to new circumstances 
and situations? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often are you able to maintain a positive outlook even when 
things look hopeless? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Self – Efficacy 
 
   
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral) 
Often  
Definitely 
Always 
1 2 3 4 5 
Questions           
To what degree do you believe you are largely in control of what will 
happen in your life? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: I do not plan too far ahead in the 
future (10 years +) because many things turn out to be a matter of luck, 
that I have no control over. 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree do you feel confident in yourself and feel strong and in 
control of your life and business? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree do you believe that your life is, to a great extent, 
controlled by accidental occurrences? 
1 2 3 4 5 
When you make plans, how often are you able to succeed with the 
plans/ meet your targets? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Innovativeness Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral)  
Often  
Definitely 
Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Questions           
How often do you look for ways to improve working methods or 
experiment with new ideas? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often will you try something totally new, even if you are 
unsure about the outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often do you actively pursue new ways to improve your skills, 
knowledge or business, if new ways are uncommon? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Even if something is working well, to what degree will you still try 
to improve it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often do you generate creative or unique ideas (that you have 
not witnessed before) for solutions to problems? 
1 2 3 4 5 
If you are unsure of the outcome of a risky activity, how likely is it 
that you will also try it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Risk Tolerance 
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral)  
Often  
Definitely 
Always  
  1 2 3 4 5 
Questions           
To what degree do you implement measures to protect yourself 
from risk (business)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree do you try to try to avoid risk in business? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: I am known in my 
community as someone who is willing to try new things/take 
risks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often will you start an activity even if you have no prior 
knowledge of anyone else attempting it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How often will you invest money in an activity if you are not 
confident in the return? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree do you see risk (business) as a challenge? 1 2 3 4 5 
How often are you willing to try something new, even if you 
know you may fail? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: I only start a new activity 
after I have seen someone else's success. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Opportunity Recognition 
                        + 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral)  
Often  
Definitely 
Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Questions           
While going about routine day-to-day activities, How often do 
you see new opportunities or business venture ideas? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree do you see and understand changes in the 
marketplace or business environment? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree are you willing to pursue new opportunities if 
you believe they are viable, even if it is risky?  
1 2 3 4 5 
How often do you use your existing market knowledge and 
understanding to pursue new opportunities? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: The new opportunities I 
have recognized over the years have been mostly related to 
each other. 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: Seeing new opportunities 
does not come naturally to me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree are you proactive in going after opportunities 
you see as beneficial to your business? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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How would you like to see financing opportunities improve? 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you consider major financial hurdles to be for you personally or nationally? 
 
 
 
Access to/ Need of:  
Capital & Financing  
Absolutely 
Never 
Very Little 
Occasionally 
(Neutral)  
Often 
Definitely Always 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Questions            
How often do you require additional financing for your 
business? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How easy is it for you to get additional capital from a formal 
lending institution, such as a commercial bank? 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: If I borrow money from 
family/ friends it creates a strain and/or conflict in our 
relationship. 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: The profit I make each 
year is enough for me to invest and expand my business in the 
ways I want. 
1 2 3 4 5 
To what degree is this statement true: I believe I have all the 
requirements for a financial institution to give me a loan? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
What Institution? 
 
     Why or why not? What is missing?  
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Please rank where you source your additional financing. 
 
Rank only actual 
sources of 
financing  
(1st, 2nd, 3rd…) 
Rank preferences of where 
you prefer to get financing     
 
Rank: 1 – 6  
1 = high  
6 = low  
Formal Lending institution, such as commercial bank 
     
Informal Lenders, such as community traders 
     
Micro-Finance Institutions, such as Umurenge SACCO 
     
Family and Friends 
     
Buyers 
     
Other (Please list) 
     
Do you need additional finance for your business at this current point in time?  (Y/N) 
 
 
Answer 1-5  
(1=low, 5=high)   
Rank  
(1-5) 
To what degree is coffee an important part of your entire livelihood? 
     
To what degree do you believe you have an influence on prices or an ability to 
change/ negotiate the prices that you get?     
Do you have access to a Phone?  
(Y=1, N=2) 
How do you access information/ market information? 
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